UKRAINE
Quarterly humanitarian access update

MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE BETWEEN 1 JULY AND 30 SEPTEMBER 2024

- In July–September 2024, intensified ground conflict and increased air attacks further constrained humanitarian access to frontline areas of Donetska and border areas of Sumska oblasts (OCHA 31/08/2024). In September, in light of the deteriorating security situation, evacuation trains from Pokrovsk were cancelled (Ukrinform 04/09/2024; Radio Svoboda 05/09/2024).

- In July–September, there were at least 23 publicly reported attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities, injuring humanitarian workers and civilians and hindering humanitarian operations in Donetska, Kharkivska, and Khersonska oblasts (ACAPS accessed 14/10/2024).

- Conflict escalation led to new restrictions on civilian movement. In Sumska, access to the 20km zone from the border required prior permission, while in Donetska, the curfew was extended to 16 hours in Kostiantynivka and 20 hours in Selydove and Kurakhove (Ukrinform 27/08/2024 and 17/08/2024).

- Mobilisation continues to affect humanitarian organisations' ability to deliver aid, particularly hindering the WASH and shelter activities of interviewed humanitarian organisations operating in Donetska and Kharkivska oblasts (KII 30/09/2024 a; KII 30/09/2024 b; KII 03/10/2024 a).

- Newly reported damage to civilian infrastructure nearly tripled in Donetska oblast and doubled in Sumska oblast from Q2–Q3 2024 (ACAPS accessed 01/10/2024).

- Increased targeting of civilian infrastructure led to electricity disruptions in many of Ukraine's oblasts, particularly in Dnipropetrovska, Donetska, Kyivska, and Odeska oblasts (NV 31/08/2024; TSN 27/08/2024).

- There was a nearly two-fold increase in landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) casualties in Q3 vs. Q2, primarily caused by a rise in incidents with multiple victims, with most incidents occurring in Donetska, Kharkivska, and Khersonska oblasts, highlighting the continued threat to civilians and humanitarians (ACLED accessed 16/10/2024).

- On 22 September, Russian forces attacked Zaporizka oblast with guided aerial bombs (FAB-250M) for the first time, injuring 21 civilians – including a minor – and damaging residential buildings and education facilities in Dniprovskyi and Voznesenskyi raions of Zaporizhzhia city (Zaxid.net 23/09/2024; RBK Ukraine 24/09/2024).

Map 1. Humanitarian access severity at the oblast level by 30 September 2024

Note: maps showing access severity at the raion level are available further in this report

Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 24/10/2024)

About this report

Aim: this report compares access challenges across Ukrainian oblasts to inform humanitarian responders and support decision-making. It is part of the ACAPS quarterly analysis of access constraints, with the latest report published on 29 July 2024.

Methodology: this analysis is based on changes in the access severity model between **1 July and 30 September 2024**, which ACAPS developed using data collected from secondary sources and nine key informant interviews with international and regional humanitarian responders conducted in September and October.

The last section of this report provides a short description of the methodology. The complete methodology, access events dataset, and access severity model API are available on the ACAPS Ukraine hub website.

For the first time, this report contains scoring and mapping of access constraints at the raion level. Scores are based on the application of ACAPS's subnational access model on the raion-level data collection of access events, with minor modifications.

Limitations: this analysis relies primarily on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive because of the dynamic situation. Access severity scores at the raion level may be lower than expected in Russian-occupied territories owing to extremely limited response, low number of reported incidents, and lower conflict intensity.

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
Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 24/10/2024)

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
Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 24/10/2024)

Map 4. Severity of physical and security constraints by 30 September

Source: ACAPS using data from ISW (accessed 24/10/2024)

Donetska oblast

Table 1. Access severity at the raion level in Donetska oblast by 30 September

| RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Bakhmutskyi	3.5	3.9	1.6	3.0
Donetskyi	3.5	3.9	1.3	2.9
Horlivskyi	3.5	3.3	1.3	2.7
Kalmiuskyi	3.5	3.3	0.7	2.5
Kramatorskyi	4.5	5.0	3.4	4.3
Mariupolskyi	3.5	3.3	1.6	2.8
Pokrovskyi	4.5	5.0	2.9	4.1
Volnovaskyi	3.5	3.3	1.5	2.8

*Lack of physical response in occupied territories may lead to lower-than-expected scores, as fewer incidents are reported

- **Access severity score trend since the second quarter (Q2) of 2024:** deterioration in Kramatorskyi and Pokrovskyi raions

- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Bakhmutskyi, Kramatorskyi, and Pokrovskyi

- **Most recurrent access events:** physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

