

### CRISIS OVERVIEW

Since 15 April 2023, clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group, have caused widespread displacement. Throughout the country, an estimated 6.7 million people (more than 1.3 million households) are internally displaced. This represents a weekly rise of nearly 40,000 IDPs between 16 and 23 April 2024 (IOM 23/04/2024).

IDPs are moving northwards into River Nile and Northern states, which offer security and potential routes to leave the country altogether (IOM 28/03/2024). River Nile state holds 11% of the IDP caseload across Sudan, while Northern state holds 6%. Between 19–28 March 2024, IDPs in Northern state increased by 6% from 404,660 to 405,030 (IOM 02/04/2024). This number had, however, reduced to 399,755 by 17 April 2024 (IOM 26/04/2024). In the same period, IDPs in River Nile state increased by 11% from 706,906 to 711,175 (IOM 02/04/2024). By 17 April, there was also a reduction of the number of recorded IDPs in the state to become 702,456 (IOM 26/04/2024). The fluctuations could be a result of some IDPs returning to their states of origin – especially regions perceived as secure, such as Khartoum – and others seeking international protection across borders (IOM 28/03/2024).

### Anticipated scope and scale

#### Northern state

- An expansion of the war closer to Northern state could lead to further secondary and tertiary displacement. Waging war and lack of resources in neighbouring states, particularly Khartoum and Aj Jazirah, will continue to drive displacement towards the north (AJ 11/04/2024).
- Food shortages will persist, worsened by rising food prices and limited cash access (FEWS NET 20/03/2024).
- Limited access to clean water and sanitation facilities is expected to remain a challenge given the IDP influx (SAPA 12/04/2024).
- Without significant improvements in healthcare infrastructure, poor healthcare access for both IDPs and host communities will persist, potentially leading to a public health crisis (Sudan Tribune 25/01/2024; IOM 29/02/2024).

- Displacement, including the conversion of schools into shelters, disrupts education (IOM 29/02/2024 and 28/03/2024). A continued lack of educational resources will have long-term effects on children – who make up half of the IDP population – and perpetuate vulnerability cycles (WTI 15/04/2024).
- Limited job opportunities and a strained economy reduce IDPs' ability to become self-sufficient, creating a long-term reliance on aid resources (IOM 29/02/2024 and 28/03/2024).

#### River Nile state

- River Nile state is vulnerable to the spillover effects of the war from neighbouring states. The effects of the war and resource scarcity in Khartoum will force further displacement towards River Nile (ACLEDD 12/01/2024).
- The newly opened passport-processing centre in Atbara could become a pull factor for people seeking to leave Sudan, increasing the short-term needs of transitory populations in the area (IOM 28/03/2024).
- People in River Nile will likely continue experiencing food shortages because of rising food prices and limited cash access.
- Healthcare access will deteriorate as IDP needs for medicine and medical equipment soar. Diseases such as cholera pose a threat to both IDPs and host communities (IOM 28/03/2024).
- Without access to income-generating opportunities in a functioning economy, IDPs will struggle to become self-reliant (IOM 28/03/2024).
- The number of displaced women, children, and people with disabilities will surge as these groups flee violence and exploitation. They will require protection measures to ensure access to essential services (UN Women 14/02/2024).

### Humanitarian constraints

- Obstruction by the warring parties is undermining the functioning of the aid system, with slow processes for bringing staff and supplies into Sudan and further delays in moving medical and food supplies from Port Sudan to other areas (Reuters 15/01/2024; KII 30/04/2024).
- The vast number of IDPs in both states (more than 1.1 million combined) creates a demand for aid, potentially exceeding available resources (IOM 02/04/2024).

- The IDP influx strains existing resources and infrastructure in both states, making it difficult to provide adequate food, water, sanitation, and healthcare (IOM 28/03/2024 and 02/04/2024).
- Insecurity in neighbouring states, particularly Khartoum and Aj Jazirah, continues to hinder the movement of aid workers and supplies (IOM 28/03/2024).
- The constant flow of displaced people through Northern state will eventually make it difficult to track and assist everyone in need as they move on to other locations (IOM 02/04/2024).
- Recent internet outages have limited access to the banking system, reducing the ability of aid to reach populations in need; this includes cash transfers and diaspora and family remittances (IOM 02/04/2024).

