CrisisInSight

GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

March 2020

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INTRODUCTION

ACAPS' *Global Risk Analysis* **outlines a number of key contexts where a notable deterioration may occur within the next six months, leading to a spike in humanitarian needs.**

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries to support evidence-based decision-making in the humanitarian sector.

What is a risk?

Risk is a function of impact and probability: i.e., the risk posed by a potential hazard increases as either the expected impact of the hazard increases or the probability that it will occur increases. Risk analysis is not an exact science. The occurrence of a risk prompts a change from the status quo that leads to a notable deterioration in the humanitarian situation and a higher number of people in need (exposure), or a higher severity of need (intensity).

The ACAPS risk methodology combines the probability with the impact for each hazard, or combination of hazards. This gives us the risk. Risks will fall into one of three categories: Low, Medium and High.

The crises identified in this report have been selected because there are certain triggers that may emerge over the coming six months that point towards this potential shift. A deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend rather than a risk. Such crises are not included in the report.

Objective of risk analysis

The objective of ACAPS' Global Risk Analysis is to enable humanitarian decision makers to understand potential changes that would likely have humanitarian consequences. By exposing the more probable developments and understanding their impact, they can be included in planning and preparedness, which should improve response.

For the next six months, ACAPS has identified the following nine risks:

HIGH RISK LEVEL	MODERATE RISK LEVEL
BURKINA FASO	COLOMBIA
ETHIOPIA	HONDURAS
	INDIA
	LIBYA
	MYANMAR
	NIGERIA
	YEMEN

Key principles of risk analysis

Risk analysis depends on a solid understanding of the context and on investigating the interaction of the variables that cause or resist change.

Risk analysis is not an exact science: an event identified by one analyst as a hazard, might be identified by another as a trigger for different event which the second analyst considers the hazard. This is of little consequence; the important issue is that the sequence of events and a hazard are identified.

The probability of a risk does not need to be high for it to be of concern. That a hazardous event is estimated to have a 50% probability of occurring should be cause for concern for humanitarians. In some cases, a probability as low as 30% (just under a one in three chance of occurrence) may be a concern.

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INTRODUCTION

Limitations

Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises in this report, it has not been possible to cover each one in detail. Instead, we have highlighted the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform operational, strategic, and policy decision-makers.

The focus on risk analysis means that we have not considered multiple possible factors that could lead to an improvement in a given context.

We do not publish our full risk monitoring but an edited version that we think is relevant for the humanitarian sector.

Unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events have not received attention in this report, such as natural hazards and sudden onset events.

Information gaps also limit the analysis.

While efforts were made to ensure that all information was up to date at the time of publishing, the fluidity of situations in some countries means that significant changes are often observed from one week to another.

Read more about our risk methodology

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LIBYA
The opening of a new frontline along the Abu Qurayn-Tawergha-Misrata main road leads to displacement and protection violations, while threatening the livelihoods of the population of the three centres

INDIA
Additional government citizenship initiatives fuel intercommunal violence, embolden militancy in Kashmir, and lead to government oppression of Muslim communities, increasing protection concerns, access restrictions, and displacement.

BURKINA FASO
Increasing insecurity and displacement cause a deterioration of food security in the Central North, East, North, and Sahel regions

HONDURAS
Deteriorating drought conditions in the Dry Corridor lead to 24% of population in severe food insecurity and increased outward migration

COLOMBIA
Increased violence between armed groups leads to confinement, displacement and humanitarian needs in rural areas in Norte de Santander, Chocó and Nariño

MYANMAR
Escalating conflict and government restrictions in Rakhine lead to deterioration of humanitarian conditions for Rohingya, especially in northern and central townships

RISK LEVEL

High

Medium

Low

*The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.

NIGERIA
Escalation of banditry in the northwest leading to increased protection, food security and displacement concerns

ETHIOPIA
The lead-up to elections intensifies pre-existing ethnic and political divisions, triggering conflict and displacement

YEMEN
Renewed Houthi offensive in Marib intensifies, causing re-displacement southwards and severely reduced access to essential services

BURKINA FASO

Increasing insecurity and displacement cause a deterioration of food security in the Central North, East, North, and Sahel regions

RISK LEVEL
HIGH

PROBABILITY

Negligible — Medium — Very high

IMPACT

Very low — Moderate — Major

RATIONALE

Conflict in Burkina Faso intensified in 2019 and an increase of attacks against civilians by armed groups and intercommunal attacks led to a surge of displacement. The number of IDPs rose from 90,000 in January 2019 to over 760,000 in mid-February 2020 (UNHCR 12/2019; UNHCR 12/02/2020). IDPs fleeing conflict-affected regions are living mainly in Central North and Sahel regions but increasingly in North region and across the eastern part of the country (ShelterCluster 12/2019).

Conflict-related fatalities per month since 2018
(including military forces and armed groups)

Source: ACLED (accessed 02/03/2020)

Insecurity and forced displacement, coupled with rain shortages in 2019 are the main drivers of growing food insecurity in Burkina Faso, contributing to reduced agricultural production and disruption of livelihoods and market activities (FAO 02/2020; GIEWS FPMA 12/02/2020). Over 1.2 million people were categorised in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or higher and needed immediate food assistance in the October-December period, compared to 300,000 people during the same period of 2018 (RPCA 11/2019). Insecurity is particularly impacting agricultural production in Central North and North regions (Crop Monitor 02/2020), decreasing humanitarian access, and hampering food assistance especially in East, North, and Sahel regions. Food assistance concentrates on accessible urban centres (FEWS NET 12/2019) and on northern parts of the country where humanitarian response has been focused so far, leaving gaps in food assistance in other regions (TNH 21/01/2020). IDPs and impoverished host households are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity (FEWS NET 02/2020).