Shifting front lines and intensifying hostilities have increased humanitarian access constraints in Donetska oblast. In August–September 2024, the Russian military made its most significant monthly territorial gain in Ukraine since October 2022, capturing approximately 1,000km2 of Ukrainian territory amid intensifying operations in Donetska oblast since July 2024 (Reuters 10/09/2024; TheDefensePost 03/09/2024). By the end of September, Russian troops were approximately 8km from the key town of Pokrovsk, a critical Ukrainian military and logistics hub in Donetska oblast, while also advancing towards other frontline communities such as Myrnohrad, Selydove in Pokrovskyi raion, and Toretsk in Bakhmutskyi raion (Ukrainska Pravda 23/09/2024; BBC 23/08/2024; ISW 23/09/2024; OCHA 26/08/2024).

These continuing offensive activities have resulted in a drastic increase in armed clashes in Myrnohrad, Pokrovsk, Selydove, and Toretsk in Q3 compared to Q2 (123 vs. 20). There was also a substantial increase in the number of air/drone (59 vs. 19) and shelling incidents (54 vs. 40) in these locations (ACLED accessed 15/10/2024).

As a result, given heightened safety and security concerns in the oblast, Russian military advances and an increased risk of first-person view (FPV) drone and rocket attacks have deteriorated access for humanitarians and civilians (KII 02/10/2024 b). For one INGO, this has led to a reduction in operations and staff presence in the oblast and increased cooperation with authorities for aid distribution (KII 04/10/2024).

Permit requirements

On 20 September, as a result of the deteriorating security situation, oblast authorities announced that humanitarian access to 19 settlements in frontline areas would require prior written permission (Donetsk RMA 20/09/2024). While no issues have been reported in securing such written permissions, access to Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Toretsk is dynamic and depends on the security situation regardless of prior permission (KII 02/10/2024 b).

Change of evacuation hubs

On 5 September, evacuation trains from Pokrovsk were cancelled as a result of security concerns, with evacuation trains now departing from Pavlohrad (111km away, in Dnipropetrovska oblast) and Kramatorsk (Ukrinform 05/09/2024; OCHA 06/09/2024). Responders provide evacuation support from Pokrovsk to the new transit centres (KII 02/10/2024 b; KII 30/09/2024 b). Pokrovsk had been a transit hub and point of departure for government-run evacuation trains, evacuating 600 people per day by the end of August (CARE 21/08/2024; Ukrinform 03/09/2024).

Evacuation constraints

Certain civilians in Pokrovsk (often elderly people who were born and raised in local settlements) are reluctant to evacuate, often only agreeing at the last minute and leaving without any personal belongings, as a result of the actual and perceived lack of access to assistance in host locations in western Ukraine (KII 30/09/2024 a; Suspilne 20/09/2024; Deutsche Welle 05/09/2024).

Extensive curfews

Extensive curfews were implemented in August in areas nearest the front lines, greatly restricting civilian movement. The daily curfew lasts 20 hours (15:00–11:00) in Kurakhivska, Pokrovska, and Selydivska hromadas, and 16 hours (17:00–09:00) in Kostiantynivka hromada (Ukrinform 27/08/2024).

Increased civilian infrastructure damage

Increased attacks led to a nearly three-fold increase in newly reported damage to civilian infrastructure in the oblast: 414 in July–September 2024 compared to 148 in April—June 2024. Kramatorskyi and Pokrovskyi raions experienced the highest number of incidents (234 and 144 respectively), particularly affecting commercial, government, and electrical facilities (ACAPS acccessed 01/10/2024).

Figure 1. Top damage per type of infrastructure Q3 vs. Q2 2024

Source: ACAPS (accessed 07/10/2024)

By the beginning of August, as a result of conflict damage, nearly 80,000 consumers in 135 towns and villages in Ukraine-controlled areas of Donetska oblast remained without electricity (OCHA 08/08/2024). In September, centralised water and gas supply was disrupted in Pokrovsk (OCHA 06/09/2024 and 20/09/2024). In some parts of the city, there was no electricity and many shops were closed, but around 16,000 people still remained (Ukrinform 18/09/2024; OCHA 20/09/2024). According to authorities, security constraints have meant that eight hromadas in Bakhmutskyi, Pokrovskyi, and Volnovaskyi raions are unable to prepare for the winter season. As such, people remaining in these hromadas will have no access to heating in the winter (Donetsk RMA 26/09/2024; Vchasnoua 26/09/2024).

