

Humanitarian access developments (October 2024 to March 2025)


BACKGROUND

Since April 2023, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has escalated into a nationwide war, severely restricting humanitarian access (UNHCR 27/02/2025; OCHA 31/12/2024; IRC 07/01/2025). In ACAPS’s Global Humanitarian Access Index¹ for the period between June–December 2024, Sudan scored 5/5 (Extreme), making it one of the most constrained humanitarian access contexts globally (ACAPS 12/2024).

Between October 2024 and March 2025, the war remained entrenched in North Darfur and Khartoum states, as the SAF and RSF fought over control of strategic locations, such as El Fasher city (Sudan Tribune 14/01/2025; ACLED 12/12/2024; ICG 21/01/2025). Conflict front lines have remained dynamic, with fighting spreading westward into Aj Jazirah, Khartoum, and White Nile states (ICG 21/01/2025). The war has also escalated southward into Sennar and Greater Kordofan (OHCHR 17/01/2025; VOA 03/02/2025; ICG 21/02/2025).

Humanitarian access constraints have significantly hindered humanitarian operations and aid delivery in the country, where over 30 million people, almost two-thirds of the population, are in need of humanitarian assistance (UNHCR 27/02/2025; OCHA 31/12/2024; IRC 07/01/2025). In March 2025, the INFORM Severity Index² scored the severity of Sudan’s humanitarian crisis at 4.9/5 (Very High), making it one of the worst humanitarian crises globally (ACAPS accessed 31/03/2025).

Map 1. Hotspots in Sudan by 28 February 2025³



Source: Protection Cluster (03/03/2025)

¹ The ACAPS Humanitarian Access Index is a global index measuring humanitarian access constraints in operational settings by providing a scoring system that enables comparability between different situations/crises, as well as trend monitoring within the same situation/crisis. The ACAPS Humanitarian Access Index is based on nine indicators and 34 sub-indicators. For Sudan, these sub-indicators are updated every six months. The methodology and dataset can be accessed here.

² The INFORM Severity Index is a global composite indicator measuring the severity of humanitarian crises by providing a scoring system that enables comparability between different situations/crises, as well as trend monitoring within the same situation/crisis. The index was developed by the INFORM working group (OCHA, Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, ACAPS, and technical partners). The INFORM Severity Index is based on 64 indicators, categorised under three dimensions, 45 of which come from pre-existing data sources. ACAPS provides input/collects data for 31 indicators and updates monthly. The methodology and dataset can be accessed here.

³ Protection Cluster hotspot mapping is used as an early warning tool to guide prevention and response efforts. The mapping categorises areas into three types: chronic hotspots, where violence is prolonged or recurrent; acute hotspots, which are experiencing active conflict; and at-risk locations, where violence is likely or civilians face imminent threat (Protection Cluster 03/03/2025).

ABOUT THIS REPORT

Aim

This report highlights the key developments affecting humanitarian access in Sudan between October 2024 and March 2025 at both the national and subnational levels, accounting for significant regional variations in access constraints. This is a follow-up report to the 27 June 2024 ACAPS report on humanitarian access in Sudan.

Scope

This report highlights new and evolving humanitarian access developments in Sudan between October 2024 and March 2025; it does not cover entrenched challenges that remain unchanged, even if continuing to affect humanitarian access. The report is structured into two main sections. The first provides an overview of key national-level access developments affecting humanitarian operations across the country. The second focuses on subnational events that significantly affected humanitarian access in specific states and regions. This section examines the impact of events on people's access to aid, humanitarian responders' ability to reach those in need, and the role of physical and environmental constraints.

Methodology

This report relies on a secondary data review of both public and non-public information sources, including reports and information from humanitarian organisations, UN organisations, and local and international media. This desk review was complemented by four expert interviews with humanitarian responders working in or on Sudan in the areas of humanitarian access, advocacy, and coordination. The subnational analysis draws on ACAPS's Global Humanitarian Access Methodology, which categorises access constraints under three pillars: (1) access of people in need to humanitarian assistance; (2) access of humanitarian responders to people in need; and (3) physical and environmental constraints.

Limitations

Reporting on humanitarian access in Sudan is often shaped by political considerations, leading to selective, incomplete, and underreported information, as both local and international organisations tend to limit their reporting to avoid jeopardising aid programmes.

Access constraints, security risks, and a highly politicised environment meant that expert interviews were challenging to conduct. As a result, this report relies heavily on secondary sources, which are often subject to delay, information gaps, and limited independent verification.

The war in Sudan remains highly dynamic, with shifting front lines and ambiguous reporting on territorial control. This lack of clear, detailed, real-time data complicates efforts to map access constraints and assess their likelihood and potential impact on humanitarian conditions in the country.

Information gaps

Publicly available information on humanitarian access in Sudan remains fragmented and incomplete, particularly at the subnational level, owing to dynamic shifts in the front lines and a complex access environment, among other factors. The war has rendered many areas of Sudan largely inaccessible, limiting public documentation and reporting capacities.

Official information and data in Sudan are often fragmented and outdated, especially disaggregated data on demographics, humanitarian indicators, and infrastructure, limiting analysis on humanitarian access and conditions. The existence of multiple administrative structures amid continuing power struggles has further weakened institutional capacity, resulting in inconsistent data collection and reporting.

Information on the specific requirements and procedures imposed by the warring parties is often unavailable, poorly communicated, or inadequately documented. This lack of clarity hampers assessment of access challenges and limits understanding of the operational environment.

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HUMANITARIAN ACCESS OVERVIEW

Humanitarian access in Sudan has been increasingly shaped and constrained by a combination of deliberate restrictions, intensified conflict, insecurity, and politically driven interference. While physical damage and insecurity have disrupted operations in many areas, access is also being strategically denied or manipulated by the warring parties, making it not only a consequence but also a tool of the conflict (UN News 14/02/2025; ICRC 27/01/2025; OHCHR 20/12/2024 and 26/06/2024).

