


# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW

Spotlight on violence against aid workers

December 2024



# INTRODUCTION

ACAPS' Humanitarian Access Overview provides a snapshot of the most challenging contexts for humanitarian access globally in the past six months.

In the *Global Humanitarian Access Index*, ACAPS analysts considered nine variables for ranking and comparing humanitarian access levels worldwide. Data was gathered per specific crisis at the national, subnational, and regional levels. Information was then aggregated at the country level, and a country score was provided as an indication of the humanitarian access situation. Between June–November 2024, crisis-affected populations in 36 countries experienced high to extreme access constraints that made it difficult for them to meet their basic needs.

By November, ACAPS was monitoring humanitarian crises in 93 countries around the world. Access scores show a deterioration in 20% of the crisis-affected countries (19 countries) and an improvement in 14% (13 countries), while the humanitarian access situation remained stable for 66% (61 countries). This stability, however, mostly indicates the persistence of severe access constraints, with 43% of the crisis-affected countries where humanitarian access has remained stable scoring between high to extreme access levels (3–5).

This issue of the *Global Humanitarian Access Overview* focuses on one indicator from the humanitarian access analysis framework: **violence against personnel, facilities and assets**. This includes security incidents, such as attacks, abductions, the killing of workers, and the looting of humanitarian warehouses or humanitarian assets. The emphasis on this indicator stems from the surge in high-intensity armed conflicts worldwide, making the security and safety of humanitarian workers even more challenging. Consequently, the report mainly focuses on a selection of conflict-affected crises and examines the trend for these security incidents, their impact on humanitarian response, and how the situation might evolve in the coming months based on historical data.

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# INTRODUCTION

## HOW ARE ACCESS LEVELS CALCULATED?

ACAPS' methodology groups nine indicators under three dimensions:

### PILLAR 1 Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

[GO TO PILLAR 1](#)

1. Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance
2. Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance

### PILLAR 2 Access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

[GO TO PILLAR 2](#)

3. Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative)
4. Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions)
5. Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities
6. Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets

### PILLAR 3 Physical, environmental and security constraints

[GO TO PILLAR 3](#)

- Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance
- Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosive remnants of war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXO)
- Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.)

The scoring model rates indicators on a scale of 0–3 and then combines them in pillars, where they get a final score on a scale of 0–5. The overall access score by country is ranked according to the following scale:

- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints

For definitions and examples of the indicators used, along with details about the data model behind the methodology, please see [here](#).



# INTRODUCTION

## HOW WERE THE HIGHLIGHTED COUNTRIES SELECTED?

---

The narratives included in the report do not cover all countries experiencing high to extreme access constraints. Instead, ACAPS included only the countries that were underlined during a joint analysis process aimed at highlighting major specific or recurrent access concerns related to violence against personnel, facilities and assets. For this reason, the narratives do not cover all the pillars of the humanitarian access analysis framework.

## WHAT ARE OUR SOURCES?

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ACAPS' Humanitarian Access Methodology uses qualitative and quantitative information sources. It collates these sources in a structured way in the Humanitarian Access Index to quantify the level of humanitarian access in a number of contexts. ACAPS analysts collect information from a range of credible and publicly available sources, including UN agencies; governments; international, national, and grassroots NGOs; international and local media; and humanitarians working in the countries and areas analysed.

Some of the most relied-upon sources and datasets are:

- the Aid Worker Security Database by Humanitarian Outcomes
- the Aid in Danger project by Insecurity Insight
- the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
- the International NGO Safety Organisation
- OCHA's Humanitarian Needs Overviews, situation reports, humanitarian snapshots, and access severity mapping
- Landmine Monitor reports.

Read more about our [methodology](#).

## LIMITATIONS

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ACAPS' Humanitarian Access Overview faces the same limitations as all secondary data reviews. Information might not be available without physical presence in the countries analysed, and information by third parties might come with a certain degree of delay, especially in very volatile contexts. When possible, analysts cross-check available information with humanitarians working in countries of operation.

ACAPS most often assesses contexts in the Humanitarian Access Overview at the country level, meaning some indicators might represent a sum of the crises present in a country. A more detailed granularity is available in the published dataset.

## DISCLAIMER

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The deterioration or increase in access constraints recorded in some countries might be the result of receiving new information previously not available rather than actual changes in the situation.



# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TRENDS

## SCORE CHANGES SINCE THE JUNE–NOVEMBER 2024 PERIOD

This overview compares the overall level of humanitarian access between the last [Global Humanitarian Access Index](#) published in July 2024 (covering December 2023 to May 2024) and this latest ACAPS assessment (covering June–November 2024) published in January 2025. The trends are reported for all countries (with scores of 0–5). **The reporting period of the trends and narratives corresponds to when the data was gathered for the index. However, the narratives on violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets examine trends beyond these reporting periods.**

  
**SCORE INCREASE**  
 Humanitarian access  
 has deteriorated

BELARUS	PAPUA NEW GUINEA	THAILAND
BENIN	PHILIPPINES	TOGO
CZECH REPUBLIC	POLAND	TUNISIA
INDIA	ROMANIA	YEMEN
LAOS	SLOVAKIA	
LEBANON	SOUTH SUDAN	
LESOTHO	SRI LANKA	
NEPAL		

  
**SCORE DECREASE**  
 Humanitarian access  
 has improved

ANGOLA	NIGERIA
CHILE	PANAMA
ITALY	PERU
KENYA	TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
LIBYA	ZAMBIA
MALAWI	ZIMBABWE
MEXICO	

  
**SCORE STABLE**  
 Humanitarian access  
 remained the same

AFGHANISTAN	COSTA RICA	GREECE	MALI	RWANDA
ALGERIA	DJIBOUTI	GUATEMALA	MAURITANIA	SENEGAL
ARMENIA	DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA	HAITI	MOLDOVA	SOMALIA
BANGLADESH	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)	HONDURAS	MOROCCO	SPAIN
BRAZIL	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	HUNGARY	MOZAMBIQUE	SUDAN
BULGARIA	ECUADOR	INDONESIA	MYANMAR	SYRIA
BURKINA FASO	EGYPT	IRAN	NAMIBIA	TANZANIA
BURUNDI	EL SALVADOR	IRAQ	NICARAGUA	TIMOR LESTE
CAMEROON	ERITREA	JORDAN	NIGER	TÜRKIYE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)	ESTONIA	LATVIA	PAKISTAN	UGANDA
CHAD	ESWATINI	LITHUANIA	PALESTINE	UKRAINE
COLOMBIA	ETHIOPIA	MALAYSIA	RUSSIA	VENEZUELA
CONGO				



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The report highlights a global trend of increased violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets resulting from the escalation and intensification of armed conflicts. Even before it ended, 2024 was already the deadliest year for humanitarian workers worldwide, breaking the record set in 2023. This trend is primarily the result of significant levels of violence in Palestine and other conflict-affected countries, including Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine. Conflict levels have almost doubled in the past five years amid the worsening of existing conflicts and the resurgence of conflicts that for a long time were of low intensity. In 2020, more than 104,000 conflict events were recorded, compared to nearly 200,000 in 2024. While non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and criminals are among the main perpetrators of violence against humanitarian workers, the participation of state military forces is increasing. There is also a continuing pattern of the harassment, coercion, and detention of aid workers in places such as Myanmar and Yemen, often for political motives or to hinder access to humanitarian crisis information (AWSD accessed 07/12/2024; AJ 25/11/2024; UN 22/11/2024; ACLED accessed 09/01/2025).