## CRISIS IMPACTS

### Northern state

#### Displacement

The number of IDPs in Northern state has risen significantly since the war began, with more than 400,000 reported by the end of March 2024 (IOM 08/04/2024). The majority of IDPs come from Bahri (Khartoum north), Khartoum, Um Durman (Khartoum state), Janub Al Jazirah, Medani Al Kubra, and Sharg Al Jazirah (Aj Jazirah state) (IOM 28/03/2024 and 08/04/2024). The majority (85%) are residing with host communities, while the rest are primarily in rented accommodations, schools, and public buildings (IOM 28/03/2024).

The search for better services, employment, and affordable goods fuels the intrastate movement of IDP households. Perceptions of improved security conditions have also led to some limited returns to Khartoum. Assessment data indicates that food, healthcare, and livelihood access remain the priority needs of IDPs in Northern state (IOM 28/03/2024).

The war has driven many people in Sudan to seek a new life in Egypt, and Northern state has become a key waypoint in their journey (IOM 28/03/2024). For instance, Halfa city is a magnet for IDPs because it is the closest town to the Egyptian border and hosts an Egyptian consulate, making it a convenient transit point.

#### Migration and asylum challenges

In June 2023, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced a new policy requiring entry visas for all Sudanese nationals, including women, children, and older men – groups previously exempt from visa requirements. The ministry cited the need to address illegal activities by individuals and groups on the Sudanese side of the border engaging in visa forgery for financial gain (HRW 13/07/2024). Recent reports reveal that Egyptian authorities have detained thousands of Sudanese refugees in a network of undisclosed military bases. They then deport these refugees back to Sudan, frequently without recourse to protection or to claim asylum (TNH 25/04/2024).

The war has disrupted travel on major roads, with people seeking to evade checkpoints, forcing people to resort to longer routes riddled with insecurity. One such example is the circuitous route connecting Ad Dabbah in Northern state to Al Malha in North Darfur. While these detours offer some reprieve from checkpoints, they come at a cost, with extended travel times and increased fuel consumption driving up expenses and ultimately burdening already conflict-affected people (FEWS NET 20/03/2024).

IDPs passing through Northern state to Egypt face several migration barriers. The unofficial price that intermediaries charge for visas has increased from around USD 200 at the start of the war to between USD 1,000–3,000. There is also a new requirement to obtain prior security clearance. These requirements, along with the limited capacity at the consulate and increased demand for visas, have resulted in long waiting times. These challenges have led many people to use intermediaries to facilitate the visa process or to leave Sudan clandestinely (KII 18/04/2024; KII 30/04/2024; RI 24/07/2023).

#### Health

The long-term displacement of people in northern Sudan's Wadi Halfa city is taking a toll on their health. Many IDPs are arriving with chronic conditions, such as diabetes and hypertension, and their current living conditions further worsen health problems (SAPA 12/04/2024).

Wadi Halfa Hospital stands out as the best-equipped facility in the region, with specialists and services unavailable elsewhere. It has numerous medical facilities offering essential services, such as antenatal care and ambulance services. Being the only facility in a large area with both IDPs and community members, the hospital is severely overcrowded (SAPA 12/04/2024).

## WASH

The war-caused displacement has created a WASH crisis. The surge in population has stretched local WASH systems, threatening the health of both residents and displaced people (IOM 28/03/2024). While the Nile River provides easy access to water, it poses health risks such as bilharzia, and the increased pressure on the river could worsen contamination (SAPA 12/04/2024).

Sanitation and hygiene are also major concerns. While more than 61% of IDP gathering points meet the recommended minimum standards of one toilet for every 20 people, others fall short (SAPA 12/04/2024). This lack of adequate sanitation facilities creates a significant risk of disease outbreaks. In these overcrowded sites, some IDPs resort to showering in latrines, further worsening hygiene problems (UNHCR accessed 17/04/2024).

## Food and nutrition

The influx of displaced people in Northern state is straining food security and nutrition, especially for vulnerable groups, such as children. Food is available but not affordable for the majority of IDPs (IOM 28/03/2024; SAPA 12/04/2024). The biggest concern is the lack of available treatment for severe malnutrition. Hospitals are already overcrowded, and most lack the capacity to provide stabilisation care for critical cases. Supplies for treating moderate malnutrition are running low, putting children at risk of developing more severe conditions (SAPA 12/04/2024).