Access to healthcare

Security concerns forced authorities to relocate seven health facilities from frontline areas of Donetska to other oblasts and two moved within the oblast, reducing access to health facilities for those remaining near the front lines (Health Cluster 06/09/2024; OCHA 12/09/2024). Settlements with no functional medical facilities include Myrnohrad, Novohrodivka, Pokrovsk in Pokrovskyi raion, and Torestke in Kramatorskyi raion (OCHA 05/09/2024; MSF 06/09/2024; Pokrovsknews 07/08/2024; Ukrinform 19/08/2024). On 6 September, the last civilian hospital in Pokrovsk had to relocate patients, staff, equipment, and supplies, leaving only MSF ambulances for emergency medical evacuations in the area (MSF 06/09/2024; Pokrovsknews 07/08/2024).

Kharkivska oblast

Table 2. Access severity at the raion level in Kharkivska oblast by 30 September

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Bohodukhivskyi	**	**	2.8	**
Chuhuivskyi	3.0	5.0	2.8	3.6
Iziumskyi	**	**	3.9	**
Kharkivskyi	1.5	2.1	3.9	2.5
Krasnohradskyi	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.3
Kupianskyi	3.5	4.4	3.3	3.8
Lozivskyi	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.4

*Lack of physical response in occupied territories may lead to lower-than-expected scores, as fewer incidents are reported

**Scores omitted because of likely information gaps in public reporting

- **Access severity score trend since the second quarter (Q2) of 2024:** deterioration in Chuhuivskyi, Iziumskyi, and Kupianskyi raions

- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Kharkivskyi and Kupianskyi

- **Most recurrent access events:** presence of UXO and mines, and physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

Between July–September, Kharkivska oblast experienced intensified Russian attacks in Hlyboke, Lyptsi, and Vovchansk from the north and toward Kupiansk from the east (Espreso 18/09/2024). Russian advances west of Pishchane appear to be aimed at creating an encirclement with the Oskil River and blocking Ukrainian logistics between Kupiansk and Borova (Radio Svoboda 16/09/2024). As a result, Vovchansk (90), Hlyboke (75), Lyptsi (45), and Kupiansk (5) settlements experienced a combined two-fold increase in armed clashes in Q3 compared to Q2 (215 vs. 120), representing nearly a quarter of the incidents reported in the oblast. Notably, there was also a combined increase in shelling incidents in these settlements in Q3 compared to Q2 (33 vs. 23). Overall, armed clashes and attacks increased from 585 in Q2 to 822 in Q3 in the oblast, representing a 41% increase. Air and drone incidents nearly doubled in Kupiansk in Q3 compared to Q2 (31 vs. 17) (ACLED accessed 15/10/2024).

Increased security concerns caused by constant shelling, air, and rocket attacks have led one NNGO to relocate from Kharkiv city to a safer location in the rural part of the oblast, while another responder noted the continued deterioration of access in the oblast, especially in Vovchansk (KII 30/09/2024 b; KII 03/10/2024 a). Destroyed bridges led to an eight-hour delay in an evacuation in Kupiansk's eastern bank of Oskil River, which was under threat of shelling (KII 26/09/2024).

Damage to civilian infrastructure

In July–September, Russian air and rocket attacks in Kharkivska oblast regularly damaged industrial, educational, medical, and protection facilities (Ukrinform 09/08/2024 and 22/08/2024). Bohodukhivskyi, Kharkivskyi, and Kupianskyi raions were the most affected, with 40, 78, and 43 incidents respectively (ACAPS accessed 01/10/2024).

Figure 2. Top damage per type of infrastructure in Q3 vs. Q2 2024

Source: ACAPS accessed 07/10/2024/2024

Although new damage was recorded at a lower rate than in Q2 2024, damage to civilian infrastructure continued, causing regular power outages. Kharkiv city has a centralised water supply and heating system, making it vulnerable to damage from attacks on the city's energy infrastructure (Ukrainska Pravda 19/09/2024; Radio Svoboda 25/09/2024).

Extensive curfews

On 13 August, a 16-hour curfew (17:00—09:00) was implemented in 201 settlements of Bohodukhivskyi, Chuhuivskyi, Iziumskyi, Kharkivskyi, and Kupianskyi raions, greatly restricting civilian movement (Ukrainska Pravda 13/08/2024).

