

YEMEN JOINT MONITORING REPORT

BIMONTHLY UPDATE ON FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY CRISIS RISKS

AUGUST - REPORT #4

KEY MESSAGES

- The Joint Monitoring Report (JMR) modeling, which uses data up to June 2024, indicates that 2.6 million people reside in areas at risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse food insecurity conditions, with the vast majority situated in areas under Government of Yemen (GoY) control. This marks a decrease of 300,000 people (11%) from the 2.9 million identified in the April JMR modeling.¹
- In May, food insecurity worsened in GoY-controlled areas compared to April, with 54% of households reporting inadequate food consumption based on [FAO High Frequency Monitoring](#). In areas under Ansar Allah (AA) control, worsening food security was reported by 42% of households. While the use of severe food-based coping strategies decreased by 2% in GoY areas and remained unchanged in AA areas, crisis and emergency livelihood coping strategies increased by 5% in GoY areas but decreased by 4% in AA areas, with overall coping strategy use being more prevalent in AA-controlled areas. [According to WFP](#), the prevalence of inadequate food consumption in May was 60% for households in GoY-controlled areas and 57% among AA-controlled areas.
- The latest IPC malnutrition analysis indicates a significant deterioration in GoY-controlled areas from November 2023 to October 2024. An estimated 609,809 children under five are acutely malnourished, including 118,570 severe cases, alongside 222,000 malnourished pregnant and lactating women. Four districts (in Al Hodeidah and Ta'iz) are projected to face an extremely critical phase by October 2024, the highest phase of the IPC AMN scale.
- Yemen has been experiencing a [severe outbreak](#) of acute watery diarrhea (AWD) and suspected cholera, with nearly 105,000 cases reported since October 2023. Between epidemiological weeks 20–26 (mid-May–June), 55,000 cases emerged, primarily in AA-controlled areas but with rising numbers in GoY-controlled regions. Malnourished children are at heightened risk of contracting these diseases.
- In June, the [exchange rate](#) indicator generated 43 critical risk alerts and 93 heightened risk alerts in GoY governorates. The monthly Yemeni rial average in GoY-controlled areas continued to depreciate, reaching YER 1,714 (USD 1), a 27% depreciation compared to the same period in 2023 and a record-high monthly average. Conversely, the exchange rate in AA-controlled governorates remained largely stable at YER 536 (USD 1).
- In June, the conflict indicator recorded 14 heightened risk alerts, largely driven by [fatalities](#) in Al Qubaytah district in Lahj governorate and in Hayfan district in Ta'iz governorate in May and June. AA forces escalated attacks on commercial ships, with [16 incidents](#) in June, the highest this year, including the sinking of the Tutor bulk carrier using a drone boat, marking an escalation in maritime tactics.
- The [IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix](#) reported that 810 people were newly displaced in June, the lowest count since at least the beginning of 2024 – 40% lower than in April and 60% lower than in May. This number did not surpass the alert thresholds. Overall, between 1 January and 29 June, at least 9,732 people were displaced in Yemen, mostly into or within Al Hodeidah, Ma'rib, and Ta'iz governorates.
- There were no drought alerts in May or June. Lack of rainfall, however, led to some limited drought conditions in May and early June in Amran and Al Hodeidah governorates.
- Overall [food and fuel imports](#) remained largely consistent in May and June, though subject to some fluctuations. The cost of the [minimum food basket](#) (MFB) in GoY-controlled areas in June increased nearly 4% from April and 16% from June 2023. In AA-controlled areas, the MFB cost increased by 5% from April and 2% from June 2023 likely due to the impact deriving from the banking crisis before parties reached an agreement to de-escalate measures.
- In early 2024, the introduction of new measures – including the launch of a new coin in AA areas, the demand that banks relocate from Sana'a to Aden, and further regulations on foreign transfers – led to increased tensions between CBY-Aden and CBY-Sana'a and destabilized the overall financial system. The FAO reported in June that these disruptions were likely to worsen food insecurity, as household purchasing power was going to further reduce as a result of currency depreciation, increased food prices, and reduced remittances. On [22 July](#), the GoY and AA agreed on

¹ Alerts and calculations of people living in areas at risk of deteriorating into IPC 4 or worse are based on statistically robust JMR quantitative indicators. Other factors relevant to food and nutrition insecurity are incorporated into other parts of this report but not included in JMR risk alert calculations because of technical considerations.

