

GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

March 2023

INTRODUCTION [1/2]

ACAPS analysts conduct the daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries, including regular risk analysis. **ACAPS' Global Risk Analysis** outlines a number of key contexts where new crises may emerge or where a particular situation may notably deteriorate within the next six months, causing a spike in humanitarian needs.

The risks included in this report were based on the identification of:

- **'Newly emerging crises' (new risks)** following new events or factors (triggers) that may emerge over the coming six months. Such triggers would point towards a hazard materialising, which would result in new or more severe humanitarian needs in a monitored context.
- Potential **'rapid and marked deterioration' in an existing crisis** that, because of a combination of deteriorating trends and new events, may significantly deteriorate in the next six months, leading to worse humanitarian outcomes. We run a trend analysis to identify such risks. It should be noted that a steadily deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same pace is considered a trend and not a risk. This report does not include trends.

ACAPS closely monitors previously identified risks to see if they materialise. **You can find the updates on the risks identified in ACAPS' Global Risk Analysis – October 2022 at the end of this report.**

ACAPS identifies risks at the regional, country, or subnational level.

ACAPS has identified risks over the next six months **in the following 11 locations** to alert humanitarian decision makers and responders on the possible emergence of new crises or significant deteriorations of existing humanitarian crises. The aim is to **support preparedness for timely and adequate responses.**

High	Afghanistan
	Myanmar
	Palestine
Medium	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
	Nigeria
	Pakistan
	Peru
	Türkiye/Syria
	Zimbabwe
Low	Armenia/Azerbaijan
	Tunisia

ACAPS METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS

The ACAPS risk methodology defines **risk as the probability of a hazard or multiple hazards materialising, combined with the estimated impact of such hazards.** Simplistically stated: risk = impact x probability. The associated risk level (low, medium, or high) is given by the combination of impact x probability, with the risk level increasing as either the expected severity of the impact of the event or its probability of happening increases.

Impact is the expected overall humanitarian consequences of a hazard. It can be an increase in the number of people needing assistance, the severity of their needs, or both. The impact is based on the assessment of the following components:

- exposure to the hazard: people, property, systems, or other elements present in hazard zones that a hazard could adversely affect
- intensity (of the hazard): the degree, level, strength, or magnitude of a hazard
- severity of impact: the degree or level of humanitarian consequences resulting from the materialisation of the hazard
- the population's vulnerability to shocks
- people's coping strategies and local, national, and international response capacities to deteriorating living and humanitarian conditions.



INTRODUCTION [2/2]

ACAPS classifies impact on a five-point scale: very low, low, moderate, significant, or major.

Probability is the chance of a hazard materialising. ACAPS assesses probability on a five-point scale: very low, low, medium, high, or very high.

Probability and impact levels are not mathematically calculated but assigned through expert judgement based on context knowledge. The overall risk level is the combination of the two, meaning it is also assigned through expert judgement.

KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS

Risk analysis requires a solid understanding of the context and an investigation of the interaction of variables that could cause or resist change.

Risk analysis has a certain degree of uncertainty. An event identified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as anticipated, or it might not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers) expected to drive a shift or change in the situation may not occur, or new factors may arise that prevent the projected change or shift from happening.

Risk probability does not need to be high to warrant concern. A hazardous event with a low or medium probability of occurring should be a cause of concern for humanitarians if the expected impact is medium, high, or very high.

LIMITATIONS

- Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises presented in this report, we cannot cover each in detail. Instead, we highlight the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform the framing of operations, strategies, and policies.
- Risk analysis focuses on negative outcomes and may not adequately consider the potential benefits or opportunities of different events.
- This report does not capture all the risks that we are monitoring. It is a selection of 11 contexts that we deem relevant to the humanitarian sector for the next six months.
- Geophysical sudden-onset disasters (such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions) and other unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events are difficult to account for in risk analysis.
- Information and data gaps for certain contexts limit the analysis.
- While we seek to ensure that all information is current at the time of publication, the fluidity of the situation in some countries means significant changes can occur quickly.

[Read more about our risk methodology](#)

OTHER ANTICIPATORY ANALYSES FROM ACAPS

ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios, and anticipatory notes. Some recent publications that complement this global analysis are:

- **Madagascar:** Tropical Cyclone Freddy Exposure and Vulnerabilities
- **Syria/Türkiye Earthquakes:** What to Watch over the Next Month
- **Ukraine:** Outlook and Risk Analysis for 2023
- **Colombia:** Colombia Risk Analysis Update
- **Afghanistan:** Forward-Looking Snapshot of the Afghan Economy
- **Afghanistan:** Risk Update – December 2022
- **Somalia:** Outlook on Drought

For the complete list of risks ACAPS analysts have identified during their daily monitoring and analysis, you can consult the [ACAPS Risk List](#).



GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

MARCH 2023

Risk level
● High
● Medium
● Low

**The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.*

PERU

Continued protests and mobility restrictions affect the living conditions of economically vulnerable population groups, worsening their overall living conditions

PALESTINE

New proposed legislation and evictions planned by Israel cause an uprising and violence in the West Bank, with potential of spillover in Gaza, affecting Palestinians' livelihoods and humanitarian conditions and generating heightened protection concerns

TÜRKIYE/SYRIA

Involuntary mass returns of Syrians refugees from Türkiye results in displacement, increased protection needs, and deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Northwest Syria

AFGHANISTAN

A severe economic crisis, harsh winter, and disruption of aid and winterisation support the increase in food insecurity and malnutrition until July-August

MYANMAR

Heightened military response following increased territorial control of and collaboration among anti-military resistance forces results in intensified conflict across most of the country, leading to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation

TUNISIA

A political deadlock and economic deterioration increase protests and civil strikes, leading to clashes between civilians and security forces and increased food and livelihood needs, especially in central western governorates

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

The expansion of the areas under the control of the 23 March Movement (M23) in North-Kivu causes increased violence targeting Rwandophone communities, resulting in displacement and protection needs

NIGERIA

High inflation and economic disruptions contribute to worsening food insecurity countrywide

PAKISTAN

Pakistan's prolonged economic crisis and stalling of the bailout programme result in increased poverty and social unrest, leading to heightened food insecurity and protection concerns

ZIMBABWE

Electoral violence, compounded by the deepening economic crisis, leads to protection incidents and increased food insecurity across the country

ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN

Escalation of conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh triggered by the Lachin corridor blockade results in population displacement and increased humanitarian needs

The border lines and names of the countries or territories indicated on this map comply with official international practices (UN) and do not in any way reflect an ACAPS political stance.




AFGHANISTAN [1/2] ⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | High

A severe economic crisis, harsh winter and disruption of aid and winterisation support the increase in food insecurity and malnutrition until July-August

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

The Taliban takeover in August 2021 has resulted in financial restrictions, further aggravating Afghanistan's already dire economic situation and precipitating into an economic crisis (HRW 04/08/2022; VOA 13/08/2022). Consequently, over 80% of Afghan households have since suffered a substantial drop in income or completely lost their means of income (WFP 31/01/2022; UN 09/05/2022).

In 2022–2023, Afghanistan endured a severe winter (winter typically runs from December to March), with temperatures dropping to -34°C in January in some provinces, making it the coldest winter in a decade (Reuters 19/01/2023; UNHCR 02/02/2023). Over 70,000 cattle died within a week in January as a result of harsh winter conditions, leaving many agricultural workers without resources (BBC 24/01/2023; CNN 24/01/2023). With the loss of drought-stricken animals, farmers will face a severe loss of income and difficulties in crop cultivation. Winter also disrupts transportation and food supplies, with heavy snowfall making roads impassable, affecting people's access to essential services, like healthcare, and aggravating the already precarious situation of many Afghans. Reduced income and high prices resulting from inflation have forced Afghans to choose between buying food or paying for heating (Al Jazeera 17/01/2023).

A ban imposed on women NGO workers by the Interim Taliban Authority on 24 December 2022 has also led to disrupted aid and winterisation support from humanitarian organisations in 2023, worsening the situation (NRC 25/01/2023; UN Women 13/01/2023). Though temporary, the sudden aid disruption during the harsh winter has made people more vulnerable and less resilient to overcoming economic hardship. The situation has contributed to increasing food insecurity. Even if the majority of the Afghan population dependent on agriculture as their main source of income receives sufficient support to plant in the spring, many will see no income until harvest in July–August and will face increasing food insecurity into the summer months. At the same time, the urban population will face further reductions in their salaries and casual labour opportunities because of the economic crisis.

IMPACT

Approximately 20 million people in Afghanistan were projected to be severely food-insecure –facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse food insecurity levels – between November 2022 and March 2023, including six million people projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels. The food security situation is especially dire in Ghor province, where all humanitarian activities remain suspended as a result of disagreements between local authorities and humanitarian organisations (WFP 07/02/2023).

Over 3.2 million children under five are projected to be acutely malnourished in Afghanistan. Of this number, 875,227 are likely to be severely malnourished (SAM) and 2,347,800 moderately malnourished (MAM). Between November 2022 and April 2023, 16 provinces are expected to fall into Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) acute malnutrition.



AFGHANISTAN [2/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | High

An increase in food insecurity and a lack of a diverse diet will increase malnutrition and child mortality in the country. Increased food insecurity and the harsh winter may result in lasting respiratory diseases and potentially more deaths for children, the elderly, and people with chronic diseases or disabilities. In January, over 160 people died from the harsh winter (DW 28/01/2023). Acute respiratory diseases also increased, mainly among children (UNICEF 15/02/2023).

The economic crisis since 2021 has taken its toll on people's resilience. Coping mechanisms have been stretched to the limit (ACAPS 13/12/2022). Any further increase in food insecurity will result in the increased adoption of negative coping mechanisms, including child marriage and child labour, which will have a disproportionate impact on women and girls (CARE 11/2022). The loss in food security can also lead people to migrate or seek refuge to neighbouring countries in search of protection and work, exposing people to protection risks while migrating.

