

# REGIONAL ANALYSIS

## SYRIA

PART  
**B**

Host countries

### STRATEGIC NEEDS ANALYSIS PROJECT

Q4 2014 | OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER 2014

This Regional Analysis of the Syria conflict (RAS) is produced quarterly and seeks to bring together information from all sources in the region to provide analysis of the overall Syria crisis. Part A covers the situation in Syria. Part A I highlights countrywide humanitarian concerns while Part A II provides detailed analysis per governorate. Part B covers the impact of the crisis on neighbouring countries. More information on how to use this document can be found on the last page of this report.

The Strategic Needs Analysis Project welcomes all information that could complement this report. For more information, comments or questions please email [SNAP@ACAPS.org](mailto:SNAP@ACAPS.org).

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## I. OVERVIEW

### I.1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

#### Border restrictions

In Q4, as in the rest of 2014, the predominant trend has been toward increasing border restrictions. There were notable exceptions: Turkey and Iraq both opened their borders to significant flows of refugees from the embattled Syrian town of Ain Al Arab (Kurdish name: Kobani). But overall, the options for Syrians hoping to flee are growing more limited. In Lebanon, new arrivals monitoring suggests an average of just over 3,300 entries per month in Q4. In Q3 there were 8,900—down from 20,000 in March. This reduction follows the formalisation of stricter admission criteria in October. (See Lebanon chapter, p. 7) In Jordan, though the restrictions remain informal and unannounced, the decline in entries is even starker: there were just over 2,900 new entries in all of Q4, compared with nearly 15,000 in Q3. (See Jordan chapter, p. 14) With the exception of the group fleeing Ain Al Arab/ Kobani, Iraq has admitted very few refugees since late 2013, and Egypt's border has been essentially closed to Syrians since June, 2013. (See country chapters, pp. 35, 30) Little information is available on Turkey's border policy or new entries, but it is reported that the entry of Syrians is significantly restricted. (NRC-IRC 13/11/2014, Amnesty 20/11/2014) Cases of deportation/forced return continue to be reported from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. (See country chapters, pp. 35, 30, 16)


Despite this, the total number of Syrian refugees registered by UNHCR across the five major host countries increased radically in Q4, primarily due to a change in registration rules in Turkey, which allowed the registration of some 683,000 refugees who were, by most accounts, already present. (See Turkey chapter, p. 21) In Lebanon, total registrations actually decreased in Q4, primarily as the result of a verification exercise that de-registered some 28,000 refugees in October and November. (See Lebanon chapter, p. 7) These contrasts demonstrate the limitations of using registration numbers as a proxy for new arrivals or changes in the refugee population.

#### Humanitarian response

On 18 December, the humanitarian community launched a consolidated appeal to support Syrian refugees and the countries that host them in 2015. This Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) asked donors for USD 5.5 billion over 2015. In a significant shift from previous years, the 3RP includes USD 2.1 billion for programming to develop the resilience of communities and enhance the ability of host countries to accommodate refugees, in addition to 3.4 billion for humanitarian assistance to 4.3 million refugees. (3RP 2015-2016) By comparison, the four ongoing L3 emergencies (Central African Republic, South Sudan, Iraq and Syria) requested USD 6.4 billion, to provide humanitarian assistance to nearly 24 million people. (SNAP analysis of OCHA figures, 01/2015) The figures show an extraordinary difference in the level of humanitarian assistance per person-in-need: USD 750 for Syrian refugees, compared to USD 230-430 for other emergencies. There are multiple factors behind this disparity, but some to consider are the relatively high cost of goods and services in the Middle East, the challenge of trying to maintain services to people displaced from middle-income countries, and the effort to program more durable interventions for a protracted crisis. Add to that the high cost of maintaining stability in severely stressed host countries, and it is clear why this is being considered the most expensive crisis in modern humanitarian history.

