

YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

JUNE 2024 - REPORT #3

KEY MESSAGES

- This Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling, which uses data up to April 2024, indicates that 2.9 million people reside in areas at risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse food insecurity conditions, with the vast majority situated in areas under Government of Yemen (GoY) control. This marks an increase of 400,000 people (16%) from the 2.5 million identified in the January JMR modeling.¹
- In March, food insecurity escalated significantly, with insufficient food consumption reaching unprecedented levels just before Ramadan (mid-March to mid-April), according to FAO high-frequency monitoring. Contributing factors included the temporary halt of food assistance in areas under Ansar Allah (AA) control, currency depreciation in GoY areas, and seasonal agricultural trends. WFP monthly monitoring updates indicate that the food security situation has deteriorated for people in AA governorates reliant on general food assistance who are no longer receiving so. Poor food consumption was particularly noted in Hajjah, one of the areas that the pause in assistance affected the most.
- In April, the Food Consumption Score improved compared to March, thanks in part to social support during Ramadan. Beyond this improvement, however, 60% of households faced shocks and income reductions. 52.9% and 41.9% of households in GoY- and AA-controlled governorates, respectively, reported inadequate food consumption. According to WFP, the prevalence of inadequate food consumption was notably higher during Ramadan in 2024 compared to last year (34% higher and 13% higher in AA- and GoY-controlled areas, respectively).
- In March and April, moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) and severe acute malnutrition (SAM) admissions respectively declined, likely in relation to fasting practices, healthcare disruptions, and increased remittances related to Ramadan. The slight improvement in household food security is likely temporary, leading to a rise in admissions. During the same period, three southern zones showed a significant rise in global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates, with Al Hodeidah surpassing the 30% threshold, requiring urgent intervention.
- Intense rainfall in mid-April resulted in flooding that notably affected IDP camps in Hadramawt governorate. The Executive Unit for IDPs reported that 1,335 IDP households residing in Al Abr, Al Mukalla, and Sayun districts in Hadramawt governorate suffered complete or partial damage to their shelters, NFIs, and food supplies. IDPs in Abyan (458 households), Ad Dali' (423 households), Al Maharah (258 households), Ma'rib (540 households), Sa'dah (287 households), Shabwah (51 households), and Ta'iz (110 households) faced worsened conditions because of floods and sandstorms. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation has appealed for urgent international aid.
- In late 2023, a cholera outbreak in Shabwah governorate expanded countrywide, resulting in about 50,000 acute watery diarrhea (AWD) and cholera cases and more than 200 fatalities until May 2024. From January–April 2024, AWD cases in therapeutic feeding centers increased by over 140% compared to 2023. Most cases were in the AA-controlled areas, but GoY-controlled areas saw a significant rise. Children with SAM are at heightened risk of falling ill. A national cholera task force under the Ministry of Public Health and Population and Ministry of Water and Environment leadership collaborated with UNICEF and WHO to devise a response plan. By May 2024, the task force had received only 24% of the USD 28 million in funding needed for the response that included the establishment of 18 diarrhea treatment centers and 84 oral rehydration corners.
- In February, Yemen's financial system destabilized as the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) branches in Aden and Sana'a clashed over the remittance sector. CBY-Aden's Unified Network for Monetary Transfers (UNMONEY) faced accusations of bias and was banned by CBY-Sana'a, complicating transactions and destabilizing the Yemeni rial. On March 31, CBY-Sana'a introduced a controversial new coin, which CBY-Aden declared illegitimate. On April 2, CBY-Aden demanded that banks relocate to Aden to maintain control over the banking sector and protect it from AA measures. On May 26, CBY-Aden regulated a foreign transfer activity scheme to combat anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, to be implemented by June 6. The JMR team is monitoring developments for the potential economic implications of currency transfer issues that can affect humanitarian programs.

¹ The alerts and calculation of people living in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse conditions are based on statistically robust JMR quantitative indicators. Other factors relevant to food and nutrition insecurity, including a reduction in humanitarian assistance, are incorporated into other parts of this report but not included in the JMR risk alert calculations because of technical considerations.