Physical constraints resulting from armed conflict, insecurity, and widespread damage to critical infrastructure have created severe access constraints across Sudan. The war in Sudan has severely damaged key infrastructure, such as roads, distribution centres, and health facilities, affecting the delivery of aid and services to people in need (AJ 11/02/2025; ICRC 27/01/2025; Insecurity Insight 24/02/2025; Sudan Tribune 03/01/2025). Military blockades and checkpoints, compounded by worsening insecurity, have severely hindered humanitarian access and isolated areas, especially in Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Khartoum (Insecurity Insight 07/01/2025; EUAA 11/02/2025; WFP 30/12/2024; STC 17/02/2025). Attacks on aid facilities and humanitarian workers have led to the suspension or scaling back of humanitarian operations (MSF 24/02/2025; Humanitarian Outcomes 29/10/2024; HRW 07/02/2025; AJ 06/02/2025). Local responders and members of mutual aid groups, such as ERRs, have been persistently targeted by both the SAF and RSF, facing detention, assault, and even death. The warring parties have also targeted aid workers. In the five months between October 2024 and February 2025, over 23 aid workers were killed, six injured, and six kidnapped, with the vast majority of incidents happening in Aj Jazirah, North Darfur, and Khartoum states (AWSD accessed 18/03/2025). Healthcare workers and facilities also remain heavily affected, with over 100 reported incidents of violence or threats of violence between October 2024 and March 2025, severely limiting access to medical care. These incidents resulted in damage to 24 health facilities and resulting casualties among healthcare workers, including 17 fatalities and 17 injuries. The vast majority of incidents occurred in Aj Jazirah, North Darfur, and Khartoum (Map Action accessed 18/03/2025; Insecurity Insight 10/03/2025; WHO 10/03/2025).

During the reporting period, humanitarian access to people in need was further constrained by restrictive practices imposed by the warring parties alongside emerging external shocks, such as the abrupt United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding freeze and subsequent cuts. Both the SAF and RSF, as well as other armed groups, have systematically curtailed humanitarian access through policies and practices, such as blocking aid trucks, restricting travel permits, and disruptive inspections of humanitarian convoys among others (USCRI 10/09/2024; NRC et al. 02/09/2024; UN News 14/02/2025; OCHA/UN RC/HC Sudan 16/08/2024). Following concerted international pressure and to bolster their legitimacy on the global stage, the parties to the conflict did make some access concessions

(CSIS 17/12/2024; KII 21/01/2025 b; Reuters 19/11/2024; OCHA 08/08/2024; US Special Envoy for Sudan X 25/11/2024 and 18/11/2024). For instance, the SAF has been authorising humanitarian use of the Adré border crossing into Greater Darfur during the reporting period. (OCHA 16/12/2024; Sudan Tribune 25/11/2024; CSIS 17/12/2024; ECHO 21/10/2024). While these concessions improved the operational environment and humanitarian access to people in need, the lack of political will among parties to the conflict means that the implementation of such concessions remains challenging and inconsistent, such as in the timely issuance of visas for aid workers (Sudan Tribune 31/08/2024 Reuters 19/11/2024; OCHA 12/01/2025; US Special Envoy for Sudan X 25/11/2024 and 18/11/2024; KII 21/01/2025 b; KII 05/12/2024). Beyond Sudan's existing access challenges, emerging external factors have further constrained humanitarian operations. The abrupt USAID stop-work orders (SWOs) and subsequent funding freeze have caused significant disruption to humanitarian response and coordination, with implications for humanitarian access (NRC 25/02/2025; NPR 26/02/2025).

Between October 2024 and March 2025, access of people in need to aid was severely constrained, mainly as a result of displacement, restrictions on the freedom of movement, and insecurity. Widespread displacement into remote and insecure areas has pushed people further away from services and aid (OHCHR 20/12/2024; AJ 03/02/2025; IRC 07/01/2025; IOM accessed 26/02/2025). Blockades, military checkpoints, destroyed roads, and insecure routes have restricted freedom of movement, trapping some populations in insecure areas with limited access to food, water, and healthcare (Sudan INGO 17/02/2025; BCC 12/02/2025; OHCHR 20/12/2024). In RSF-controlled areas, both the SAF and RSF imposed constraints left many without access to assistance (AJ 31/12/2024; IPC 24/12/2024; Sudan INGO 17/02/2025). As such, people are increasingly relying on mutual aid groups – such as ERRs – for critical assistance, despite these groups' limited capacity and the heavy restrictions imposed on them (TNH 13/11/2024; The Guardian 31/12/2024). The warring parties' looting of markets and aid stocks in many areas, such as North Darfur and Sennar states, has further reduced civilians' access to essential goods, including food and medicine (Sudan Tribune 30/06/2024; WHO 05/12/2024).

KEY NATIONAL-LEVEL ACCESS DEVELOPMENTS

Denial of famine in parts of the country

Famine (IPC Phase 5) levels of food insecurity have been confirmed in multiple localities across Sudan. SAF-aligned entities have rejected these findings and dismissed them as politically driven, prompting the SAF to withdraw from the IPC process. In December 2024, the IPC Famine Review Committee determined that famine exists in five areas in the Greater Darfur region and western Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan state. 17 more localities are projected to be at risk of famine until at least May 2025 in Aj Jazirah and Khartoum states, the central Nuba Mountains, and Greater Darfur region (IPC 24/12/2024). This followed an August 2024 IPC assessment that deemed famine plausible in Zamzam camp in North Darfur state, confirming other organisations' assessments (FEWS NET 09/07/2024; MSF 01/05/2024; IPC 01/08/2024). SAF-aligned entities have categorically denied the existence of famine in Sudan and withdrawn from the IPC process (IPC 24/12/2024; SUNA 07/01/2025; UN 06/01/2024; Radio Dabanga 03/01/2025). Such entities cited concerns over the credibility of IPC findings, claiming that famine assessments were speculative, politically motivated, and intended to justify foreign intervention (Sudan Tribune 31/12/2024; RFI 29/12/2024; Reuters 24/12/2024).

SAF-aligned entities have actively obstructed and undermined the IPC, delaying the official famine determination process to avoid political pressure and scrutiny over its role in blocking aid. Both the SAF and RSF extensively employ the practice of blocking aid, and increased scrutiny of famine conditions would put political pressure on the SAF to ease access restrictions and improve the flow of aid to people in need throughout RSF-controlled areas (Reuters 05/12/2024 and 24/12/2024; ECHO 21/10/2024). According to Reuters investigation, SAF-aligned entities were able to delay the IPC's determination of famine in Zamzam camp in North Darfur state by seven months, as it was only deemed plausible in August 2024 (Reuters 05/12/2024; IPC 01/08/2024; MSF 01/05/2024). This earlier determination of famine triggered heightened international attention, with the resulting pressure contributing to the SAF's limited humanitarian access concessions, including authorising humanitarian responders to use the Adré border crossing into Greater Darfur (Sudan Conflict Monitor 10/09/2024; US Special Envoy for Sudan X 23/08/2024; ISHR 28/02/2025).