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cancelling all the recent decisions against banks by both sides and refraining from similar actions in the future.

- The [FAO Agrometeorological Early Warning Bulletin](#) predicts that increased rainfall will enhance early farming conditions while raising flood risks, especially in coastal and low-lying areas. From July–September, areas such







as Ibb governorate and the Central Highlands expect over 200mm of rain, with typically dry governorates such as Hadramawt receiving up to 40mm. Poor drainage and environmental conditions contribute to the increased risk of flash floods, affecting food security and waterborne diseases.

AGGREGATED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ALERTS AND RISK SEVERITY

This section summarizes the heightened and critical alerts recorded based on JMR key indicators of deteriorating food and nutrition security. For a more detailed breakdown of indicator alerts by governorate and district, please refer to Annexes I and II.

In June, the continuing exchange rate depreciation in GoY-controlled areas led to 43 critical and 93 heightened risk alerts across all districts in these areas.² Compared to April data from the last JMR publication, the number of critical alerts decreased (from 75) and the number of heightened risk alerts increased (from 61). In June, conflict also triggered 14 heightened risk alerts in Lahj and Ta'iz governorates. Refer to Table 1 for an overview of countrywide heightened and critical food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator.

Table 1. Number of heightened and critical food security risk alerts countrywide by indicator in April and June 2024

INDICATORS	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE	CRITICAL RISK ALERTS	HEIGHTENED RISK ALERTS	GOVERNORATE
	APRIL 2024			JUNE 2024		
 Exchange rate	75	61	All GoY governorates	43	93	All GoY governorates
 Conflict	0	9	Aden Al Bayda Dhamar Lahj Sana'a	0	14	Aden Al Hodeidah Dhamar Hajjah Lahj Sana'a Ta'iz
 Displacement	0	0		0	0	
 Drought	0	0		0	0	
 Food prices	0	0		0	0	
 Fuel prices	0	0		0	0	
TOTAL	75	70		43	107	

² Critical alerts identify areas where a deterioration in food security is almost certain based on historical trends. Decision makers should consider these areas high priority. Heightened alerts identify areas where there is a high chance of deterioration in food and nutrition security and provide decision makers a good overview of current food and nutrition security trends countrywide.

JMR modeling shows that, in June, there were 2.6 million people (nearly 8% of the population) residing in areas at risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or worse food insecurity conditions.³ This marks a decrease from 2.9 million in April. For a comprehensive historical overview of the population at risk of a decline in food and nutrition security (such as transitioning to IPC 4 or worse) from January 2014 to June 2024, please refer to Annex IV.

SELECTED CRISIS RISK INDICATOR ANALYSIS


This section offers context-specific details related to each crisis risk indicator, providing a more detailed analysis of the factors triggering risk alerts.

Exchange rate

In GoY-controlled areas, the monthly average exchange rate continued to depreciate, reaching a new record high in June of YER 1,714/USD 1. This represents a 27% depreciation compared to June 2023 and a 2.7% depreciation compared to April 2024 (Figure 1). The exchange rate depreciation led to 43 critical risk alerts and 93 heightened risk alerts, all within GoY-controlled governorates. Governorates with critical risk alerts included Aden, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Socotra, and Ta'iz, while the JMR model recorded heightened risk alerts in Abyan, Ad Dali', Hadramawt, Lahj, Ma'rib, and Shabwah. In June 2024, the average monthly exchange rate in AA-controlled areas stood at YER 536/USD 1, marking a slight depreciation of 0.7% compared to April 2024 and 0.4% compared to June 2023.

The depreciating exchange rate is primarily attributed to the [dwindling availability of foreign currency reserves](#) as a result of decreased crude oil exports and reduced remittance inflows, compounded by the decision in AA-controlled areas to prohibit the sale and control of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) produced in Ma'rib. Consequently, there has been a notable increase in local food and fuel prices (refer to relevant sections below).