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- Cyclone conditions in the Gulf of Aden may affect Socotra and Al Maharah, with heightened risks until May. Increased rainfall could cause flash flooding and boost locust populations. Preparedness measures such as continued monitoring and early communication are recommended.
- In April, the exchange rate indicator generated 75 critical risk alerts and 61 heightened risk alerts in GoY governorates. The monthly Yemeni rial average in GoY-controlled areas continued to depreciate, reaching YER 1,661 (USD 1), a 38% depreciation compared to the same period in 2023 and setting a record-high monthly average. Conversely, the exchange rate in AA-controlled governorates remained largely stable at YER 535 (USD 1), showing a 1.4% year-on-year appreciation.
- Food and fuel prices in GoY-controlled areas increased as a result of currency depreciation. Despite tensions in the Red Sea, overall food and fuel imports remained largely consistent, though subject to some fluctuations.
- In April, there were nine heightened risk alerts for conflict in the governorates of Aden, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Lahj, and Sana'a. The primary drivers of these alerts were clashes between the GoY/Southern Transitional Council (STC) and AA in Lahj, attacks by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula on STC forces in Abyan, and tribal violence in Al Bayda and Dhamar, leading to fatalities and violent incidents.
- There were no displacement alerts in April, but in the two months since February, a total of 803 households faced displacement, primarily in Al Hodeidah, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz. March recorded two heightened risk alerts in Ta'iz after the displacement of 99 households because of insecurity and economic reasons.
- There were no drought alerts in April, but March recorded five critical and six heightened drought risk alerts, while February registered 14 critical and four heightened risk alerts. The affected districts included Ad Dali', Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Al Maharah, Amran, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahj, Sa'dah, Socotra, and Ta'iz.

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section offers a synopsis of the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on the JMR key indicators used to signal a deterioration in the food and nutrition security situation. For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In April, the continued devaluation of the exchange rate in GoY-controlled areas led to 75 critical risk alerts and 61 heightened risk alerts across all districts in these areas. This marks an escalation from previous months, which saw only heightened risk alerts for exchange rate concerns in GoY-controlled areas. In April, conflict also triggered nine heightened alerts in Aden, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Lahj, and Sana'a. Refer to Table 1 for an overview of countrywide heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator.

Table 1. Number of heightened and critical food security risk alerts² countrywide by indicator in April and January 2024

INDICATORS	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
	April 2024			January 2024		
 Exchange rate	75	61	All GoY governorates	0	136	All GoY governorates
 Conflict	0	9	Aden Al Bayda Dhamar Lahj Sana'a	0	2	Dhamar Shabwah
 Displacement	0	0		0	11	Al Maharah Hadramawt Ibb
 Drought	0	0		4	1	Abyan Al Bayda Hajjah Ta'iz
 Food prices	0	0		0	0	
 Fuel prices	0	0		0	0	

According to JMR modeling,³ the number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a decline in food and nutrition security classified under IPC 4 or worse has risen, from 2.5 million in January to 2.9 million in April. For a comprehensive historical overview of the population at risk of a decline in food and nutrition security (such as transitioning to IPC 4 or worse) from January 2014 to April 2024, please refer to Annex IV.

2 Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

3 The JMR calculates the probability of food and nutrition insecurity across different districts using a statistical model known as the generalized linear model. This involves an analysis of various risk alerts and their predictive significance in estimating a potential decline in food and nutrition security. A confidence score determines the likelihood of such deterioration, multiplied by the population of the district to project the anticipated number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a deterioration in food and nutrition security (e.g. transitioning to IPC 4 or worse). It is essential to understand that this process involves prediction (forecasting), and it is important to clarify that the JMR does not formally classify IPC phases for districts.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS


This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Exchange rate

In GoY-controlled areas, the monthly average exchange rate continued to depreciate, reaching a record high in April at YER 1,661 per USD 1. This represents a 38% decrease compared to April 2023 and a 7% decrease compared to January 2024 (Map 1). The exchange rate depreciation led to 75 critical risk alerts and 61 heightened risk alerts, all within GoY-controlled governorates. Governorates with critical risk alerts included Aden, Hadramawt, Ma'rib, Socotra, and Ta'iz, while the JMR model recorded heightened risk alerts in Abyan, Ad Dali', Al Maharah, Lahj, and Shabwah.

The depreciation of the exchange rate is primarily attributed to the [dwindling availability of foreign currency reserves](#) from decreased crude oil exports and reduced remittance inflows, compounded by the decision in AA-controlled areas to prohibit the sale and control of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) produced in Ma'rib. Consequently, there has been a notable increase in local food and fuel prices (refer to relevant sections below). In April 2024, the average monthly exchange rate in AA-controlled areas stood at YER 535 per USD 1, marking a 1.4% appreciation from April 2023 and only a slight depreciation (0.75%) compared to January 2024.