The withdrawal of SAF-aligned entities from the IPC process limits humanitarian responders' ability to assess humanitarian needs, negotiate access, and justify their presence. Many humanitarian responders rely on IPC assessments to detect emerging food crises and inform strategic decisions by donors and implementing organisations (Reuters 05/12/2024 and 24/12/2024; Radio Dabanga 25/12/2024; KII 21/01/2025 a). The absence of IPC data hinders the prioritisation of emergency and humanitarian activities and the effective

designing of programmes, such as famine-related response (Reuters 05/12/2024; IPC 10/2024). As result, effective aid targeting and access to people in need is hindered. The lack of IPC data also deprives humanitarian responders of reliable information needed to negotiate access to conflict-affected areas and people. Without reliable information, humanitarian responders may struggle to justify their presence and operations to key stakeholders, including institutions and donors, ultimately affecting humanitarian access (UN 06/01/2025; WFP 27/06/2024; Business Standard 24/12/2024; Atlantic Council 25/09/2024).

USAID stop-work orders and subsequent cuts

The US administration's abrupt funding freeze has complicated Sudan's humanitarian access landscape, with unclear exemptions leaving aid organisations uncertain about the scope of permitted activities. On 20 January 2025, the new US administration paused USAID funding, including humanitarian aid, for 90 days pending a strategic review to align funding with the new administration's foreign policy priorities (The White House 20/01/2025). The USAID SWOs and subsequent cuts come amid growing humanitarian needs in Sudan, including the spread of famine, protection concerns, and displacement crises (Operation Broken Silence 06/02/2025; NRC 25/02/2025; Sudan INGO unpublished). While the US Government issued special waivers for lifesaving interventions, humanitarian organisations lacked clarity on which programmes were exempt (USAID 10/02/2025; Think Global Health 10/02/2025). The vague nature of these waivers caused confusion, as interpretation was left to implementing organisations. Many organisations struggled to determine whether they could legally continue to provide aid, resulting in the suspension of many humanitarian activities (NRC 25/02/2025; Operation Broken Silence 06/02/2025).

The USAID funding freeze has severely disrupted humanitarian operations, led to programme closures and financial instability, and reduced access to aid for people in need. Beyond disrupting the continuity of USAID-funded services, the freeze has forced programmes to shut down as financial capacities have eroded, even for organisations in receipt of waivers for lifesaving operations, affecting broader networks of responders through disruptions to supply chains and food pipelines (Protection Cluster 09/02/2025; Operation Broken Silence 06/02/2025; BBC 25/02/2025; H2H 26/02/2025; Sudan INGO unpublished). Many affected organisations have adopted a risk-based approach to minimise their financial exposure (KII 26/02/2025). Local NGOs and last-mile aid delivery mechanisms, such as ERRs, have been deeply affected by the significant financial risk and strain caused by the freeze and subsequent cuts (Living Church 13/02/2025; NBC 11/02/2025). In Khartoum, 80–90% of the 742 communal kitchens had to close as a result of SWOs, leaving some of the most food-vulnerable populations with no access to critical services (AP 01/03/2025; Sudan INGO 17/02/2025; NBC 11/02/2025). The suspension of US funding is having a significant impact on Sudan's health sector, further weakening an already collapsing system and limiting people's access to essential services amid multiple health

crises. Across the country, 335 health facilities have been affected, including 57 in Greater Darfur, representing 7% of the region's total health infrastructure. These disruptions come alongside disease outbreaks, such as cholera in White Nile state (Insecurity Insight 10/03/2025; Sudan Tribune 03/03/2025; Health Cluster 24/02/2025).

The shutdown of FEWS NET, compounded by the SAF's withdrawal from the IPC process, has undermined famine monitoring systems in Sudan, leaving humanitarian responders without the data essential to assessing food insecurity and negotiating access. By March 2025, the FEWS NET website remained offline, depriving humanitarian responders of an important monitoring tool for food insecurity projections, including famine warning (Devex 30/01/2025; FEWS NET accessed 26/03/2025). Alongside the SAF withdrawal from the IPC process, the shutdown of FEWS NET limits humanitarian organisations' ability to assess the extent and level of food needs, anticipate the evolution of hazards, and plan effective response, hindering response efforts for populations vulnerable to food insecurity (KII 26/02/2025; NPR 21/02/2025). While alternative methods such as satellite imagery and community-based reporting are increasingly used to fill information gaps, such methods often lack the methodological consistency and analytical rigour of systems such as FEWS NET and the IPC, which also allow for comparable reliable trend analysis (DFS 19/01/2024; UNICEF 05/2020; Wu et. al 19/12/2022; Reuters 07/02/2025). Without FEWS NET assessments, organisations' ability to negotiate access to conflict-affected areas and people is hampered with the absence of reliable information to justify the need for humanitarian operations. While a global list of continued and terminated US grants indicates that FEWS NET's operations will continue, at the time of writing, the website remains offline (UN 06/01/2025; WFP 27/06/2024; Business Standard 24/12/2024; Atlantic Council 25/09/2024).

For a more comprehensive analysis of the implications of the US funding freeze for Sudan, please see [Sudan: implications of the USAID funding cuts](#).

New requirements imposed by SARHO on INGOs

In December 2024, the RSF-aligned Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO) imposed new requirements on INGOs. The new directives require INGOs operating in Greater Darfur, where the RSF holds significant control, to register with SARHO, even if they already registered with the SAF-aligned Humanitarian Aid Coordination (HAC), with the risk of retribution if organisations do not comply. These dual registration requirements have created operational challenges for humanitarian organisations, as they now face double registration mandates and statutory fees (KII 05/12/2024; KII 21/01/2025 a; KII 26/02/2025; OCHA 10/02/2025). These newly imposed requirements and impediments appear to contradict Jeddah Declaration commitments, hindering aid delivery in RSF-controlled areas and raising donor concerns over the impartiality and safety of humanitarian operations (OCHA/UN RC/HC Sudan 10/02/2025; StratNews Global 25/03/2025; Radio Dabanga 11/02/2025).