Figure 1. YER-USD exchange rate in Aden (GoY) and Sana'a (AA) from June 2023 to June 2024



Source: WB (accessed 09/07/2024)

³ The JMR calculates the probability of food and nutrition insecurity across different districts using a statistical model known as the generalized linear model. This involves analysis of various risk alerts and their predictive significance in estimating a potential decline in food and nutrition security. A confidence score determines the likelihood of such deterioration, multiplied by the population of the district to project the anticipated number of people residing in areas vulnerable to a deterioration in food and nutrition security (e.g. transitioning to IPC 4 or worse). It is essential to understand that this process involves prediction (forecasting), and it is important to clarify that the JMR does not formally classify IPC phases for districts.

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Conflict

The month of May had already seen significant military activity, particularly on the Hayfan front, underscoring the strategic importance of the area amid continuing hostilities. Throughout the month, various clashes between GoY forces and AA fighters led to multiple fatalities and injuries on this front. The heightened risk alerts in Al Miftah and Kuhlun Ash Sharaf districts in Hajjah were driven by incidents in May in the Kuhlun Ash Sharaf district itself and neighboring Suwayr district in Amran. The first incident concerned a land dispute between the Bani Muanis and Bani Yaman tribes in early May, which resulted in three fatalities and three injuries. In Suwayr, the fatalities were a result of clashes between AA fighters and armed tribesmen.

In June, the conflict indicator recorded 14 heightened risk alerts but no critical alerts. Heightened risk alerts for Al Burayqah (Aden), Al Hawtah, Al Madaribah, Al Maqatirah, As Silw, Hayfan (Ta'iz), and Tur Al Bahah (Lahj) were driven by incidents that caused fatalities in Al Qubaytah and Hayfan districts in May and June. The heightened risk alert for As Salif followed the escalation in the conflict indicator in May. AA fighters conducted 16 attacks on commercial ships, the highest number of such incidents this year, as reported by UK Maritime Trade Operations. The attacks, purportedly in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza, have targeted vessels perceived to be linked to Israel since November 2023. In mid-June, AA fighters used a drone boat to sink a ship, the Tutor bulk carrier, for the first time since they began targeting commercial vessels in regional maritime zones around Yemen in November 2023. This incident marks an escalation in AA use of drone boats, which began in 2017. From 13–30 June 2024, the AA deployed 17 drone boats in the Red Sea, more than double the previous five months' total. Increased conflict between AA and international military forces related to these events has led to damaged infrastructure as well as reported casualties, resulting in heightened risk alerts for Jabal Ash Sharq and Otmah districts in Dhamar and Al Haymah Al Khariyyah and Manakhah districts in Sana'a.

Additionally, the United Nations has recently reported that 13 personnel—in addition to 5 staff members of international non-governmental organizations and representatives of Yemeni civil society—have been arbitrarily detained by AA forces. The Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs as well as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, among others, have called for the immediate and unconditional release of these individuals, including as part of a meeting of the United Nations Security Council held on 13 June 2024. Such detentions could have implications on future humanitarian assistance in the country, and the JMR team continues to monitor these developments and their impacts.

Displacement

In June, as reported by the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, 618 people were displaced across Yemen. These movements did not, however, reach the threshold for alerts in any district. Between 1 January and 29 June, up to 9,732 people experienced displacement at least once. Out of all the displaced households (1,622), 61% reported conflict-related reasons as their main driver for moving, followed by economic reasons, including increasing market and rental prices as well as unemployment or salary cuts, which were reported by 38% of displaced households in the first six months of 2024. Natural hazards, such as drought and flooding, and health reasons were reported by eight and three households respectively. The majority of households left Ta'iz (35%), Al Hodeidah (28%), and Ma'rib (9.6%). The majority of displacements were internal to the governorates of Ta'iz and Al Hodeidah, while most people in Ma'rib came from other governorates.

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
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
Drought

There were no drought-related alerts in May or June. The assessment of vegetation, based on Normalized Difference Vegetation Index changes and seasonal indicators, as measured by the Agricultural Stress Index indicator, for May and June 2024, however, shows very localized areas of slight drought in Al Hodeidah and Amran governorates, with an index ranging from 25–55%. This was caused by a precipitation deficit during the early stages of the farming season.