Rapid SMART surveys in October 2019 among hosts and IDPs in four conflict-affected regions found acute malnutrition rates for children above the alert threshold of 10% in three of six communes: 12.7% in Arbinda (Sahel region), 11.7% in Matiacoali (East region), and 11.2% in Titao (North region). The critical threshold of 15% was exceeded in Barsalogho (Central North region), both in the IDP reception site (19.7%) and the municipality (17.2%), and in Djibo (Sahel region) (16.9%) (UNICEF 12/2019; GoBF/WFP/UNICEF 11/2019).

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BURKINA FASO

RISK LEVEL
HIGH

PROBABILITY

Negligible   Medium   Very high

**IMPACT**

Very low   Moderate   Major

IMPACT

Food insecurity will rise as violence persists and mass displacement continues. At the current rate, about 900,000 people will be displaced by April 2020 (OCHA GHO 2020) but there is a risk displacement will exceed planning figures. Large-scale displacement will lead to further deterioration of livelihoods and a reduction in food availability among poor households, both hosts and IDPs. IDPs will be increasingly dependent on food assistance (FEWS NET 02/2020). Additionally, impoverished host households face increased vulnerability to food insecurity. They have limited sources of income apart from the sale of livestock and are at risk of early depletion of their crop stocks (FEWS NET 01/2020). Overall agricultural production during the 2019/20 season is expected to decline by up to 15% compared to 2018/19 (FAO HRP 2020) and livestock value will probably decrease, particularly impacting the livelihoods of households in conflict-affected areas in the north (FEWS NET 01/2020).

Around 1.8 million people in Burkina Faso are projected in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and above during the lean season of June-August 2020, compared to 0.7 million during the same period in 2019 (Cadre Harmonisé 11/2019). The figure includes over 80,000 people in Centre-North, East, North, and Sahel regions projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Without the planned humanitarian response, 15 provinces face Emergency level (HRP 2020). Exponential rise in displacement combined with shrinking humanitarian access will exacerbate food insecurity.

Methodology note: This risk was initially identified in the **ACAPS March 2019 Risk Report** and materialised as violence and displacement resulted in a significant increase of food insecurity in Burkina Faso (ACAPS 03/2019). A further, significant increase in the number of food insecure people due to rapid deterioration of humanitarian conditions comprises a new risk.

IDPs in Burkina Faso since 2018

765 517

Source: UNHCR

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COLOMBIA

Increased violence between armed groups leads to confinement, displacement and humanitarian needs in rural areas in Norte de Santander, Chocó and Nariño

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible — Medium — Very high

IMPACT

Very low — Moderate — Major

RATIONALE

Colombia's government signed a peace agreement with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in 2016 but armed conflict has continued, leaving people with unmet humanitarian needs in Norte de Santander, Chocó and Nariño departments. After the peace agreement, competing armed groups fought for control over areas previously controlled by FARC and conflict intensified. At the beginning of 2018 the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) declared war on the National Liberation Army (ELN). Their clashes intensified in 2019, fuelled also by the presence of FARC dissidents and paramilitary groups such as the Clan del Golfo. Escalation of armed conflict is probable in the coming months, owing to the slow implementation of the peace agreement, the absence of dialogue between the government and armed groups, and the presence of new armed groups. The population has been affected by disruption of access to services and livelihoods, displacement, presence of antipersonnel mines, and forced recruitment (FIP 26/02/2020; CrisisGroup 02/2020; DDP 12/02/2020).

Conflict-driven internal displacement is expected to continue over the next six months. According to government figures, around 27,000 people were internally displaced in Norte de Santander, Chocó, and Nariño departments in 2019, though the actual number is likely higher due to a lag in government registries. Displacement has continued in 2020 particularly in Norte de Santander and Nariño (RNI 01/01/2020; MSF 03/03/2020), where IDPs need shelter and food.

The situation worsened after 13 February, when armed groups held an "armed strike", sparking additional clashes. In Catatumbo (Norte de Santander) around 20,000 people in rural areas suffered severe movement restrictions as the armed groups controlling the territory cut access to roads, health facilities, education, and crops, and stopped public transport. Such confinement also affected around 23,000 people in Choco during 2018 (RNI 01/01/2020; MSF 03/03/2020; AA 15/02/2020; OCHA 21/02/2020).

IMPACT

Higher rates of confinement and displacement in rural areas are probable as armed groups gain control of territory. The municipalities of Tibu, San Calixto, El Tarra, Sardinata, Abrego, La Playa and Bojaya Tumaco Roberto Payán, Magüí Payán y Olaya Herrera, where conflict has been most active, have an estimated population of 494,000 people (Defensoria del pueblo 12/02/2020).

Further confinement and more "armed strikes", combined with use of antipersonnel mines, will likely create significant access constraints for people living in the affected areas, and for humanitarian actors present. In rural areas safe access to potable water and basic sanitation, as well as access to crops, transport, education, and health institutions will be hindered, leading to food insecurity, livelihood, and protection concerns; decreased access to education and healthcare.

Increased violence will likely lead to security and access challenges for aid workers, creating difficulties in reaching affected populations or resulting in temporary suspension of humanitarian activities in certain regions. Protection issues related to sexual and gender-based violence, forced recruitment, and forced labour are likely if the

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COLOMBIA

PROBABILITY

Negligible   Medium   Very high

IMPACT

Very low   Moderate   Major

conflict continues and armed groups expand their presence in the department. Norte de Santander hosts around 202,000 Venezuelan refugees and migrants, who are particularly vulnerable to such human rights violations (El Tiempo 20/06/2019; R4V 01/12/2020).