Khersonska oblast

Table 3. Access severity at the raion level in Khersonska oblast by 30 September

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Beryslavskyi	1.5	2.6	3.3	2.5
Henicheskyi	3.5	3.3	0.6	2.5
Kakhovskyi	5.0	3.3	1.9	3.4
Khersonskyi	5.0	5.0	3.8	4.6
Skadovskyi	5.0	3.3	0.7	3.0

*Lack of physical response in occupied territories may lead to lower-than-expected scores, as fewer incidents are reported

- **Access severity score trend since the second quarter (Q2) of 2024:** deterioration in Beryslavskyi and Kakhovskyi raions
- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Beryslaskyi and Khersonskyi
- **Most recurrent access events:** UXO, mines, and access to medical services and water

Access in Khersonska oblast continues to be primarily constrained by Russian forces' use of short-range drones and shelling, which mainly affects the 20km zone on the right bank of the Dnipro River and in Kherson city (Radio Svoboda 06/08/2024).

Notably, there was a nearly two-fold increase in air and drone attack incidents in Khersonska in Q3 compared to Q2 (321 vs. 176). Beryslavska, Khersonska, and Tiahynska were among the most affected hromadas. Khersonska (200), Beryslavska (75), Tiahynska (52), and Novooleksandrivska (50) hromadas had the most shelling/artillery/missile incidents (377 out of 690) in Q3 in the oblast (ACLED accessed 14/10/2024).

Humanitarian access to the 20km zone is highly constrained by the security risks posed by drones, with some organisations unable to operate there (KII 30/09/2024 c; KII 04/10/2024).

Damage to civilian infrastructure

Despite a lower number of recorded damage to civilian infrastructure in Q3 compared to Q2, continued shelling disrupted services such as water, public transport, and radio (Ukrinform 31/07/2024 and 11/08/2024; Suspilne 06/08/2024). Beryslavskyi and Khersonskyi raions were the most affected, with 15 and 63 incidents, respectively, resulting in a temporary electricity malfunction affecting trolley bus routes and causing water disruptions (ACAPS accessed 01/10/2024).

Figure 3. Top damage per type of infrastructure in Q3 vs. Q2 2024

■ New Damage July-September 2024   ■ New Damage April-June 2024

Source: ACAPS accessed 07/10/2024

Access to medical services

Two respondents reported constrained access to medical services and medicine, particularly in rural areas, partly resulting from a lack of staff and equipment (KII 03/10/2024 b; KII 30/09/2024 c).

Access to water

Access to drinking water appears to have improved, although the population remains reliant on water deliveries. Shortages of non-potable water affect the livelihoods of those dependent on gardening and agriculture (KII 30/09/2024 c; KII 02/10/2024 a).

Luhanska oblast

Table 4. Access severity at the raion level in Luhanska oblast by 30 September

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED*	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Alchevskyi	5.0	3.3	0.4	2.9
Dovzhanskyi	5.0	3.3	0.4	2.9
Luhanskyi	5.0	3.3	0.5	2.9
Rovenkivskyi	5.0	3.3	0.4	2.9
Shchastynskyi	5.0	3.3	0.7	3.0
Sievierodonetskyi	5.0	3.3	1.3	3.2
Starobilskyi	5.0	3.3	0.4	2.9
Svativskyi	5.0	3.9	1.3	3.4

*Lack of physical response in occupied territories may lead to lower-than-expected scores, as fewer incidents are reported

- **Access severity score trend since the second quarter (Q2) of 2024:** no significant change

- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Sievierodonetskyi

- **Most recurrent access events:** access to medical services

Most of Luhanska oblast remains occupied, limiting reporting on incidents affecting humanitarian access. In July–September, Russian forces continued their efforts to capture the rest of Luhanska oblast (ISW 01/09/2024). There was an increase in armed clashes in Q3 compared to Q2 (370 vs. 340), with most incidents occurring in Kolomyichyska, Krasnorichenska, and Kreminska hromadas (321).

Access to medical services

According to Ukrainian authorities, shortages of medical specialists and ambulances have been reported in Russian-occupied parts of the oblast, leading to deteriorated access to medical services in localities outside Luhansk city (Zmina 03/07/2024; Ukrinform 03/08/2024 and 05/09/2024).

Sumska oblast

Table 5. Access severity at the raion level in Sumska oblast by 30 September

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Konotopskyi	1.5	0.9	2.0	1.5
Okhtyrskyi	1.5	0.9	1.8	1.4
Romenskyi	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.3
Shostkynskyi	2.0	3.4	2.1	2.5
Sumskyi	2.0	1.8	3.8	2.5

- **Access severity score trend since the second quarter (Q2) of 2024:** deterioration in Konotopskyi, Shostkynskyi, and Sumskyi raions

- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Shostkynskyi and Sumskyi

- **Most recurrent access events:** physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

In early August 2024, Ukraine conducted an incursion into the Kursk oblast of the Russian Federation, capturing 1,000m2 by 12 August. As part of its military response to this incursion, Russia redeployed troops closer to Ukraine's northern border and stepped up attacks using different types of weapons (Radio Svoboda 17/09/2024; Texty 19/09/2024; Ukrainska Pravda 12/08/2024; ISW 18/09/2024).