Map 1. Normalized Difference Vegetation Index estimates for May and June 2024



Map 2. Agricultural Stress Index estimates for May and June 2024




Source: FAO (accessed 16/07/2024)

Food prices

In June, the national average price of monitored food items (beans, oil, salt, sugar, and wheat flour) experienced a new peak, although the levels did not correspond with heightened or critical alerts. The average MFB cost in GoY-controlled areas in June 2024 was 128,144 YER (USD 74), nearly 4% higher than in April 2024 and 16% higher than in June 2023. In AA-controlled areas, the MFB cost also increased by 5% compared to April 2024 and 2% compared to June 2023. The increase in AA areas is likely related to the banking crisis that was unfolding in June before the parties reached an agreement to de-escalate measures in July.

Figure 2. MFB price in GoY and AA areas between June 2023 and June 2024



Source: WB (accessed 09/07/2024)

In June, the FAO Cereal Price Index decreased by 3% from May and was 9% lower than the same period in 2023. Wheat prices fell as a result of seasonal harvest pressure in the northern hemisphere, improved production in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and Türkiye's temporary import ban. Maize prices also dropped as harvests in Argentina and Brazil progressed, with higher-than-expected production. Increased maize planting in the United States and good crop conditions further contributed to the decline. Barley and sorghum prices also decreased in June. The FAO All Rice Price Index also saw a modest decline. The FAO Vegetable Oil Price Index increased from May to June, reaching its highest level since March 2023. The rise was driven by higher prices for palm, soy, and sunflower oils, while rapeseed oil prices remained stable. The FAO Sugar Price Index increased by 2% compared to May, ending 21% lower than in the same period in 2023.

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
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Fuel prices

The JMR model incorporates average diesel, petrol, and LPG prices. In June, no alerts were raised for fuel prices. The average prices of petrol and diesel in GoY-controlled areas were, respectively, 5% and 2.6% higher in June than April, marking a significant year-on-year increase (31% and 28%). The LPG price increased by 3.2% in June compared to April and was 2.4% higher year-on-year. The increase continues to be affected by currency depreciation in GoY-controlled areas. In AA-controlled areas, on the other hand, diesel and petrol prices increased by 2.3% on average in June compared to April, while petrol increased by 4% year-on-year and diesel decreased by 3.7% compared to June 2023. The LPG price in AA-controlled areas decreased by 1% compared to both April 2024 and June 2023.

Figure 3. Diesel, gas, and petrol prices in GoY and AA areas between June 2023 and June 2024



Source: WB (accessed 09/07/2024)

OTHER INDICATORS

This section covers additional contextual information on pertinent food and nutrition security indicators in Yemen.

Cholera cases


Yemen is facing a **severe outbreak** of AWD and suspected cholera, with nearly 105,000 cases reported across all 22 governorates since the beginning of the outbreak in October 2023, according to the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP) data. Between epidemiological weeks 20–26, there were 55,000 cases reported, with a daily caseload between 500–1,000 cases. The majority of cases are in AA-controlled areas, but there has been a significant rise in GoY-controlled governorates since late March. Populations with specific vulnerabilities, especially children with severe acute malnutrition (SAM), are at heightened risk of illness and death. Reports from inpatient therapeutic feeding centers for the management of children with SAM facing medical complications are still showing a significant increase in the number of cases admitted with AWD – more than 100% compared with admissions during the same period in 2023. This was further evident in the increase of suspected AWD cases within the age group 24–59 months as per disease surveillance weekly reports.

WHO and Yemen’s Ministry of Public Health and Population, funded by King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre, have launched a **USD 3 million project**, which aims to directly assist over 4.7 million people and indirectly benefit 520,175 more over a period of 12 months. This project is vital for rapidly detecting and managing AWD cases and preventing further spread of the outbreak. The project focuses on three main outcomes: early AWD detection, improved case management, and preventing community transmission, aiming to reduce health risks and strengthen Yemen’s future health response capabilities.

Food imports

In June, **food imports** to Yemen, totaling 500,750MT, decreased compared to the previous two months – 27% less than in May and 22% less than in April – and were 7% below the 12-month moving average.⁴ Food imports through Red Sea ports were 7% lower than the 12-month moving average; however, this decrease should be considered in the context of higher-than-usual food imports in May (26% above the 12-month moving average). Food import volumes through southern ports were the lowest since February 2024 and 6% below the 12-month moving average.