**'In Q4, as in the rest of 2014, the predominant trend has been toward increasing border restrictions'**

#### 3RP: REFUGEE NUMBERS AND FUNDING LEVELS




#### Cuts to WFP Assistance

Although the total humanitarian funding for the region slightly increased in 2014, funding did not keep pace with the growing needs (as expressed in the regional response plans). (OCHA 2015, OCHA 2014, OCHA 2013) The unsustainability of the current large-scale humanitarian response appears most clearly in the struggle the WFP has faced to maintain food assistance to nearly 1.9 million Syrian refugees, at a cost of USD 77 million/month. (See RAS brief, December 2014) In Q4, the programme faced potential funding shortfalls on a monthly basis, which were only prevented by last-minute donations. In Jordan, 37,000 Syrians had their food assistance cut, and in Egypt, targets were scaled down and assistance levels reduced across the board, in response to funding shortfalls. (See country chapters)

Despite these efforts, in December, assistance to 1.7 million urban refugees was briefly suspended because of budget shortfalls. (*Reuters 01/12/2014*) Distributions resumed by mid-month, but at lower than usual levels, and in January food assistance continues to be reduced: in Jordan and Egypt, vouchers are being distributed at less than 2/3 their previous value. (*See country chapters*)

Without a significant increase in income-generating opportunities in host countries, or a marked decrease in violence within Syria, enabling the return of the refugee population, humanitarian actors will face increasing difficulties in supporting the large caseload. Although targeted assistance has been introduced to try to channel the available funding to those most in need in Lebanon in 2013, other countries have not (yet) agreed on a multi-sector vulnerability framework to feed into such a targeting approach.

## REGIONAL DISPLACEMENT




## Increasing needs and harmful coping mechanisms

Despite the large-scale response, the humanitarian crisis in refugee-hosting countries has further deteriorated with the start of winter across the region. Many refugees are still living in sub-standard shelters that offer little protection against cold and rain—this is particularly acute in Lebanon, but also among the new arrivals from Ain Al Arab/Kobani in Turkey. All vulnerable groups are affected by the additional cost of fuel and winterised NFIs, while income opportunities traditionally diminish during the winter months.

The deteriorating humanitarian situation, coupled with increasingly strict entry and residence policies, have pushed a number of Syrians to undertake risky journeys to countries outside the region. In 2014, record numbers of migrants and asylum seekers have made the dangerous crossing from Africa to Europe, a large number of them fleeing the Syria crisis. (*UNHCR 02/10/2014*)

European countries have been hesitant to provide official refuge to Syrians. An attempt by UNHCR in December to persuade European countries to absorb an additional number of refugees was only partly successful, with countries committing to the resettlement of 100,000 Syrians, falling short of the intended 130,000 refugees resettled by 2016. (*UNHCR 09/12/2014*) Even this ambitious goal falls short of the actual needs, with UNHCR estimating that 10% of the refugee population (currently 380,000 people) are highly vulnerable and would be best served by resettlement.


## 1.2.TIMELINE



### I.3. HUMANITARIAN POPULATION PROFILE

All figures are estimates and have been rounded for clarity.

1. Estimate based on UNRWA reporting that 14% of the 540,000 Syrian Palestinians have fled the country. See Humanitarian Profile Part A, note 5.
2. Calculated from total PRS recorded by UNRWA in host countries.
3. UNHCR (Registered refugees + awaiting registration). Numbers of unregistered refugees have been omitted from this RAS, due to lack of comparability.



## I.4. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS

### Overview

The refugee situation in the upcoming three months is not likely to change significantly. The main drivers of the humanitarian crisis remain: the continuing conflict in Syria that prevents large-scale return of refugees, restrictive policies imposed by host countries, funding constraints, and winter weather— all of which will continue to cause deterioration of the humanitarian situation.

### Population status and movements

Host countries are not expected to ease restrictions on the entry of Syrians, so it is unlikely the number of refugees will significantly grow in the coming months. It is possible another singular, large- or medium-scale displacement to Turkey could occur — for example, if the conflict in Syria spreads to Afrin, or if violence escalates significantly in Aleppo City.

Faced with limited options to leave the country, Syrians will increasingly resort to unofficial crossings, thereby putting them at risk of exploitation. Given it is highly unlikely there will be a significant increase in the number of people able to resettle in areas outside the region, the number of Syrians undertaking dangerous boat journeys is expected to continue or increase.

Host countries may also continue to tighten rules (and the enforcement of rules) on entry and legal stay. Changes to procedures for visas and visa/residency renewals could leave thousands of refugees with no legal protection. In this case, even the refugee status recognised by UNHCR registration might not be sufficient to guarantee refugees protection. Such restrictions may cause refugees to prefer attempts at invisibility to regularising their status, decreasing their access to humanitarian organisations, and vice-versa. Additionally, restrictions on access to employment could force refugees into negative coping strategies, making them vulnerable to exploitation, child labour and child exploitation.