In 2022, income from opium production accounted for 29% of the total agricultural sector value. Despite the current ban on drug cultivation, opium production is likely to continue – especially in areas less tightly controlled by the Taliban. The opium harvest from April–July will provide income to some rural households during that period, mitigating the impact of food insecurity in some rural areas (UNODC 11/2022).

Projection: acute malnutrition situation (November 2022 to April 2023)



Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as well as the data used on this map, do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship or acceptance. ACAPS is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation

Source: ACAPS using IPC (accessed 14/03/2023)



MYANMAR (1/2)

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | High

Heightened military response following increased territorial control of and collaboration among anti-military resistance forces results in intensified conflict across most of the country, leading to a deterioration of the humanitarian situation

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Myanmar's military is currently facing a conflict of scale and intensity they had never faced before (CSIS 05/12/2022; Stimson 27/09/2022 b; ACLED accessed 16/02/2023). It is estimated that the junta and its militias have full control only of nearly 30% of the 330 townships of Myanmar. Around 60% of the townships are either contested or under the control of anti-military resistance groups (Special Advisory Council for Myanmar 05/09/2022; OHCHR 31/01/2023; Al Jazeera 04/02/2023).

The February 2021 coup by the Myanmar military was followed by the formation of a government in exile called the National Unity Government (NUG) and its armed wing, the People's Defense Forces (PDFs), with the NUG acting as a parallel government in the areas under its control (The Diplomat 06/05/2021 and 06/09/2022; ISEAS 28/01/2022; USIP 03/11/2022; Mizzima 15/03/2022; The Irrawaddy 07/02/2023). Since the coup, the PDFs have been in intense conflict with the military (ACLED accessed 16/02/2023; Al Jazeera 01/02/2023; The Wilson Center 05/2022). Through time, the PDFs have been enhancing their capacities, including by

adopting innovative technologies (such as weaponised drones). Since 2022, there has been increased collaboration between the PDFs and ethnic armed organisations on military training, the supply of arms, and common defensive and offensive strategies (USIP 03/11/2022; The Irrawaddy 06/02/2023, 03/02/2023, 07/02/2023 a, and 07/02/2023b; Fulcrum 10/02/2023; Myanmar Now 09/02/2023, 06/02/2023, and 26/10/2022). On the other hand, the junta's military has been losing personnel because of injuries, defections, and desertions, leading it to tap into other forces, such as the police and militias, for support (Stimson 27/09/2022 a and 27/09/2022 b; CSIS 05/12/2022). It has also issued a 'right to arms' policy allowing civilians to access weapons, with the aim of facilitating the creation of new or the expansion of existing pro-military junta militias (The Diplomat 09/03/2023; Myanmar Now 13/02/2023 and 17/02/2023).

Because of the increased territorial control of and collaboration among anti-military resistance forces, the military and its affiliated militias are expected to increase operations in the coming months to gain back lost territories and reduce the strength of resistance forces. As a result, conflict will escalate across most of the

country. The military is likely to increase air strikes, especially as a result of congenial non-monsoon weather conditions, to conduct air operations (VOA 01/02/3023; BBC 31/01/2023; The Wilson Center 05/2022). It is also likely to attack civilians and infrastructure, heightening constraints on humanitarian access. The junta has already employed this tactic to force anti-military resistance groups to use up their resources for meeting the needs of conflict-affected populations and to cut off such groups from their access to food, finances, intelligence, and recruits (OCHA 25/01/2023 and 15/01/2023; OHCHR 03/03/2023; The Irrawaddy 09/02/2023).



MYANMAR [2/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | High

IMPACT

An escalation of fighting across the vast majority of the country will likely increase the number of IDPs to 2.4 million in the third quarter of 2023, as per OCHA 2023 projections. Currently, there are more than 1.6 million IDPs in the country, of whom about 1.4 million are post-coup IDPs (OCHA 15/01/2023; UNHCR 08/03/2023).

Many people will likely flee conflict-affected areas to remote locations, such as jungles, which are cut off from any services and beyond the reach of humanitarian responders. Displacement will increase protection threats, such as family separation, psychological distress, gender-based violence, and human trafficking (OCHA 25/01/2023 and 15/01/2023; The Guardian 03/02/2022; UNHCR 06/06/2022; TRT World 04/10/2021). The agriculture sector employs more than 70% of the workforce in Myanmar (ITA 28/07/2022). If conflict intensifies, agriculture inputs and infrastructure could be damaged and looted, and landmines and explosive remnants of war will contaminate croplands. Many farmers will be forced to leave their lands, losing their source of livelihood. The food production gap will further increase, heightening food insecurity and malnutrition. Increased movement restrictions, the rapid depreciation of currency and inflation, high fertiliser and fuel costs, and a lack of government support for farmers will also heighten the loss of livelihood and food insecurity situation (OCHA 15/01/2023; The Irrawaddy 16/02/2023; Al Jazeera 02/02/2023 and 26/01/2023; Frontier Myanmar 27/04/2022; East Asia Forum 24/01/2023).

Trend in violent and security incidents as at January 2023 and projections until July 2023




Note: The projections were made by the ACAPS team only for battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, and fatalities, based on the risk raised

- ▨ Fatalities ● Explosion/remote violence ● Protests ● Violence against civilians ● Strategic developments ● Riots ● Battles
- ▨ Fatalities (upper bound projection) ▨ Fatalities (lower bound projection) ●●● Violence against civilians (upper-bound projection) ●●● Battles (upper-bound projection)
- Violence against civilians (upper-bound projection) ●●● Violence against civilians (upper-bound projection)

Source: ACAPS using data from ACLED (10/03/2023)

Projections for the number of IDPs in 2023



Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (15/01/2023)



PALESTINE (1/2) ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | High

New proposed legislation and evictions planned by Israel cause an uprising and violence in the West Bank, with potential of spillover in Gaza, affecting Palestinians' livelihoods and humanitarian conditions and generating heightened protection concerns

RATIONALE

Benjamin Netanyahu, the longest-serving Israeli leader, returned to power on 29 December 2022 under a fragile coalition, with Likud and ultra-nationalist parties holding the majority of parliamentary seats. Since then, the coalition has agreed on a number of measures, which vow to annex the occupied territories of the West Bank, legalise 70 settlements, and overhaul the judicial system to limit its power (NPR 29/12/2022; JP 28/12/2022; TOI 28/12/2022; Xinhua 30/12/2022). The draft legislation for reforming the judicial system would allow the Israeli Parliament to overrule by simple majority the Supreme Court of Israel's decisions. This includes turning down parliamentary laws intended to legalise settlements and outposts on private Palestinian land and pave the way for the annexation of the West Bank (The Guardian 04/01/2023; Al Jazeera 03/02/2023; Reuters 07/03/2023; Adalah 15/06/2020; MEMO 28/07/2022). It would also give the executive branch more power in appointing judges and government legal advisers (AP 16/01/2023; Xinhua 13/01/2023).


In its first two months, the new Government has already called for the eviction of 1,000 Palestinians from their homes in Msafer

Yatta locality and of 200 residents of Khan Al-Ahmar (Roya News 24/01/2023; MSF 19/01/2023). It has also already authorised nine settlements in the West Bank (Al Jazeera 13/02/2023). In 2022 alone, Israeli authorities demolished and confiscated more than 950 structures in the West Bank, including homes and agricultural and livelihood-related structures. These included shops, warehouses, and public infrastructure, such as water pipes. More than 28,400 people were affected, and over 1,000 were forcibly displaced. In the first three months of 2023, over 250 structures were demolished, affecting more than 11,000 people and displacing almost 400 (OCHA accessed 16/02/2023 a; OCHA accessed 16/02/2023 b). The announcement of the new legislation and the increased number of demolitions and evictions will likely cause an uprising in the West Bank, mainly in cities and refugee camps, resulting in violence and clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians, both civilians and armed individuals and groups. In May 2021, forced evictions and demolitions in East Jerusalem sparked protests and the escalation of hostilities in both the West Bank and Gaza. In the West Bank, 26 people were killed, and about 6,900 were injured. In Gaza, 256 were killed, and 2,000 were injured (OCHA 04/06/2021; ACAPS 08/06/2021).

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

An uprising in the West Bank will expose at least three million Palestinians to conflict and deteriorating humanitarian conditions, with a spillover of violence into Gaza. During the first (1987–1980s) and second (2000–2005) Palestinian uprisings, the violence killed nearly 2,000 and 4,300 people, respectively, with 75% of the casualties being Palestinians (Britannica 21/05/2020; Vox 14/07/2014). The second uprising caused a steep decline in all Palestinian economic indicators: the real national income shrunk by 38%, and both exports and imports contracted by about 33%. Over a quarter of the private workforce was laid off during the second intifada, affecting livelihoods and forcing households to adopt negative coping mechanisms, such as selling assets, borrowing, and cutting consumptions, including food (WB 05/2003).



PALESTINE [2/2] ⊕ NEW RISK


● Risk level | High



A new uprising will significantly affect livelihoods and humanitarian conditions for Palestinians already suffering a humanitarian crisis. Currently, an estimated 2.1 million Palestinians (of the total population of 5.3 million) are in need of humanitarian assistance, including 800,000 people residing in the West Bank and 1.3 million in Gaza (OCHA 25/01/2023).

Palestinians already face serious protection challenges, including threats to life, liberty, security, property, and freedom of movement compounded by a lack of accountability and effective remedy (OCHA 2020). In the West Bank, OCHA categorises the humanitarian situation for one quarter of households as 'catastrophic', 'extreme', or 'severe', and 31% reported challenges in meeting basic needs, such as food and health. In Gaza Strip, OCHA categorises the humanitarian situation for 29% of households as 'catastrophic' or 'extreme', and 81% reported challenges in meeting basic needs, such as food and health (OCHA 29/06/2022; OCHA 25/01/2023).