Figure 4. Monthly food imports (by port) between June 2023 and June 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 09/07/2024)

4 For the May–June period, food imports included wheat (69%), sugar (10%), corn (9%), rice (6%), flour (3%), and soy (3%) (ACAPS YETI accessed 09/07/2024).

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
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Fuel imports

In June 2024, total fuel imports increased by 22% compared to May and 20% compared to April, although still 2.6% below the 12-month moving average. Notably, fuel imports through southern ports increased in June compared to the previous two months, by 93% compared to May and 554% compared to April, surpassing the 12-month moving average by 36%. Fuel imports through Red Sea ports only increased 4% compared to May and were 13% lower than in April.

Figure 5. Monthly fuel imports by port from June 2023 to June 2024



Source: ACAPS (accessed 09/07/2024)

FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY OUTCOMES

Food Consumption Score

According to the [FAO High-Frequency Monitoring report](#), food insecurity in GoY-controlled areas worsened in May compared to April, with 54% of households reporting inadequate food consumption.⁵ This marks a 24% increase year-on-year, but remains at similar levels (although slightly higher) to March and April 2024. The deterioration is driven by reduced food assistance, high food prices, and a weakened Yemeni rial. 64% of households in GoY-controlled areas also reported decreased income, with higher food insecurity among those with reduced earnings. About 54% of households faced shocks affecting income or food production, with a slightly higher incidence in AA areas (55%) compared to GoY areas (53%). In AA-controlled areas, inadequate food consumption was reported by 41% of households, a slight decrease from April and 3% lower than in May 2023. In Abyan, Al Bayda, Al Jawf, Hajjah, Lahj, Shabwah, and Ta'iz, high food prices and decreased wages have led to increased hunger and reduced dietary diversity.

Based on [WFP data](#), inadequate food consumption in GoY areas was reported by 60% of the surveyed households in May and by 57% in AA-controlled areas. Poor food consumption also peaked in May, as reported by 31% of households in GoY areas and 32% in AA areas. The trend significantly worsened in AA areas reporting a 78% increase year-on-year, compared to the 52% increase for GoY areas.

In May, the [WFP](#) conducted a one-off food distribution in eight districts in Hajjah and Al Hodeidah after the six-month pause in food distribution. A survey of 219 households revealed that severe food deprivation in these districts dropped from 41% in February to 22% after the distribution. In contrast, non-assisted districts saw an increase in severe food deprivation from 41–49%. Severe hunger in assisted districts fell from 12–4%, and reliance on severe food-based coping strategies decreased from 62–58%. Severe food deprivation reached an all-time high in Al Bayda, Al Hodeidah, Al Jawf, Amran, and Hajjah.

Reduced Coping Strategies Index

In May, as compared to April, the prevalence of households using [severe food-based coping strategies](#) decreased by 2% in GoY-controlled areas and remained unchanged in AA-controlled areas. The use of crisis and emergency livelihood coping strategies, on the other hand, was 5% higher in GoY areas in May, as compared to April, but saw a 4% decrease in AA areas. Overall, the utilization of coping strategies was more prevalent in AA areas.

Moderate and severe acute malnutrition

According to the latest IPC malnutrition analysis, during the current period (November 2023 to June 2024), an estimated 609,809 children under five are estimated to be acutely malnourished, including 118,570 severe cases, marking a 34% increase since 2023. Additionally, around 222,000 pregnant and lactating women are also estimated to be malnourished.

Overall, 70 districts (60%) of the 117 assessed districts in GoY areas are in IPC AMN Phase 3 or worse during the current period including 56 districts in IPC Phase 3, 10 districts in IPC Phase 4 and three districts (Al Makha in Ta'iz; Hays and Al Khawkah in Al Hodeidah) in IPC Phase 5. The situation is projected to worsen from July–October 2024, with all the 117 districts in GoY areas covered in the survey expected to face IPC AMN Phase 3 and worse, including four districts (with the addition to the previous ones of Mawza' in Ta'iz) expected to experience IPC Phase 5. The main drivers of malnutrition in GoY areas include high morbidity, disease outbreaks, food insecurity, and inadequate childcare practices.

Efforts to improve nutrition and health outcomes involve enhancing community engagement, implementing supplementary feeding programs, and improving micronutrient supplementation and growth monitoring.