Figure 1. YER-USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from April 2023 to April 2024



Source: WB (unpublished)

Conflict

During April, Aden, Al Bayda, Dhamar, Lahj, and Sana'a governorates recorded nine heightened risk alerts. In the first half of the month, skirmishes unfolded between [GoY/STC forces](#) and AA militia along the Shurayjah and Kirsh fronts in Al Qubaytah district in Lahj governorate, killing 26 people. On April 6, the GoY and STC coalition recaptured AA-controlled villages used as launching points for attacks on GoY areas and AA positions in the mountains overseeing the AA-controlled Al Rahidah area in Ta'iz. The offensive killed ten AA fighters. These incidents prompted alerts for Al Burayqah and Dar Sa'd districts in Aden, as well as Al Hawtah and Al Maqatirah districts in Lahj governorate. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula militant assaults against STC forces in Madiyah district in Abyan governorate triggered two heightened risk alerts in Khur Maksar in Aden and Al Malah in Lahj governorate.

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In Al Bayda, a series of violent incidents linked to intertribal conflict in Rada' district resulted in nine fatalities. On April 21, clashes erupted between the Al Muqna and Rassam tribes in Al Wari, Dhamar, killing three people and injuring four. Regional leaders intervened to mediate and de-escalate tensions. While the exact cause of the conflict remains unclear, there are speculations that AA forces were provoking tribal conflicts. This incident raised alerts in Jabal Ash Sharq district in Dhamar and Manakhah district in Sana'a governorate.

Displacement

There were no displacement alerts in April 2024. It is worth noting that some displacement – although not at levels corresponding with heightened or critical alerts – did occur during the monitored months of February (302 households displaced), March (273), and April (228). The majority of displacement was reported in Al Hodeidah, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz governorates. In March, only two heightened risk alerts occurred based on the JMR model, in the districts of Al Ma'afer (96 households displaced) and Jabal Habashi (three) in Ta'iz. The reasons cited for displacement were general insecurity in the former and economic factors in the latter.

Drought

There were no drought-related alerts in April 2024. The JMR model recorded five critical risk alerts and six heightened risk alerts in March, as well as 14 critical risk alerts and four heightened risk alerts in February. The districts that the JMR model flagged for drought risk alerts included Ad Dali', Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Al Maharah, Amran, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahj, Sa'dah, Socotra, and Ta'iz.

The analysis of the Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) showed a low likelihood of water stress in April 2024, though elevated temperatures in coastal areas affected soil moisture and livestock activities. The Vegetation Condition Index (VCI) indicated varied vegetation conditions: Hajjah, Lahj, Abyan, Aden, and Ta'iz had poorer conditions, while Dhamar, Raymah, Ibb, Ad Dali', Sana'a, and Al Bayda saw improvements. Dhamar, Hodeidah, Al Bayda, and Ibb demonstrated good vegetation performance, consistent with changes in the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI).

Map 1. Agricultural Stress Index (ASI) estimates for February, March, and April 2024




Source: FAO (accessed 21/05/2024)

Food prices

In March, the national average price of monitored food items (beans, oil, salt, sugar, and wheat flour) peaked since July 2022, although the levels did not correspond with heightened or critical alerts. The most recent instance of heightened risk alerts for food prices occurred in July 2022, with 23 issued for GoY areas, while the latest in AA areas was 21 alerts in May 2022. Critical risk alerts occurred in December 2021 for GoY areas and October 2018 for AA areas. Moving to April 2024, prices remained consistent with the preceding month but were 4% higher than in January and 12% higher than in April 2023. The cost of the minimum food basket (MFB) in GoY-controlled areas in April 2024 was 5% higher than in January and 20% higher than in April 2023. In AA-controlled areas, the MFB cost rose by 3% in April 2024 compared to January and was consistent with levels in April 2023.

Figure 2. MFB price in GoY and AA areas between April 2023 and April 2024



Source: WB (13/12/2023)

In April, the FAO Cereal Price Index slightly rose by 0.3% from March but remained 18% lower than during the same period last year. Wheat prices stabilized following three months of decline, while maize prices increased as a result of high import demand and logistical disruptions in Ukraine. Rice prices fell by 1.8% compared to March, attributable to poor harvest. The FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index showed a modest increase from March to April, reaching a 13-month price peak. The higher prices of sunflower and grapeseed oil offset declines in palm and soy oil prices. The FAO Sugar Price Index dropped by 4.4% in April, ending 15% lower than in the same period in 2023. Improved global sugar supply enabled lower sugar prices.