The overlapping aid coordination platforms, with their conflicting requirements, have severely hindered humanitarian access in Sudan, forcing organisations to navigate a complex and restrictive operational landscape. As the RSF attempts to establish a parallel government, humanitarian aid coordination in Sudan is becoming more fragmented and overlapping, creating significant operational challenges that hinder effective humanitarian access, causing delays and shortages in aid delivery (OWP 23/10/2024; Mercy Corps 09/2023; UN 06/08/2024; Reuters 25/03/2025). Other parties to the conflict impose their own procedures and requirements in areas under their control, such as the Sudan People Liberation Movement North – Al Hilu in parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states and the Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel Wahid in Jabal Marrah area in greater Darfur region (OCHA 24/06/2024; KII 05/12/2024). In practice, the presence of multiple aid coordination platforms forces humanitarian organisations to negotiate localised access with various competing groups. These platforms closely monitor and selectively manage the application of aid, ensuring the governing entities retain extensive control over humanitarian assistance (KII 21/01/2025a; National Centre for Social Research 18/08/2024; Radio Dabanga 13/08/2023; OCHA 12/01/2025). Other group may also impose its own financial requirements, including varying registration processes, fees, and taxes, leading to confusion and inconsistencies in compliance (STPT 29/01/2025; MEE 18/03/2024). These procedures often differ even within the same group's areas of control (Mercy Corps 08/2023; Sudan INGO unpublished).

The new imposed requirements compound already existing impediments caused by taxes and fees imposed by parties to the conflict and humanitarian principles, such as neutrality. Such fees and taxes, including those imposed at checkpoints, further perpetuate a pattern of exploiting humanitarian operations (ICG 21/02/2025; TPT 29/01/2025; RVI 10/2019; KII 23/01/2025). Collectively, these measures increase the cost of delivering aid, slow down supply chains, and limit resource availability for urgent needs in conflict-affected regions. In areas controlled by non-state groups, the absence of a formal operational financial system further complicates legal compliance, making it difficult for organisations to navigate legal obligations and ensure financial transparency. The lack of standardisation not only hinders effective humanitarian response but also exposes organisations to legal repercussions, as they struggle to operate while upholding humanitarian principles and accountability (Sudan INGO unpublished; Asharq Al- Awsat 23/01/2025; OCHA 05/02/2025; Humanitarian Action 31/12/2024).

It is still unclear what the potential establishment of an RSF-led parallel government would mean for humanitarian access. While a parallel government has yet to be established, RSF along with other aligned signed a charter paving the way for an alternative government in non-SAF controlled areas (Sudan War Monitor 03/02/2025; MEMO 10/03/2025; DFS/H2H 25/10/2024). The establishment of an RSF-led parallel government could both improve and worsen humanitarian access, depending on how new administrative structures are implemented (KII 26/02/2025; MEMO 10/03/2025). In the immediate term, RSF will likely consolidate control over aid mechanisms, introducing additional bureaucratic layers and procedures that could stifle

effective humanitarian operations (KII 26/02/2025; CSFDD/09/2023). In the long term, access may improve if the RSF-led parallel government establishes functional administrative systems and gains recognition from neighbouring countries such as Chad and Libya, improving humanitarian access through border crossing under their control (TRT Afrika 23/02/2025; Arab News 25/10/2024; Al Jazeera 09/01/2020; BL News 13/12/2024).

Extension on the use of the Adré border point

Since August 2024, the periodic three-month extensions of the Adré border opening have created uncertainty for humanitarian organisations, making long-term aid planning difficult. Cross-border access in Sudan has been heavily constrained since war between the SAF and RSF erupted in April 2023, particularly the Adré crossing point between Chad and West Darfur state. Although the Adré crossing point is within RSF-controlled territories, its administration remains under the SAF-aligned government. As such, access to the border crossing requires SAF approval (OCHA 31/08/2024; Reuters 13/11/2024). The SAF-aligned government reopened the Adré border in August 2024 after closing it for six months to exert pressure and limit RSF access (Sudan Tribune 06/08/2024 and 19/10/2024; TRT World 15/11/2024). After concerted international pressure, the SAF has been extending humanitarian use of the crossing every three months, including a renewal in February 2025 for another three-month period (WFP 14/11/2024; Sudan Tribune 17/02/2025; NYT 15/08/2024; CNN 15/08/2024). Continued use of the crossing will likely depend on the trajectory of the conflict, particularly RSF-SAF dynamics, as well as international diplomatic engagement and pressure. The uncertainty around Adré's renewal every three months has complicated long-term humanitarian planning and response coordination, as organisations are unable to establish predictable operational timelines for aid delivery (KII 21/01/2025 a; UN News 14/11/2024; Reuters 13/11/2024).

While the reopening of the Adré border has significantly improved aid delivery to Sudan, new inspection protocols continue to create operational delays. The Adré border crossing is one of the most efficient and shortest routes for aid delivery to Greater Darfur and parts of the Greater Kordofan region (OCHA 31/08/2024). Adré also serves as an alternative to the Tine crossing, which frequently faces constraints resulting from flooding during the rainy season, such as in August 2024, when heavy rains and flooding significantly impeded aid transportation via the Tine route (OCHA/UN RC/HC Sudan 16/08/2024; WFP 01/08/2024; FEWS NET 05/09/2024). Since Adré's reopening in August 2024, the flow of aid into Sudan from Chad has significantly improved compared to when Adré was closed and organisations had to rely on Tine. By the end of December 2024, 732 humanitarian cargo trucks had crossed into Sudan from Chad through Adré, compared to none in August 2024 (OCHA 12/01/2025). In contrast, only 165 trucks crossed through Tine in the same period (OCHA 12/01/2025). Despite these improvements, new inspection protocols introduced by the SAF-aligned government in January 2025 have been causing delays at the crossing (UN 06/01/2025).

New directives on bank notes


The rollout of new SAF-issued banknotes has complicated cash-based humanitarian programming. On 9 November 2024, the SAF-aligned Central Bank of Sudan announced the rollout of new 500 and 1,000 Sudanese Pound banknotes (Sudan Tribune 10/11/2024). The bank justified its issuance of new notes as a currency-strengthening measure amid inflationary pressures, a faltering economy, and competing parallel exchange rates (OCHA 05/20/2025; SUNA 18/11/2024; Radio Dabanga 10/11/2024). The issuance of new banknotes appears aimed, however, at undermining the RSF by restricting its access to financial resources, reasserting control over monetary flows, and mobilising funds to sustain SAF operations (France 24 22/01/2025; Radio Dabanga 15/11/2024). The distribution of the new banknotes has been limited to areas under SAF control, while the RSF has prohibited the circulation of the new bank notes in areas it controls, posing significant challenges for humanitarian operations in areas outside SAF control (The National 17/12/2024; Sudan Tribune 08/12/2024; Dabanga 30/12/2024). Organisations operating across both SAF and RSF-controlled areas now face operational challenges, particularly in determining which banknotes to designate as legal tender in cash-based programming. The two separate monetary systems present complex challenges for operational planning, such as in the execution of cash assistance, increasing difficulty in aid distribution and financial transactions (OCHA 05/02/2025; WFP 30/01/2025; KII 26/02/2025).