Victims of confinement in Colombia 2014 - 2019

Source: OCHA 02/03/2020; OCHA Colombia (accessed: 11/03/2020)

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ETHIOPIA

The lead-up to elections intensifies pre-existing ethnic and political divisions, triggering conflict and displacement

RISK LEVEL
HIGH

PROBABILITY

Negligible	Medium	Very high

IMPACT

Very low	Moderate	Major

RATIONALE

Federal elections in Ethiopia are set for 29 August. They are likely to be turbulent, with several issues serving as possible triggers for further ethnic division and polarisation. The pre-election period could amplify existing border disputes, political discontent, and historical ethno-regional fissures, resulting in intensified conflict and mass displacements (ICG 16/12/19).

Between 1995 and 2018, Ethiopia pursued a system of ethnic federalism. The country divided into nine ethnically defined states and two administered city-states, seeking to balance the demands of its many ethnic groups (ICG 04/09/09). However, the governing coalition party maintained an authoritative grip on bureaucracy at all levels, rejecting political openness, controlling resource allocation, and fuelling civil unrest (ACCORD 11/19; Mokaddem 03/19). In 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power, bringing a new Ethiopian vision of Medemer (coming together) which seeks a more open, unified nation. Several changes, including improved gender parity in politics and the revision of restrictive civil laws, have begun to alter Ethiopia's political and economic landscape (Mokaddem 03/19). However, Abiy's reforms have heightened tensions and garnered forceful opposition from those who want to preserve the status quo.

Given the political backdrop, any delays, imbalances, or irregularities in the electoral process will likely motivate protest movements and violence in multiple hotspots. Underlying tension between Amhara and Oromo, Somali and Afar, Tigrayans and the federal government, intra-ethnic unrest in Oromia, and border disputes between Somali and Oromo and between Amhara and Tigray, each could be triggered (ICG 19/07/19). Recent violence and ethnic clashes in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambela also raise concerns (Ezega 28/02/20; East African 31/01/20).

Some 1.2 million conflict-affected IDPs are in need of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia. Increased conflict will increase this number, potentially to 2018 levels, when border disputes and ethnic conflicts sparked 2.9 million internal displacements (IOM DTM 07/02/2020).

IMPACT

Widespread conflict and enforced control measures – such as internet blackout – would interrupt basic services around the country. Previous episodes of ethnic-based violence have led to school closures, disrupted transportation links, and hindered economic activities (IFRC 29/08/18; VOA 25/06/18). Prolonged periods of insecurity would likely challenge precarious government systems, for instance the health sector, which is short of health workers and lacks medical supplies (OCHA 09/01/2020; Health Cluster 30/01/2020).

As in previous years, an intensification of violence would increase the number of IDPs. The level of needs of displaced populations across the country would heighten, with poor living conditions, protection risks, limited access to basic services such as healthcare, and consequent increased health risks (OCHA 09/01/2020). Internal displacements in conjunction with a weakened healthcare system and the Kiremt rainy season (July-September) would increase the risk of a major disease outbreak, such as cholera or malaria.

In parts of the country where geographic remoteness and insecurity make populations hard to access, lack of humanitarian presence and infrastructure barriers, such as road closures, would hinder a rapid response to people displaced by conflict (OCHA 31/01/20; OCHA 15/11/19). As in 2019, the rainy season would likely hamper access and cause further internal displacement (OCHA 21/10/19). Any denial of IDPs' existence, as seen in Amhara, would restrict populations from acquiring assistance, escalating needs (OCHA 08/01/20).

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ETHIOPIA

RISK LEVEL
HIGH

PROBABILITY

Negligible   Medium   Very high

IMPACT

Very low   Moderate   Major

Potential impact of 2020 Elections

Divisive Campaigning along Ethnic and Ideological Lines	Emboldened Ethnic and Political Identities	Negative Perceptions of Electoral Process

Pre-election campaign triggers

Border Disputes   Protests

Pre-existing and recurring triggers

Increased tensions

Localised Conflict/Violence   **Prolonged insecurity**

Increased Displacement   Disruption to Basic Services and markets   Hindered Humanitarian Access

Lack of adequate shelter, WASH facilities, and access to health care

Increased and unmet needs of the Population

Inability to respond and reach affected populations

Triggers

Hazards

Humanitarian impact

Source: OCHA 08/01/2020

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HONDURAS

Deteriorating drought conditions in the Dry Corridor lead to 24% of population in severe food insecurity and increased outward migration

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible | Medium | Very high

**IMPACT**

Very low | Moderate | Major

RATIONALE

Rainfall in Honduras has been irregular and below-average over four consecutive years, affecting crops and food insecurity in the South and West regions (CIA 07/02/2020; WFP 2018). At least one million people in the country suffer chronic food insecurity at Crisis and Emergency levels (IPC Phases 3 and 4) (IPC Honduras 11/2019), while 638,000 Hondurans lack access to safe water (Water.org 18/02/2020; FEWS NET 02/2020). The economy of Honduras is heavily dependent on agriculture, with one-third of the Hondurans depending on it for their livelihoods (WB 10/10/2019; SGA 2014; WFP 2014). Subsistence farmers in drought-affected regions are depleting their food stocks and have become more dependent on seasonal employment in the coffee sector. However, coffee sector wages have been dropping for the past seven years, affecting the livelihoods of these seasonal workers. The estimated coffee production volume for the 2020 season are 12% lower than in 2019.

Some 3.5 million people (total pop.) are living in the most affected departments in the South and West regions: Santa Barbara, Copan, Octopeque, Lempira, Intibuca, Comayagua, Francisco Morazan, La Paz, Valle, El Paraiso, and Choluteca. The US has not resumed aid funding in the region since halting it in March 2019 (Devex 24/10/2019). The funding focused on cash transfers for food and increasing the capacity of drought-affected communities (NPR 17/07/2019). The total number of beneficiaries fell from 1.5 million in March 2019 to an estimated 18,000 by December 2020 (CRS Report 12/11/2019).