In particular, there was a 225% increase in air/drone attack incidents in Q3 compared to Q2 (2,117 vs. 651) in the oblast. In this regard, Bilopilska, Esmanska, Krasnopilska, and Velykopysarivska hromadas experienced approximately half of the total 645 shelling/ artillery/missile incidents and 2,117 air/drone attacks against the oblast in Q3 (ACLED accessed 15/10/2024).

One NNGO mentioned that Bilopilska, Esmanska, Hlukhivska, Krasnopilska, and Shostkynska hromadas were particularly difficult to access (KII 26/09/2024). These hromadas faced hostilities or were previously occupied after the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and fell under increased shelling and attack after Ukraine's incursion into the Kursk oblast in August 2024 (ACAPS accessed 07/01/2024; Ministry of Reintegration 25/08/2023).

Permit requirements

In August, heavy shelling led to the implementation of a permit system to access settlements within 20km of the Russian border (Sumy OMA 14/08/2024; National Police 19/09/2024). While the permit requirement applies to all civilians and humanitarians, no impediments to humanitarian responders' ability to reach affected populations had been noted by 12 September (OCHA 12/09/2024).

Increased civilian infrastructure damage

In July–September, Russian troops stepped up shelling, air, and missile attacks, causing more than double the number of civilian infrastructure damages than the previous quarter (104 vs. 51). Shostkynskyi and Sumskyi raions were the most affected, with 21 and 42 instances respectively (ACAPS accessed 07/10/2024). The mass attack on 26 August 2024 left 250,000 people without access to electricity and temporary delays to trains as a result of damaged railway infrastructure (RBK 26/08/2024).

Figure 4. Top damage per type of infrastructure in Q3 vs. Q2 2024

Source: ACAPS (accessed 07/10/2024)

Constraints to evacuations

In August, evacuations from certain localities were limited by the high level of shelling (Shostka 29/08/2024; Antikor 25/08/2024; KII 26/09/2024). The Ministry of Reintegration of Ukraine launched a hotline for those willing to evacuate, but one interviewee mentioned that there was poor access to information about evacuation-related services. Civilians should call the hotline

launched for each hromada. Limited coordination between volunteers and authorities at the oblast level further hampered evacuations (Ministry of Reintegration 10/09/2024; KII 26/09/2024).

Constrained winterisation response

One interviewed NNGO mentioned that, as a result of the deteriorated security situation, it has been unable to provide civilians with wood and briquettes, which are especially critical for elderly people and those with low mobility in rural areas in the winter (KII 30/09/2024 a).

Closure of Kolotylivka-Pokrovka border crossing point

Starting on 6 August 2024, amid increased hostilities, the Kolotylivka-Pokrovka checkpoint – the border between Sumska oblast and Russia – stopped operating, marking the closure of the only passage for Ukrainians to return to Ukraine-controlled territories. Ukrainians from occupied territories who wish to return to Ukraine must now cross the border with Belarus at the Mokrany-Domanove checkpoint in Volynska oblast, and be subjected to added checks and filtration measures in Belarus, prolonging the time it takes to reach their destination (Suspilne 06/09/2024; Radio Svoboda 20/09/2024; KII 30/09/2024 a).

Zaporizka oblast

Table 6. Access severity at the raion level in Zaporizka oblast by 30 September

RAION	ACCESS OF PEOPLE IN NEED TO HUMANITARIAN AID	ACCESS OF HUMANITARIAN ORGANISATIONS TO PEOPLE IN NEED	PHYSICAL, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND SECURITY CONSTRAINTS	ACCESS SCORE
Berdianskyi	5.0	3.3	0.5	3.0
Melitopolskyi	5.0	3.9	0.5	3.1
Polohivskyi	5.0	3.3	1.3	3.2
Vasylivskyi	5.0	3.3	2.0	3.4
Zaporizkyi	1.5	1.7	2.3	1.8

- Access severity score trend since the second quarter (Q2) of 2024: deterioration in all raions

- **Raions with the highest number of events:** Zaporizkyi

- **Most recurrent access events:** physical prevention of the use of services or assistance

In Q3 2024, Zaporizka oblast experienced a substantial increase in Russian air/drone attack incidents compared to Q2 (477 vs. 285), damaging industrial, educational, and energy facilities. 68% of all incidents took place in Huliaipilska (75), Malynivska (114), Orikhivska (81), and Stepnohirska (55) hromadas (ACLED accessed 16/10/2024).