The new currency directive has further worsened the existing liquidity crisis, disrupting cash-based humanitarian programming and straining market-dependent aid efforts. Cash assistance is a major modality in the current humanitarian response, accounting for around 7.7% of Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan requirements for 2025 (OCHA 31/12/2024 and 09/09/2024; Mercy Corps 01/07/2024; Concern Worldwide 04/10/2024). The issuance of new banknotes has further compounded this liquidity crisis, severely disrupting humanitarian operations. By late January 2025, the WFP had reported delays in cash and in-kind food distribution to over four million people as a result of insufficient physical cash. Other organisations noted in late January 2025 that approximately USD 11.5 million in cash and voucher-based activities targeting 500,000 people in SAF-controlled areas had also been delayed by liquidity issues. The inability to pay porters and suppliers in cash has further constrained the delivery of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 05/02/2025). Humanitarian organisations rely on a network of commercial merchants for logistics and to supply essential items, most of which are sourced from local markets as part of a strategy to revitalise market functionalities and address liquidity challenges (OCHA 05/02/2025; WFP 30/01/2025). Prior to the new directive, money in circulation was already restricted by liquidity shortages and market disruptions, posing a significant challenge to cash-based assistance programmes (CALP Networks 22/10/2024; CGAP 03/12/2024). The further reduction in the availability of cash caused by the new banknote directive has already disrupted humanitarian programming, leading to the suspension of certain operations (WFP 23/01/2025).

SUBNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

This section highlights access-related constraints between October 2024 and March 2025 in states and regions reporting the most significant humanitarian access developments in terms of frequency of incidents, administrative barriers, and conflict-related disruptions. These areas include Khartoum state, the Greater Darfur region, Sennar state, Aj Jazirah state, and the Greater Kordofan region. Other states and regions, such as Blue Nile state, eastern Sudan region, Northern state, and White Nile state, also saw access-related developments, but these areas are not covered in this section because the severity and operational impact of access constraints were relatively lower as a result of these areas' distance from the front lines and access to key humanitarian hubs, such as Port Sudan.

Map 2: Humanitarian access constraints map as at February 2025



Source: OCHA (06/03/2025)

Khartoum state

Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

Khartoum is the primary origin of displacement in Sudan, with approximately 31% of IDPs originating from the area by March 2025 (IOM 23/03/2025). During the reporting period, the conflict continued to cause displacement in Khartoum as people feared further attacks, forcing them away from services and assistance (AJ 31/12/2024; UNHCR 28/01/2025 and 20/02/2025; IOM 05/02/2025). Displacement has led to overcrowded conditions in host areas, straining resources and aggravating humanitarian needs (UN News 08/11/2024; IOM 23/03/2025; IPC 24/12/2024). As for people who remained in Khartoum, many have been confined within RSF-controlled areas, unable to access assistance as a result of insecurity and RSF-imposed restrictions. (AJ 31/12/2024; Radio Dabanga 13/10/2024).

During the reporting period, the population of Khartoum, in areas both held by the RSF and SAF, faced significant obstacles to accessing humanitarian assistance, as many humanitarian organisations limited operations in the area. To fill the gap left by the absence of operational INGOs in Khartoum – a result of insecurity and constrained humanitarian access – people relied on ERRs, who played a critical role in delivering assistance. The ability of ERRs to operate has been severely restricted, however, by security threats and both SAF and RSF imposed barriers (TNH 13/11/2024; The Guardian 31/12/2024; Chatham House 09/12/2024). ERRs' perceived alignment with opposing forces and control over critical resources have made them targets, as both the RSF and SAF view these characteristics as a threatening alternative to their authority and services (AJ 06/02/2025; CFR 26/03/2025; AI 07/02/2025).

Access of humanitarian responders to people in need

Since April 2023, humanitarian organisations have faced significant access constraints in Khartoum, including delays in travel permits and approvals for crossline aid delivery, restricting humanitarian responders' ability to intervene effectively (IRC 25/06/2024).

Humanitarian organisations and community responders also face severe security hazards and growing risk of harm, including violence targeting aid workers (AI 10/02/2025; OHCHR 07/02/2025). On 10 January 2025, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), one of the few humanitarian organisations operating in RSF-controlled areas, temporarily suspended its activities at the Bashaier hospital in Khartoum because RSF forces were perpetrating violence in the hospital, targeting patients and staff (MSF 10/01/2025). The temporary suspension of MSF activities further paralysed the hospital, removing a critical source of medical care for people in need of essential health services (MSF 10/01/2025).

Similarly, members of mutual aid groups, such as ERRs, have been persistently targeted by both the SAF and RSF, facing detention, assault, and even death (TNH 13/11/2024). With the SAF retaking formerly RSF-controlled territories in Khartoum, there has been a surge in reprisal attacks targeting community aid workers, who the SAF accuse of supporting the RSF (AJ 06/02/2025; AI 07/02/2025; TNH 13/11/2024). In response to rising insecurity, many community aid workers have fled, forcing the shutdown of many essential services, including communal kitchens (TNH 13/11/2024; Reuters 08/10/2024). As a result, humanitarian needs have deepened in areas previously served by such local aid groups, as their capacity to meet needs has been severely disrupted (Reuters 08/10/2024).

The USAID funding freeze in January 2025 has further disrupted the work of ERRs and communal kitchens, with more than 80% of kitchens shutting down immediately after the freeze took effect, significantly reducing access to food assistance (The Guardian 12/02/2025; NBC 11/02/2025). This disruption has left some of the populations most vulnerable to food insecurity with no access to these critical services (AP 01/03/2025; Sudan INGO 17/02/2025; NBC 11/02/2025).

With the SAF recapturing parts of Khartoum and the resumption of crossline aid delivery in significant areas, the overall humanitarian access landscape has marginally improved, with an increased flow of aid into those areas (ICG 21/02/2025; OCHA 11/02/2025). In line with past trends, however, the SAF and aligned entities may impose additional requirements and hurdles in newly reclaimed areas, introducing new humanitarian access constraints (ICG 21/02/2025; MERIP 15/04/2024; KII 21/01/2025 a).