Food insecurity and crop failures are increasingly being recognised as drivers of migration. A survey led by Creative Associates International found that 46% of Honduran respondents under age 29 intend to migrate; 67% of respondents cite economic concerns as a primary reason (Saliendo Adelante 03/09/2019). In 2014, when the drought began, the number of people from Honduras trying to cross the Mexico-US border spiked, with around 91,000 people apprehended. Numbers have rapidly increased, with 254,000 Hondurans apprehended in 2019 (US Border Patrol 20/01/2020).

Honduran nationals at the US border

Year	Count
2014	91 475
2015	33 848
2016	53 402
2017	47 900
2018	77 128
2019	254 561

Source: US Border Patrol 12/2019.

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HONDURAS

PROBABILITY

Negligible Medium Very high

IMPACT

Very low Moderate Major

IMPACT

The worsening drought, expected to continue in 2020, and its impact on production of coffee, corn, and maize crops, in combination with the lack of aid programmes, will increase the number of food insecure people. Around 1.22 million people are projected in severe acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and higher), including 258,000 people projected in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) by June 2020, the highest number since 2016 and an four-fold increase compared to 0.28 million during the same period in 2019 (IPC 01/12/2019; IPC 05/02/2019). The 2020 basic grain agricultural season is estimated to be below normal. Losses in subsistence agriculture will affect food supply, leading to price increases. Some households will be barely able to meet their needs unless they adopt emergency coping strategies, increasing their vulnerability and their dependence on food assistance (FEWS NET 02/2020). As the situation deteriorates, more displacement and outgoing migration are expected (The Guardian 30/10/2019; The Guardian 11/02/2020). A spike in migration in the coming months will create significant needs, particularly for protection and shelter, along migration routes in Mexico and Guatemala.

IPC figures

■ IPC 1 ■ IPC 2 ■ IPC3 ■ IPC4 ■ IPC5

Source: IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification 12/2019.

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INDIA

Additional government citizenship initiatives fuel intercommunal violence, embolden militancy in Kashmir, and lead to government oppression of Muslim communities, increasing protection concerns, access restrictions, and displacement

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible — Medium — Very high

IMPACT

Very low — Moderate — Major

RATIONALE

Recent moves by Prime Minister Modi and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have strained relations and incited new dissent from India's Muslim population. In August 2019, a presidential decree revoked the autonomy status of Jammu and Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state. A complete lockdown on communications and movement in the region followed. Simultaneously, the Assam National Register of Citizens (NRC) brought the citizenship status of 1.9 million people, mostly Muslims and minorities, into question (CSIS 12/08/2019, UNHCR 01/09/2019), and efforts to establish a nationwide registry have been met with opposition. The situation was further aggravated by the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in December, designed to provide a pathway to citizenship for those fleeing religious persecution from certain countries, but did not include Muslims (BBC 11/12/2019).

Anti-CAA demonstrations have fuelled violence between Hindu and Muslim communities. As of February 2020, nearly 80 people have died, including 53 in four consecutive days of violence in Delhi, which saw the torching of Muslim shops, homes, and mosques (The Intercept 30/01/2020; Aljazeera 27/02/2020).

In 2020, Supreme Court rulings eased the internet shutdown in Jammu and Kashmir and allowed protests to continue (Times of India 10/01/2020). However, legal challenges against the CAA and questions about the NRC remain unanswered. The Supreme Court, rather than rule on the amendment's constitutionality, has given the government an opportunity to respond to challenges. Statements from BJP leaders have indicated that no decision has been made regarding a nationwide registry, though a push to convene a National Population Register in April 2020 has raised concerns that demographic data will be used to identify non-citizens (The Intercept 30/01/2020).

Any announcement of a nationwide citizenship registry or other moves perceived to alienate Muslims are likely to fuel intercommunal violence and embolden militancy in Kashmir, resulting in a strong response by the Indian government. This is particularly true if the Supreme Court is unwilling to address challenges to the CAA or Indian police do not ensure the safety of all Indian communities and protestors.

IMPACT

Political unrest will disproportionately affect Muslims in Kashmir, Assam, and Uttar Pradesh, all of which have a history of deep ethnic tensions. Reports indicate that police have been slow to respond to, or even active participants in, violence in Muslim communities (Foreign Policy 02/03/2020; NYT 12/03/2020). Conflict trends suggest that 100,000 to 250,000 people could be significantly affected, either by displacement, access restrictions, or increased protection risks.

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INDIA

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible　　　　Medium　　　　Very high

IMPACT

Very low　　　　Moderate　　　　Major

An increase in intercommunal violence and militancy will likely result in a strong response from Indian forces. Previous human rights violations by the Indian government included mass detention, excessive use of force to suppress dissent, and amplified military presence (HRW 14/01/2020). Civilian attacks targeting Muslims will likely increase, leading to casualties, property damage, and loss of livelihoods if shops are destroyed.

Government response to violence will likely include restrictions on communications and/ or movement. Kashmir has limited capacity to cope with further restrictions or conflict following the August 2019 lockdown, which strained public services and hindered access to healthcare, education, and livelihoods for 8 million people (Business Insider 10/01/2020). Access to healthcare will be strained should road blockades impede access to hospitals (The New Humanitarian 19/09/2019). Threats from militants attempting to usurp control, as well as government-imposed restrictions, will likely result in school closures and fear of attending classes (NYT 21/10/2019).

Displacement is likely. Conflict forced 170,000 people in India from their homes in 2018, the majority in Kashmir, and ethnic conflict in Assam has previously displaced 150,000 people in a single episode of violence (IDMC 05/2019; NYT 26/07/2012). Conflict displacement in India is often temporary; however, recent intercommunal violence torched homes, creating longer-term displacement (Al Jazeera 27/02/2020).