Beyond the recent escalation of conflicts, protracted crises in countries such as Burkina Faso, the DRC, Ethiopia, and Nigeria pose a significant threat to humanitarian workers. The presence of a multiplicity of armed parties each trying to assert their territorial control and policies, amid mistrust towards humanitarian workers, makes operations very challenging in the conflict-affected areas of these countries. Road ambushes are among the most common attacks in such contexts, severely restricting the movement of humanitarian organisations. In response, authorities may impose military escorts in certain high-risk areas of these countries, but this challenges upholding the principle of neutrality for humanitarian organisations.

The analysis of the intentionality of violence reveals considerable variations, depending on the context: from crimes of opportunity to overt attacks on humanitarian workers for political, economic, or other reasons. Other cases involve collateral damage, such as from IED explosions, shelling, or stray bullets during armed conflict.

One of the trends that emerged from analysing the different cases is the excessive exposure of national staff to violence. In different contexts, almost all the workers who were killed were national staff. Their position, proximity to communities, and perceived ability to navigate dangerous security situations put them at risk of targeting by various conflict parties. There are also the social dynamics of the communities of origin of national staff that worsen their exposure to violence. In South Sudan, for instance, national staff may be subject to revenge killings in the context of community conflicts or suffer from various forms of aggression spurred by perceptions of their wealth.


Whether they are the result of collateral damage, political or economic motivations, disagreement with the implementation of humanitarian activities for moral reasons, accusations of support for conflict parties, or even the obstruction of access to certain areas, all the conditions that have led to these levels of violence are expected to persist in the next six months. Unless there is a de-escalation in the most intense armed conflicts, such as, Myanmar, Palestine, Sudan, or Ukraine, violence levels against aid workers are expected to remain at a similar level, if not worsen further.

*“2024 was already the deadliest year for humanitarian workers worldwide, breaking the record set in 2023. This trend is primarily the result of significant levels of violence in Palestine and other conflict-affected countries, including Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine.”*



# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS SCORE MAP

DECEMBER 2024



**Global access ranking**


- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints



## PILLAR 1

# Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

This map illustrates the global ranking of the scores in the first pillar 'access of people in need to humanitarian aid'.



### PILLAR 1

### PILLAR 2

### PILLAR 3

- Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance.
- Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance.

### Ranking

- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints






## PILLAR 2

# Access of humanitarian organisations to people in need

This map illustrates the global ranking of the scores in the second pillar 'access of humanitarian responders to people in need'



PILLAR 1

**PILLAR 2**

PILLAR 3

- Impediments to enter the country (bureaucratic and administrative).
- Restriction of movement within the country (impediments to freedom of movement and/or administrative restrictions).
- Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities.
- Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets.

### Ranking

- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints


Date created: 30/12/2024



## PILLAR 3

# Physical, environmental and security constraints

This map illustrates the global ranking of the scores in the third pillar 'physical, environmental, and security constraints'.



PILLAR 1

PILLAR 2

**PILLAR 3**

- Ongoing insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance.
- Presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), explosive remnants of war (ERW), and unexploded ordnance (UXOs).
- Physical constraints in the environment (obstacles related to terrain, climate, lack of infrastructure, etc.).

### Ranking

- Extreme access constraints
- Very high access constraints
- High access constraints
- Moderate access constraints
- Low access constraints
- No significant access constraints

Date created: 30/12/2024



# ACCESS INDICATORS

	Country																																																							
	Afghanistan	Algeria	Angola	Armenia	Bangladesh	Belarus	Benin	Brazil	Bulgaria	Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon	CAR	Chad	Chile	Colombia	Congo	Costa Rica	Czech Republic	Djibouti	Dominican Republic	DPRK	DRC	Ecuador	Egypt	El Salvador	Eritrea	Estonia	Eswatini	Ethiopia	Greece	Guatemala	Haiti	Honduras	Hungary	India	Indonesia	Iran	Iraq	Italy	Jordan															
<b>Overall humanitarian access ranking</b>	4	2	1	1	3	3	1	1	0	5	2	4	4	3	1	3	1	0	1	1	0	3	4	2	2	2	2	0	1	4	2	2	3	2	0	2	3	3	3	1	1															
Denial of existence of humanitarian needs or entitlements to assistance	2	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0															
Restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance	2	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	2	2	2	3	0	2	1	0	2	2	0	2	2	1	0	3	1	2	1	2															
Impediments to enter the country	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	1	0	0	2	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0															
Restriction of movement within the country	2	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	3	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	2	2	0	0	3	1	1	3	1	0	0	2	0	2	1	0															
Interference into implementation of humanitarian activities	3	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	3	1	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	1	0	3	0	0	1	1	1	2	1	0															
Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0														
Insecurity or hostilities affecting humanitarian assistance	2	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	3	0	3	3	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	2	1	1	0	0																
Presence of landmines, IEDs, ERW, and UXO	3	1	2	3	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	3	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	3	0	2																
Physical constraints in the environment	3	2	1	0	3	0	1	3	0	3	3	3	3	3	1	3	2	1	2	1	0	2	3	3	0	2	2	0	2	3	0	3	3	3	0	3	2	1	0	1	0															
	Kenya	Laos	Latvia	Lebanon	Lesotho	Libya	Lithuania	Malawi	Malaysia	Mali	Mauritania	Mexico	Moldova	Morocco	Mozambique	Myanmar	Namibia	Nicaragua	Niger	Nigeria	Pakistan	Palestine	Panama	Papua New Guinea	Peru	Philippines	Poland	Romania	Russia	Rwanda	Senegal	Slovakia	Somalia	South Sudan	Spain	Sri Lanka	Sudan	Syria	Tanzania	Thailand	Timor Leste	Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia	Türkiye	Uganda	Ukraine	Venezuela	Yemen	Zambia	Zimbabwe					
	2	2	0	4	1	3	0	1	2	4	1	2	0	2	3	5	1	1	3	4	4	5	1	3	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	5	5	0	1	5	4	2	3	0	1	0	3	2	3	5	3	5	1	2					
	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	2	3	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	3	2	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	2	2	0	0	2					
	2	0	1	3	0	3	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	0	3	3	3	3	0	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	2	3	2	1	0	0	1	3	2	2	3	2	3	0	0	0				
	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	2	1	1	1	2	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	2	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	1	1	2		
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	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	3	3	0	0	2	2	3	3	1	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	3	0	0
	0	3	0	3	3	1	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	2	0	0	3	1	1	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	3	0	0	3	1	3	0	3	0	1	0	0	3	1	3	1	2	0	2	
	3	3	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	3	0	2	1	2	2	3	1	0	3	3	3	3	1	3	1	3	2	2	2	1	2	3	3	3	1	2	3	0	2	3	1	0	0	1	0	3	3	2	3	2	2	2				



# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

## EXTREME

## CONSTRAINTS

### BURKINA FASO



Score: 5

Humanitarian access remains extremely limited in Burkina Faso as a result of continuing insecurity, blockades, and the presence of IEDs. The Government's imposition of armed escorts for humanitarian aid convoys has worsened the situation (ECHO 26/11/2024; RI 22/10/2024 and 13/07/2023).

Between January 2019 and November 2024, 349 documented security incidents affected humanitarian workers. Yearly figures reveal fluctuations, with spikes in 2022 (78 incidents) and 2023 (62 incidents). The violence has killed 13 aid workers, injured 19, and led to the kidnapping of 84. In 2024 alone, it killed at least four aid workers, injured three, and led to the abduction of four until 13 December. Key entities involved in the reported incidents include NSAGs, criminal groups, and government forces (INSO accessed 07/12/2024; AWSD accessed 07/12/2024). From the humanitarian incidents reported, Burkinabé staff remain the most frequent target of attacks, most often in the form of roadside ambushes (AWSD accessed 07/12/2024).

The motivations for physical attacks against humanitarian workers are often unclear. Economic factors drive some incidents, while others stem from allegations that they collaborate with either NSAGs or government forces. In May 2024, an IED event killed a humanitarian worker; it remains unclear whether it was a targeted attack or collateral damage (AWSD accessed 13/12/2024; INSO accessed 07/12/2024; IRC 14/02/2024; RI 22/10/2024).

Violence against humanitarian workers has severely disrupted the humanitarian response. It killed two Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) workers in early 2023, leading to the suspension of activities. Similarly, armed attacks on MSF offices and facilities in November 2023 and July 2024 in Djibo town (Sahel) highlight the persistent threat to aid infrastructure (IRC 14/02/2024; MSF 21/10/2024; France 24 09/02/2023). In 2023, armed attacks targeted an aircraft, resulting in the temporary grounding of UNHAS humanitarian flights. This further restricted access to communities reliant on emergency aid (RI 22/10/2024). The trend indicates that humanitarian workers are facing increasingly dangerous conditions, especially in regions with high NSAG presence, such as Centre-Nord, Est, Nord, and Sahel.

[READ MORE ABOUT BURKINA FASO](#)



## MYANMAR



Score: 5

Extreme access constraints have continued to affect humanitarian activities in Myanmar mainly as a result of armed conflict, movement restrictions, bureaucratic hurdles, violence against aid workers, the obstruction of humanitarian operations, and climate hazards, such as floods.

Violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets has significantly increased after the military coup in February 2021 (Insecurity Insight accessed 05/12/2024; AWSO accessed 05/12/2024). Since the coup, around 190 incidents of such violence have affected nearly 420 humanitarian personnel. The figure was highest in 2021, with violence affecting nearly 180 humanitarian personnel, and decreased in the following years. In 2022, the figure was nearly 100, and in both 2023 and 2024, it was around 70. The most prevalent form of violence against humanitarian workers from 2021–2024 was detention or arrest (around 65%), followed by death (around 17%), injury (around 11%), and kidnapping (around 7%). Nearly 20 of the reported deaths occurred during captivity after abduction or arrest. The military junta was the perpetrator of the majority of reported violence. Allegations of support for conflicting parties were a major factor in the targeting of aid workers. Most of the reported violence occurred in Mandalay, Mon, Rakhine, Sagaing, Shan, and Yangon states and regions (Insecurity Insight accessed 05/12/2024; AWSO accessed 05/12/2024; OCHA 06/05/2023, 16/08/2024, 01/07/2024, 24/05/2024, 05/04/2024, and 03/03/2024; WFP 26/06/2024; BNI 05/07/2024; RFA 22/10/2024).

Some major incidents of the looting, occupation, and destruction of humanitarian facilities in Myanmar were reported in 2024, mostly in Rakhine state. These incidents include the confiscation of food aid for IDPs, looting and burning of a UN agency warehouse storing life-saving food and supplies, stealing and selling of goods from an international humanitarian organisation's warehouse, and occupation of multiple humanitarian offices (BNI 13/05/2024; OCHA 16/08/2024 01/07/2024). In mid-2024, clashes between the military junta and ethnic armed organisations also caused the temporary relocation of international humanitarian organisations and suspended the operations of some Myanmar-based NGOs in northern Shan state. Similar events occurred in other states and regions throughout 2024 (OCHA 16/08/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT MYANMAR](#)

## PALESTINE



Score: 5

Since October 2023, Israeli military operations in Palestine, especially in Gaza, have resulted in extremely high access restrictions and unprecedented violence against humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets, as a result of direct and indirect attacks. In the second half of 2024, the violence killed more than 75 humanitarian workers, bringing the total to 178 fatalities since January 2024 and 343 since October 2023 (OCHA 03/12/2024).

By 3 December 2024, there had also been approximately 1,047 fatalities among health workers and 88 among members of the Palestinian Civil Defence since October 2023. The exact number of deaths among Palestinian committee members securing and distributing aid remains unverified (OCHA 03/12/2024 a). Israeli attacks have also targeted healthcare facilities, with over 438 incidents reported until 20 November 2024 (Health Cluster 12/12/2024). These numbers are likely underestimates, as many reports of fatalities do not account for individuals trapped under rubble, missing people, and indirect deaths from diseases, food insecurity, and a lack of critical services (Khatib et al. 20/07/2024; UN 02/05/2024).

Israeli forces have also targeted humanitarian facilities, assets, convoys, and warehouses, including 190 UNRWA installations, such as schools and health clinics, and all of Gaza's hospitals (The Intercept 06/12/2024; TNH 03/12/2024; OCHA 03/12/2024 a and 08/10/2024; UNRWA 04/10/2024).

This widespread violence has compelled some humanitarian organisations and UN agencies to suspend activities, reduce staff, or severely restrict operations (HRW 14/05/2024; OCHA 03/12/2024 b).