People affected and displaced by demolitions in the West Bank in 2022




Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as well as the data used on this map, do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship or acceptance. ACAPS is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation

Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (accessed 21/02/2023)



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) (1/2) ⊕ NEW RISK




● Risk level | Medium

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



The expansion of the areas under the control of the 23 March Movement (M23) in North-Kivu causes increased violence targeting Rwandophone communities, resulting in displacement and protection needs

RATIONALE

Since the resurgence of the M23 in November 2021, tensions have intensified between the DRC and Rwanda, which accuse each other of supporting rival armed groups in North Kivu province (BBC 24/12/2022; DW 20/01/2023; RFI 27/01/2023). Demonstrations by civil society organisations have taken place in several provinces of the country since May 2022 to support the Congolese army, demand a more offensive attitude from the East Africa regional force towards the M23, or even express their hostility towards Rwanda. These demonstrations often turn into attacks against people and their property because of their presumed Rwandan origins or proximity to the M23 (RFI 20/06/2022; Afrique XXI 23/01/2023; ICG 25/08/2022; BBC 22/06/2022).

Since January 2022, riots or attacks by armed groups targeting people of Rwandan origin have killed at least 12 people. These attacks have intensified since June 2022 in Maniema, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces, shortly after the M23 took over the border town of Bunagana (ACLED accessed 14/02/2023). In February

2022, demonstrations against the regional force's lack of action escalated into the destruction and looting of shops believed to be Tutsi-owned. Churches were also ransacked on the grounds that they were mainly frequented by the Banyamulenge community (descendants of Rwandans) (RFI 20/06/2022 and 15/06/2022; Actualité 16/06/2022 and 07/02/2023). Because of the inability of the regional force, MONUSCO, and the Congolese army to curb the advances of the M23, violence against Rwandophone communities is likely to increase.

In addition, these communities are increasingly being accused of sympathy for the M23. Some of them claim to have been threatened and beaten by Congolese troops or armed groups and militias fighting the M23 in Kitshanga (Masisi territory), forcing them to flee to other localities and hide (TV5 Monde 26/12/2022; France 24 12/12/2022; La Prunelle RDC 05/01/2023). A ceasefire expected to start on 7 March 2023 and supposed to be implemented by the M23 was announced by the President of Angola, which is currently mediating peace efforts between the DRC, Rwanda, and the M23. That said, the ceasefire seems unlikely to lead to

the M23 withdrawing from the controlled areas or to a decrease in the intensity of the anti-Rwandan sentiments in the DRC. While the ceasefire is supposed to have taken effect, clashes between the Congolese army and the M23 still continue, and both sides accuse each other of launching attacks on their positions (RFI 07/03/2023; UN 06/03/2023; Le Figaro 07/03/2023).

IMPACT

The expansion of the area under M23 control is likely to cause an increase in retaliatory attacks against Rwandophone communities across the country. The property of many people from these communities will likely be destroyed or looted in the demonstrations that follow M23 advances. With the context of the tension between the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda being conducive to the expression of hostile feelings against the latter, some civil society members will continue to maintain a discourse of hatred against Rwandophone communities.



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) (2/2) ⊕ NEW RISK




Incidents involving armed groups and militias fighting the M23 and conflating ethnicity and ideological support are also likely to increase (France 24 12/12/2022; BBC 22/06/2022; Afrique XXI 23/01/2023).

Although not the whole country subscribes to such stigmatisation, and certain civil society organisations continue to defend Rwandophones, such as Association jeunes Tutsi au Nord-Kivu and the Archidiocese of Kinshasa, the security of the latter will likely be increasingly threatened, particularly in areas where armed groups fighting the M23 are active (TV5 Monde 26/12/2022; Clingendael Spectator 24/08/2022). Many protesters will consider members of Rwandophone communities as foreigners and threaten them into returning to Rwanda.

The announcement of the Rwandan President to no longer host Congolese refugees, without giving more details, risks further reducing the options of those who wish to find refuge in Rwanda (RFI 10/01/2023; VOA 09/01/2023). As a result, new IDPs (both Rwandophone and not) within the DRC will be added to the thousands already displaced by the resurgence of the M23, with critical needs for protection, health, livelihoods, and shelter.

Violence targeting rwandophone communities since January 2022



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Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (accessed 21/02/2023)



NIGERIA [1/2] MARKED DETERIORATION



 Risk level | Medium

High inflation and economic disruptions contribute to worsening food insecurity countrywide

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Inflation rates in Nigeria have risen steadily since January 2022 and are projected to remain high or rise further in 2023 (WB 01/2023). In January 2023, the inflation rate was 21.82%, the highest since September 2005 (TE accessed 15/02/2023; NBS 01/2023). Food inflation in January 2023 also rose to the highest in 17 years. Floods in 2022 damaged 676,000 hectares of farmland and affected harvests at the end of the year, possibly contributing to food inflation in 2023 (WB 01/2023; NBS 01/2023; OCHA 19/12/2022; UNDRR 28/10/2022). In 2023, the residual impact from the floods, compounded by high fertiliser prices, is likely to contribute to the lower domestic production of staple crops, like maize, paddy rice, and sorghum, and export crops, like cocoa beans. A decline in domestic crop production could push food prices higher, since the demand would exceed the supply. The Nigerian naira could also further depreciate against the US dollar in 2023, resulting in costlier imports and contributing to increased inflation (AFEX 2023; NESG 01/2023; Commodity.com 25/04/2022).

By early 2023, fuel shortages countrywide had driven up fuel prices and increased transportation costs, contributing to high inflation rates (NESG 01/2023; Punch 16/02/2023; Premium Times 24/01/2023). Cash shortages had also resulted from a government initiative to phase out existing naira notes and replace them with new ones (BBC 14/02/2023; Al Jazeera 02/02/2023). The lack of cash to continue business operations has forced many small businesses and traders to cease operations (Coin Geek 08/02/2023; DW 10/02/2023). These cash and fuel shortages have triggered violent protests in Kano, Ogun, and Oyo states (Africanews 10/02/2023; AP 07/02/2023). High levels of electoral violence characterised the pre-electoral season (October 2022 to February 2023), with protests breaking out after the announcement of the outcome of the February presidential elections (ICG 10/02/2023; ACLED 03/02/2023; AP News 06/03/2023). These factors have caused high levels of sociopolitical uncertainty, creating an unfavourable environment for businesses. To minimise losses, many businesses and investors are expected to adopt a cautious approach in early 2023, possibly contributing to an economic slowdown in the first quarter of the year (AFEX 2023).



NIGERIA [2/2] ⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium

IMPACT

133 million Nigerians are multidimensionally poor¹. Low-income households spend a greater share of their income on food. They are likely to be the most affected by the higher cost of living, which could push them deeper into poverty (ILO 2023; WB 01/2023; NPM accessed 15/02/2023). The disruption of business activities and livelihoods as a result of pre-/post-electoral violence, compounded by the cash shortage, is likely to reduce income for people working in the informal sector (Coin Geek 08/02/2023; ABC News 18/02/2023). The income of many households will not increase in line with rising inflation, and the decline in real income would erode their purchasing power (ILO 2023).

Food inflation contributes to worsening levels of acute food insecurity. The number of people facing acute food insecurity in Nigeria is projected to increase from 17 million between October–December 2022 to 25 million between June–August 2023 (Food Security Cluster 01/12/2022). Unemployment rates are likely to increase as a result of a slowdown in economic growth in 2023 (NESG 01/2023). The rise in unemployment could in turn increase mental health concerns, such as depression and suicidal ideation. It could also drive high crime rates and contribute to higher levels of conflict and violence in the country, since unemployment is among the factors that drive recruitment into armed groups. An escalation in violence would result in displacement and disrupt farming activities, further worsening food insecurity (UNDP 07/02/2023; Food Security Cluster 01/12/2022; Business Day 24/02/2022).

Inflation and food inflation rates in January 2023 rising to the highest levels since September 2005



Source: ACAPS using data from NBS (01/2023)

1. The Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) examines 15 indicators within four dimensions: health, education, living standards, and work and shocks. As per the Index "[a] household is considered poor if they are deprived in more than one dimension, or the equivalent share (26%) of the weighted indicators measured in the index" (OPHI 17/11/2022).



PAKISTAN [1/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium

Pakistan's prolonged economic crisis and stalling of the bailout programme result in increased poverty and social unrest, leading to heightened food insecurity and protection concerns

RATIONALE


Pakistan's economy is in decline as a result of the compound effects of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine on the global supply chain and trade, and the 2022 monsoon floods on the country's production. The country is currently experiencing a balance-of-payments crisis because of high external debt (VOA 03/02/2023). Along with high inflation rates (the consumer price inflation rate rose to 31.5% in February 2023 compared with 12.2% in February 2022), currency depreciation, and a drop in foreign reserves, this crisis has made the country dependent on loans (Reuters 26/01/2023; TOI 10/02/2023; TE accessed 14/03/2022). Pakistan's foreign reserves dropped to USD 2.9 billion in February 2023, from 4.3 billion in January 2023, affecting the country's ability to import basic goods (Al Jazeera 10/02/2023; TOI 10/02/2023; Pakistan Today 09/02/2023; The Guardian 12/02/2023; Reuters 12/01/2023). This has already caused a shortage of essential medicine and medical equipment (BT 26/02/2023).

A new IMF loan could be disbursed, after having stalled since 2022, but this loan is conditioned on some economic reforms and austerity measures Pakistan has so far failed to follow (Reuters 06/02/2023). Funding options from other sources, such as the


Gulf countries, are also getting narrower, as these countries also signalled to lend Pakistan money on the same conditions given by the IMF (Bloomberg 05/02/2023; VOA 03/02/2023; Reuters 06/02/2023). Regardless of funding from the IMF and other countries, the Pakistani Government will likely need to make structural reforms to avoid an economic collapse, including reducing subsidies and introducing new taxes, affecting both enterprises' and people's economies (Nikkei Asia 19/01/2023). The industrial sector is preparing for more job cuts and a sharp decline in production, with over one million informal workers in the textile sector expected to lose their jobs. Small businesses have been greatly affected, and some people are finding it difficult to afford basic necessities, such as food and education (Mint 03/02/2023; BT 28/02/2023; HRW 06/02/2023; Daily Times 15/01/2023; Nikkei Asia 19/01/2023).