Figure 5. Top damage per type of infrastructure in Q3 vs. Q2 2024

Source: ACAPS accessed 07/10/2024

On 22 September, for the first time since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces attacked Zaporizhzhia city with guided aerial bombs (FAB-250M), resulting in injuries to 21 civilians – including a minor – and damage to residential buildings, education facilities, and vehicles in the Dniprovskyi and Voznesenskyi raions of the city (Zaxid.net 23/09/2024; RBK Ukraine 24/09/2024).

Although no significant access developments were recorded for July–August, guided aerial bomb attacks on Zaporizka oblast could lead to changes in the conflict, and hence access, from October 2024. One responder mentioned that their organisation moved its activities, such as training for humanitarian staff, from Zaporizhzhia to Dnipro city because of Zaporizka's worsening security situation (KII 03/10/2024 a).

MAIN ACCESS DEVELOPMENTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities

The number of attacks on humanitarian responders was slightly higher between July–September (23 publicly reported incidents) than between April–June (21 incidents). Incidents primarily occurred near frontline or border areas of Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Sumska oblasts. Russia's missile and drone attacks also led to one incident in Kyiv city (ACAPS accessed 07/10/2024). Several interviewed organisations noted an increase in attacks on humanitarian responders in Q3 compared to Q2, particularly in Sumska and Donetska oblasts (KII 26/09/2024; KII 02/10/2024 a; KII 03/10/2024 a; KII 30/09/2024 a; KII 02/10/2024 b).

Donetska oblast

On 12 September, three International Committee of the Red Cross staff were killed and two others injured when a site in Viroliubivka village, intended to be used in the distribution of solid fuels, was shelled (ICRC 12/09/2024). This situation led the organisation to temporarily suspend operations at its Dnipro office (Radio Svoboda 13/09/2024). On 25 September, three Ukrainian Red Cross staff were injured by shelling in Kramatorsk (Ukrainian Red Cross Facebook 25/09/2024). State Emergency Service evacuation efforts were also targeted by FPV drones three times in a single week in late August (DSNS 27/08/2024).

Kharkivska oblast

On 24 July, the Swiss Demining Foundation office was struck by an aerial bomb, which inflicted significant damage to its premises, vehicles, and equipment (FSD 24/07/2024). On 14 August, a humanitarian aid distribution point in Kupiansk was hit by shelling (Zmina 14/08/2024). On 18 September, a bus was attacked by shelling when transporting people evacuating frontline communities (UNHCR X 19/09/2024). On 30 September, two volunteers sustained injuries from a Russian FPV drone attack on the village of Ivashky in the Bohodukhiv district (UNN 30/09/2024).

Khersonska oblast

Khersonska remains the most dangerous location for humanitarians, with nine publicly reported attacks on humanitarian responders and facilities in July–September, leading to four injuries and two deaths. Almost all incidents involved FPV drones. Incidents were reported in Beryslav (Beryslavskyi raion), Kherson city, Khersonskyi raion, Oleksandrivka, and Stanislav (Kherson OVA Telegram 11/07/2024 a, 11/07/2024 b, and 16/07/2024; Kerson OVA Facebook 16/09/2024; WCK 18/07/2024; Suspilne 25/07/2024, 21/09/2024, and 01/10/2024; Espreso 15/08/2024).

Kyiv city

On 2 September, the shared offices of Danish Church Aid and Norwegian Church Aid were destroyed in a missile attack. No casualties were reported (Ukrinform 02/09/2024).

Sumska oblast

On 17 August, several cars of Rokada, an NNGO, were damaged by shelling (UNHCR Instagram 17/08/2024). On 13 September, the charitable foundation Together for Ukraine was shelled while unloading humanitarian assistance for the Yampil Hospital (Rubkryka 13/09/2024).

Conscription and new mobilisation law

The entry into force of the new Mobilisation Law in April 2024 has continued to affect humanitarian operations and the provision of public services to the civilian population. Humanitarians mentioned that this law is an operational constraint, with the strongest impacts affecting specialised staff (KII 30/09/2024 a; KII 30/09/2024 b; KII 03/10/2024 a).

Mobilisation also adversely influences the provision of public services to the civilian population. Between July–September, this law resulted in the mobilisation of numerous specialists employed across critical economic sectors (e.g. healthcare, construction, public transportation, logistics, and utilities), affecting the provision of essential services such as public transport, sewage, water, and gas (TSN 23/07/2024; Korrespondent 05/09/2024; Obozrevatel 28/08/2024; Kyiv24 News 12/09/2024).