Physical and environmental constraints

Since January 2025, the Merowe Dam power station in Northern state, a facility responsible for producing approximately 40% of the nation's electricity, has been severely damaged by drone strikes attributed to the RSF. This includes damage to a key transformer, which has significantly disrupted electricity access in Khartoum, Omdurman, and the surrounding areas. As a result, telecommunications have been heavily affected, with power outages rendering mobile networks unreliable, slowing humanitarian coordination and hampering access to already-fragile banking services (Mercy Corps 08/05/2023; Reuters 18/01/2025; Sudan Horizon 05/03/2025).

Shifting frontlines have prompted return movements. The presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance UXO in Khartoum significantly hampered these returns, limiting access to services. Landmines and UXO had also limited the ability of organisations to conduct needs assessments in the area due to the hazards posed on aid workers (UNICEF 24/03/2025; UNMAS 03/04/2025; UNICEF 24/03/2025).

Greater Darfur region

Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

In early February 2025, clashes intensified significantly in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state, as the RSF escalated efforts to capture the last major city in western Sudan still under SAF control (IPC 24/12/2024; AJ 03/02/2025; STC 03/02/2025). Capturing El Fasher would enable the RSF to exert political dominance over North Darfur and control humanitarian operations across the region (SCR 01/03/2025; OHCHR 22/01/2025; AJ 03/02/2025).

Conflict in El Fasher has displaced tens of thousands, forcing them to flee to areas with limited services. Most displaced people have sought refuge in Al Koma, Al Malha, Dar As Salam, Kebkabiya, Kutum, Tawila, and Um Baru localities across North Darfur state (IOM 06/02/2025; OHCHR 20/12/2024; IPC 24/12/2024). Attacks on fleeing civilians along evacuation routes have also been reported (Sudan INGO 17/02/2025; OHCHR 20/12/2024). Displacement from El Fasher ranks as the third highest in Sudan, after Khartoum and Bahri cities. By 14 January 2025, North Darfur state was hosting approximately 15% of Sudan's total IDPs (IOM 06/02/2025).

People's access to health services has been severely restricted in El Fasher. Al Saudi Maternity Hospital has been repeatedly shelled, as it is located near the fighting front line just north of the El Fasher airport. Al Saudi is the only remaining public hospital providing surgical operations and sexual and reproductive health services in the city. Its continued targeting has left many people with no access to critical medical care (OHCHR 20/12/2024; The Guardian 26/01/2025; Sudan INGO 17/02/2025). This degradation of healthcare infrastructure is particularly alarming given the region's already high maternal mortality rate and incidence of sexual violence systematically employed as a weapon of war (OHCHR 29/10/2024; AJ 13/03/2025; France 24 29/10/2024; MSF 25/09/2024).

The RSF siege of El Fasher since May 2024 has led to severe restrictions on people's access to fuel, food, and water (IPC 24/12/2024; AJ 03/02/2025; Sudan INGO 17/02/2025). This has caused a significant deterioration in humanitarian conditions, particularly food insecurity. According to an IPC Famine Review Committee assessment in December 2024, Famine (IPC Phase 5) has been confirmed and is projected to persist until at least May 2025 in Al Salam and Abou Shouk IDP camps in El Fasher (IPC 01/08/2024 and 24/12/2024).

Zamzam IDP camp, approximately 15km south of El Fasher, is the only corridor out of the city and hosts around half a million IDPs (AJ 04/12/2024; OHCHR 20/12/2024; MSF 24/02/2025). Since the start of the war in April 2023, the parties to the conflict have intermittently imposed a de facto aid blockade on the camp, severely hindering people's access to critical items such as food and medicine (MSF 16/10/2024). Continued clashes and attacks on Zamzam camp have triggered further displacement, forcing people away from services and aid (MSF 02/12/2024;

Sudan INGO 03/12/2024; Sudan Tribune 28/12/2024). In mid-February 2025 alone, at least 10,000 people were displaced within and outside the camp (IOM 19/02/2025). The months-long blockade of and repeated attacks on Zamzam camp have contributed to the existing famine conditions, which are projected to persist until at least May 2025 (Mercy Corps 03/12/2024; MSF 13/09/2024; IPC 24/12/2025).

On 12 February, an alleged RSF attack on the camp resulted in the looting and burning of the main market, affecting people's access to food supplies and leading to an increase in food prices, as the camp's supply chain was significantly disrupted, making trade more costly (BBC12/02/2025; STC 17/02/2025; Reuters 24/12/2024). Similar targeting of markets also occurred in other areas of the Greater Darfur region during the reporting period. On 24 March 2025, what are believed to be SAF warplanes bombed the weekly market in Tora village, approximately 40 kilometres north of El Fasher, causing a massive fire and killing more than 50 people (Dabanga 07/04/2025; France24 25/03/2025; Aljazeera 25/03/2025).

Overall, constrained access of people in need to aid is contributing to the deterioration in humanitarian conditions in the Greater Darfur region, especially North Darfur state. Between December 2024 and May 2025, according to the IPC, famine is expected to expand in North Darfur, with at least the following localities being at risk: Al Lait, At Tawisha, El Fasher, Melit, and Um Kadadah (IPC 24/12/2024). Non-Arab ethnic groups – such as the Zaghawa and Masalit – have been systematically targeted by the RSF, with insecurity and forced displacement leading to severely disrupted access to entitlements and humanitarian aid. These groups are disproportionately affected by access constraints particularly in Greater Darfur, where these non-Arab ethnic groups reside (IPC 24/12/2024; VOA 30/10/2024; The Guardian 20/01/2025; MSF 03/02/2025).

Access of humanitarian responders to people in need

Humanitarian response across the Greater Darfur region continues to be severely hindered by security threats and deliberate obstruction of aid, limiting aid to people in need (FEWS NET 01/08/2024). For example, on 14 February 2025 two humanitarian aid workers were killed in attacks on Zamzam camp (Sudan INGO 17/02/2025). The deteriorating security situation and continued fighting have forced aid organisations to suspend or scale down operations in hotspot areas, especially in El Fasher and Zamzam camp, where RSF shelling and SAF airstrikes are regular occurrences (OHCHR 20/12/2024; Sudan INGO 17/02/2025).