Political instability and insecurity have also led to a significant fall in foreign investment. The activity of Taliban- and Islamic State-affiliated groups contribute to high levels of insecurity, especially in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (IFPRI 10/2022; WB 28/10/2022; Arab News 23/08/2022; Dawn 20/07/2021). Since 2021, there have been active protests across Pakistan against political instability and growing armed group

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



activities. The deepening economic decline is likely to generate additional mass protests, resulting in increased social unrest. Pakistan's Central Organization of Traders has announced its plan to organise state-wide demonstrations in response to the Government's potential implementation of IMF-recommended tax increases, which would add to the current political demonstrations against the increased activity of armed groups (The New Indian 06/02/2023; DW 25/05/2022; FP 24/02/2023).

IMPACT

The impact of this prolonged economic crisis is multifaceted and will likely result in the increased prices of essential commodities, food insecurity, a livelihood crisis, and social unrest (The Intercept 12/02/2023). The major impact will befall poor people. 20% of the total population was already living below the poverty line before the crisis started, and an additional nine million people ran into poverty as a direct impact of the 2022 monsoon floods (Dawn 06/10/2022; WB 06/10/2022 and 10/2022; Al Jazeera 21/10/2022).



PAKISTAN (2/2)

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION




● Risk level | Medium

Without international financial support, and in the event of economic austerity measures, more people will be pushed into poverty, affecting food insecurity levels across the country. Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh provinces might be the worst affected, as an estimated 8.5 million people from these provinces are already facing IPC 3 or worse food insecurity levels (IPC 30/12/2022). The overall health situation and malnutrition rates will likely increase across the country, particularly among children (The Borgen Project 17/02/2023; Dawn 30/10/2022; Pakistan & Gulf Economist 28/11/2022; IPC 30/12/2022). 17.7% of children aged under five are already acutely malnourished (Nutrition Cluster 07/2022; WFP accessed 06/03/2023). The inability to access basic goods will likely push the poorest to adopt adverse coping strategies, such as skipping meals, borrowing money, removing children from schools, and resorting to child labour.

The 2022 floods displaced 7.9 million people, including 800,000 refugees (Pakistan hosts a total of 1.35 million refugees, mostly from Afghanistan) (OCHA 04/10/2022; 3UNHCR accessed 10/03/2022). The impact of this risk will be more severe on displaced people already in need of humanitarian assistance.

Finally, a possible intensification of social unrest could result in violence, potentially causing internal and cross-border displacement. Afghan refugees would face secondary displacement or forced returns as a result. Displacement would then expose them to several risks, including human trafficking and exploitation, particularly for women and children (US Department of State 06/2016; Asian Human Rights Commission 14/05/2016).

Inflation and food inflation rates increasing steadily between January 2022 and January 2023



Source: ACAPS using data from TE (accessed 17/02/2023 a); The Nation (02/08/2022); TE (accessed 17/02/2023 b)



PERU (1/2)

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium

Continued protests and mobility restrictions affect the living conditions of economically vulnerable population groups, worsening their overall living conditions

RATIONALE

Sociopolitical instability in Peru, which has been continuing for more than two years, has been on the rise since 7 December 2022 because of the impeachment of Pedro Castillo, the president elected on 20 July 2021. This is the fifth presidential impeachment since 2018 (Portafolio 08/12/2022; Wilson Center 20/01/2023). The subsequent appointment of Dina Boluarte as president, a former vice-president in Castillo's government, sparked nationwide protests especially in Arequipa, Cuzco, Lima, and Puno cities (BBC 19/01/2023; El País 15/01/2023). The protests are likely to continue if some of the demands are not met, including the dismissal of Boluarte, general elections to renew Congress, and a new constitution (NYT 27/01/2023 and 17/01/2023; BBC 19/01/2023; El País 15/01/2023). The response to the protests included mobility restrictions, mass arrests, and 60 killings as at mid-February (BBC 19/01/2023; El País 15/01/2023; LA Times 10/02/2023). A similar response can be expected for future protests.

In Peru, around 1,700,000 people are estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance, including around 1.01 million Venezuelans living in Peru, 66,200 Venezuelans in transit, and 618,000 Peruvians, especially indigenous and Afro-Peruvians (R4V 06/12/2022).

In 2022, Peruvian inflation reached 8.46%, the highest in 26 years,

resulting in a higher cost of living and lower spending capacity. Sociopolitical instability is aggravating an already weakened economic situation, hitting mainly the most economically vulnerable groups (Forbes 02/01/2023; RPP 01/01/2023; BCRP 07/12/2022).

Since 2017, political instability has been weakening public institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which processes residence permits (VOA 13/12/2022; El Pitazo 25/01/2023). These institutional shortcomings have affected the Venezuelan population. Delays in the processing of permits have resulted in at least 35% of Venezuelans remaining in an irregular situation, affecting their access to basic necessities, such as education and health (R4V 06/12/2022; 3INEI accessed 10/03/2022). A nationwide state of emergency declared on 15 December 2022 and extended for 60 days on 4 February 2023 will likely further restrict mobility (BBC 14/12/2022; DW 15/01/2023; The Guardian 15/01/2023; VOA 05/02/2023). The state of emergency involves the suspension of several basic rights, including to freedom of movement, personal liberty, and security (The Guardian 15/01/2023; VOA 05/02/2023). The effects of prolonged social unrest are expected to be felt mainly by the most economically vulnerable population and will cause a deterioration of their living conditions.

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

Prolonged protests and further extensions of the state of emergency are expected to result in mobility restrictions, affecting the labour force and the livelihoods of the most economically vulnerable groups in the country (Últimas Noticias 16/12/2022; Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú 30/12/2022). Over 80% of Venezuelans do not hold permanent employment contracts and are at higher risk of dismissal (Venezolanos en Perú 03/02/2023; El Pitazo 25/01/2022; Efecto Cocuyo 24/01/2023). Although there are no exact figures, many Venezuelans earn their income in the informal sector as street vendors, and the protests undermine their sales (VOA 13/12/2022; El Pitazo 25/01/2023; Efecto Cocuyo 24/01/2023). Labour constraints may further impact Venezuelan women's income, as they tend to earn lower wages and spend more time on informal work (Gobierno de Peru 18/01/2022; Venezolanos en Peru 25/01/2023). Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian people also tend to be economically vulnerable, with at least 38.5% and 32.1%, respectively, falling below the poverty line. These groups have limited access to the formal labour sector and lower wages owing to exclusion and racism (Ministerio de Cultura 05/2022; El Peruano 24/06/2022).



PERU [2/2]

⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Medium


The economic impact of sociopolitical instability has decreased the availability of fuel and food, leading to high food prices and reduced purchasing power, which may affect food security (Infobae 26/01/2023; Perú21 16/01/2023; Canal-N 15/12/2022). For Venezuelans, further delays in their regularisation could also restrict access to education and public healthcare. Changes in the Migration Law in early February 2023, which requires regularisation for rent, can also limit their access to housing (UNHCR accessed 13/02/2023; El Pitazo 30/01/2023).

Poor road infrastructure, complex geographical areas (such as mountains and deserts), and a lack of connectivity between regions, especially in rural areas where people in need live, are already hampering humanitarian access (El Peruano 11/06/2022; SNI 31/08/2022; Nature Serve 29/10/2022). Road blockades, fuel shortages, and violence during protests may further hamper humanitarian operations from reaching people in need.

1.57M

At least 1.57M Venezuelan migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in Peru by December 2022

Timeline of sociopolitical instability and main migration developments in Peru



Sources: ACAPS using data from R4V (06/12/2022); DW (30/01/2023); BBC (14/12/2022); The Guardian (15/01/2023); VOA (05/02/2023); UNHCR (accessed 13/02/2023); El Pitazo (30/01/2023)



TÜRKIYE/SYRIA [1/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | Medium

Involuntary mass returns of Syrians refugees from Türkiye results in displacement, increased protection needs and deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Northwest Syria


RATIONALE

The current President of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has vowed to return one million out of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees in the country to 13 areas held by Turkish-backed Syrian opposition factions, mainly in Northwest Syria, with no set date yet (PMM accessed 14/03/2023; NPA Syria 19/01/2023; MEMO 03/10/2022). With the approaching general Turkish elections scheduled in May 2023, some leaders from the main opposition parties are also vowing to return at least two million Syrian refugees within two years if they were to win the elections (MEMO 03/10/2022 and 03/09/2021; NPA Syria 30/01/2023; Arab News 29/06/2022; GT 20/02/2023). Early opinion polls have pointed to a tight contested election in May, with some early polls showing opposition coalition parties leading (Al Jazeera 30/01/2023; France 24 22/01/2023; OSW 24/01/2023; PolitPro 31/01/2023). The anti-refugee public sentiment in Türkiye has been increasing in the past years according to opinion polls, in combination with the decline of the economic situation generating competition over jobs and services (Arab News 06/02/2022; NPA Syria 19/01/2023; Al Jazeera 30/01/2023; The New Arab 24/06/2022; SWP 21/02/2020; Al Jazeera 27/07/2022).

The Turkish Government had already announced in 2022 the construction of more than 68,000 prefabricated briquette houses in areas of Northwest Syria for the return of Syrian refugees (VOA 26/09/2022; Global Voices 08/05/2022). The construction of these houses is part of the bigger project to establish residential compounds in 13 areas of northern Syria, which would eventually absorb one million Syrian refugees from Türkiye (Al-Monitor 08/05/2022; Sabah 05/05/2022). Around a half million Syrians have already voluntarily returned to Syria, some because of economic hardship, discrimination, and a general feeling of being unsafe in Türkiye (MEMO 03/10/2022; SCF 27/9/2022).

The earthquakes that hit southeastern Türkiye and northwestern Syria in February 2023 could increase the resentment towards refugees, as competition over public services and housing would likely increase. The deterioration of humanitarian conditions in Northwest Syria as a result of the earthquakes will pose challenges and delay the Turkish Government's plans to return Syrian refugees to the region.