⁵ The difference between the FAO and WFP in the Food Consumption Score can sometimes be attributed to the sampling methodology and timing of data collection. FAO data is representative at the governorate level whereas WFP data is collected at the district level. FAO High-frequency monitoring data collection is based on computer-assisted telephone interviews using Random Digit Dialing (RDD). This method tends to find more respondents in populated areas, introducing urban and wealth biases. To address this, adjustments for rural-urban biases are made, and weights are applied during data analysis to correct regional stratification. The sample size, based on population across 22 governorates, is designed for 10% precision, 50% food insecurity prevalence, and a 95% confidence interval. Adjusting for urban biases, the total sample size is 2,500 households, averaging 112–113 per governorate. WFP Remote monitoring combines RDD and a panel of 1.2 million phone numbers, collecting data from around 9,000 calls monthly. The sample is 30–50% RDD, with the rest from the panel, proportionate to WFP beneficiaries and district populations. Monthly samples are representative at the governorate level and quarterly at the district/cluster level, with 32 surveys per district monthly and 95 quarterly. Overall, 241 districts and 36 clusters are monitored monthly.

Examples of interventions to improve critical nutrition and health outcomes

Prevention interventions: focus on redefining the role of community nutrition volunteers for better engagement, scaling up social behavior change communication on nutrition, health, WASH, and care for child development, as well as addressing gender-based violence at the community level. Implementing a blanket supplementary feeding program is crucial to addressing immediate deprivations, especially for women and children in the first 1,000 days in critical districts. Enhancing micronutrient supplementation coverage and scaling up growth monitoring and promotion at the community level, along with quality interpersonal communication with caregivers, are also vital for effective prevention.

Curative interventions: implement deliberate, seasonal (July–October) scale-up of treatment and prevention of acute malnutrition in extremely critical districts.

Build on existing inter-sectoral collaboration: inter-sectoral collaboration involves engaging with health responders to reduce morbidity, support routine immunization, and enhance antenatal care. Collaboration with WASH responders is essential to preventing diarrheal diseases and improving access to safe drinking water and sanitation. Working with food security and livelihood responders helps provide tailored assistance and support sustainable livelihoods. Maintaining cash or social protection support is also crucial for comprehensive community welfare.

Enhance surveillance system: to address the critical and potentially worsening nutrition situation in certain governorates, strengthening surveillance efforts is essential. This includes enhancing the monitoring of humanitarian response plan targets through quarterly reviews organized at the subnational-cluster level. By doing so, we can ensure timely and effective interventions to mitigate the impact of malnutrition and improve overall health outcomes in areas vulnerable to food insecurity.

OUTLOOK

Agreement on de-escalation measures regarding the banking sector

On [22 July](#), the GoY and AA informed the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, of their agreement on several de-escalation measures regarding the banking sector and Yemenia Airways flights. The agreed measures include canceling recent decisions against banks by both sides and refraining from similar actions in the future as well as resuming Yemenia Airways flights between Sana'a and Jordan with three daily flights, and operating flights to Cairo and India as needed.

In [February](#), clashes between CBY-Aden and CBY-Sana'a over control of the remittances sector destabilized Yemen's financial system. In [March](#), CBY-Sana'a introduced a new coin, raising inflation concerns and deepening the monetary divide. In [April](#), CBY-Aden demanded that Yemeni banks relocate from Sana'a to Aden, increasing tensions and threatening economic stability. In [May](#), CBY-Aden regulated foreign transfer activity to combat money laundering, eventually affecting remittance operations.

In [July](#), the regulatory conflict between Yemen's rival central banks escalated further when the CBY-Aden revoked the licenses of six banks, threatening to sever their access to the SWIFT international banking system. This action was the peak of CBY-Aden and GoY's efforts to gain control of the national financial system. In response, AA leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi issued public threats to resume attacks on Saudi Arabia unless the kingdom intervened and to target Yemeni ports and airports if the government did not step back.

If the parties had not agreed to reverse the recent regulations, the economic and humanitarian situation in Yemen would have likely deteriorated significantly. According to a June [FAO report](#), disruptions in the banking sector would have further reduced household purchasing power, exacerbating food insecurity. Key likely outcomes included currency depreciation, increased food prices, decreased household incomes, diminished remittances, disrupted humanitarian assistance, and rising unemployment. The JMR team continues to closely monitor these developments to assess their impact on food and nutrition security in the coming months.