On 24 and 26 February 2025, intensified RSF shelling led MSF and the WFP to suspend activities in Zamzam, as operations were becoming increasingly dangerous and unfeasible (WFP 26/02/2025; MSF 23/02/2025). The indiscriminate shelling and worsening insecurity led to the closure of an MSF-operated clinic in Zamzam, severely hindering IDPs' access to healthcare (Sudan INGO 03/12/2024; OCHA 03/12/2024; MSF 24/02/2024). The suspension of the

camp's clinic came at a time of increasing medical needs, as conflict-related injuries and worsening malnutrition have placed growing pressure on the area's already limited health services (MSF 23/12/2024 and 06/11/2024).

Beyond the physical and security barriers hindering humanitarian responders' access to those in need, in December 2024, the RSF imposed a range of stringent measures that interfere with humanitarian aid operations in Darfur. Such measures include requiring collaboration with RSF-affiliated vendors, which exposes humanitarian operations to corruption, and the imposition of extra paperwork and inspections at checkpoints, which cause delays and disrupt the timely delivery of aid. These measures have hindered the delivery of lifesaving supplies to people in need in the Greater Darfur region (AP 10/02/2025; ECHO 21/10/2024; KII 26/02/2025; OCHA 10/02/2025).

Physical and environmental constraints

In the Greater Darfur region, inadequate road infrastructure significantly hampers humanitarian access, particularly to remote areas. This challenge was exacerbated during the reporting period by flood damage occurring just prior (STC 05/09/2024; FAO 08/07/2024; IFRC 06/09/2024; OCHA 02/08/2024 and 05/09/2024). Notably, the Krinding and Ardamata bridges near El Geneina, along the Adré crossing route into Darfur, and the Morni Bridge between El Geneina and Zalingei were affected, disrupting the timely delivery of humanitarian supplies (UNHCR 02/09/2024; UNHCR 16/09/2024; ; Radio Tamazuj 07/09/2024; UN 16/08/2024).

As of March 2025, the Morni Bridge remains impassable. While the bridge structure is intact, flood-induced erosion has removed approximately 80 metres on the western side and 25 metres on the eastern side. During the dry season, vehicles reroute via the dried riverbed. No alternative has been established for the upcoming wet season. The Ardamata Bridge is passable with limitations, with trucks reportedly able to cross. For the Krinding Bridge, road erosion from flood damage forces vehicles to use the dry riverbed in the dry season. During the upcoming wet season, vehicles are expected to reroute via the nearby Ardamata Bridge (Logistics Cluster accessed 31/04/2025).

Sennar state

Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

Between 29 June and 23 November 2024, Sinja, the capital of Sennar state, was under RSF siege, severely restricting movement and limiting access to humanitarian assistance (Sudan War Monitor 23/06/2024; ACLED 12/07/2024). During that period, Sennar became a critical battleground, with growing humanitarian needs resulting from recurrent armed confrontations between the SAF and RSF, particularly around key areas on SAF supply routes (ACLED 14/10/2024; OCHA 01/07/2024; MEMO 31/01/2025; Sudan Tribune 05/10/2024). Heavy shelling of civilian infrastructure, such as the 8 September 2024 bombing of a market in Sennar, underscores the severity of insecurity in this period (UNICEF 11/09/2024; ST 08/09/2024). Similarly, access to the Sinja Teaching Hospital had been severely restricted as a result of insecurity, with reports of medical staff and patients being used as human shields, further disrupting healthcare services (Insecurity Insight 09/07/2024; OCHA 04/07/2024). Before the SAF recaptured most of the state in November 2024, RSF-held areas, such as Ad Dinder and Jebel Moya, faced entrenched humanitarian access restrictions, making it extremely difficult for people in need to reach aid (OCHA 01/07/2024; Sudan Tribune 15/02/2025; ACLED 18/11/2024).

Between 29 June and 23 November 2024, more than 700,000 people were displaced from Sennar, mainly to White Nile and Aj Jazirah states, severely compromising their access to aid and basic services (IOM 04/08/2024; DRC et al. 07/08/2024). This displacement has led to overcrowded conditions in host areas, straining resources and aggravating humanitarian needs (UN News 08/11/2024; IPC 24/12/2024).

Access of humanitarian responders to people in need

Up until November 2024, when the SAF recaptured significant parts of Sennar state, humanitarian organisations faced significant obstacles – in the form of continuing security threats – reaching affected populations (UNHCR 15/02/2025). Between late June–November 2024, the RSF controlled major roads and agricultural areas, significantly hindering the movement of humanitarian convoys and delaying the delivery of aid (OCHA 16/12/2024; Mada Masr 08/10/2024). Acts of indiscriminate violence not only impeded humanitarian assistance by restricting the movement of goods but also aggravated the humanitarian conditions of crisis-affected people (ICRC 27/01/2025).

Before the RSF's June 2024 incursion, Sennar state had served as a key humanitarian hub. Rising insecurity following the RSF takeover of the state between June–November 2024, however, forced humanitarian organisations to suspend operations, significantly limiting aid delivery (SIHA 07/06/2024). During that period, active conflict and insecurity also hampered many humanitarian organisations, as they struggled to maintain operations, assess needs, and deliver critical assistance in the state (IOM 05/02/2025).

Physical and environmental constraints

Physical conflict-related disruptions limited humanitarian access in Sennar (UNHCR 15/02/2025). The shifting frontlines have prompted some displaced populations to initiate return movements. However, the presence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) has limited safe returns and access to services (UNICEF 24/03/2025).

The armed conflict in the Jebel Moya region posed a major disruption to critical infrastructure, such as telecommunication facilities (WFP 31/07/2024). Disruptions to telecommunication networks have hindered humanitarian response and coordination, as financial systems – especially mobile money transfers – have experienced interruption, affecting the access of people in need to cash aid (ACLED 12/07/2024; CIR 18/07/2024).

Aj Jazirah state

Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

Between October 2024 and January 2025, humanitarian access in Aj Jazirah state was severely constrained following the escalation of conflict after a senior RSF commander defected to the SAF. By mid-January, before the SAF recaptured significant portions of the state, intensified fighting had led to the displacement of an additional 135,000 people, including nearly 70% of Wad Medani's population, severely limiting access to essential humanitarian services (OCHA 16/01/2025; STC 20/12/2023; UN 01/11/2024; ACLED 18/11/2024). Aj Jazirah was also a hosting community for over 300,000 IDPs who escaped the conflict in Khartoum (DTM 17/09/2024). During this period, escalating conflict led to many people losing access to shelter and livelihoods. Essential services, including water, electricity, and healthcare, were severely disrupted, as infrastructure was destroyed and insecurity persisted (OCHA 16/01/2025; STC 20/12/2023).