### Funding

The 2015 3RP appeal asks for 47% more funding than the 2014 RRP6 which was only 59% funded at year end. While it is possible that the size of the new appeal will motivate donors, and the new focus on resilience will draw in development and non-traditional donors, it seems unlikely, given the 2013-2014 trend, that the increase in funding will match the increase in estimated needs, and a decrease is also possible. With funding becoming more limited, even as the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate, increased targeting of assistance to the most vulnerable will be the only alternative to broad, unplanned assistance cuts, or the collapse of programs, as occurred briefly with WFP assistance in December 2014. This situation will increase the importance of the contribution of non-traditional donors such as the Gulf countries. The refugee response in Iraq is particularly vulnerable to a decrease in funding: the RRP6 for Iraq was only 36% funded, and the growing L3 crisis will put increasing pressure on resources.

***‘Increased targeting of assistance to the most vulnerable will be the only alternative to broad, unplanned assistance cuts, or the collapse of programs’***

***‘More and more host communities will fall below poverty lines as the available resources become scarcer’***

### Humanitarian assistance

Targeted assistance, long discussed but sparsely implemented, will almost certainly become the norm in the region, although modalities for inclusion/exclusion are still to be determined in Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Delays in implementation and failure to communicate on this process could trigger social unrest among refugee communities. Turkish authorities may start considering reducing the assistance package they are currently providing, as the refugee bill becomes unsustainable for the country, while countries like Jordan, which have already reduced their contribution, may continue to do so. Vulnerable host communities will increasingly be subject to poverty and inadequate basic services. Significant numbers of refugees may resort to negative coping strategies, increasing their vulnerabilities even further.

Regional efforts led by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) could open a path for the development of a comprehensive regional policy to respond to the crises in Syria and Iraq. Though currently focusing on regional security agreements to fight terrorism (*Al Jazeera 09/12/2014*), the GCC may decide to further engage in humanitarian action, as seen already in 2014, with substantial funding pledges.

### Social tensions

Social tensions are highly likely to continue to grow, particularly in Lebanon and Turkey, despite the 3RP's emphasis on resilience. In Lebanon the economic and social situation is almost certain to lead to further social unrest and violence against refugees, who will also face increasing discriminatory measures and restrictions imposed by local authorities, in part as a response to increasingly negative public perception of refugees.

### Host communities

More and more host communities will fall below poverty lines as the available resources become scarcer. The development gains in host countries are likely to be slow, and even start regressing in the most affected areas. The likelihood of internal displacement in Lebanon arising from localised conflicts or heightened social tensions will increase drastically.

### Winter

Scores of refugees living in makeshift shelters will be affected by the coldest months of the winter, particularly in high altitude areas such as northeast Lebanon and northern Iraq, and will suffer unnecessarily from the harshness of the cold, leading to excess morbidity such as acute respiratory infections, bronchitis, etc., and some increase in mortality.


## 2. COUNTRY CHAPTERS

### 2.1. LEBANON

Displaced	
Syrians registered and awaiting registration	1,158,995
% living in formal camps	N/A
% living in informal settlements/sub-standard accommodation	43%
Unregistered refugees	Unknown
Palestinian Refugees from Syria	44,000
Lebanese returnees	50,000
Estimated returns to Syria	Unknown

Sources: UNHCR 11/12/2014, UNHCR 31/12/2014, UNRWA 03/12/2014, IOM 11/2014, UNIGoL 16/12/2014

#### SYRIAN REFUGEES PER GOVERNORATE



*'A significant number of Syrians may face desperate situations that push them toward negative coping strategies'*

**1,158,995**

Syrians registered and awaiting registration

**44,000**

Palestinian Refugees from Syria

#### 2.1.1. Key Issues

The reporting period was characterised by continued tensions between refugees and host communities, a rise in the number of evictions, an increase in restrictions affecting freedom of movement, and ambiguous changes in policies related to entry and legal stay for Syrians in Lebanon. (See below, 'Protection', p. 10)

In a bid to protect the Lebanese labour market, the Labour Ministry issued a decree in December limiting Syrian refugees' access to employment to the agriculture, construction and cleaning sectors. It is believed this could deprive up to 80% of economically active Syrians of their jobs. Additionally, WFP food voucher assistance was briefly cut in Q4 due to lack of funding, and the level has been reduced in Q1 2015, impacting livelihoods and food security for nearly 1 million refugees. (See 'Livelihoods', p. 11)

Mid-2014 projections based on UNHCR shelter surveys estimated that by the end of 2014, more than half of Syrian refugees would be living in unfinished houses, construction sites, and informal settlements. This constitutes a major source of concern in the winter season. The lack of funding also represents a major challenge for winterisation: As of late November, more than 37,000 families are expected to be left without the needed weatherproofing assistance. (See 'Shelter', p. 12)