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



IMPACT

The plan of the current Turkish Government and opposition parties to return Syrian refugees would expose at least five million people to the risk. This figure includes the refugees currently in Türkiye and the people residing in Turkish-backed Syrian opposition functions in Northwest Syria (NPA Syria 19/01/2023 and 30/01/2023; MEMO 03/10/2022 and 03/09/2021; Arab News 29/06/2022; GT 20/02/2023). The influx of returnees will put a strain on infrastructure and limited resources, worsening humanitarian needs in the area (Al-Monitor 08/05/2023; Sabah 05/05/2022; IOM 13/05/2020; OCHA 18/01/2023). The February earthquakes highly affected northwestern Syria, killing more than 51,000 people, injuring more than 120,000, and damaging more than 220,000 buildings, including hospitals (OCHA 06/03/2023 and 24/02/2023; IBC 13/02/2023). Prior to the earthquake, Northwest Syria was already hosting 2.9 million IDPs, with 1.8 million living in camps. Four million people relied on humanitarian assistance, with 3.3 million being food insecure.



TÜRKIYE/SYRIA [2/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | Medium

Northwest Syria faces very high humanitarian access constraints in an area where politics and humanitarian issues overlap. Cross-border and crossline operations have been highly constrained and since 2014 regularly re-negotiated at the UNSC level. Aid for Northwest Syria is highly politicised and has been limited by authorities in charge of different areas. Damaged infrastructure from the conflict and earthquakes further complicates humanitarian access in the region, potentially hampering the provision of assistance to returnees (ISPI MED accessed 13/03/2023; The Guardian 07/02/2023; CARE et al. 06/01/2023; Al Jazeera 06/02/2023; ACLED accessed 14/05/2022).

Many returnees to Syria are facing grave human rights violations, torture, and blackmail by the Government of Syria and the different opposition militias. Future returnees from Türkiye are likely to face similar protection concerns (HRW 24/10/2022; STJ 14/02/2022; EASO 06/2021). On the longer term, if the areas of return would come under the control of the Syrian army – whether to prevent Turkish advancement or in coordination with Türkiye – there would be heightened concerns for the safety of those perceived by the Government of Syria as opposition figures and activists (HRW 17/08/2022; VOA 23/12/2020; Al 18/10/2019; The Guardian 23/08/2022).

Provincial breakdown of Syrian refugees in Türkiye as at January 2023




Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as well as the data used on this map, do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship or acceptance. ACAPS is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation

Source: ACAPS using data from UNHCR (17/01/2023) and Liveumap (accessed 13/02/2022)




ZIMBABWE (1/2) ⊕ NEW RISK




● Risk level | Medium

Electoral violence, compounded by the deepening economic crisis, leads to protection incidents and increased food insecurity across the country

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

General elections in Zimbabwe are scheduled for July or August 2023. Regularly disputed and contested results because of electoral malpractices since 1995 and episodes of political violence make tensions around elections also probable this year (ASC Leiden 15/03/2002; Vox 02/08/2018; The Guardian 09/08/2013; EISA accessed 15/02/2023). In 2022, there were more than 140 protests and riots and 2,000 cases of political violence countrywide, an increase by more than half compared to the cases recorded in 2021 (VOA 03/11/2022; ACLED accessed 13/02/2023; DW 30/12/2022; AllAfrica 19/01/2023; Stratfor 23/01/2023). Divisive remarks by some politicians about the upcoming elections are likely to be a breeding ground for violence (VOA 12/07/2022). Opposition rallies are already experiencing violent incidents resulting in injuries, fatalities, and the postponement of their rallies (The Star 28/02/2022; US News 28/02/2022; AllAfrica 31/01/2023; Al Jazeera 26/10/2022).

The present Government has yet to implement any promised electoral reforms recommended by the EU Election Observation Missions after the 2018 elections (VOA 20/05/2022; The Standard 18/12/2022). Opposition parties are also distrustful of the institutions tasked with managing the electoral process – i.e. the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and the courts tasked with hearing

electoral issues (The Mirror 05/04/2022; AllAfrica 31/07/2015; ICG 21/08/2018; Africa Portal 31/12/2018).

Each side is unlikely to concede defeat because they are confident of victory, and supporters of the losing candidate may refuse to accept the electoral outcome (BNN Bloomberg 21/02/2023; Pindula News 08/12/2022).

Foreign investors are likely to be sceptical of investing during the electoral period because of possible insecurity. The withdrawal of foreign investment could lead to a rise in unemployment rates and a decrease in purchasing power. As at 1 February 2023, inflation stood at 229.8%. It is likely to remain above 200% in 2023. Increased inflation and further currency devaluation resulting from economic disruptions could contribute to further increasing the prices of imported goods, such as fertilisers, food, and petroleum products (AA 19/01/2023; IMF accessed 08/03/2023; Mondaq 15/02/2021; TE accessed 15/02/2023; AP 25/06/2022; DW 09/01/2016).

IMPACT


Social unrest following the elections will likely increase police violence, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances. The violence will likely disrupt access to services, such as education and health,

and lead to the damage or destruction of business properties. There will also likely be an increase in cases of sexual and gender-based violence, which the military and police have been accused of during protests, especially in areas where there are no civil society organisations monitoring or reporting on the situation. Survivors will require healthcare and psychological support, as well as access to legal services (The Guardian 31/01/2019; OHCHR 10/06/2020; HRW 09/08/2014; AI 15/09/2022; DW 09/01/2016).

The increase in fertiliser prices will likely further affect households already experiencing low agricultural produce because of successive drought and climate changes, leaving them vulnerable to food insecurity (EIU 25/06/2020; Fitch Solutions 12/05/2022; WFP 19/08/2022). Eight million people were estimated to experience IPC 3 or worse levels of food insecurity in December 2022, an increase of around 200,000 people from November 2022 and of 400,000 from October. A further reduction in household purchasing power, the devaluation of the local currency, and an increase in the prices of food and fertilisers could increase the number of food-insecure people by mid-2023 (WFP 18/01/2023; FAO 22/12/2023).




ZIMBABWE [2/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | Medium

Rise in inflation since February 2022 as a result of numerous economic shocks



Source: ACAPS using data from Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (accessed 14/03/2023); TE (accessed 14/03/2023)



ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN


[1/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | Low

Escalation of conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh triggered by the Lachin corridor blockade results in population displacement and increased humanitarian needs

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Since 12 December 2022, Azerbaijan has blocked the Lachin corridor, which connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (France 24 25/12/2022). There have been reports of shortages of essential medicine and food as a result of the blockade, affecting those living in Nagorno-Karabakh, largely ethnic Armenians (Reuters 22/12/2022; Euractiv 28/12/2022; BBC 06/01/2023). Gas and electricity provision and internet connectivity have been disrupted during the blockade, demonstrating Azerbaijan's ability to affect the access to essential resources of Nagorno-Karabakh residents (Azatutyun 17/01/2023; OC Media 17/01/2023; MassisPost 17/01/2023; RFE/RL 17/01/2023; Eurasianet 16/12/2022; CEIP 15/12/2022).

The Lachin corridor, which runs across Azerbaijani territory, is the only land connection between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. The Azerbaijani Government reports that the road is

open for Russian peacekeepers and emergency services of the International Committee of the Red Cross, but transit is still limited for trucks transporting essential goods and for stranded civilians (RFE/RL 10/01/2023; France 24 07/01/2023; HRW 21/12/2022). On 22 February 2023, the International Court of Justice issued a provisional measure ordering Azerbaijan to end the blockage of Lachin corridor (Forbes 25/02/2023). Armenia is accusing Azerbaijan of ignoring these orders (Asbarez 03/03/2023; Panorama. am 04/03/2023).

Nagorno-Karabakh is a long-disputed area between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In September 2020, tensions between the two countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region escalated into armed conflict, killing more than 140 civilians and thousands of combatants. On 9 November 2020, the countries signed a ceasefire agreement, but tensions still continued. In September 2022, clashes between the two countries resulted in 207 dead or missing people, internally

displaced 7,600, affected 160,000 in total, and damaged over 90 buildings (IFRC 07/10/2022). Nagorno-Karabakh has been recognised as part of Azerbaijan since 1993 but is de facto controlled by an ethnic Armenian administration (CEIP 11/11/2020; ICG 10/11/2020). Russia has previously intervened to mitigate tensions between the two countries over Nagorno-Karabakh and has a peacekeeping troop on the Lachin corridor (Time 18/01/2023; France 24 25/12/2022).

Since the beginning of the blockade; in December 2022, Russia has taken a distant role in the situation because of its war with Ukraine. The current tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan could result in renewed hostilities between the two countries, with a subsequent humanitarian implication similar to those in September 2020 and 2022.



ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN [2/2] ⊕ NEW RISK



● Risk level | Low

IMPACT


An escalation of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh will expose at least 1.5 million people in and around the contested region to conflict, displacement, and humanitarian needs (Statistical Committee of Armenia accessed 13/03/2023; UNHCR accessed 29/05/2022). Previous conflict between the two countries killed more than 25,000 people and displaced more than one million (HRW 01/12/1994; UNSDG 19/10/2021; DW 14/07/2020). The conflict escalation is expected to increase the displacement of mainly ethnically Armenian residents from Nagorno-Karabakh. Most likely, the displacement will be towards areas in Armenia, as has happened during previous hostilities (IFRC 07/10/2022). Because the area still has landmines from the 1988–1994 conflict and the 2020 hostilities, relocation and displacement would increase protection incidents (HALO accessed 11/01/2023; Al Jazeera 09/11/2021).

The displacement of people and forced confinements during conflict disrupt income-generating activities, especially in agriculture. During previous hostilities, one of the main priorities was restoring livelihood support so that people could meet their basic needs, particularly regarding food.

During past conflicts between the two countries, various diseases affected the health of displaced populations, including COVID-19, monkeypox, waterborne diseases, and other vaccine-preventable diseases (IFRC 07/10/2022). Future hostilities will likely cause displacement, which will lead to shelter needs. In 2020, shelter was one of the priority needs (Artsakh Ombudsman 01/11/2020).