Wheat production in recession-hit regions of Northern state is likely to decline because of high input costs and limited access to financing. As of mid- February 2024, 27–40% of these areas had poorer vegetation health compared to the same period in 2021, a year with good wheat yields (FEWS NET 20/03/2024).

## Rise in cost of living

Recent internet outages have hampered access to banking systems, affecting IDPs' cash access (IOM 28/03/2024). Restricted cash flow also affects local markets and host communities. With limited cash, IDPs are less likely to buy goods and services, potentially harming local businesses that rely on consumer spending.

Fuel prices have skyrocketed since the war began in April 2023, increasing in the official market by an average of 120%. The situation is even worse on the parallel market, with prices jumping by 180%. Currently, official prices range between \$ 1.88-5.95 per litre (FEWS NET 20/03/2024). Similarly, by June 2023, the cost of renting a house in Wadi Halfa had quadrupled from USD 17 to USD 68 (Dabanga 27/06/2023).


## Protection

Women and children face a heightened risk of sexual violence and exploitation. Children also face the risk of being forced into war as soldiers or labourers or separated from their families. The psychological trauma that these experiences inflict can last for years (UNFPA 15/10/2023; GCR2P 15/06/2023).

## Response proportion of IDPs to host communities

Response proportion refers to the relative numbers of IDPs compared to host communities within a specific locality. The goal is to demonstrate the distribution of the displaced population and the burden placed on host communities in different areas.

Figure 1. Response proportion of IDPs to host communities in the Northern State



Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (22/12/2023)

Administrative divisions of Northern state demonstrate varying but generally robust planning in addressing the needs of both host and IDP populations. While each locality faces unique challenges, there is a strong commitment to solidarity and inclusivity overall. In some areas, such as Halfa and Dongola, the response capacity is particularly dependable, with targeted assistance reaching both the host communities and the significant numbers of IDPs they accommodate. Delgo and Al Burgaig maintain a balanced approach, ensuring equitable support for both hosts and displaced individuals despite facing nearly equal populations

of each group. Ad Dabbah, Al Golid, and Merwoe exhibit resilience in the face of challenges, with the ability to provide aid to both hosts and IDPs, albeit with varying degrees of capacity (OCHA 22/12/2023).

## River Nile state

### Displacement

The number of IDPs in River Nile state has grown significantly, with more than 700,000 reported in April 2024 (IOM 21/04/2024). The vast majority (98%) come from Bahri (Khartoum north), Khartoum, and Sharg An Neel localities of Khartoum state (IOM 08/04/2024 and 28/03/2024).

Like Northern state, River Nile acts as a passage for displaced communities heading to other destinations within Sudan or neighbouring countries. Others are moving intrastate, seeking better services or job opportunities, with only limited returns to Khartoum based on perceived improved security. 81% of IDPs identify food security, health, and livelihood as priority needs (IOM 28/03/2024).

### Poor living conditions

75% of IDPs are residing with host communities, 19% are in rented accommodations, and 6% are in schools and other public buildings (IOM 28/03/2024). Large families live in crowded and small spaces, often with more than five people sharing a single room (FAO et al. 27/11/2023).

At the beginning of May 2024, authorities in Atbara forcibly expelled displaced people from schools that had served as shelters since the war began. The displaced families, including those with young children, reported receiving minimal notice and experienced forceful evictions. The authorities maintain that it offered alternative housing with essential services, but the families contend that the new location lacks adequate facilities (Dabanga 01/05/2024).

### Impact on children

The war has severely disrupted children's education, which is available to 86% of IDPs but remains affected by overcrowding (IOM 28/03/2024). Children are out of school because of a lack of necessities, such as proper seating and school supplies, as well as the conversion of schools into gathering sites. Displacement has also taken a psychological toll on children. In Ad Damar, children exhibit signs of violence and trauma as a result of their experiences during the war. Child labour is also present in the community. Beyond the emotional scars, children also face safety hazards from risky swimming spots and scorpions in their play areas (FAO et al. 27/11/2023).

### Malnutrition and limited healthcare

The increased prevalence of diseases, such as cholera, has heightened the demand for medicine and medical equipment, contributing to significant gaps in the healthcare sector (IOM 28/03/2024). Medical facilities lack the resources to address non-communicable diseases, mental health concerns, and family planning needs. Electricity shortages further complicate matters, hindering vaccine storage and the use of medical equipment. Essential medicines, including those for chronic illnesses, malaria, tuberculosis, and reproductive health, are in short supply (FAO et al. 27/11/2023).