The substantial loss of frontline responders, including civil defence, health, and humanitarian workers, is likely to further complicate efforts to address the escalating humanitarian crisis, leaving over two million Palestinians in Gaza with limited access to critical services (OCHA 08/10/2024 and 03/12/2024 b; UNRWA 04/10/2024; TNH 03/12/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT PALESTINE](#)



## SOMALIA

Score: 5



In 2023, Somalia ranked as the sixth most dangerous country globally for humanitarian workers, with 26 recorded violent incidents against humanitarian personnel (AWSO 05/08/2024). The country continues to experience extreme access constraints. By August 2024, 124 recorded security and access incidents had significantly disrupted humanitarian access in Somalia. These incidents included injuries to 12 aid workers during relief operations and 13 cases of physical assault, harassment, and intimidation targeting humanitarian personnel (OCHA 19/08/2024).

These events reflect Somalia's unstable security landscape, dominated by NSAGs such as Al Shabaab, interclan conflicts, and criminal activities. The primary threats for aid workers include shootings, kidnappings, and collateral violence (OCHA 30/09/2024 and 08/08/2024). Al Shabaab continues to pose a significant threat through attacks, such as an IED explosion in Baidoa that injured one person and the kidnapping of an aid worker near Belet Weyne (INSO 08/2024 and 07/2024; AWSO accessed 05/12/2024).

In 2024, clan conflicts were reported in different states, including Jubaland and Galmudug states, affecting not only civilians but also humanitarian workers (OCHA 13/08/2024 and 14/11/2024). In Gedo region, escalating interclan clashes killed two humanitarian workers and destroyed an IDP settlement. Such incidents illustrate how humanitarian workers are often caught in the crossfire of community disputes, becoming unintended victims of broader tensions. Localised militias, such as the Digil-Jiido group, also contribute to these threats, as seen in Qoryooley, Lower Shabelle, where one humanitarian worker was targeted (AWSO accessed 05/12/2024; INSO 10/2024; OCHA 30/09/2024). In October 2024, interclan clashes in Luuq district, Jubaland state, led some humanitarian organisations to suspend assistance because of movement restrictions, significantly limiting the delivery of essential aid and aggravating the vulnerability of affected populations. In Yurkud village and Luuq district, insecurity has restricted access to air transport, further complicating logistical efforts, driving up operational costs, and, as a result, delaying critical humanitarian interventions (OCHA/OCHA 23/10/2024, 12/08/2024, and 03/12/2024 c). The risks for humanitarian workers suffering direct or collateral violence will likely escalate, especially as intercommunal conflicts intensify and Al Shabaab armed attacks and use of IEDs persist.

[READ MORE ABOUT SOMALIA](#)

## SOUTH SUDAN

Score: 5



South Sudan is one of the most dangerous operational environments for humanitarian workers globally, with 2023 marking a record-high number of fatalities (OCHA 17/08/2023; AWSO 2023/08). Humanitarian workers face significant security risks, including shootings and ambushes, with nearly half of all 2024 attacks occurring on roads during transit (OCHA 11/10/2024, 25/07/2024, and 27/08/2024).

From January–October 2024, access incidents involving aid workers increased by 16% compared with the same period in 2023, with over 170 cases recorded (OCHA 31/10/2024). Between June–December alone, these incidents directly affected 21 humanitarian workers, including two killed, ten injured, and nine kidnapped (AWSO accessed 03/12/2024).

The high fatality rate highlights the vulnerability of South Sudanese nationals to armed attacks –who comprised 94% of aid workers killed between 2011–2023 – to armed attacks (ISS 12/11/2024). South Sudanese workers are frequently targeted in retaliatory revenge killings, often linked to intercommunal disputes or their perceived wealth and status within the community. The role of these staff as vital contributors to both aid delivery and their extended families makes them particularly exposed to these risks (TNH 05/06/2024; ISS 12/11/2024).

In total, 17 humanitarian workers were abducted in 2024, reflecting the growing risks for humanitarian operations in South Sudan (INSO accessed 31/12/2024). In July, incidents in Morobo county and along the Yei-Maridi road involved the abduction of humanitarian workers with high ransom demands, further compromising humanitarian access (OCHA 27/08/2024). In Central Equatoria state, the kidnapping of MSF staff forced the suspension of health services in Yei county from 20 September to 11 November, leaving people in the area with limited healthcare (MSF 24/09/2024; Eye Radio 11/11/2024; OCHA 11/10/2024).

Safety and security risks to humanitarian workers in South Sudan are expected to escalate, particularly as the rainy season ends, increasing access to previously inaccessible areas and potentially exposing more aid workers to threats. The lean season is likely to worsen food insecurity, making humanitarian convoys and personnel more vulnerable to targeting by armed groups amid heightened urgency. The worsening economic situation may further drive criminal activity and increase attacks on aid operations as communities and armed groups compete for scarce resources (OCHA 27/08/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT SOUTH SUDAN](#)



## SUDAN

Score: 5



Armed confrontations between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces have led to extreme humanitarian access constraints across Sudan (OCHA 08/08/2024). Violence against humanitarian personnel, assets, and health facilities has been on a rising trend since the eruption of the power struggle conflict in April 2023, hindering humanitarian response in conflict hotspots, especially in Khartoum state and Darfur region. In 2023, the violence killed 25 humanitarian workers and led to the kidnapping of six. Comparatively, 2024 saw 29 more humanitarian workers killed and nine kidnapped, indicating a slight increase in violence reported against humanitarian personnel (AWSO accessed 31/12/2024).

Rampant insecurity has driven attacks and violence against humanitarian personnel on account of deliberate targeting and, in some instances, as collateral from violence (AWSO 05/11/2024). Between July–November 2024, indiscriminate attacks by conflict parties killed 14 humanitarian workers, injured another two, and led to the kidnapping of five (AWSO accessed 15/11/2024). On multiple accounts, relief organisations suspended their response as personnel increasingly came into harm's way in insecure contexts (MSF 10/07/2024).

Between 1 July and 29 November 2024, 84 reports of attacks on healthcare facilities were documented. 26 healthcare facilities were damaged, while about 24 medical staff were killed (Insecurity Insight accessed 29/11/2024). On 11 August, the MSF-operated Saudi Hospital in Al Fasher, North Darfur, was shelled for the 11th time since the onset of the conflict. The attack on the hospital injured patients and hospital staff, besides damaging the hospital's facilities, including a surgical ward (MSF 14/08/2024). Beyond violence, humanitarian organisations have also been targeted with misinformation (Sudan Independent 05/11/2024). False allegations of organisations dealing in weapon smuggling into Sudan have not only disrupted operations but also put humanitarian personnel in danger, especially with the authorities (NRC 05/11/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT SUDAN](#)

## UKRAINE

Score: 5



Overall access remains extremely constrained. Shelling, drones, missile attacks, mine and unexploded ordnance contamination, as well as detention in Russian-occupied areas, are the main threats to humanitarians, rescuers, health workers, and civilians in Ukraine (KII 26/03/2024; KII 27/03/2024 a; KII 29/07/2024; KII 19/07/2024; Zmina 27/05/2024 and 05/07/2024; DIIS 21/02/2024; Proliska accessed 20/06/2024; HEKS 20/02/2024; WHO 04/04/2024; ASWD accessed 02/12/2024).