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INDIA

RISK LEVEL
## MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible — Medium — Very high

IMPACT

Very low — Moderate — Major

Indian Government Citizenship initiatives: Key events

August 2019 — February 2020

5 August 2019

Articles 370 and 35A revoked by presidential decree; Kashmir Lockdown Begins.

31 October 2019

Kashmir downgraded from state to union territory.

12 December 2019

Anti-CAA protests develop in Northeastern states of Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya.

15 December 2019

Shaheen Bagh protest begins, blocking a key highway in Southeast Delhi.

5 January 2020

Attack on Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi injures 39.

23 February 2020

Riots in Delhi last four days, killing 37 people.

Assam National Register of Citizens (NRC) gets published.

31 August 2019

Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) passed by Parliament.

11 December 2019

Protests erupt in Delhi, Hyderabad, and West Bengal.

14 December 2019

Violence erupts in Uttar Pradesh; 19 killed; police accused of abuse.

20 December 2019

Supreme Court refuses stay on CAA implementation.

22 January 2020

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LIBYA

The opening of a new frontline along the Abu Qurayn-Tawergha-Misrata main road leads to displacement and protection violations, while threatening the livelihoods of the population of the three centres

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible   Medium   Very high

IMPACT

Very low   Moderate   Major

RATIONALE

The road connecting Abu Qurayn and Misrata is a strategic artery, which might soon be subject to increasingly intense attacks by Khalifa Haftar's Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF). Peace efforts are stagnating, while the internationally recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) and its allies are under increasing economic and military pressure. With UN negotiations slowing down after the resignation of UN Envoy Ghassan Salamé and multiple ceasefire violations reported at the end of February, the new battlefront might be definitively opened (The Guardian 02/03/2020; UNSMIL 28/02/2020).

Misrata is one of only five enclaves under GNA control and connects by road directly to Tripoli. This eastern front of GNA forces has been under pressure since the LAAF entered Sirte on 10 January and took its Ghardabiya military airbase, a vantage point for a military campaign (ISPI 10/01/2020; ICG 18/01/2020; Al Sharq al Awsat 09/01/2020). Furthermore, Misratan militias have shown signs of internal division, as some of those responsible for the defence of Sirte withdrew, leaving the city to the LAAF (ISPI 13/01/2020). Misratan militias have given essential military support to the GNA in Tripoli, including during the offensive started in April 2019 (ECFR 26/02/2020). An escalation of ground clashes from Abu Qurayn and more intense shelling along the main road up to and including Misrata would oblige the GNA to divert forces from the capital, thinning out its defences, and put further pressure on the Tripoli government, as it struggles economically with a LAAF-imposed blockade of oil exports (ISPI 10/01/2020; ICG 18/01/2020; Bloomberg 09/02/2020).

Routine violations of the 2011 arms embargo and continuous inflow of foreign weapons and personnel (benefitting both parties), are likely to result in the LAAF having enough resources to open the battlefront (UNSMIL 30/01/2020).

IMPACT

The humanitarian consequences of the offensive would resemble those in Tripoli. The Misrata region already hosts the third highest number of people in need countrywide: 83,000 of the regional population of 580,000 (HNO 2020; Bureau of Statistics 2015). The number of people in need and overall level of need will grow. Based on recent displacement in the region, thousands from Abu Qurayn, Tawergha, and Misrata would be expected to flee to Misrata city and Sirte, adding to the 48,800 IDPs in both regions, with some thousands going as far east as Benghazi (IOM DTM 24/01/2020; OCHA 08/12/2019; IOM DTM 16/03/2020). Civilians remaining in the cities to protect their homes and employment will risk injury or death related to shelling and crossfire, as well as human rights violations. Detainees will also be exposed (HNO 2020; HRW 06/02/2020).

Extreme economic and livelihoods losses would ensue. Some 70% of the 400,000 Misratans work in trade and industry. The insecurity will shrink production and increase unemployment (Reuters 29/01/2016; ICRC 01/09/2019; OCHA 08/12/2019). One-third of Misratans already spend over 75% of their income on food and they lack coping capacity; the livelihoods of several of the 59,000 migrants in the region surviving on informal work

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LIBYA

PROBABILITY

Negligible   Medium   Very high

IMPACT

Very low   Moderate   Major

would also be affected (ICRC 01/09/2019; IOM DTM 12/02/2020). Targeting of health facilities and personnel will further diminish access to medicines and specialised care. Disruption of waste management will increase the risk of disease outbreak (OCHA 08/12/2019). Schools will likely become increasingly overcrowded - 11% of schools are already closed regionally - and children exposed to danger travelling to and from school (OCHA 08/12/2019, IOM DTM 24/01/2020). As the Tripoli Mitiga airport is often non-operational, a closure of Misrata's airport will deprive civilians of yet another exit and humanitarians of a supply route (UNSMIL 18/11/2020). Impediments to cargo delivery due to attacks on the seaport will also undermine access (Logistics Cluster 19/07/2019).

Violent incidents in Misrata

Legend:
- ○ Cities
- ✸ Violent incidents
- Misrata
- other Libya provinces

Source: ACLED 10/03/2020

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MYANMAR

Escalating conflict and government restrictions in Rakhine lead to deterioration of humanitarian conditions for Rohingya, especially in northern and central townships

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible · Medium · Very high

IMPACT

Very low · Moderate · Major

RATIONALE

The end of 2019 saw intensified conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and the Arakan Army. Armed clashes resulted in 9,000 new displacements in November 2019 and mine contamination and shelling in Rohingya villages has caused a spike in civilian casualties in early 2020, particularly in the northern townships of Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and Kyauktaw (OCHA 01/12/2019). Units of the Arakan Army have advanced to more southern areas of Rakhine, which will likely cause an increase in humanitarian needs in townships previously less affected by the conflict (ICG 31/01/2020).