In January 2024, cholera cases were detected in three localities, with the majority in Ad Damar locality in Sidon administrative unit. Mining activities can disrupt sanitation infrastructure and practices, creating ideal conditions for cholera spread, leading to concerns about the potential effects of mining in the state and the continued IDP influx (Sudan Tribune 19/01/2024).

### Food insecurity and livelihood losses

The IDP influx has worsened existing shortages of essential items. Conflict-related displacement has resulted in severe food insecurity for many families, primarily through the loss of assets, which has disrupted their ability to maintain food reserves (IOM 28/03/2024). Limited access to markets because of transportation difficulties and lack of funds further worsens the situation. Before the war, in Ad Damar locality the majority of IDPs and their host community were farmers or government employees, but farming activities were disrupted, and government salaries have remained unpaid since April 2023. Most IDPs rely on daily wages, engaging in small market sales and infrequent aid distributions to survive (KII 30/04/2024; KII 19/04/2024). /2023). Most IDPs rely on daily wages, engaging in small market sales and infrequent aid distributions to survive (KII 30/04/2024; KII 19/04/2024).


### Ethnic targeting and detention

Security forces in River Nile state face accusations of targeting and detaining individuals from Darfur and Kordofan, alleging their affiliation with the RSF. There are reports of beatings, torture, and even extrajudicial killings of detainees from the two regions (DNHR 19/12/2023; Dabanga 16/01/2024). Similarly, in January 2024, the governor of River Nile state claimed that informal workers were collaborating with the RSF to disrupt regional stability (Sudan Tribune 19/01/2024).

## Response proportion of IDPs to host communities

The distribution of IDPs across River Nile state presents a challenge for ensuring equitable access to resources and targeting humanitarian assistance effectively (OCHA 21/12/2023). Localities with a high concentration of IDPs are struggling to meet the needs of both displaced and host communities because of the strain on resources (OCHA 22/12/2023).

Figure 2. Response proportion for IDPs and host communities in River Nile State



Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (22/12/2024)

Across all administrative divisions, substantial numbers of both host community members and IDPs need assistance. Ad Damar has the highest number of both host community members and IDPs, with more than 109,000 individuals in each category. Al Matama, Atbara, and Shendi also have significant IDP populations, each hosting more than 100,000 individuals. While some areas, including Shendi and Atbara, demonstrate a relatively close match between the numbers of host community members and IDPs targeted, others, such as Al Matama and Ad Damar, show a larger gap. This indicates potential challenges in targeting assistance effectively (OCHA 22/12/2023).

## CRISIS DRIVERS

### Conflict

Fighting in neighbouring states is a primary reason for people to flee their homes. Insecurity in areas of origin forces people to seek refuge in places they perceive to be secure. Whilst lack of security in states located along routes to places of habitual residence discourages return (IOM 28/03/2024). This is keeping IDPs in a state of limbo in Northern and River Nile states, prolonging the crisis and straining resources in the host states. The potential for RSF advancement to the region also poses a threat and leads to continued displacement (ACLED 12/01/2024).

### Resource scarcity

Both Khartoum and Aj Jazirah, the main origin states for IDPs in the north, are struggling with shortages of food, water, sanitation facilities, and healthcare. Limited access to livelihoods and services compels displaced people to move to areas perceived to have better resources (IOM 02/04/2024). The lack of job opportunities in areas of origin also contributes to displacement, meaning that people are moving to find work and support themselves and their families (IOM 28/03/2024). There is also a significant number of IDPs moving north in search of medical attention (KII 30/04/2024).

## COMPOUNDING/AGGRAVATING FACTORS

### Limited resources strained further

The immense number of displaced people (more than 1.1 million) creates a demand for necessities and basic services that exceeds available resources in both states (IOM 08/04/2024). The IDP influx strains existing infrastructure, such as water systems, sanitation facilities, and healthcare services, leading to further shortages and limited access.

### Migration

Both states serve as transit points for displaced communities. This makes it challenging to accurately track needs and provide assistance as people move. Insecurity in neighbouring states discourages return, keeping IDPs in a state of limbo. The opening of a new passport issuance centre in Atbara, River Nile state, as well as the presence of the Egyptian consulate in Northern state, will continue to attract populations on the move (IOM 28/03/2024; Egypt e-Visa accessed 08/04/2024).