Since the onset of the Russian full-scale invasion in 2022, violent incidents, including deliberate double-tap missile attacks that produce more casualties, had killed 128 health workers and 97 rescuers and injured 288 and 395 by April and September 2024 respectively (DW 28/09/2024; Rubryka 17/09/2024; BBC 14/04/2024; Babel 31/10/2024; WHO 04/04/2024). Over 80% of the 124 security incidents recorded in the Aid Worker Security Database between 9 March 2022 and 26 November 2024 affected the national staff of both international and national humanitarian NGOs. Almost all are attributed to the Russian armed forces, except three incidents whose perpetrators remain unconfirmed (ASWD accessed 06/01/2025).

Ongoing insecurity will likely continue to pose security risks to the responders in Ukraine in coming months as the conflict enters its fourth year. The humanitarian access situation will therefore remain extremely constrained, particularly along the frontline and in occupied areas (ACAPS 28/10/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT UKRAINE](#)



## YEMEN

Score: 5



Yemen experiences extreme humanitarian access constraints. Since 2019, the country has consistently reported high levels of kidnappings, killings, and harassment of humanitarian workers (AWSD accessed 31/12/2024).

By early June 2024, the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known as the Houthis) had detained 13 Yemenis working for UN agencies and NGOs, as well as 50 civil society members, throughout the year. The prevalence of detention cases, along with increased bureaucratic restrictions and harassment, has significantly hindered humanitarian efforts in DFA-controlled areas (HRW 26/06/2024; DOS 27/09/2024; SCR 30/09/2024).

National staff –comprising more than 95% of aid workers in Yemen – are disproportionately affected given their extensive presence in communities and fewer security protections (The Media Line 20/09/2023). Incidents have included violent raids, threats, and arrests. Between 2009–2024, at least 149 national and 36 international humanitarian workers were killed, wounded, or kidnapped in Yemen (AWSD accessed 11/12/2024). The DFA-controlled capital, Sana’a, remains particularly dangerous for aid workers given the rising prevalence of detentions, especially among those working with UN agencies and INGOs (Reuters 07/06/2024). Incidents such as detention, intimidation, and access obstructions have delayed humanitarian operations and forced some organisations to suspend or scale back activities (DOS 27/09/2024).

Humanitarian workers in Yemen are targeted for a combination of political, economic, and operational reasons. The politicisation of aid remains a key factor; warring parties may perceive humanitarian assistance as favouring rival factions, leading them to use their control over aid distribution to exert leverage and influence (HRW 14/09/2020; UN 27/01/2020). Economic motivations further drive violence, with armed groups and criminal networks engaging in kidnappings and carjackings to extort money or resources. Humanitarian workers also face coercion and violence at distribution points, where armed parties attempt to control or manipulate the delivery of assistance, compromising humanitarian neutrality (UN 27/01/2020).

[READ MORE ABOUT YEMEN](#)





# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

VERY HIGH

CONSTRAINTS

## AFGHANISTAN

Score: 4



Humanitarian access in Afghanistan remains greatly restricted owing to a combination of factors, including administrative and bureaucratic obstructions, a volatile security situation, and physical and environmental constraints (OCHA 22/07/2024, 11/08/2024, and 04/09/2024).

Since 2021, coinciding with the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, more than 900 security incidents affecting humanitarian workers have been reported. By December 2024, these incidents had killed more than 30 people, injured 150, and resulted in the abduction of 40. That said, the number of violent attacks on aid workers varies yearly. The number of injured or kidnapped humanitarian workers significantly decreased in 2024 (at only 3 until 13 December) compared to 2021, the deadliest year in the past four with 27 fatalities. While there have been at least 100 reported incidents of violence against aid workers annually since 2021, the overall trend also shows a decline. The majority of these incidents affect Afghan staff, with most being attributed to unidentified armed groups, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and the DFA in Afghanistan (INSO accessed 13/12/2024; AWSO accessed 13/12/2024; OCHA 16/09/2024).

The underlying causes of security incidents targeting humanitarian workers are not always clear. A significant proportion can be attributed to political motivations, especially those involving NSAGs and the DFA. These entities often perceive humanitarian workers as threats because of their activities, which they interpret as contrary to their understanding of Islamic values and Afghan cultural norms, leading to targeted violence. Many incidents also stem from economic factors, such as robberies and ransom demands (INSO accessed 13/12/2024; AWSO accessed 13/12/2024; OCHA 17/01/2024; STC 04/01/2023; NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security accessed 04/12/2024).

Bureaucratic and administrative barriers and restrictions on female aid workers were the primary cause of access challenges in Afghanistan, but violence against humanitarian workers remained the second most significant obstacle to access in the country until July 2024. Such incidents persist and continue causing recurrent suspensions or shutdowns of humanitarian activities or programmes (OCHA 16/09/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN](#)



## CAMEROON

Score: 4



Very high access constraints persist in Cameroon. Violence against humanitarian personnel, armed clashes between state security forces and NSAGs, movement and administrative restrictions, and environmental constraints from heavy rains and floods in 2024 significantly affected humanitarian access in the country, especially in Far North, Northwest, and Southwest regions (OCHA 02/09/2024, 04/11/2024, and 16/09/2024; WFP 22/07/2024; UNFPA 24/07/2024).

Humanitarian workers face a variety of issues in these regions, such as deaths, arbitrary arrests and detention, kidnapping or abduction, harassment, collateral damage, and exposure to IEDs, especially in Northwest and Southwest (OCHA 02/09/2024 and 04/11/2024; WFP 22/07/2024; INSO accessed 05/12/2024). These issues often cause disruptions to humanitarian efforts, including the temporary halting of operations. For instance, in July 2024, some humanitarian organisations suspended the movement of personnel in Makary and Hilé Alifa communes of Far North after an IED explosion killed a civilian (OCHA 16/09/2024).

Abduction is the most common type of violence in the country. Since 2022, 125 humanitarian workers have been abducted, with 42 reported in 2024 and the highest, 58, in 2022. Cameroonian humanitarian workers are generally the targets of abductions (INSO accessed 05/12/2024). NSAGs perpetrate most of the abductions, followed by criminal organisations (OCHA 15/04/2024; AWSO accessed 05/12/2024; Insecurity Insight accessed 05/12/2024; INSO 21/03/2024). Generally, NSAGs conduct such activities with the objective of establishing authority, punishing perceived opposition, and demanding ransom (INSO 21/03/2024; OCHA 15/04/2024, 02/09/2024, 04/11/2024).