#### 2.1.2. Possible Developments

The new regulations limiting access to the labour market are expected to deprive thousands of refugees of employment. Winter is also reducing employment opportunities in the agriculture and construction sectors, which are among the limited areas still open to Syrians. Middle- and low-income refugee households are expected to face serious reductions in their ability to afford shelter, and an increased risk of food insecurity. With an increase in evictions, curfews and raids on homes and workplaces, combined with winter weather, and the level of food assistance decreasing from lack of funding, it is likely that a significant number of Syrians may face desperate situations that push them toward negative coping strategies. The number of families living in open air, informal settlements or unfinished buildings is likely to increase.

The rise in security incidents has further exacerbated social tensions throughout the country. Despite the implementation of security plan in Tripoli, and the Bekaa Valley, the risk of an outbreak of inter-communal violence remains very high, especially in areas hosting large numbers of refugees and vulnerable Lebanese.

### 2.1.3. Security and political developments

Security in Lebanon was significantly challenged in Q4 by attacks carried out in north and eastern Lebanon by armed groups, some affiliated to opposition groups fighting in Syria such as Jabhat Al Nusra (JAN), targeting the Lebanese armed forces (LAF) and Hezbollah. (Daily Star 05/11/2014, Daily Star 04/12/2014, Reuters 06/10/2014, Al Jazeera 05/10/2014, Daily Star 27/12/2014, UNSC 07/10/2014, UNSC 05/11/2014, The Guardian 05/12/2014, Al Jazeera 06/12/2014, Al Jazeera 08/12/2014) Reports also indicated continued air raids on border areas by the Syrian armed forces (SAF). (UNSC 05/11/2014, AFP 09/12/2014, OCHA 30/11/2014) Security incidents across the country caused the LAF to increase the frequency and geographic extent of their operations in the form of movement restrictions, controls, raids, and arrests. December also witnessed a series of raids and arrests against suspected militants across the country in North Lebanon (Daily Star 15/12/14), Aarsal in the Beka'a Valley (Daily Star 14/12/2014, Daily Star 11/12/2014, Daily Star 04/12/2014, Daily Star 27/12/2014) and Sidon in South Lebanon. (Daily Star 11/12/2014)

In late October, clashes erupted between local armed groups and the LAF in the northern coastal city of Tripoli, following a military raid in an outlying village, where the army killed two men and arrested several others suspected of links to armed groups operating in Syria. While it is not believed Syrian armed groups were directly involved in the fighting, these four days of clashes were the worst violence since August, when JAN and affiliated groups attempted a takeover of the northeastern town of Aarsal and surrounding border areas. (AFP 25/10/2014, Al Jazeera 28/10/2014, Reuters 27/10/2014) A security plan was imposed in Tripoli after the LAF regained control, and in mid-November a security plan was imposed in certain northern areas of the Beka'a Valley, following political, religious, and popular calls for country-wide implementation, and accusations that the security forces were limiting their operations to Sunni areas. (Al Monitor 26/11/2014)

Recent reports from a local source indicate the LAF is planning to implement new security measures in the Aarsal area in January 2015, requiring people moving in and out of Aarsal to its eastern outskirts to have a new permit from the army. The announcement reportedly triggered protests among the local population, which argued this new regulation would hamper their movement and daily work. (Daily Star 28/12/2014)


In early November, Lebanon's parliament voted to extend its own mandate until 2017, citing security concerns linked to organising elections amid continued regional instability. (Reuters 05/11/2014) Lebanon has been without a president since May because feuding lawmakers cannot agree on a candidate. (Reuters 05/11/2014, Daily Star 27/11/14)

In mid-December, the Government of Lebanon (GoL) and the UN launched the 2015-2016 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), aiming to bridge the gap between Lebanon's humanitarian and stabilisation agendas by proposing an integrated plan to support vulnerable groups and communities (Syrian refugees, Palestinian refugees, Lebanese returnees and poor Lebanese). The plan also aims at strengthening the capacity of local and national delivery systems, by investing in services and institutions benefitting up to 2.9 million people. The plan asks for USD 2.1 billion, of which USD 170 million is requested for the GoL to invest in building services and institutions, in line with its revised Roadmap of Priority Interventions for Stabilisation from the Syrian Conflict. (OCHA 30/11/2014, LCRP 2015-2016, 3RP 2015-2016)