Attacks on civilian infrastructure

In July–September, Russian forces increased air and shelling attacks across Ukraine, damaging civilian infrastructure, causing civilian casualties, and affecting the provision of utilities. Dnipropetrovska oblast, although not directly on the front lines, remained the oblast with the most significant amount of new civilian infrastructure damage, with Kryvorizkyi (36), Nikopolskyi (261), and Pavlohradskyi (35) raions suffering the most damage. Simultaneously, Donetska experienced a three-fold increase in damage incidents, with the Kramatorskyi (234) and Pokrovskyi (144) raions sustaining the highest number. Kyiv city and Kyivska, Lvivska, and Sumska oblasts also saw a notable increase in new damage to civilian infrastructure compared to the April–June period (ACAPS acessed 01/10/2024).

Figure 6. Change in newly reported damage to civilian infrastructure between April–June and July–September 2024 in the most affected oblasts

Source: ACAPS accessed 07/10/2024

On 26–27 August, Russia conducted the two largest strikes since 2022, with over 200 missiles and drones launched at Ukraine, damaging energy facilities and leading to power cuts across 15 regions (ACAPS 13/09/2024; Reuters 26/08/2024; Suspiline 27/08/2024) Power cuts to water pumping stations disrupted water supply in several cities (Ukrinform 26/08/2024 and 26/08/2024). These attacks killed 11 and injured 63 people (Suspilne 27/08/2024; Ukrinform 27/08/2024)

Russia's air and shelling attacks also targeted other forms of civilian infrastructure. For example, on 8 July 2024, a mass rocket attack on Kyiv led to 33 civilian deaths and 125 injured, including ten minors at the Okhmatdut Children's Hospital (Radio Svoboda 11/07/2024). 94 minors in operating rooms and intensive care units had to be transferred to other municipal hospitals in Kyiv (Radio Svoboda 09/07/2024).

Mandatory evacuations

Between July–September, an increase in shelling and rocket attacks led Ukrainian authorities to announce additional evacuations in the east and north of the country, including the mandatory evacuation of minors with at least one legal guardian.

Donetska oblast

The worsening security situation in the frontline communities of Myrnohrad, Novohrodivka, Pokrovsk, and Selydove in August led the oblast military administration to announce several mandatory evacuations of minors with at least one guardian from these cities and 41 settlements located near the front lines (Radio Svoboda 21/08/2024; Donetsk RMA 26/08/2024). In September, the oblast military administration ordered the further mandatory evacuation of 3,473 minors with parents or legal guardians in 15 settlements in Pokrovska hromada and 17 settlements in Kramatorska hromada (Ministry of Reintegration 04/09/2024; Ukrinform 05/09/2024). There are communities in the Donetska oblast (e.g. Chasiv Yar) where many residents refuse to evacuate despite lacking food, water, and medical care (Glavkom 09/08/2024).

Sumska oblast

On 17 August, the mandatory evacuation of minors with at least one guardian was announced for 23 settlements as a result of the increased shelling of border areas (Sumy State Administration 17/08/2024; Ministry of Reintegration 10/09/2024). On 4 September, mandatory evacuation was expanded to include five more settlements in the Shostkynskyi and Konotopskyi raions (Ukrinform 04/09/2024). On 9 September, the evacuation of an additional 40,000 people from Esman, Hlukhiv, and Svesa cities in Shostkynskyi raion was announced (Court-Judicial Paper 09/09/2024; LB 09/09/2024). Residents of border hromadas were evacuated, but authorities reported that many chose to remain within the oblast (OCHA 26/08/2024).

Kharkivska oblast

On 17 July, Ukrainian authorities announced the mandatory evacuation of minors from 24 settlements in Vovchanska hromada (SLKH 17/07/2024). On 12 September, the Defence Council of the Kharkivska oblast ordered the further evacuation of 269 minors with at least one guardian from 29 settlements in Kupianskyi raion (Ukrainska Pravda 12/09/2024; Ministry of Reintegration 12/09/2024).

Khersonska oblast

On 10 August, as Russian troops intensified the use of drones and other types of weapons on the right bank of the Dnipro river in the oblast, mandatory evacuation was expanded to seven settlements and the Hydropark and Naftohavan districts of Kherson city (Suspilne 10/08/2024).

Access constraints for civilians in Russian-occupied territories

Russian authorities continued restricting civilians' access to essential services between July–September:

Movement restrictions

According to Ukrainian authorities, Russian authorities banned residents from entering a 15km zone along the left bank of the Dnipro River in the Russian-occupied Khersonska oblast. Ukrainian authorities also claim that many residents have already been deported from that zone (Ukrainska Pravda 15/07/2024).