Until 5 December, there were no deaths among aid workers reported in 2024, compared to five being reported from 2021–2023. That said, four aid workers were injured in 2024, compared to 16 being injured from 2020–2023 (INSO accessed 05/12/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT CAMEROON](#)

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

Score: 4



Humanitarian access restrictions in CAR continue to be very high in the second half of 2024 given armed group control, illegal taxation, checkpoints, and administrative delays, all intensified by violence, interference of the government and armed groups in operations, and rising insecurity.

From June–November 2024, insecurity-related violence injured ten humanitarian workers. There were no reports of killing, injury or abduction in August and October likely because of decreased humanitarian operations during the rainy season (INSO accessed 11/01/2025). Conversely, from January–May, incidents were less frequent but resulted in higher casualties, with nine injuries, five abductions, and one death. Overall, in 2024, Bangui consistently emerged as the region where most incidents of violence were recorded (OCHA 07/07/2024, 07/08/2024, 04/09/2024, and 03/10/2024).

The majority of violent incidents against humanitarian workers, facilities and assets are attributable to NSAGs, criminal groups, the Central African military, and their Wagner group allies. Among those for which the motives are known, most are from economic factors (AWSO accessed 13/12/2024). Humanitarian workers in CAR operate in a volatile environment where they are at constant risk of targeting by armed groups because of the spread of misinformation. Such misinformation creates mistrust owing to fear of hidden agendas accompanying humanitarian efforts, consequently disrupting the delivery of services (Malhouni and Mabrouki 08/09/2023). An example is suspecting that humanitarian workers may be spies working with rival armed groups or implementing foreign agendas (Africanews 18/07/2024).

The trend throughout 2024 shows an improvement compared to data from 2019 onwards. The lowest fatality count (one) and a significant reduction in abductions (five) signal a departure from the higher levels of targeted violence in 2019 and 2020. There are still many injuries being reported in 2024 (19), but they are decreasing compared to the peak in 2019 (40) (INSO accessed 04/12/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC](#)



## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)



Score: 4

The DRC continues to experience very high access constraints mainly owing to insecurity related to NSAG activities and bureaucratic constraints. Since 2022, over 1,000 security incidents affecting humanitarian workers have been documented across the country. By 13 December 2024, these incidents had killed more than 20 humanitarian workers, half of which were recorded in 2024 alone. The majority of these violent incidents involve injuries, followed by kidnappings and killings. The number of security incidents has been on the rise since 2022, with 2024 already surpassing the number of incidents recorded in 2023 before the end of the year. Criminal groups and NSAGs perpetrated most physical attacks, often motivated by economic or political factors. Congolese staff constituted the majority of humanitarian workers killed, injured, or abducted (INSO accessed 11/12/2024; AWSD accessed 13/12/2024).

The multiple threats from various NSAGs in different provinces in the east of the country affect the ability of humanitarian organisations to carry out their activities. Humanitarian activities in Ituri, Nord-Kivu, and Sud-Kivu provinces are frequently interrupted for security reasons (RFI 06/04/2024). The suspension of humanitarian aid resulting from the targeting of workers and assets affects people in need of assistance in a worsening humanitarian situation driven by conflict, climate hazards, and disease outbreaks. With the current crisis in eastern DRC and the emergence of other conflicts, particularly in the west, humanitarian worker insecurity will likely persist, if not increase, in the coming months (OCHA 05/04/2024 and 01/11/2024; Caritas Int'l 25/06/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO](#)

## ETHIOPIA



Score: 4

Humanitarian access constraints in Ethiopia, particularly in Amhara, remain very high. Conflict between Fano militias and federal forces erupted in May 2023, persisted through two consecutive states of emergency (from August 2023 to June 2024), and escalated in July 2024, with militias expanding their control over areas and roadways. Since then, Fano militias have briefly seized at least 45 woredas, hampering humanitarian operations by heightening the risk of attacks on humanitarian workers (APA 18/09/2024; ACLED 20/08/2024 and 24/09/2024; CT 26/09/2024; TNH 19/09/2024).

In 2024, nine humanitarian workers were killed nationwide. Seven of these were in Amhara region alone, which saw five deaths in 2023 (OCHA 14/08/2024; PI 02/10/2024; AWSD accessed 11/12/2024; USAID 30/09/2024; HRW 03/07/2024). Also in 2024, at least 14 incidents of kidnapping for ransom targeting humanitarians were reported; most were in Central and North Gondar zones of Amhara region (OCHA 14/08/2024; VOA 14/08/2024).

Arbitrary road closures by armed groups, active clashes, and government drone attacks have increased the risks for both civilians and humanitarian workers, significantly disrupting access (ACLED 12/11/2024; GCR2P 16/10/2024; TNH 19/09/2024). Humanitarian access disruptions have delayed response efforts across the region. In western Amhara, these disruptions have caused shortages of food, healthcare, and water for refugees hosted in West Gondar zone (OCHA 01/03/2024; USAID 30/09/2024). Humanitarian workers also face accusations of aiding government soldiers and gathering intelligence, often leading to militias detaining them at roadblocks for 'education' about the conflict and persuasion efforts to win their support. The targeting of aid workers will likely increase in the coming months if the conflict in Amhara persists, with humanitarians navigating areas controlled by both militias and the Government and facing movement and operational challenges given numerous checkpoints and roadblocks (TNH 19/09/2024).

The conflict has also severely disrupted access to public services in Amhara. By March 2024, over 960 health facilities were looted, while more than 120 ambulances were seized (HRW 03/07/2024). Humanitarian assets, including pharmacies and ambulances, have been targeted, further limiting the capacity of organisations to deliver aid (The Reporter 26/10/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT ETHIOPIA](#)



## LEBANON

Score: 4



Humanitarian access constraints in Lebanon continue to be very high since the clashes that escalated between Hezbollah and Israel in September 2024. These clashes have since resulted in widespread displacement, fatalities, and infrastructure damage, especially in the southern Lebanon governorates of Nabatiye and South and the southern suburbs of Beirut. These issues have restricted access to essential services across the country (UN 27/11/2024). Before the ceasefire reached on 26 November 2024, the fighting disrupted humanitarian operations, with Israeli air strikes killing four humanitarians and injuring two between June - November, although they were not directly targeted. Compared with the previous reporting period of January–May, when two Lebanese humanitarian workers were killed, the second half of 2024 showed a clear deterioration when it came to the safety of humanitarian personnel (AWSO accessed 04/12/2024). Compared to July 2006, when clashes escalated between Hezbollah and Israel for a 34-day war, no humanitarian workers were killed or injured and nearly 90% of humanitarian convoys were able to reach the people in need, likely because the period of the conflict was shorter and lower in intensity (RI 04/10/2024).