Meanwhile, access constraints continue to pose challenges for humanitarian organisations and people in need. In 2020, the government added new restrictions for organisations wanting to access affected areas: 8 of 17 townships in Rakhine have become inaccessible or extremely restricted for most organisations, leaving at least 100,000 people with limited access to essential services and humanitarian assistance (OCHA 20/01/2020; Frontier Myanmar 02/04/2019). Additionally, an IDP camp in Kyaukphu hosting nearly 1,000 people closed, the third camp closure since 2018, when the government announced plans to transfer IDPs to permanent settlements (OCHA 10/02/2020). 2020 will likely see this policy expanded. Shifting from temporary to permanent settlements will further cement ethnic divisions by signalling a permanence to Rohingya displacement.

In January 2020, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) obliged Myanmar to provide reports of measures taken to protect the Rohingya from genocide (ICJ 23/01/2020). The first report deadline is 23 May 2020 and it is unclear how Myanmar will respond. The government has denied genocide allegations, blocked UN investigators, and constrained humanitarian organisations (OHCHR 16/09/2019). As pressure mounts, an emboldened Arakan Army could intensify attacks, particularly in more southern townships. If the government is met with stronger militancy in Rakhine and higher risk of international interference, an intensified crackdown is probable.

The population in Rakhine has limited capacity to cope with worsened humanitarian conditions. Historical increases in need suggest an additional 50,000 to 100,000 people could see deteriorating in human conditions across the state (CFR 23/01/2020; HNO 2020).

IMPACT

As conflict moves closer to Rohingya villages, civilian casualties will likely increase, with immediate risks highest in the northern townships of Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and Kyauktaw. A shift toward increased conflict in southern townships of Myebon, Ponnagyun, and Minbya will bring landmines and shelling to areas previously less affected by direct conflict.

An increased Tatmadaw presence will likely increase protection risks, such as arbitrary detention of Rohingya, confiscation of property, and forced displacement; as well as movement restrictions limiting access to shelter, farmland, and education (Myanmar HCT Protection Strategy 12/2018). Humanitarian organisations are likely to face additional access limitations, arising both from insecurity and the government seeking to restrict international involvement.

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MYANMAR

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible | Medium | Very high

IMPACT

Very low | Moderate | Major

Food security and livelihoods will be affected as trade routes become disrupted by insecurity and warring parties attempting to control territory. In 2019, some 6,000 hectares of crops went unharvested, which could prove detrimental given that 36% of Rakhine's population relies on small and medium farms for their livelihoods (FAO 07/2019). As the 2020 May-October harvest approaches, food production is likely to decrease further as farmers avoid fields for fear of landmines, crossfire, and detention (TNH 18/02/2020).

WASH needs will increase, particularly for IDPs with limited access to clean water. As water sources in the camps dry up during the March-May hot season, and water stagnation and flooding occurs during the May-October monsoon season, IDPs will become more dependent on contaminated water, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases (UNICEF 19/03/2020; Narinjara News 12/01/2020).

People in Need - Township level

2020

- 2000 - 3600
- 3600 - 20000
- 20000 - 37000
- 37000 - 73000
- 73000 - 200000

Source: HNO 2020

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NIGERIA

Escalation of banditry in the northwest leading to increased protection, food security and displacement concerns

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible — Medium — Very high

IMPACT

Very low — Moderate — Major

RATIONALE

Banditry (village raids, kidnapping, cattle rustling) in northwest Nigeria since 2018 has led to the internal displacement of 210,000 people, and an additional 35,000 fleeing to Maradi, in Niger (UNHCR 03/2020). Activity has increased in recent months with attacks in several states including Zamfara, Katsina, Kebbi, Kaduna, Sokoto, and Niger. The government responded with aerial bombardments in February, killing over 250 armed men (Channels TV 05/02/2020).

Escalation of the crisis is connected to the failure of an amnesty programme in October 2019 initiated by Katsina and Zamfara states. The two most powerful groups, Buharin Daji and Dogo Gedi, reportedly did not participate (Salkida 16/10/2019). It appears that some bandits accepted amnesty because the rainy season – an obstacle to their activities – was imminent. Many participated in the exchange of small arms for money and moved to other states in northern Nigeria such as Kaduna and Niger.

Peace processes appearing to grant more concessions to the Fulani (more closely linked to banditry) while neglecting some of their Hausa victims is a potential aggravating factor likely to stir up Hausa/Fulani ethnic conflicts (Salkida 16/10/2019). These concessions stem from beliefs that the Fulani 'aggressors' were rewarded for violence through amnesty, while the Hausas were not compensated enough for economic losses such as farmlands and crop destruction. Fears that bandits may be in contact with elements of Boko Haram and Ansaru living in the northwest adds to protection concerns for over 27 million people exposed to the violence.

IMPACT

The government's adoption of a more aggressive stance through aerial bombardment is likely to spark reprisal attacks by the bandits on civilians, raising protection concerns and leading to an increase in the number of IDPs and refugees. Security forces' preoccupation with Boko Haram in the northeast will likely reduce the availability of manpower and other resources to combat banditry in the northwest. Disruption of agriculture will leave the affected population no longer able to rely on own-produced cereals for subsistence and commercial farming, and cattle rustling will continue to hamper animal husbandry, increasing risk of food insecurity.