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Conflict escalation

Following intensified AA attacks on vessels in the Red Sea and increased fighting along the Ta'iz-Lahj border in June, the AA escalated its actions against Israel in July. On [19 July](#), the AA launched a drone that hit a building in central Tel Aviv near the US embassy, killing one person and injuring ten others. On 20 July, in response, Israeli fighter jets bombed Yemen's port in Al Hodeidah, which is under AA control, hitting fuel depots and causing a massive fire that killed at least six people and injured dozens. Israel claimed the strike, stating that it intended to disrupt alleged Iranian arms shipments to AA territories. The port of Al Hodeidah is the main entry point for food, fuel, and humanitarian aid for the largely populated areas under AA control. While the [AA stated](#) that the port is still operating at full capacity, the risk of further escalation poses a threat to Yemen's food and nutrition security situation. The JMR team will continue to closely monitor these developments to flag any possible risk.

Rainfall forecasts

According to the [FAO Agrometeorological Early Warning Bulletin](#), increased rainfall at the end of June is expected to enhance farming conditions, aid germination and early growth stages, and boost the start of the farming season.

Yemen's [rainy season](#) (July–September), however, poses a high risk of flooding, especially in coastal and low-lying areas. Factors such as poor drainage systems, declining vegetation, and environmental conditions increase the risk of flash flooding, especially in July when precipitation is higher. Precipitation is expected to rise, with areas such as Ibb governorate, the Central Highlands, and the Southern Uplands seeing over 200mm of rain, while typically dry areas such as Hadramawt may get up to 40mm. In Yemen, [humanitarian responders](#) are enhancing flood preparedness and response to protect communities at risk, given that floods aggravate food insecurity and waterborne diseases. Led by the Inter-Cluster Coordination Group and OCHA, key actions include flood risk analyses, early warnings, and coordination with authorities, although resource constraints remain a challenge.

[Temperatures](#) are expected to remain elevated in July, with some areas experiencing over 44° C, notably in Al Maharah, Hadramawt, and coastal areas in Al Hodeidah, Hajjah, and Lahj, and around 40° C in parts of Al Jawf, Al Maharah, Hadramawt, Ma'rib, and Shabwah. Extreme temperature alerts necessitate measures to protect significant agricultural assets.

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ANNEXES

Annex I. Number of JMR alerts by governorate in June 2024

Table 2 shows the number of JMR district alerts for each indicator by governorate. For June 2024, 136 districts in ten governorates raised exchange rate alerts. Conflict alerts occurred in seven governorates.

Table 2. Number of JMR district alerts by governorate⁶

GOVERNORATE	EXCHANGE RATE		CONFLICT		DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	FOOD PRICES	FUEL PRICES
	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED	CRITICAL	HEIGHTENED				
Ta'iz	23			2				
Al Maharah	9							
Aden	8			1				
Socotra	2							
Hadramawt	1	27						
Lahj		15		4				
Shabwah		17						
Ma'rib		14						
Abyan		11						
Ad Dali'		9						
Dhamar				2				
Hajjah				2				
Sana'a				2				
Al Hodeidah				1				
Al Bayda								
Al Jawf								
Al Mahwit								
Amran								
Ibb								
Raymah								
Sa'dah								
Sana'a City								
Total	43	93		14				

⁶ Critical risk alerts are counted as double. The order of the list is based on the sum of both critical and heightened risk alerts.

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Annex II. JMR alerts by district in June 2024, districts at most risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

Table 3 shows JMR alerts by district. The districts with the highest risk of food and nutrition security deterioration are included. The table highlights critical alerts (red), heightened alerts (yellow), and typical status (white) per food security risk indicator by district.