The recent escalation of clashes has also directly affected non-humanitarian personnel. Notably, Israeli air strikes have targeted health workers and paramedics, with 241 health workers killed and 200 injured between 8 October 2023 and 5 December 2024 (Insecurity Insight 05/12/2024). The Israeli Government claims that Hezbollah uses ambulances to transport fighters and hospitals to hide weapons and equipment, which independent investigations have not verified (HRW 30/10/2024; Times of Israel 12/10/2024; The Guardian 13/10/2024). The targeting of healthcare facilities and workers disrupts a much-needed response to the treatment of injuries. It overwhelms Lebanon's already fragile healthcare system, which has already been suffering from shortages in medical staff and supplies following the economic crisis since 2019 (OCHA 18/11/2024; HRW 30/10/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT LEBANON](#)

## MALI

Score: 4



Humanitarian access constraints remain very high in Mali. Since 2021, more than 570 security incidents affecting humanitarian workers have been reported in the country. These attacks have affected humanitarian operations, especially in areas witnessing intensified hostilities, particularly in central and northern Mali along the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger. The number of deaths has increased from three in 2021 to at least 16 in 2023. Until 13 December 2024, the attacks had killed two humanitarian workers throughout the year; until mid-October, there were 13 reported incidents, including the two fatalities, three other injuries, and eight kidnappings, with the fatalities and injuries happening in the second half of 2024. This marks a decrease from 2023, when 26 incidents occurred, involving three fatalities, five injuries, and 18 kidnappings (OCHA 26/02/2024; AWSO accessed 14/12/2024; INSO accessed 13/12/2024).

Abductions remain the most common type of incident, although their frequency has decreased since 2021. The perpetrators of these violent events include NSAGs, criminal groups, the Malian defence and security forces, and their allies in the Wagner group (AWSO accessed 14/12/2024; INSO accessed 13/12/2024). Some of the reasons behind the targeting of humanitarian workers by NSAGs include the latter's views of humanitarian interventions as extensions of foreign influence and the use of humanitarian access as a tactic of war (AP 22/09/2024; TNH 12/03/2024; BBC 21/09/2024). A significant incident in the second half of 2024 included an attack on Bamako International Airport, damaging two UN aircraft and preventing temporary aid workers from travelling (UNICEF 21/11/2024).

Violence is expected to escalate and spread in early 2025 given continued political instability, the withdrawal of international forces, and an increase in NSAGs' capabilities. As such, humanitarian workers, facilities, and assets face a heightened risk of being targeted, which would further jeopardise aid delivery (AP 22/09/2024; Reuters 24/09/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT MALI](#)



## NIGERIA

Score: 4



Nigeria experienced very high access constraints during the second half of 2024. From 2020–2024, at least 49 incidents involving 79 humanitarian workers were reported, encompassing kidnappings, ambushes, and fatalities (Punch 20/08/2024; AWSO accessed 05/12/2024). In 2023, four humanitarian workers were killed, six kidnapped, and eight injured in northeastern Nigeria (OCHA 19/08/2024). The situation further escalated in 2024, with nearly 26 humanitarian workers kidnapped, ambushed, or assaulted by August (Punch 20/08/2024; AWSO accessed 05/12/2024).

Multiple factors drive this trend of violence against humanitarians. NSAGs, such as Boko Haram and Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) are the primary perpetrators of these attacks in the northeast (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states), while various bandit factions operate in the northwest (Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara states) (INSO 07/2024; OCHA 06/06/2024). NSAGs often regard humanitarian workers with suspicion or hostility as they see them as foreign agents or collaborators of the Government, aiming to weaken territorial control (Punch 20/08/2024). In Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara states, conflict between farmers and herders further heightens tensions, resulting in violent reprisals that often ensnare aid workers in ambushes, attacks, and kidnappings and lead to restricted access. These incidents severely hinder humanitarian aid delivery, delaying operations, escalating costs, and jeopardising staff safety. Notably, in July 2024, incidents involving NSAGs in the northeast reached their highest levels in two years, highlighting the growing danger in the region (INSO 07/2024; OCHA 06/06/2024).

The emergence of a new Islamist insurgent group from Niger and Mali called the Lakurawa, which operates predominantly in the northwest, combined with continued attacks in both the northwest and northeast, poses a growing threat to humanitarian operations. These escalating risks could lead to more frequent attacks on humanitarian workers, forcing some organisations to withdraw their operations (VOA 08/11/2024; ECHO 24/06/2024; INSO 2024; Reuters 07/11/2024). Such withdrawals would further heighten food insecurity and health crises, leaving millions of people in need of assistance without critical support.

[READ MORE ABOUT NIGERIA](#)

## SYRIA

Score: 4



Syria's protracted conflict has significantly intensified in the second half of 2024, with a considerable impact on humanitarian personnel, facilities, and assets.

On 27 November 2024, armed opposition groups, notably Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, launched an offensive, capturing major cities in Syria and ousting the former Syrian President on 8 December (UNHCR 09/12/2024). During this period, fighting involved bombing and shelling, as well as Russian air strikes in support of the defeated Syrian Government forces under Bashar Al Assad. The fighting has resulted in the targeting of civilian infrastructure and humanitarian assets, such as hospitals, UN facilities, warehouses, and schools. The situation remains dynamic, with unverified numbers of fatalities and extent of the impacts on humanitarian workers and infrastructure (OHCHR 03/12/2024; UNHCR 11/12/2024).

Before 27 November 2024, around 14 incidents against humanitarian workers had been recorded within the year that killed five people, injured seven, and led to the kidnapping of two people. In 2023, 14 incidents resulted in seven fatalities, seven injuries, and zero kidnappings. Various conflict parties have been implicated in these attacks, including the defeated government's forces, Israeli forces, Russian forces, and NSAGs (AWSO accessed 07/12/2024). Humanitarian workers are usually targeted by parties to the conflict as a tactic of war or because they are perceived with suspicion or as adversaries, with some aid organisations facing accusations of being a front for political and military activities (AWSO accessed 07/12/2024; CEIP 06/07/2016; HRW 15/10/2020 and 29/02/2024; SNHR 28/12/2023; BBC 27/02/2021BBC 27/02/2021).

The violence in the second half of 2024 forced some organisations to suspend, limit, or relocate operations, hindering aid delivery to people in need of assistance (OCHA 02/12/2024 and 08/12/2024; PHR 05/12/2024; WHO accessed 07/12/2024; UNHCR 11/12/2024)..