Access to water

Constraints to accessing water continued to be reported in Russian-occupied territories. In Khersonska oblast, constraints relate to the continued impacts of the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam and lack of water supply system maintenance. In Melitopol, seasonal fluctuations in water levels led to a lack of drinking water. In Mariupol, heat and power disruptions at water pumping stations have aggravated pre-existing issues with water supply (Radio Svoboda 01/08/2024).

Communications constraints

People in Russian-occupied territories of Khersonska and Zaporizka oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea reported that the functioning of messaging and social media applications has deteriorated, especially without VPNs (Investigator 21/08/2024).

Landmine and explosive ordnance casualties

The number of landmine casualties (injuries and deaths) nearly doubled in Q3 compared to Q2 (58 vs. 30), with the highest number of victims documented in Kharkivska (21), Khersonska (17), and Donetska (13). This increase is primarily the result of a higher number of incidents involving multiple casualties (ACAPS accessed 14/10/2024).

Khersonska oblast

Khersonska oblast remains one of the most affected oblasts in Ukraine, with 17 mine/UXO victims recorded from July–September. Most incidents occurred in Khersonskyi (8) and Beryslavskyi (8) raions (ACAPS accessed 14/10/2024). Despite demining efforts, the presence of landmines on roads persists, leading to detours and delays in delivering humanitarian assistance (KII 30/09/2024 c).

Kharkivska oblast

At least 21 landmine/UXO casualties were reported in the oblast between July–September, a significant increase from nine in April–June. Most incidents were recorded in Kharkivskyi and Chuhuivskyi raions, with six and eight incidents respectively (ACAPS accessed 14/10/2024). In one particular incident, three people were injured after triggering a tripwire while attempting to self-evacuate from the occupied Starytsi village in Chuhuivskyi raion (Suspilne 12/07/2024).

Donetska oblast

From July–September, at least 13 landmine/UXO casualties were recorded in the oblast, a substantial increase from zero such incidents between April–June. Most incidents were recorded in Kramatorskyi and Mariupolskyi raions, with seven and six incidents respectively (ACAPS accessed 14/10/2024).

METHODOLOGY

The data used in this report came from publicly available and unpublished sources circulated within the response. The narrative presented is based on data analysis and a secondary data review. Access severity scores were calculated using the oblast and raion-level data collection of events related to access constraints. The collected access events are available in the Ukraine hub humanitarian access events dashboard and dataset. ACAPS has predefined 75 event types and grouped them into 35 subindicators, nine indicators (I1–9), and three pillars (P1–3). The indicators receive a score between 0–3, and the pillars receive a score between 0–5. The final access severity score is an average of the three pillar scores.

Pillar 1: access of people in need to humanitarian aid

I1. Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance

I2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

Pillar 2: access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

I3. Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)

I4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)

I5. Interference in implementation of humanitarian activities

I6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

Pillar 3: physical, environmental, and security constraints

I7. Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance

I8. Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices, explosive remnants of war, and unexploded ordnance

I9. Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

More information on ACAPS's humanitarian events monitoring and access scoring system is available in this methodology note. For Ukraine's oblast-level scoring, calculations were done on a continuous numerical scale instead of thresholds, allowing for decimals and a more nuanced result. The resulting scores were classified into the following groups:

0–1 low access constraints

1–2 moderate access constraints

2–3 high access constraints

3–4 very high access constraints

4–5 extreme access constraints.

Changes for raion-level access severity scoring

When applying the oblast-level model to raions, the following changes were made to the methodology.

- Only events logged at the raion level were taken into account, with the exception of subindicators S9.1, S9.3, and S9.4, as information for these is mostly reported at the oblast level. For these subindicators, scores were taken from computing all entries in the oblast.
- Thresholds for scoring subindicators S7.1, S7.2, S9.2, and indicator I6 were recalibrated to reflect the number of events at the raion level.
- Indicator 3 (impediments to entry into the country) is not included when computing scores, as it is not relevant to the raion level.

Limitations

The analysis relies on publicly available data, which is unlikely to be comprehensive in a dynamic war situation such as Ukraine. Reported data may come with a delay, meaning some published data may no longer be applicable at the time of analysis. This analysis collected data through a review process to ensure that selected subindicators for a given oblast were still relevant. The evolving situation and amount of data collected mean that some inaccuracies will likely remain.

Detailed information is lacking on the humanitarian response and access constraints that humanitarians face in Russian-occupied areas, including Crimea and Sevastopol.

As there is lower conflict intensity in Russian-occupied raions, raion-level access scores for such areas may be lower than expected. For these raions, Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 scores may be more accurate reflections of the actual access severity.