About 70% of IDPs surveyed in Sokoto, Katsina and Zamfara previously reported insufficient food, with global acute malnutrition rates among children as high as 31% (WFP 09/2019). Some 1.4 million people in Katsina (18.08% of the state population), 452,000 people in Sokoto (8.84%) and 451,000 in Zamfara (10.02%) have insufficient food intake (WFP 02/2020). An escalation of this crisis with a disruption of livelihoods is likely to worsen nutrition levels, especially for women and children. Most INGOs are focused in the northeast and have not yet established a presence in the northwest. Continued armed attacks and government military response are likely to prevent humanitarian access, especially in the rural areas.

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YEMEN

Renewed Houthi offensive in Marib intensifies, causing re-displacement southwards and severely reduced access to essential services

RISK LEVEL
MEDIUM

PROBABILITY

Negligible | Medium | Very high

IMPACT

Very low | Moderate | Major

RATIONALE

There are a number of reasons why the Houthis may launch an offensive against Marib city: they currently see themselves in a position of strength compared to the Government of Yemen (GoY); control of Marib would nearly complete Houthis control over northern Yemen (with Shabwah and Al Jawf remaining which might be the next objective); control of Marib risks cutting off coalition forces between al-Wadiyah on the Saudi border and Shabwa; control of Marib provides access to revenue through control of cooking gas routes from Marib, and to a lesser extent oil exports (ACAPS discussions with operational actors 10/3/20).

The Houthis' strength is derived from a combination of control over the bulk of the national army, their strong internal cohesion built up from ten years of fighting the Sa'dah wars, and their strong ability to co-opt resources out of local business. The GOY is heavily dependent on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) for financial and military support, yet KSA's determination to 'win' in Yemen appears to be waning: there is a growing possibility that KSA may decide to pursue an alternative track in the peace talks that involves acknowledging Houthi governance over part of Yemen. This is an incentive for the Houthis to take as much ground as possible prior to any peace agreement.

The Houthi's desire to expand territorial control, taking advantage of weakened GoY forces, will likely result in a determined and sustained assault on the city of Marib; a more enticing prize than Ta'iz where the frontline has been stagnant. Marib is strategically important for the GoY as it is home to a significant proportion of the government's bureaucracy and the current stronghold of Islah, rivals of the Houthis.

Any success in Marib city would likely be followed by an attempt to control much of

Marib governorate in order to place strategic gas reserves and oil fields under siege. Additionally, tax on businesses in Marib and land imports from KSA and Oman, and investment from the local market and potential oil exports would provide much needed revenue.

An intense conflict in Marib would cause many casualties and displace over 500,000 people (of the current one to two million population of Marib city including 750,000 IDPS) into the eastern and southern corners of Marib (immediately to Harib), potentially spilling into Bayhan and Shabwah. Some IDPs may opt to move northwards towards Saudi coalition areas. Individuals based in Marib for business reasons would likely return to their home governorates primarily in Dhamar, Ibb, Hodeidah, and Amran.

IMPACT

The displacement of more than 500,000 Yemenis from Marib city and surrounding districts eastwards towards the outskirts of Marib and, and south towards Bayhan and Shabwah would result in many staying with host families, but others (~40%) would crowd into informal settlements with very limited facilities. The Aulaqi tribe (a large and influential south Yemeni tribe located in central/southern parts of Yemen) and smaller tribes in Bayhan (the BalUbayd, Banu Hilal, and BalHarith tribes) are likely to reject any IDPS perceived as northerners from entering their region. These tribes have been heavily associated with the UAE/STC activity in the South and are wary of any attempt by "northerners" to take over limited resources. Most of the IDPs fleeing Marib have been displaced multiple times, resulting in low resilience.

Food and water would emerge as priority needs and tensions with host communities would likely rise. The lack of water and sanitation would increase the risk of cholera and

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YEMEN

PROBABILITY

Negligible · Medium · Very high

IMPACT

Very low · Moderate · Major

dengue outbreaks and other communicable diseases. Protection risks, including child marriage, domestic violence and child recruitment, would likely increase in Marib, where up to a million people are caught in the fighting, and in areas of displacement where many families would be forced to adopt negative coping strategies.

The humanitarian response, unable to meet growing needs, would be constrained by blocks on access, logistics, and security issues. Those in Al Jawf would be particularly difficult to access. Those trapped in the conflict area would face severe protection issues and food/water shortages.

To find out more, see **ACAPS Yemen risk and scenarios reports.**

Areas of control

Ansar Allah (Houthis) and allies.

Area captured between end Feb./early March 2020

Hadi-led government and Saudi-led Coalition and allies

Controlled area end 2019

Note: This map is for illustrative purposes only and does not imply endorsement by International Crisis Group. [Open Sources; OSM; ESRI, Twitter, local media outlets]

Map by Crisis Group (17/03/2020)

Note: On March 10, 2020 ACAPS held a joint analysis session with 21 participants from 12 organizations to map key risks that may impact the humanitarian situation of Yemenis. This risk is based on feedback and follow up interview with key operational actors and ex-perts.

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UPDATE FROM PREVIOUS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

The countries listed below refer to risks identified in ACAPS' previous *Global Risk Analysis* published in December 2019, and therefore remain within the six month outlook period.

BURUNDI/TANZANIA (Medium Risk Level in December 2019)

Continued reduction in settlement services and increased pressure from the Tanzanian government results in mass return of Burundian refugees, where they face reintegration and protection challenges

Most of the risks associated with the repatriation of refugees from Tanzania to Burundi have materialised. Of the 222,884 Burundian refugees in Tanzania, 96,000 are projected to return in 2020 (UNHCR January 2019 to December 2020). Although President Pierre Nkurunziza is not running for office in the forthcoming elections, political persecution continues. The Burundian government admitted to killing 22 'wrongdoers' outside Bujumbura at the end of February, in clashes linked to upcoming general elections (The New Humanitarian 26/02/2020). The UN Human Rights Office, forced to close on 28 February 2019 after it accused the Burundian government of abuses, has not re-opened. Such events indicate that the Burundian government is still not ready to guarantee fundamental human rights. The voluntary nature of repatriations is also in question. Most humanitarian agencies said they are not promoting the repatriations because it is unclear if people are leaving Tanzania of their own free will (UN News 05/03/2019). Apart from political instability, economic decline and extreme food insecurity are impacting the living conditions of people living in Burundi and would affect refugees if they are forced to return.