Displacement, livelihood disruptions, fighting, and insecurity will also result in an increased need for mental health and psychosocial support to overcome stress and trauma (IFRC 07/10/2022).

Nagorno-Karabakh Enclave and Lachin Corridor



Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as well as the data used on this map, do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship or acceptance. ACAPS is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation

Source: ACAPS using data from UNHCR (xx/xx/xxxx)




TUNISIA [1/2] MARKED DETERIORATION



 Risk level | Low

A political deadlock and economic deterioration increase protests and civil strikes, leading to clashes between civilians and security forces and increased food and livelihood needs, especially in central western governorates

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Following the Jasmine revolution in 2011, Tunisia has been experiencing a sharp socioeconomic crisis marked by high unemployment, particularly among educated youth, and slow economic growth. A mismanagement of the country's finances has led to shortages in foreign currency reserves, affecting imports and the availability of some food items in the market, such as milk, butter, and sugar (WB 06/09/2022; JT 08/09/2022; The North Africa Post 21/01/2023). The IMF has frozen an agreement meant to help the Government get loans to pay public sector salaries and fill budget gaps aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the fallout from Russia-Ukraine war. The loan is conditioned on political reforms that have not been met until today (AP 24/12/2022 and 06/03/2022; Al Jazeera 18/12/2022; The New Arab 30/01/2023). Even if an IMF loan is secured, the Government will still likely have to follow the IMF conditions and reduce food and energy subsidies, driving more protests across the country (Reuters 29/10/2022).

People have been increasingly protesting to remove President Kais Saied since he sacked the parliament in July 2021 (France 24 25/07/2021). Most people consider the political deadlock a major reason for the increase in food and fuel prices (Reuters 25/09/2022; The New Arab 15/10/2022).

By September 2022, people had started experiencing shortages of commodities in markets, increasing discontent with the way the President was running the country (The National News 06/09/2022; Al Araby 29/08/2022; AP 11/10/2022). The Government's inability to pay subsidies and public salaries has already triggered strikes, such as in the bakery and transportation sectors (The New Arab 07/12/2022; Al Jazeera 02/01/2023).

Inflation rates have been following a steady upward trend since July 2021 and will likely continue to increase alongside food prices (TE accessed 14/02/2023). The number and intensity of protests will likely increase, with a possibility of clashes with security forces. Major strikes in the education and health sectors are also likely to take place, as disruptions to their access to these services will likely increase people's frustration with the Government. It is also likely that organised civil unions, such as the Tunisian General Labour Union, will be calling for even more protests and igniting a social uprising until the removal of the President.



TUNISIA [2/2] ⬇️ MARKED DETERIORATION



● Risk level | Low


IMPACT

About 2.5 million people (more than 21% of Tunisia’s population) who live under the poverty line will likely experience difficulties in accessing food and employment in case of a social uprising in Tunisia (BBC 16/10/2022; Shems FM 17/10/2021; Afrigate News 23/01/2022).

States in the central western governorates (Al-Kaf, Beja, Kairouan, and Kasserine), who already have the highest poverty rates in Tunisia, will likely be the most affected. Kairouan, in particular, has the largest number of people living below the poverty line (nearly 200,000), ten times higher than in Tunis governorate. The central western governorates are also the least served in terms of access to services, such as education and livelihoods (Inkyfada 23/09/2021). These social and economic vulnerabilities will likely increase the impact of a social uprising on the residents of cities in the central western region of Tunisia.


A social uprising will further hinder efforts to obtain loans from the IMF or even the World Bank, meaning that food prices will likely increase further. The import of food items will also likely be limited, as the Government will continue to lack foreign currency to do so. A social uprising will also aggravate the socioeconomic crisis Tunisia is facing, leading to higher unemployment rates that will affect mainly the livelihoods of the most vulnerable people.

Inflation and food inflation rates between February 2022 and January 2023



Source: ACAPS using data from Statista (accessed 14/02/2023) and TE (accessed 14/02/2023)

Unemployment rate in Tunisia between 2000–2023



Source: ACAPS using data from Macrotrends (accessed 13/03/2023) and TE (accessed 13/03/2023)



LATEST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH ^(1/2)

ITALY

New restrictions and potential logistical delays in issuing needed permissions for humanitarian organisations' rescue ships will likely increase the number of missing migrants and asylum seekers in the Mediterranean

Towards the end of 2022, the newly elected Italian Government made amendments to a decree issued by the Ministry of Interior in 2018 known as the Security Decree. The amendments concern restrictions around the stay and disembarkation of both commercial and rescue ships in Italian waters of the Mediterranean Sea. The decree states that organisations will only be able to carry out a single rescue each time they are at sea after obtaining permissions from the Sea Coordination Centre, whereas ships usually carry out multiple rescues. At the same time, the Government recently started assigning ports for NGO rescue ships to dock, which are far away from Sicily where NGO boats normally disembark after rescuing migrants and asylum seekers. and people stranded at sea would face an increasing risk of drowning during bad weather and sea conditions (MSF 05/01/2023; Gazzetta Ufficiale 02/01/2023). Both measures could result in significant delays for rescue ships to return to search-and-rescue operation areas.

In the event of any political interference or bureaucratic delay, some logistical delays will likely occur during the implementation of these procedures. This could further hinder rescue operations. People stranded at sea risk dehydration and drowning, since migration boats are unsafe. Children, especially unaccompanied ones, are the most at risk (Al Jazeera 05/11/2022; UN 10/06/2022). Without the timely rescue of migrants and asylum seekers, they will face higher risks of drowning at sea or increased needs for urgent healthcare.

MOLDOVA ^(1/2)

Russian interference escalating violence in Moldova results in security concerns and disrupts access to services and humanitarian aid

Anti-government protests attended by thousands of people began in Chisinau, Moldova, in September 2022 and have continued into early 2023 because of the high cost of living. The protests were organised by pro-Russia political parties with funding from Russia (France 24 20/02/2023; BBC 20/02/2023; Reuters 18/09/2022). Russia is likely aiming to fuel the social tensions and political instability in Moldova to interfere in Moldova's path to the EU (VOA 10/02/2023; AP 10/03/2023).

The protests are happening in a period of socioeconomic distress caused by the combined negative economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the effects of the 2020 drought, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which triggered a refugee influx in 2022. These have been compounded by an energy crisis, after a 30% reduction of gas supply by Russia in October 2022, which reached 50% by the end of 2022 (Warsaw Institute 22/12/2022; BBC 20/02/2023; UN 21/01/2023; WB 20/12/2022; Balkan Insight 07/03/2022; UNECE 07/10/2022; Atlantic Council 05/12/2022). Energy costs are affecting poor households, particularly those in rural areas (UNDP 09/09/2022; BBC 20/02/2023; ECFR 13/10/2022; Reuters 28/11/2022; France 24 20/02/2023). The inflation rate in December 2022 reached 30%, up from 14% during the same period in 2021 (IONITA 11/01/2023). Both the Moldovan and refugee populations have been affected by economic hardship and become more reliant on governmental and international support (REACH 31/01/2023). Ukrainian refugees continue to arrive in the country, with almost 110,000 present as at mid-March 2023, up from 90,000 in October 2022 (UNHCR accessed 10/03/2023; ILO 24/10/2022).



LATEST DEVELOPMENTS TO WATCH (2/2)

MOLDOVA (2/2)

Overall, Moldova received almost 650,000 Ukrainian refugees and 77,000 third-country nationals since late February 2022 (UNHCR accessed 13/03/2023).

Russia is known to have plans to destabilise Moldova by sending armed individuals into Moldova to take control of state institution buildings by force, a situation that can be aggravated by the presence of Russian military forces in Transnistria, designated by the Council of Europe as a Russian-occupied territory of Moldova (ECFR 29/07/2022; Balkan Insight 16/03/2022; RFE/RL 09/02/2023, FP 15/02/2023). Social unrest and a potential violent overthrow of the EU-oriented Government would result in the disruption of services and humanitarian response in Moldova, as well as overall reduced security and access in the country (EU Observer 13/02/2023; ECCEU 08/02/2023; Politico 10/02/2023; AP 10/03/2023).

YEMEN

The formation of a new military force under the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) risks sparking renewed tensions among members of the anti-Houthi front, leading to fighting in the south, which would result in displacements and social and economic deterioration

On 29 January, the head of the PLC Rashed Al Alimi issued a presidential decree to establish new reserve military units under its command called the National Shield Forces, with the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) (Asharq Al-Awsat 31/01/2023). The decision is an effort to unify under one structure all military units in areas under the control of the Internationally Recognized Government of Yemen (IRG), but it has raised concerns that the new military formation will be a presidential force competing with armed groups under the command of other members of the PLC, namely those affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC) (South24 30/01/2023; Arab News 30/01/2023). Under the Riyadh Agreement signed in 2019, all IRG and STC forces should fall under the supervision of the KSA. As the agreement stalled, the KSA has tried to find new opportunities to strengthen its influence among the fragmented southern governorates under the nominal control of the IRG but de facto ruled by a number of different forces, mainly the STC. Depending on how the president of the PLC will determine the real objectives and location of the National Shield Forces, there is a risk of escalating tensions within the anti-Houthi front, de-legitimising the PLC, and leading to fighting among different armed groups in IRG-controlled governorates (MEI 31/01/2023). The fighting would likely result in displacement and economic deterioration, with the risk of violence spreading to other areas if the DFA takes advantage of the situation to re-ignite expansionist efforts, particularly around Ma'rib. ACAPS continues to monitor the situation, particularly in light of talks among the warring parties for the renewal of the truce agreement.



UPDATE FROM THE OCTOBER 2022 RISK ANALYSIS

This is an update of the risks identified in the last Global Risk Analysis report published in October 2022.

COLOMBIA

In January 2023, ACAPS raised a risk on *Dialogue and negotiations between the Colombian Government and armed groups deteriorate the security situation in targeted regions and increase attacks against civilians in areas under their influence*. As at March 2023, while dialogue and negotiations are ongoing, attacks against civilians, including forced displacement, confinement and HRD killings persist in areas under the influence or disputed by armed groups. For more information of current active risks, and evolution of past risks, ACAPS raised for Colombia you can read our [Colombia Risk Analysis Update report](#).