The outlook of the security situation in Syria in the coming several months remains uncertain. The eruption of clashes among the different armed groups will expose humanitarian workers and assets to violence, especially since opposition armed groups – similar to the defeated government forces – have a record of violating international humanitarian law and international human rights law (HRW 04/12/2024; OCHA 05/12/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT SYRIA](#)



# HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

HIGHH

CONSTRAINTS

## COLOMBIA



Score: 3

Colombia continued to experience high access constraints in the second half of 2024. Since 2019, violence against humanitarian workers has escalated across the country (ICRC 28/03/2022). By September 2024, 169 humanitarian access constraints were reported, 59% of which were tied to insecurity derived from disputes among NSAGs and between NSAGs and the Colombian army (OCHA 06/11/2024). The departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Guaviare, Nariño, and Norte de Santander were the most affected by violence-driven constraints (OCHA 15/04/2024). The primary factors restricting humanitarian access in 2023 included threats, military operations, and hostilities (OCHA 13/02/2024).

The most reported incidents in the same year involved medical personnel, with the targeting of ambulances and health facilities; healthcare workers also frequently reported threats and injuries (SWI 18/08/2023; OCHA 13/03/2024). Territorial disputes between NSAGs drive the attacks against medical personnel. 101 attacks were recorded in 2018, rose to 218 in 2019, 325 in 2020, and peaked at 553 in 2021 (ICRC 28/03/2022). Although incidents decreased to 271 in 2022, the total surged again to 511 in 2023, largely because of intensified disputes following ceasefires.

There is little information about the trend of these incidents in 2024. However, since NSAGs violence intensified in 2024, attacks against aid workers likely persisted and will continue into 2025 (ET 06/01/2023; InSight Crime 21/06/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT COLOMBIA](#)



## HAITI

Score: 3



Insecurity linked to criminal gangs continues to maintain a high level of humanitarian constraints in Haiti. Violent incidents affecting humanitarian organisations have significantly increased since 2021, when only two incidents were reported. This number rose to 15 in 2022, then almost quadrupled to 52 in 2023. In 2024, the figure remained nearly unchanged, with 51 incidents reported until 12 December. This upward trend exhibits a regional concentration, as most of the incidents over the past two years occurred in Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince (INSO accessed 12/12/2024; AWSD accessed 12/12/2024).

Criminal gangs are the main perpetrators of violence against humanitarian workers, followed by government forces. Economic motives explain most of the violence, particularly in cases of kidnapping for ransom or the robbery of humanitarian assets. Over the past four years, the most common incidents have been confinement and the theft of humanitarian equipment and personal items (INSO accessed 12/12/2024; AWSD accessed 12/12/2024).

In February 2024, armed gangs in the capital launched a coordinated attack against the Government, resulting in the targeting of public infrastructure, increased clashes with police forces, and heightened restrictions on movement because of insecurity (GC2RP 01/12/2024). In this context, humanitarian workers suffer violence from both the Haitian police and criminal gangs, mostly indirectly. In some cases, however, attacks have been targeted (AWSD accessed 13/12/2024; AJ 19/03/2024). Although the intensity of the clashes has since diminished, violence against civilians and humanitarian workers persists in an increasingly volatile context (France 24 09/12/2024).

[READ MORE ABOUT HAITI](#)

## MOZAMBIQUE

Score: 3



Mozambique experiences high access constraints from heightened insecurity in northern Mozambique. The drivers are active insurgencies and criminal activities. Humanitarian workers face increased scrutiny and hostility, as NSAGs often view them as collaborators of state and regional forces. Checkpoints manned by government forces, regional troops, and militias, such as the Nampamas, further impede humanitarian access through extortion, harassment, and obstruction. In Quissanga district from August–September 2024, incidents involving checkpoints demonstrated significant constraints on humanitarian activities (INSO 10/2024 and 09/2024).

From August 2022 to November 2024, 85 incidents targeting humanitarians were recorded. Annual trends reflect consistently high numbers of incidents – 27 in 2022, 31 in 2023, and 27 throughout 2024 until November (INSO accessed 03/12/2024). These incidents killed three humanitarian workers and injured eight, with attacks attributed to NSAGs, criminals, and unidentified armed groups (AWSD accessed 03/12/2024; INSO accessed 03/12/2024).

The growing insecurity has suspended humanitarian operations. In May 2024, MSF halted activities in Macomia following attacks on premises and staff. There remains no clarity on whether the organisation has resumed operations, as the district was among the most affected by violence until November 2024 (OCHA 29/11/2024; MSF 23/05/2024). In October, the Norwegian Refugee Council suspended operations, citing unsafe conditions for staff (NRC 25/10/2024). Such disruptions significantly hinder the delivery of assistance and heighten the needs of the affected population.

As insurgency and criminal activity persist, threats to humanitarian workers may escalate, with a risk of more organisations suspending activities for safety reasons, especially in conflict-affected districts of Cabo Delgado province.

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## NIGER

Score: 3



Humanitarian access remains highly constrained in Niger primarily because of persistent insecurity linked to NSAG activities, particularly in Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillabéri regions (UNHCR 26/08/2024; OCHA 16/10/2024).

Since 2021, around 300 violent incidents affecting humanitarian workers have been recorded in Niger. These incidents have killed at least six humanitarian workers, including one in 2024. While the number of reported cases fluctuates annually, there was a significant increase in the overall count between 2021–2023. Although it is difficult to determine whether this increase was from an escalation of violence against humanitarians or better monitoring of such events, the figures represent the risks that humanitarian workers face, particularly in conflict-affected areas. Physical attacks are mostly attributed to criminal groups, NSAGs, and government forces (INSO accessed 13/12/2024; AWSD 13/12/2024).

There was one reported fatality among humanitarian workers in April 2024 attributed to the Islamic State, but no fatalities were recorded in the latter half of the year. That said, opportunistic criminality, such as thefts and burglaries, affected humanitarian personnel and assets (INSO 22/10/2024; Insecurity Insight 16/09/2024). Three humanitarian workers sustained injuries as a result of insecurity during this period (INSO accessed 10/12/2024).

Humanitarian operations continued to face significant challenges in the second half of 2024, with numerous areas designated as military operation zones, restricting aid delivery. The Government mandates military escorts for travel in insecure regions, particularly Diffa and Tillabéri. Other areas, such as parts of Maradi and Zinder, require military clearance for NGOs. These restrictions significantly affect humanitarian access as they can lead to the scaling down or suspension of humanitarian operations in those areas. This has caused heightened needs among people living in affected areas (FEWS NET 10/07/2024; Crisis 24 19/09/2024; NZ MFAT accessed 18/11/2024; US Embassy in Niger 13/08/2024; OCHA 08/12/2023).

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