CENTRAL AMERICA (High Risk Level in December 2019)

Ratification of the bilateral Asylum Cooperation Agreements between the US and Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras leads to protection concerns and increased humanitarian needs of asylum-seekers

In July 2019, the United States (US) entered into three separate "Asylum-Cooperative Agreements" with Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. The three countries have ratified the agreements but so far only Guatemala has received asylum seekers turned away by the US. According to the agreement, any asylum seeker who passes through Guatemala will be ineligible for asylum in the US unless they first applied for protection in Guatemala (TNH 11/02/2020). Since November, when the policy was implemented, around 400 asylum seekers have been sent to Guatemala (Instituto Guatemalteco de Migracion 31/01/2020). Although Guatemala has one of the region's largest economies it is one of the most socially unequal and dangerous countries. Asylum seekers deported to Guatemala face protection issues, inadequate shelter, and lack of access to healthcare. Honduras and El Salvador agreed to serve as "safe third countries" but they are not yet ready to accept asylum seekers (Al Jazeera 6/02/2020). The capacity of these countries to manage an increased number of asylum cases is very low and some measures are already being challenged in the US courts (MSF 02/2020).

HAITI (Medium Risk Level in March 2019)

A worsening economic and political crisis leads to long term protests, causing protracted disruption of aid delivery and rising poverty levels

While protests stopped in November, the socioeconomic and political situation has not improved. President Moise has ruled by decree since 13 January – when the mandate of most parliamentarians expired – and recently appointed a PM and government, both unratified by Parliament (France24 05/03/2020). Protection and access concerns remain paramount. In February the police and the army clashed, while citizens protested gang violence and government inaction (DG-ECHO 26/02/2020; Modern Diplomacy 20/02/2020). Gang violence, historically present, is increasing. Armed men were reported on the Arcahaie-

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UPDATE FROM PREVIOUS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

Cap Haitien and the Gressier-Miragoane routes, kidnapping has risen since January, and gangs are vying for control in Port-au-Prince (FEWS NET 12/2019; DG ECHO 04/03/2020). Negative food security prospects outlined in November have been confirmed, with five arrondissements predicted to totally or partially move from Stressed (IPC 2) to Crisis (IPC 3) levels between February and May (FEWS NET 01/2020). Inflation is expected to remain high (17.5% to 22% annual rate predicted for 2020) and the Haitian gourde keeps depreciating against the US dollar with repercussions on Haitians' purchasing power (IMF 28/01/2020; The New Humanitarian 13/01/2020; Haiti Central Bank 2020). Despite a seeming return to normalcy, some business owners have struggled to resume work, even though the protests stopped. Staple food prices remain well above their five-year average (Reuters 02/03/2020; FEWS NET 29/02/2020).

INDIA (High Risk Level in March 2019)

Assam National Register of Citizens (NRC) leaves 1.9 million people at risk of statelessness, detention, and displacement

The August 2019 publication of the Assam National Register of Citizens (NRC) brought into question the citizenship of 1.9 million people. Six months later, it has evolved into a slow-moving political battle and left Assam's Muslim communities in citizenship limbo. Rejection certificates, originally meant to be issued around October 2019, have not been sent. Following claims that foreigners were included in the list while many Hindus were excluded, some BJP leaders called for the Assam NRC to be carried out again (Telegraph India 21/11/2019). Inconsistencies, including discrepancies in the list and the disappearance of data from the cloud service used to store it, has resulted in questions about accuracy and security (Economic Times India 24/02/2020; Times of India 11/02/2020). As of February 2020, internal checks have begun to determine if ineligible people, such as declared foreigners, have been incorrectly included (NDTV 23/02/2020). Authorities have announced plans to finish the filtering of names, notify the Registrar General of India of the final list, and send rejection certificates by mid-March, after which appeal cases to the foreigners' tribunals will begin (Telegraph India 18/02/2020). The NRC process, along with other citizenship initiatives implemented by the Indian government, have sparked violence between Hindu and Muslim communities, which continues to threaten the security of Muslims in Assam

and India. Additionally, questions around citizenship status still present a risk of human rights violations, lack of access to public services, and even statelessness.

INDONESIA (Medium Risk Level in March 2019)

Escalating violence due to protests in Papua and West Papua leads to displacement and increased humanitarian needs

Protests have all but disappeared in Indonesia's Papuan province. Those responsible for the racial taunts that fuelled the protests in August 2019 have been convicted in the country's first racism case (UCAN 23/01/2020). However, conflict between supporters of the Free Papua Movement and Indonesian security forces remains a threat to civilians, particularly in the Central Highlands. Since the 2019 protests, widespread arrests and treason charges against Papuan activists have continued and reports of refugee movements into neighbouring Papua New Guinea have surfaced (HRW 05/12/2019, RNZ 17/02/2020). Arms proliferation in the region and the discovery of caches of weapons indicates the ability of the conflict to further escalate (Jakarta Post 17/01/2020). When outlining the political agenda for 2020, the Indonesian government announced plans to evaluate funding received by the Papuan provinces, as well as the creation of additional provinces within Papua and West Papua (Jakarta Post 21/02/2020; Jakarta Post 31/10/2019). Measures perceived as further encroachments on Papuan autonomy are likely to see another rise in protests and independence-related violence.

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