COASTAL COUNTRIES OF WEST AFRICA — ● Medium

The expansion of armed groups from central Sahel to coastal countries (Bénin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo) leads to displacement and increased food insecurity

This risk is materialising at a slow pace. A progressive deterioration of the security situation in the northern regions of West African coastal countries is observed. Between October 2022 and January 2023, more than 73 violent incidents involving mostly non-state armed groups have been reported in the northern regions of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo ([Africanews 28/12/2022](#)). On the same period in 2022, around 30 incidents were reported ([ACLED accessed 13/03/2023](#)). These incidents included attacks on civilians and security forces, kidnappings, the destruction of property, and the use of improvised explosive devices. Benin is the country recording the highest number of attacks by armed groups, followed by Togo. In Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, the attacks are on a smaller scale given a still-low presence of armed groups, but these are becoming more regular ([VOA 09/02/2023](#); [Togoweb 14/02/2023](#); [VOA 09/02/2023](#)).

The violence has started to trigger internal displacement in Benin and Togo. In Benin, at least 1,200 IDPs have been reported in the department of Atakora, while in Togo, more than 2,200 IDPs are registered in the region of Savanes ([GRANIT 30/11/2022](#)).

Armed group activity in the northern regions of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo has not seemed to affect food insecurity levels, as the number of food-insecure people remained stable between October–December 2022 compared to the same period in 2021 ([GRANIT 30/11/2022](#)).

DRC — ● Medium risk level

The resurgence of the 23 March Movement (M23) and intensification of conflict lead to displacement and further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Nord-Kivu (from March 2022 report)

The DRC update below refers to the risk initially raised in March 2022 and then updated in the Global Risk Analysis of October 2022.

This risk has materialised, while the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. Clashes between the Congolese army and the M23 are still continuing, forcing thousands of people to flee. The M23 continues to expand its area of influence and threatens to cut off the main supply routes to Goma, the capital of North Kivu ([RFI 10/02/2023](#); [TV5 Monde 10/02/2023](#)). The killing of more than a hundred people in December 2022 is also attributed to the M23 ([RFI 08/02/2023](#); [BBC 08/12/2022](#)). As at January 2023, more than 520,000 had been displaced since the clashes intensified in March 2022 ([OCHA 19/01/2023](#)). A lack of food and the poor living conditions of the displaced people in sites in Kanyaruchinya and surrounding areas in Nyiragongo territory led to the declaration of a cholera outbreak by the provincial authorities on 14 December 2022. The confirmed cases have risen to 4,530, with 16 related



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

deaths recorded in Nyiragongo and Karisimbi health zones as at 8 February 2023 (WHO 09/02/2023; MSF 13/12/2022).

The ceasefire agreement concluded in Luanda between the DRC and Rwanda in November 2022, which requires the withdrawal of M23 fighters from areas under their control, has not been followed (RFI 13/02/2023). In November 2022, East African states deployed a regional force to end armed group violence in eastern DRC. That said, some civil society organisations and inhabitants of North Kivu do not perceive this force as offensive enough. Demonstrations have taken place mainly in Goma to demand the departure of this force or a more offensive attitude towards the M23. The negotiations conducted by the regional force with the M23, perceived by some as support for the armed group, have reinforced doubts on the agenda of the regional force (Agenzia Fides 10/01/2023; Actualité 07/02/2023; Jeune Afrique 19/01/2023).

The M23 continues to illegally tax people in areas under their control and to forcibly recruit civilians into their ranks (DW 02/01/2023; HRW 06/02/2023).

INDONESIA — ● Medium risk level

Violent crackdown on protests and insurgency, and rising ethnic tensions after the announced division of Papua province result in increased displacement and protection needs in West Papua territory

The risk has not materialised yet and is still active. The law to divide Papua province into four provinces in Indonesia was passed in June 2022. In December 2022, the Government of Indonesia went

ahead with the division of West Papua province into West Papua and Southwest Papua provinces (Antara News 09/12/2022; Asia Times 19/08/2022; The Jakarta Post 18/09/2022). Protests and riots in reaction to social and political issues, such as disputes and human rights violations, continued at a similar pace in West Papua territory throughout 2021–2022, contrary to ACAPS' anticipated increase in the October 2022 risk report. There have been some protests against the creation of Southwest Papua province. Violent incidents have become less frequent and less intense (with fewer fatalities) since October 2022 compared to what was observed in 2021 and in the first eight months of 2022. The West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) has continued their separatist activities and engaged in clashes with the Indonesian security forces from October 2022 to January 2023 (ACLEDA accessed 16/02/2023). Activists continue to fight the Government through protests, lobbying and gaining public support from other provinces. The Indonesian President has continued to call for the implementation of stern policies in the region to thwart armed group activities (The Diplomat 21/12/2022; CNN 19/12/2022; Benar News 20/12/2022; Jacobin 18/12/2022). Papua province's governor was arrested by the country's anti-graft agency after he was charged with bribery in return for infrastructure contracts. On the other hand, some activists believe that he was arrested because of his opposition to the creation of new provinces in West Papua territory (CNA 10/01/2023; UCA News 11/01/2023; ULMWP 12/01/2023). The TPNPB has rejected all forms of government offers and asked non-Papuans to leave the region. It has threatened to kill those who would support the Government in the newly created provinces in the region (West Papua Daily 07/12/2022, 16/12/2022, and 15/01/2023; BBC 08/02/2023). General elections in Indonesia are

scheduled for 14 February 2024, and the new provinces are set to participate in them. This will likely heighten tensions in West Papua territory from 2023–2024 (Antara News 27/01/2023; West Papua Daily 18/11/2022).

MAURITANIA — ● Low risk level

Rising food and fuel prices worsen socioeconomic instability and ethnic tensions, leading to social unrest and food and livelihood needs

The risk has not materialised, as inflation rates reached a peak in October (12.7%) and started to decrease since then. Inflation rates in January dropped to 10.3% (TE accessed 15/02/2023). There have been no major changes in the food security situation, as food-insecure people remained in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) levels. Even though the harvest season between October–December 2022 was generally good, some people resorted to buying from markets to meet their food needs despite high inflation and the rising prices of some food items (FEWS NET 31/12/2022). There is no indication that the local currency of Mauritania (the ouguiya) has seen any further depreciation. There has also been no social unrest in the past months. The prices of some food items continued to rise as at February 2023, as the risk suggested. These food items included fruits and vegetables (tomatoes, potatoes, and onions), milk, cheese, eggs, fish, seafood, and cooking oils (Sahara Medias 13/02/2023; Anbaa 13/02/2023). Food inflation rates peaked in July 2022 (17.4%). Between August 2022 and January 2023, food inflation ranged between 11.8–15.9% (TE accessed 15/02/2023).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

MEXICO — ● Medium risk level

An increase in the number of Haitian and Salvadoran migrants and asylum seekers in Mexico seeking to reach the US causes a deterioration of needs at the southern border

The risk materialised from January–December 2022, with around over 444,000 migrants and asylum seekers crossing into Mexico, an increase of 44.4% compared to 2021 (Segob 02/2023). On the southern border alone, more than 152,400 people entered through the state of Chiapas and around 48,300 through the state of Tabasco in 2022, an increase of 99% and 9.9%, respectively, compared to 2021 (Segob 02/2023; Chiapas Paralelo 22/01/2023).

In El Salvador, since October 2022, political instability, the economic crisis, and the current state of emergency have triggered the increase in asylum applications of Salvadorans in Mexico (La Prensa Gráfica 07/12/2022). In 2022, around 7,400 Salvadorans applied for asylum in Mexico, an increase of almost 80% compared to the previous year (La Prensa Gráfica 07/12/2022; Resumen Latinoamericano 02/01/2023). The main drivers for Salvadorans leaving the country have been increased protection needs and declining livelihoods (INM 05/01/2023; Resumen Latinoamericano 02/01/2023).

In Haiti, the humanitarian crisis has been deteriorating (PBS 04/12/2022). By January 2023, at least 18,000 Haitian migrants and asylum seekers were stranded at Mexico's southern border, especially owing to delays in migration procedures (INM 27/12/2022; Monitoreamos 23/01/2023; La Vanguardia 23/01/2023).

The increase in migration flow has led to longer delays in migration procedures and an increased number of migrants and asylum seekers stuck in southern Mexico, especially in Tapachula (Forbes 01/01/2023; La Silla Rota 03/01/2023; Agencia EFE 02/02/2023). The high number of arrivals at the southern border has continued to put a strain on the already limited resources, capacities, and opportunities in the area. People have no other option than to live in makeshift shelters in streets and parks. Besides shelter, health assistance, clean water, NFIs, emergency education, and food are needed (Agencia EFE 02/02/2023; INM 31/12/2022).

MYANMAR — ● High risk level

The large-scale military response of the junta following the Arakan Army's increased control of Rakhine state results in intense fighting and violence, leading to displacement and increased humanitarian and protection needs

The risk is still active. Renewed conflict between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar military spanned August–November 2022, killing more than 40 civilians and displacing more than 23,000 others. As at 2 February 2023, around 12,500 people remained displaced as a result of the conflict. The clashes ended when the two groups agreed upon a temporary truce in late November 2022 (ACLEDA accessed 16/02/2023; RFA 07/10/2022 and 26/09/2022; Narinjara News 25/09/2022; BNI 14/11/2022; The Irrawady 28/11/2022 and 15/12/2022; Myanmar Now 28/11/2022; Myanmar Witness 16/01/2023; OCHA 02/02/2023; DMG 23/12/2022).

The conflict resulted in heightened security measures across Rakhine, including the blockage of waterways and roads, limiting people's movement and obstructing aid delivery. The military junta temporarily suspended all humanitarian activities in several townships, halting assistance to nearly 240,000 people. Since November, the temporary truce and relaxation of some of the access restrictions have allowed for the gradual resumption of humanitarian activities (OCHA 01/10/2022, 31/10/2022, 03/12/2022, and 30/12/2022; ECHO 19/09/2022).