Hilaliya, which remained under RSF siege between October 2024 and January 2025, was one of the most affected localities in Aj Jazirah state. During the siege, residents of Hilaliya were prevented from leaving or accessing aid, despite worsening humanitarian conditions, under pressure to surrender. The siege severely restricted access to food, water, and healthcare, leading to deaths from illness and starvation (Reuters 15/11/2024; Sudan Tribune 12/11/2024; The National 02/02/2025; AA 08/11/2024).

Following armed confrontations and the disruption of agricultural activities, food insecurity became widespread across Aj Jazirah. Before the escalation of conflict, the state was a key storage hub for agricultural produce and produced half of the country's net cereal stock (OCHA 16/01/2025; STC 20/12/2023). The conflict has severely eroded Aj Jazirah's capacity to meet its own food needs, however, let alone support displaced people (FEWS NET 01/02/2024; OCHA

23/01/2025; MEE 28/10/2024). According to IPC projections, around 50,000 people are expected to experience Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) levels of food insecurity between December 2024 and May 2025. By 24 December, Medani Al Kubra and Sharg Aj Jazirah localities in Aj Jazirah state had been identified by the IPC Famine Reviewing Committee as one of the 17 new areas at risk of famine (IPC 24/12/2024).

Access of humanitarian responders to people in need

Before the SAF regained control of Aj Jazirah in January 2025, the state was heavily contested by the warring parties (Reuters 13/01/2025; AJ 12/01/2025). When under RSF control, movement in and out of the state was highly restricted, with main roads from Khartoum to Al Hasahisa, Tambul, and Wad Medani blocked, severely limiting humanitarian access in the state (Protection Cluster 25/12/2023). Following the SAF's recapture of Wad Medani, humanitarian access improved, with aid organisations resuming humanitarian intervention and delivery after nearly a year of restricted access (WFP 23/01/2025; OCHA 23/01/2025).

Physical and environmental constraints

The SAF recaptured Wad Medani in January 2025, triggering return movements of displaced people to Aj Jazirah. However, widespread unexploded ordnance contamination by parties to the conflict posed significant risks to civilians and humanitarian workers. In response to concerns around contamination, local authorities temporarily suspended return arrangements, limiting returnees access to shelter and services (OCHA 23/01/2025; WFP 23/01/2025).

Greater Kordofan region

Access of people in need to humanitarian aid

Since November 2024, renewed clashes between the SAF and RSF in Keilak town in West Kordofan and Um Rawaba town in North Kordofan have triggered waves of displacement, forcing thousands to flee (IOM 26/11/2024). Greater Kordofan serves as a strategic logistical corridor connecting Khartoum, Greater Darfur, and South Sudan. Key transport hubs, such as El Obeid, are vital to controlling supply routes, making the region a focal point in the SAF-RSF war (VOA 23/02/2025; 3ayin 06/03/2025). Displaced populations face severe challenges accessing essential services and reaching aid, including food, WASH, and health services, leading to a deterioration in humanitarian conditions for both displaced and host communities (IPC 24/12/2025; UN News 08/11/2024; UNHCR accessed 18/02/2025). Restricted humanitarian access continues to aggravate food insecurity across the Greater Kordofan region. In besieged

areas, such as the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, IPC assessments identified pockets of Famine (IPC 5) as early as October 2024. Between December 2024 and May 2025, the IPC projected famine to expand to Al Buram, Delami, western Kadugli, and Um Durein localities in South Kordofan, further deepening food insecurity in the region (IPC 24/12/2024).

Access of humanitarian responders to people in need

Insecurity along key humanitarian routes, such as the Kosti-El Obeid road between White Nile and North Kordofan states, has caused significant delays for humanitarian convoys (OCHA 12/01/2025). In some areas, such as Ghubaish in West Kordofan state, humanitarian organisations' access to people in need remains highly constrained as a result of infighting and insecurity. In mid-January, a WFP convoy successfully reached Ghubaish, delivering aid to 7,000 South Sudanese refugees for the first time since the war began in 2023 (WFP 23/01/2025).

In South Kordofan state, the towns of Dilling, El Habila, and Kadugli have been under siege-like conditions for much of the conflict (NRC 04/07/2024; ISHR 10/01/2025). Prolonged blockades have severely worsened humanitarian conditions, particularly food insecurity. According to IPC projections, Kadugli is expected to experience famine between December 2024 and May 2025 (FEWS NET 09/10/2024; IPC 24/12/2024).


In November 2024, SAF leader General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan announced plans to open airports in Kadugli (South Kordofan) and El Obeid (North Kordofan) in order to ease humanitarian access in the region. By January 2025, however, tangible results had yet to be seen (KII 05/12/2024; KII 21/01/2025 a; OCHA 16/12/2024; Sudan Tribune 25/11/2024; CSIS 17/12/2024).

Physical and environmental constraints

The Nuba Mountains in the Greater Kordofan region, primarily controlled by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement North, are characterised by rugged terrain, isolating communities and restricting humanitarian access. Conflict dynamics further aggravate access constraints, as armed groups have deployed troops near key areas and closed main roads, leading to severe shortages of fuel and seeds (Sudan Tribune 13/01/2025; Refugees International 22/08/2024; Radio Dabanga 03/09/2024).

Many displaced people lack essential services in the Nuba Mountains, with famine conditions detected as early as October 2024. Food insecurity is expected to worsen, with famine likely to expand across the Nuba Mountains until at least May 2025, further aggravating humanitarian conditions in the area (IPC 24/12/2024; UNDP 03/09/2024; Radio Dabanga 03/09/2024).


MAP 1. PROTECTION HOTSPOTS IN SUDAN BY 28 FEBRUARY 2025⁴



Source: Protection Cluster (03/03/2025)

⁴ Protection Cluster hotspot mapping is used as an early warning tool to guide prevention and response efforts. The mapping categorises areas into three types: chronic hotspots, where violence is prolonged or recurrent; acute hotspots, which are experiencing active conflict; and at-risk locations, where violence is likely or civilians face imminent threat (Protection Cluster 03/03/2025).

MAP 2: HUMANITARIAN ACCESS CONSTRAINTS MAP AS AT FEBRUARY 2025



Source: OCHA (06/03/2025)