Fuel prices

The JMR model incorporates average diesel, petrol, and LPG prices. There were no fuel alerts in April, but 18 and eight heightened risk alerts occurred in March and February, respectively. In both months, Aden experienced eight heightened risk alerts, with the remaining ten in March reported in Sana'a city.

During March, the average prices of petrol and diesel in GoY areas were respectively 5% and 2% higher than in January, marking a significant year-on-year increase (27% and 26%). The increase predominantly stemmed from currency depreciation in GoY-controlled areas. On the other hand, in AA areas, petrol and diesel prices respectively experienced a modest 0.9% and 1.6% increase in March compared to January but were 4% and 17% lower than in March last year.

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
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In GoY areas, the LPG price increased by 3% in March 2024 since January but was 9% lower than in the previous year. In AA areas, the LPG price decreased by almost 4% in March 2024 compared to January and by 3% compared to March 2023. The prices of petrol, diesel, and gas in April 2024 remained steady compared to March 2024.

A significant increase in LPG prices influenced the alerts in Aden. LPG prices jumped by 28% and 16% in March and February, respectively, along with a noticeable increase of 9% in petrol prices compared to January. There was a decrease in diesel prices in March, dropping by 8% compared to January. Conversely, in Sana'a, the ten heightened risk alerts in March were solely linked to a surge in gas prices, which increased by 17% compared to January.

Figure 3. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in GoY and AA areas between April 2023 and April 2024



Source: WB (24/01/2024)


OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information concerning pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Food imports

In April, food imports⁴ to Yemen increased compared to March, totaling 657,000MT, 28% above the 12-month moving average. Importantly, food imports through Red Sea ports under AA control surged by 72% in April compared to March, remaining 28% above the 12-month moving average and marking a 32% year-on-year increase. Notably, food import volumes through Aden and Al Mukalla experienced a substantial 180% growth between February–April compared to the preceding three months, although in April, they were lower than in March.

Figure 4. Monthly food imports (by port) between April 2023 and April 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 16/05/2024)

Fuel imports


In April 2024, total fuel imports decreased by 29% compared to March, marking a 10% decrease year-on-year and remaining 19% below the 12-month moving average. This decline in imports in April follows a period of above-average fuel import volumes in March.

Despite the Red Sea crisis, there have been no disruptions in fuel imports. For April, fuel imports through Red Sea ports were in line with the 12-month moving average, marking a 47% increase compared to April 2023. Although fuel import volumes in April were 5% lower than in March, this drop followed a period of exceptionally high imports in January.

Fuel imports via the GoY-controlled southern ports of Aden and Al Mukalla decreased significantly month on month, plummeting by 86% compared to March and declining by 81% in comparison to the 12-month moving average. Even so, the total fuel imports from February–April were only 11% lower than in the previous three months, November–January.

⁴ For the February–April period, food imports included wheat (64%), corn (14%), soy (6%), rice (5%), sugar (5%), flour (4%), and vegetable oil (2%) (ACAPS accessed 26/05/2024).

Figure 5. Fuel imports by port monthly from April 2023 to April 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 16/05/2024)

Cholera cases

Yemen is facing a **severe outbreak** of AWD and suspected cholera, with around 49,000 cases reported from March 14 to May 18, 2024 (epidemiological weeks 11–20), across all 22 governorates. The majority of cases are in the AA-controlled areas, but there has been a significant rise in cases in GoY-controlled governorates since late March. There are between 500–1,000 new cases daily. Populations with specific vulnerabilities, especially children with SAM, are at heightened risk of illness and death. Between January–April 2024, reports from inpatient therapeutic feeding centers for the management of children with SAM facing medical complications showed a significant increase in the number of cases admitted with AWD – more than 140% compared with admissions during the same period in 2023. Heavy rains and flooding have contaminated water sources since the beginning of the rainy season in April, worsening the situation.