Table 3. JMR alerts by district with higher risk of food and nutrition security deterioration

GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	EXCHANGE RATE	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Aden	Al Burayqah						
Ta'iz	As Silw						
Ta'iz	Hayfan						
Aden	Al Mansurah						
Aden	Al Mu'alla						
Aden	Ash Shaykh Othman						
Aden	At Tawahi						
Aden	Dar Sa'd						
Aden	Khur Maksar						
Aden	Kritar - Sirah						
Al Maharah	Al Ghaydhah						
Al Maharah	Al Masilah						
Al Maharah	Haswin						
Al Maharah	Hat						
Al Maharah	Hawf						
Al Maharah	Man'ar						
Al Maharah	Qishn						
Al Maharah	Sayhut						
Al Maharah	Shahin						
Hadramawt	Sayun						
Socotra	Hadibu						
Socotra	Qalansiyah wa Abd Al Kuri						
Ta'iz	Al Ma'afer						
Ta'iz	Al Makha						
Ta'iz	Al Mawasit						
Ta'iz	Al Misrakh						
Ta'iz	Al Mudhaffar						
Ta'iz	Al Qahirah						

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
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GOVERNORATE	DISTRICT	EXCHANGE RATE	CONFLICT	DISPLACEMENT	DROUGHT	FOOD PRICE	FUEL PRICE
Ta'iz	Al Wazi'yah						
Ta'iz	Ash Shamayatayn						
Ta'iz	At Ta'iziyah						
Ta'iz	Dhubab						
Ta'iz	Dimnat Khadir						
Ta'iz	Jabal Habashi						
Ta'iz	Maqbanah						
Ta'iz	Mashr'ah Wa Hadnan						
Ta'iz	Mawiyah						
Ta'iz	Mawza'						
Ta'iz	Sabir Al Mawadim						
Ta'iz	Salah						
Ta'iz	Sami'						
Ta'iz	Shar'ab Ar Rawnah						
Ta'iz	Shar'ab As Salam						
Lahj	Al Hawtah						
Lahj	Al Madaribah Wa Al Aarah						
Lahj	Al Maqatirah						
Lahj	Tur Al Bahah						

Annex III. JMR historical heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to June 2024)

Figure 6 shows the historical breakdown of JMR food and nutrition security risk alerts by indicator for all districts. The graphs show the percentage of total possible heightened and critical risk alerts for all six food and nutrition security crisis risk indicators. The higher the score, the worse the deterioration in food and nutrition security.


Figure 6. Historical percentage of total JMR heightened and critical risk alerts (January 2014 to June 2024)



Annex IV. Historical overview of the population at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4+ (January 2014 to June 2024)

Figure 7 shows the population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food security into IPC 4 or worse between January 2014 and June 2024.

Figure 7. Percentage of population living in areas at risk of experiencing a deterioration in food and nutrition security into IPC 4 or worse (January 2014 to June 2024)



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Annex V. Sources and time frames of risk indicators, target variables, and food and nutrition outcome indicators

Table 4. Indicators' sources and time frames

	SOURCE	LINK	DATA FROM	DATA TO
RISK INDICATOR				
Conflict	ACLED	https://acleddata.com/data/	01/01/2015	06/30/2024
Displacement	IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix	https://dtm.iom.int/yemen	01/01/2014	06/30/2024
Drought	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/1981	06/30/2024
Exchange rate	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6159	01/01/2009	06/30/2024
Food prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/4508	01/01/2009	06/30/2024
Fuel prices	World Bank	https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/6133	01/01/2009	06/30/2024
Target variable				
FEWS NET	World Bank	https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/search/dataset/0064614	07/01/2009	02/01/2024
Food and nutrition outcome indicators				
FCS	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	06/30/2024
rCSI	FAO	Shared by FAO	01/01/2018	06/30/2024
IPC	IPC	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/b70c2734-2339-4a4d-a69d-fa2bd3225156/resource/5e7ac2dd-84c1-4177-b009-0c47b1f20a9a/download/ipc_yem_area_wide.csv	12/01/2018	03/15/2023
GAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
MAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024
SAM	UNICEF	Shared	01/01/2019	02/01/2024

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

The JMR combines quantitative modeling and qualitative analysis to provide robust bimonthly food and nutrition security monitoring that identifies emerging food and nutrition security crisis risks. The report aims to complement IPC analyses and facilitate early recognition and coordinated responses to emerging major food and nutrition security crises among humanitarian and development stakeholders. The JMR is the product of a core development team comprising members from ACAPS, FAO, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and the World Bank.

A detailed explanation of the empirical foundation that the Yemen JMR uses is available in the [Policy Research Working Paper](#) by the World Bank. Further nutrition analysis is planned for future iterations of the JMR.

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