Increased insecurity and violence and access constraints since mid-2022, combined with existing poor socioeconomic conditions, have pushed the Rohingyas in Rakhine to increasingly embark on risky maritime journeys to reach other countries, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. Numerous Rohingyas have been arrested for travelling beyond Rakhine state in attempts to cross into foreign countries (CASS accessed 16/02/2023; TNI 26/01/2023; The Straits Times 06/12/2022).

During the conflict, the AA captured or destroyed several junta bases along the border between Bangladesh and Maungdaw district, in Rakhine. This allowed them to strengthen their control over the border with Bangladesh, which is critical for political and commercial relations. The military junta has been bolstering their position with a resupply of military resources in Rakhine state during the truce. Tensions between the AA and the military and its allies persist in the state. The truce is considered fragile, and it has been reported that the conflict may resume in Rakhine at any time, as the rice cultivation season is coming to an end in March/April (Myanmar Now 05/01/2023; Nikkei Asia 05/01/2023; UNHCR 17/02/2023).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

SUDAN — ● Medium risk level

Increased intercommunal clashes in Blue Nile state lead to displacement and more needs for shelter, healthcare, and legal documentation

The risk that more than 100,000 people would likely be displaced from Blue Nile has largely materialised, as intercommunal clashes continue to target the Hausa tribe. Between July 2022 and January 2023, Blue Nile state recorded the highest number of displacements across Sudan because of intercommunal conflict. Nearly 120,000 people have been displaced, including 97,000 within Blue Nile and 17,600 to White Nile state. The displaced need food, health, nutrition, protection, shelter, education, and WASH support (USAID 10/02/2023; OCHA 13/02/2023).

Clashes have kept taking place since July between armed Hausa tribe members and armed men from other tribes (including from the Berta, Funj, Gumuz, Hamaj, and Masalit tribes) in many areas of Blue Nile state, especially in Ar Rusayris and Wad Al Mahi localities. Reasons for many of the clashes include disputes following the Hausa trying to access markets or lands and the escalation of sporadic attacks targeting Hausa tribe members while they travel between localities in Blue Nile (IOM 16/02/2023, 02/02/2023, 11/01/2023, and 29/12/2022). Some of the people displaced outside Blue Nile are experiencing severe food insecurity, which is driving them to return to Blue Nile despite the lack of security (Dabanga 12/02/2023).

SYRIA/LEBANON — ● Medium risk level

Involuntary mass returns of Syrian refugees from Lebanon amid a current socioeconomic crisis put them in unsafe and inadequate living conditions

The risk of the involuntary mass return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon is still active. In early 2022, the Lebanese Government announced its plan to send 15,000 Syrian refugees monthly back to Syria (MEMO 24/06/2022; 961 04/07/2022; OLJ 15/08/2022; AP 06/07/2022 and 05/11/2022). In October 2022, a first group of around 500 Syrian refugees returned under a programme of the Lebanese and Syrian authorities. In November 2022, another 330 returned under the same programme (AP 05/11/2022). Beyond these two groups, the plan has failed to materialise so far. Regardless, the risk remains active, as Syrians still face resentment from members of Lebanese host communities and face pressure from authorities to leave Lebanon through restricted access to job opportunities and services (OLJ 13/08/2022; STC 08/08/2022; HRW 06/07/2022). Anti-refugee sentiments in Lebanon stem from a combination of economic, political, and social issues, including competition for jobs and pressure on the health and education systems (The Economist 22/08/2019; The New Arab 10/08/2022; ARK 30/06/2021; Brookings 15/04/2021; Enab Baladi 08/08/2022; AP 21/07/2022; OLJ 09/09/2022; WB 25/01/2022; IMF 21/09/2022). The economic crisis in Lebanon is worsening, with the multidimensional poverty rate rising to more than 80% in 2021, up from 42% in 2019 (IFRC 03/01/2023; UNESCWA 15/12/2021). The unemployment rate reached around 30% in 2022 – up from 11% in 2019 (WB accessed 25/01/2023; ILO 12/05/2022; UNESCWA 16/12/2021). Aside from normalised relations with the Syrian

Government, the repatriation plans announced in May in Türkiye may have emboldened the Lebanese Government to announce similar plans (MEI 24/03/2022; AP 21/06/2022; Daily Sabah 10/05/2022). UN agencies and INGOs have long stated that Syria is not safe for return and have renewed calls against the plan (RPW 16/11/2021; MEI 22/02/2022; HRW 06/07/2022).

SYRIA/TÜRKIYE — ● Medium risk level

Nearing general elections and economic hardship trigger a renewed military incursion of Türkiye into northern Syria, resulting in displacement and urgent humanitarian and protection needs

The risk of renewed military incursion of Türkiye into northern Syria is still active. In 2022, Türkiye announced on multiple occasions its intentions of a military incursion into northern Syria to establish a “safe zone” and neutralise Kurdish armed groups in the area. The Turkish Government perceives the armed groups to be linked to the armed separatist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), with whom it has been in protracted armed conflict since 1984 (BBC 23/11/2022; Al Jazeera 24/11/2022; MEO 23/11/2022; Al-Monitor 30/05/2022; ICCT 28/06/2022; CFR 06/01/2023; Asharq Al-Awsat 10/08/2022). In November 2022, an explosion in the centre of Istanbul took place, killing six people and injuring 81. The Turkish Government blamed Kurdish armed groups in northern Syria, escalating Turkish talks of an incursion (Daily Sabah 14/11/2022; Al Jazeera 14/11/2022 a; Al Jazeera 14/11/2022 b). Türkiye faces strong pushback from the US and Russia against further incursion into Syria (HRW 17/08/2022; Al Jazeera 10/10/2019). The



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

earthquakes that hit southeastern Turkey and northwestern Syria in February 2023 have also resulted in high numbers of damage to buildings and critical infrastructure, deaths, injuries, and the displacement of millions. That said, the damage and destruction caused by the earthquakes in both countries reduce the risk of a Turkish incursion into northern Syria (Al Jazeera 15/02/2023; IBC 13/02/2023, 06/02/2023; NPR 06/02/2023; CNBC 06/02/2023; Al Jazeera 06/02/2023). Within Türkiye, with general elections scheduled for June 2023, a military operation could raise approval ratings for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party and current President, as it did in 2019, helping him secure re-election (Reuters 05/11/2019). Parallel with its military plans, Türkiye renewed its intent to send one million Syrians back to Syria (Al Arabiya 03/05/2022; DW 27/07/2022).

UKRAINE — ● High risk level

Increased fighting and power and gas supply disruptions severely limit people's ability to access heating, resulting in loss of life and increased acute humanitarian needs in Russian-controlled areas and areas of active ground conflict in the southeast

This risk has materialised. The Russian military has continued targeting critical civilian infrastructure, with a targeted campaign on the energy infrastructure since 10 October 2022 (PAX 22/12/2022; GPF 05/12/2022). In newly accessible areas, such as western Kherson oblast, the Russian forces have continued to heavily target civilian infrastructure both before and after their withdrawal in November 2022. This has resulted in displacements

or evacuations of the population to safer areas outside Kherson oblast. The damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure has also resulted in the deterioration of people's living conditions, also pushing people to leave Kherson (Politico 27/11/2022). Active ground conflict elsewhere has continued to result in civilian fatalities, displacements and evacuations, and a lack of access to power, heating, water, and basic services. The risk has especially materialised in active fighting hot spots, including frontline areas near Bakhmut city, in Donetsk oblast, and in Russia-controlled areas, such as Mariupol city in Donetsk oblast (Radio Svoboda 15/12/2022; DW 25/01/2023; WHO 08/02/2023). Humanitarian access to areas outside the Ukraine Government's control remain extremely constrained, while access to information in and from areas controlled by the Russian military is blocked (Radio Svoboda 17/02/2023). This prevents humanitarian responders from reaching people in need and limits the possibility of conducting assessments to evaluate the actual scale of needs. The severity of needs is the highest in all areas close to the front line and in areas controlled by the Russian military. OCHA categorises the severity of needs to be 'catastrophic' (in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, the severity corresponds to level five* as per the ACAPS INFORM Global Crisis Severity Index methodology) (OCHA 05/02/2023 and 28/12/2022; Radio Svoboda 17/02/2023). *See the *INFORM Severity Index methodology* [here](#).

YEMEN — ● High risk level

The collapse or non-extension of the truce leads to renewed fighting, resulting in increased civilian casualties, displacement, and reduced access to services, basic goods, and livelihoods

Despite the continuation of negotiation efforts following the expiration of the truce on 2 October 2022, Yemen's warring parties still had not signed a new agreement as at the end of February 2023. While large-scale conflict has not resumed after the end of the truce, the risk remains active, as fighting has continued along the main front lines (namely in the governorates of Ad Dali', Al Hodeidah, Lahj, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz). From October–November 2022, the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) also carried out drone attacks on IRG-controlled seaports in Hadramawt and Shabwah, preventing ships from docking and suspending crude oil exports, the main sources of revenue for the IRG (South24 09/11/2022; Reuters 21/11/2022). The IRG said that the Ad Dabah oil terminal in Hadramawt sustained damage that will require at least five to six months of repairs. Following the attack in October, the IRG responded by warning that "all options are open" for retaliation, a sign that it could resume military operations (Asharq Al-Awsat 23/10/2022). The attacks by the DFA were a means to pressure the IRG to share their revenues from crude oil exports, especially to allow the payment of public sector salaries and pensions in DFA areas. In the meantime, talks between the DFA and the KSA have continued. If the talks between the DFA and the IRG fail to lead to a renewed truce, the DFA will very likely continue attacking ports in IRG-held areas to prevent Yemeni oil from being exported, and fighting would escalate along the front lines. A prolonged loss of revenues for the IRG will likely lead to a new depreciation and volatility of the Yemeni rial in areas under their control. Violence will likely result in displacement and civilian casualties (The New Arab 30/11/2022).



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