A national cholera task force began work in Sana’a and Aden, co-chaired by the Ministry of Public Health and Population and the Ministry of Water and Environment, with UNICEF and WHO providing technical support. The response plan requires USD 28 million. With only 24% of the financial needs mobilized by May 2024, the plan urgently requires additional funding. Other challenges include supply shortages, poor WASH infrastructure, and the reluctance of patients to seek care. Responders have developed an interagency response plan focusing on treatment and containment, with 18 diarrhea treatment centers and 84 oral rehydration corners established and more planned.

Floods

Prolonged rainfall starting from April 16 led to flooding during the week of April 20. The floods significantly affected Hadramawt governorate, with intense rainfall and subsequent inundations that especially affected IDP camps. The Executive Unit for IDPs reported that 1,335 IDP households residing in Hosh Al Adros, Madouda, Maryamah, and Northern Gharran camps (in Al Abr, Al Mukalla, and Sayun districts) suffered complete or partial damage to their shelters, NFIs, and food supplies. Affected households require urgent intervention through the delivery of emergency shelters, NFI kits, and food packages.

Heavy rains in Ar Rayan, Al Jawf governorate, in April damaged shelters and affected 1,700 families. IDPs in Al Jawf currently face worsening conditions aggravated by floods and sandstorms. The weather conditions affected 540 IDP households in Ma’rib and damaged 51 shelters in Shabwah. Intense rains in Sa’dah also affected 287 households, while Abyan’s floods affected 458 IDP households in Altwmasi Camp. In Ad Dali’, extensive rains affected 423 households. Al Maharah experienced sandstorms affecting 258 households, and floods in Ta’iz affected 110 IDP households. The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation has issued an appeal for urgent international assistance to address the widespread needs arising from recent floods.

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

Food Consumption Score

In March 2024, food insecurity worsened, with inadequate food consumption reaching highs just before Ramadan. While most food insecurity indicators were worse in AA-controlled areas, inadequate food consumption was 6% higher in GoY areas. Several contributing factors drove this deterioration: the reduction in humanitarian food assistance in AA-controlled areas, local currency depreciation in GoY areas, and typical seasonal trends such as post-harvest-season shortages, when household food stocks and agricultural income begin to decline (February–March). The highest recorded decrease in household income, particularly in AA-areas, indicates an earlier-than-normal seasonal food stock depletion.

In April, the prevalence of households reporting inadequate food consumption decreased compared to the previous month, mostly because of the social support and charity experienced during Ramadan. Despite the improvement, 60% of households still experienced shocks and income decreases in April, with a higher proportion among households in AA areas compared to those in GoY areas. Inadequate food consumption in April was 52.9% among households in GoY areas and 41.9% for households in AA-controlled governorates. Food security has worsened for people previously relying on humanitarian aid in AA-controlled governorates, particularly Hajjah, where poor food consumption rose by 165% from November to February following a reduction in food aid since December.

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

In April, the prevalence of households using severe food-based coping strategies decreased by 2.7% in AA areas but increased by 2.6% in GoY areas compared to the previous month. Similarly, the use of crisis and emergency livelihood coping strategies was 6.2% lower in AA areas and 2.4% lower in GoY areas in April. Overall, households employed potentially harmful coping strategies more commonly in AA areas.

Moderate and severe acute malnutrition

Ramadan contributed to a decline in MAM and SAM admissions in March and early April. Fasting practices, such as restricting food and low activity levels of caregivers during the day, and disruptions in healthcare services during Ramadan also influenced this decline. Increased remittances during this period may have also improved household food security, leading to better dietary diversity and households' ability to seek health services from private health facilities. That said, the improvements are likely short-lived, and admission trends are expected to rise in the coming months.

In the 15 Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions surveys conducted in GoY areas from October 2023 to February 2024, the three zones of Lahj Lowland, Ta'iz Lowland, and Al Hodeidah Southern Lowland showed GAM prevalence of 20.2%, 24.2%, and 33.9%, respectively. While the rest of the zones had GAM rates relatively comparable to the previous year, these three zones experienced a significant deterioration, with Al Hodeidah surpassing the 30% threshold for Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5) classification and requiring urgent intervention.

OUTLOOK

Food insecurity

Food insecurity is expected to worsen in the upcoming months, peaking around July to August 2024. This trend aligns with seasonal patterns and an anticipated increase in localized conflict during that timeframe. Additionally, decreased humanitarian assistance, the persistent macroeconomic crisis economic downturn, and the significant increase in the cost of essential food items are likely to pose challenges for households and institutions, exacerbating the crisis. This will be exacerbated by continued tensions across the Middle East region.