### Climate conditions

The expected hot and dry weather with minimal rainfall in River Nile and Northern states over the next three months poses significant challenges for displaced communities (AccuWeather accessed 23/04/2024 a; AccuWeather accessed 23/04/2024 b). High temperatures increase the risk of heat-related health issues, particularly among displaced groups living in makeshift shelters (Shelter Cluster 15/04/2024). Limited access to clean water increases water scarcity, heightening the risk of waterborne diseases and food insecurity (OCHA 17/05/2023). The arid climate affects agriculture and livestock, which are often vital for livelihood, leading to economic instability (iMMAP et al. 31/10/2023). Fragile shelters face vulnerability to extreme weather events such as dust storms, further compromising the safety and wellbeing of displaced individuals (Shelter Cluster 15/04/2024).

## FUNDING AND RESPONSE CAPACITY

By 25 April, the 2024 response plan for Sudan was funded at 10.3% of the USD 2.7 billion goal to assist 14.7 million people in need (OCHA accessed 30/04/2024; OCHA 14/04/2024)..

### Northern state

By March 2024, a total of eight organisations had active humanitarian projects in Northern state. These included UN agencies as well as national and international NGOs (OCHA 24/04/2024).

Figure 3. Response in Northern state per cluster

**Northern state**

Cluster	People in need	People targeted	People reached	% People reached
Education	146,500	73,200	0	0%
Food security & livelihood	370,300	290,700	340,000	117%
Health	27,300	0	32,300	0%
Nutrition		0	1,700	0%
General protection	174,700	119,400	10,800	9%
Child protection	13,100	3,200	3,100	97%
Gender-based violence	64,100	52,500	0	0%
Shelter & NFIs	115,300	115,300	30,400	26%
WASH	265,600	0	33,200	0%
Refugee response	1,100	1,100	0	0%

Created with Datawrapper

Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (accessed 08/04/2024)

Based on Figure 3, food security and livelihood are major concerns, with a substantial portion of the population identified as in need of assistance. General protection and education needs follow, though to a lesser extent. Other needs, including health, nutrition, and gender-based violence, are also significant and require significant degrees of attention. When it comes to targeting efforts, there is a concerted attempt to address these needs, as indicated by the sizable populations targeted for assistance across various clusters, although the actual reach varies. While efforts in food security and livelihood have surpassed the targeted



population, other areas such as health, education, and general protection show lower reach percentages, suggesting challenges. There are clusters where the percentage of people reached is notably lower than others, such as education, gender-based violence, and refugee response, where no individuals were reached at all. This indicates potential challenges including obstacles in aid delivery.

### River Nile state

A total of nine organisations were active in humanitarian projects in March 2024 in River Nile state. These organisations included UN agencies and national and international NGOs, demonstrating a diverse range of responders providing humanitarian assistance in the region (OCHA 24/04/2024).

Figure 4. Response in River Nile state per cluster

#### River Nile



Cluster	People in need	People targeted	People reached	% People reached
Education	388,800	194,400	0	0%
Food security & livelihood	495,500	388,900	509,900	131%
Health	91,800	0	1,400	0%
Nutrition		0	6,900	0%
General protection	145,600	80,100	0	0%
Child protection	22,000	2,500	530	22%
Gender-based violence	57,200	51,400	0	0%
Shelter & NFIs	88,900	88,900	20,000	22%
WASH	132,900	2,500	386,100	15626%
Refugee response	3,600	3,600	0	0%

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
Source: ACAPS using data from (OCHA accessed 08/04/2024)

Based on Figure 4, education is a significant area requiring attention. A large number of individuals have been identified as in need, yet no one has been reached. Similarly, general protection and gender-based violence are substantial needs, but no individuals have received aid in these areas. On the other hand, food security and livelihood interventions have surpassed the targeted population.

Health and nutrition assistance show relatively lower numbers in both targeting and reaching populations, indicating potential limitations or challenges in these areas of response. Likewise, child protection efforts, while reaching a portion of the targeted population, suggest that the cluster is facing challenges in broadening their reach. Shelter and NFI also present significant needs, but the percentage of people reached is relatively low, suggesting obstacles in effectively delivering aid.

In contrast, the WASH sector stands out with an exceptionally high percentage of individuals reached. Lastly, the refugee response area shows no indication of individuals being reached despite the identified population in need.

Map 1. Displacement in the north



Source: ACAPS using data from IOM (08/04/2024)