Monetary policies

In [February](#), Yemen's financial system destabilized further as CBY-Aden and CBY-Sana'a clashed over control of the remittance sector, essential for many Yemenis. CBY-Aden introduced UNMONEY to enhance transparency in government-controlled areas. This decision sparked accusations of favoring AA interests from the STC-affiliated Southern Money Changers Syndicate since there are [reports](#) that a Sana'a-headquartered company is managing the new network. CBY-Sana'a, however, retaliated by banning dealings with UNMONEY and restricting remittance flows to Saudi riyals, complicating transactions and destabilizing the Yemeni rial. Despite a temporary truce in late March, the underlying conflict persists, complicating efforts to stabilize the economy and manage monetary policy effectively.

On [March 31](#), CBY-Sana'a introduced a new metal coin to replace deteriorating 100-rial banknotes, claiming it would not affect exchange rates, but the lack of transparency and potential for further coin issuance raised inflation concerns. The GoY and CBY-Aden branded the coin illegitimate and warned against its use, fearing trade disruption and exchange system destabilization. This move deepened the monetary divide that the 2020 AA ban on newly printed rials created, complicating future monetary policy unification and undermining public trust in the financial system.

On [April 2](#), CBY-Aden demanded all Yemeni banks to relocate their headquarters to Aden within 60 days to maintain control over the banking sector and protect it from AA measures. Banks failing to comply faced legal repercussions, including exclusion from international financial networks, compromising their operations. This stringent resolution follows CBY-Aden's 2021 relocation request and reflects heightened tensions. The escalating competition between Yemen's central banks threatens overall economic stability.

On [May 26](#), CBY-Aden released a circular regulating the practice of foreign transfer activity through international remittance companies. This circular mandated all external remittance activity to qualify and meet the requirements, conditions, and standards approved by CBY-Aden. This was designed to combat anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing, with plans for implementation by June 6. The JMR team continues to monitor these developments to assess potential implications on the economy in both areas of control and the risk of humanitarian program disruptions caused by potential currency transfer issues between Aden and Sana'a.

Rainfall forecasts

Recent [heavy rains](#) in the central highland governorates have caused flooding in Al Dali' and Ibb, increasing the risk of waterborne diseases. As the Saif rainy season concludes, storms in the Gulf of Aden may create cyclone conditions that could affect Socotra and Al Maharah. Forecasts indicate a heightened cyclone risk in the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea until the end of May 2024. Increased rainfall (20–40mm) in eastern Yemen, especially coastal Al Maharah, could lead to flash flooding. Above-average rainfall along Yemen's eastern coast, particularly in Al Maharah, may also boost locust populations during the spring breeding cycle. Monitoring and early communication are recommended for preparedness.

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ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate in April 2024

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate. For April 2024, 136 districts in ten different governorates raised exchange rate alerts. Conflict alerts occurred in five governorates.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate

GOVERNORATE	EXCHANGE RATE		CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENTS		DROUGHT		FOOD PRICE		FUEL PRICE	
	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED
Hadramawt	28											
Ta'iz	23											
Ma'rib	14											
Aden	8			3								
Socotra	2											
Lahj		15		3								
Shabwah		17										
Abyan		11										
Ad Dali'		9										
Al Maharah		9										
Al Bayda				1								
Dhamar				1								
Sana'a				1								
Al Hodeidah												
Al Jawf												
Al Mahwit												
Amran												
Hajjah												
Ibb												
Raymah												
Sa'dah												
Sana'a City												
TOTAL	75	61	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Annex II. JMR alerts by district in April 2024, districts at most risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest risk of food and nutrition security deterioration are highlighted. The table highlights critical alerts, heightened alerts, and typical status per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 3. JMR alerts by district with a higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	EXCHANGE RATE	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENTS	DROUGHT	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Aden	Al Burayqah	2	1				
Aden	Dar Sa'd	2	1				
Aden	Khur Maksar	2	1				
Aden	Al Mansurah	2					
Aden	Al Mu'alla	2					
Aden	Ash Shaykh Othman	2					
Aden	At Tawahi	2					
Aden	Kritar - Sirah	2					
Hadramawt	Ad Dis	2					
Hadramawt	Ad Dulay'ah	2					
Hadramawt	Al Abr	2					
Hadramawt	Al Mukalla	2					
Hadramawt	Al Mukalla City	2					
Hadramawt	Al Qaff	2					
Hadramawt	Al Qatn	2					
Hadramawt	Amd	2					
Hadramawt	Ar Raydah wa Qussay'ar	2					
Hadramawt	As Sawm	2					
Hadramawt	Ash Shihr	2					
Hadramawt	Brum Mayf'ah	2					
Hadramawt	Daw'an	2					
Hadramawt	Ghayl Bawazir	2					
Hadramawt	Ghayl bin Yamin	2					
Hadramawt	Hajar	2					
Hadramawt	Hajar As Say'ar	2					
Hadramawt	Haridah	2					
Hadramawt	Rakhyah	2					
Hadramawt	Rumah	2					
Hadramawt	Sah	2					
Hadramawt	Sayun	2					
Hadramawt	Shibam	2					
Hadramawt	Tarim	2					
Hadramawt	Thamud	2					
Hadramawt	Wadi Al Ayn	2					
Hadramawt	Yab'uth	2					
Hadramawt	Zamakh wa Manwokh	2					
Ma'rib	Al Abdiyah	2					
Ma'rib	Al Jubah	2					
Ma'rib	Bidbadah	2					

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
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GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	EXCHANGE RATE	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENTS	DROUGHT	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Ma'rib	Harib	2					
Ma'rib	Harib Al Qaramish	2					
Ma'rib	Jabal Murad	2					
Ma'rib	Madghal Al Jid'an	2					
Ma'rib	Mahliyah	2					
Ma'rib	Majzar	2					
Ma'rib	Ma'rib	2					
Ma'rib	Ma'rib City	2					
Ma'rib	Raghwan	2					
Ma'rib	Rahabah	2					
Ma'rib	Sirwah	2					
Socotra	Hadibu	2					
Socotra	Qalansiyah wa Abd Al Kuri	2					
Ta'iz	Al Ma'afer	2					
Ta'iz	Al Makha	2					
Ta'iz	Al Mawasit	2					
Ta'iz	Al Misrakh	2					
Ta'iz	Al Mudhaffar	2					
Ta'iz	Al Qahirah	2					
Ta'iz	Al Wazi'yah	2					
Ta'iz	As Silw	2					
Ta'iz	Ash Shamaya-tayn	2					
Ta'iz	At Ta'iziyah	2					
Ta'iz	Dhubab	2					
Ta'iz	Dimnat Khadir	2					
Ta'iz	Hayfan	2					
Ta'iz	Jabal Habashi	2					
Ta'iz	Maqbanah	2					
Ta'iz	Mashr'ah Wa Hadnan	2					
Ta'iz	Mawiyah	2					
Ta'iz	Mawza'	2					
Ta'iz	Sabir Al Mawadim	2					
Ta'iz	Salah	2					
Ta'iz	Sami'	2					
Ta'iz	Shar'ab Ar Rawnah	2					
Ta'iz	Shar'ab As Salam	2					
Lahj	Al Hawtah	1	1				
Lahj	Al Malah	1	1				
Lahj	Al Maqatirah	1	1				

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to April 2024)

Figure 6 shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.


Figure 6. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to April 2024)



Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4+ (January 2014 to January 2024)

Figure 7 shows the population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food security into IPC 4 or worse between January 2014 and January 2024. IPC data of the population in IPC 4 or worse was overlaid with JMR data to show similarities between the population estimated to be at risk from JMR and IPC figures.

Figure 7. Percentage of population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or worse (January 2014 to April 2024)



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Annex V. Sources and time frames of risk indicators, target variables, and food and nutrition outcome indicators

Table 4. Indicators' sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
RISK INDICATOR				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	04/30/2024
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	04/30/2024
Drought	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/1981	04/30/2024
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	04/30/2024
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	04/30/2024
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	04/30/2024
TARGET VARIABLE				
FEWS NET	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	02/01/2024
FOOD AND NUTRITION OUTCOME INDICATORS				
FCS	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	01/01/2024
rCSI	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	01/01/2024
IPC	IPC	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/b70c2734-2339-4a4d-a69d-fa2bd3225156/resource/5e7ac2dd-84c1-4177-b009-0c47b1f20a9a/download/ipc_yem_area_wide.csv	12/01/2018	05/01/2023
GAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
MAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
SAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging food and nutrition security crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation that the Yemen JMR uses is available in the [Policy Research Working Paper](#) by the World Bank. Further nutrition analysis is planned for future iterations of the JMR.

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