### 2.1.4. Operational Constraints

According to the Safety & Security Committee for Lebanon (SSCL), northern Beka'a, Tripoli, and Akkar are areas of highest risk for direct and indirect threats against humanitarian workers, owing to reduced levels of acceptance from the host communities, an increase in armed conflict, and sectarian hostilities increasing the risk of indirect harm. (OCHA 30/11/2014)

#### AREAS OF HIGHER RISK FOR DIRECT AND INDIRECT THREATS AGAINST HUMANITARIAN WORKERS



Sources: SSCL and OCHA 14/11



## 2.1.5. Research and Publications

Six assessments were published in the fourth quarter of 2014:

- The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Save the Children Lebanon published a report on evictions in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. (NRC/SCL 12/2014)
- The REACH initiative published:
  - A Multi Sector Community Level Assessment of Informal Settlements in Akkar. (REACH/ UNHCR 11/2014)
  - A preliminary analysis on host communities. (REACH/OCHA 10/2014)
  - A profiling report on children out of school. (REACH/UNHCR 11/2014)
- IOM completed a livelihood assessment of Lebanese returnees from Syria. (IOM 11/2014)
- UNDP produced an assessment investigating the environmental impact of the refugee influx on solid waste management (SWM), water, wastewater management, air pollution, land-use, and ecosystems in the country. (UNDP 09/2014)

Various assessments are ongoing or due to be published soon:

- REACH completed data collection for assessments on the WASH and livelihood situation of Syrian refugees in Akkar. Another report on social cohesion is being produced at the country level for all population groups, and a report on the food security of Lebanese at the country level.
- UNHCR is undertaking a baseline assessment on health care access for vulnerable populations. (UNHCR 09/14)
- UNDP is currently mapping risks and resources across Lebanon. (UNDP 09/14)

## 2.1.6. Information Gaps

There are significant gaps in information sharing regarding protection concerns and the situation of specific population groups, including:

- Public information on border restrictions, numbers turned away or stranded at the border,
- Incidents of deportation and forced return,
- Numbers, locations and needs of unregistered Syrian refugees,
- Effects of the crisis on Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps, which host large numbers of Syrians and have major pre-existing vulnerabilities,
- Persons with specific needs,
- Refugees in urban areas.


## 2.1.7. Displacement

**Entry restrictions:** On 20 October, a Lebanese government official announced strict new border measures to curb the influx of refugees. UNHCR reported that the new measures had been in place informally for weeks. (Al Akhbar 20/10/2014, AFP 18/10/2014, UNHCR 19/10/2014, Daily Star 02/10/2014) The restrictions appeared to be briefly reversed in early December, but in early January, a new policy was established requiring Syrians to state the purpose of their visit within set categories and limiting sharply the time they can stay in Lebanon. In mid-January, a new circular changed the regulations again, allowing people to enter as 'displaced persons' under certain conditions. If they are not registered with UNHCR, they can enter if they fall under the 'humanitarian' criteria defined by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA). If registered with UNHCR, they can enter if they fall within one of the entry regulations details in the circular. (PI 09/12/2014, PI 11/2014, ABC News 05/01/2015, Al Jazeera 05/01/2015, GSO 13/01/2015)

## 'The number of identified individuals entering Lebanon decreased steadily from more than 20,000 in March to 3,150 in December'

**New arrivals:** According to data collected by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), which attempts to monitor new arrivals, the number of identified individuals entering Lebanon decreased steadily from more than 20,000 in March to 3,150 in December. This data agrees with some media reports that suggest the tightening of borders has been a gradual, informal process. (UNHCR 19/10/2014, Daily Star 02/10/2014) The numbers suggest just over 10,000 entries in Q4, compared to nearly 27,000 in Q3.

### DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL ESTIMATED NEW ARRIVALS



**Registered refugees:** As of 31 December, more than 1.1 million Syrians were registered as refugees with UNHCR in Lebanon, and more than 12,000 were awaiting registration. Though there are some discrepancies in reporting, this appears to be a decrease from the end of Q3, when 26,000 more refugees were registered. (UNHCR dashboard) In addition to the new border restrictions, the decrease is attributable to a large number of refugees who were de-registered by UNHCR in October. (See 'Protection,' p. 10)

**Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS):** According to UNRWA, there are currently 44,000 PRS registered in Lebanon. As of late December, heightened restrictions on entry to Lebanon and visa renewal for PRS introduced in early May remain in place. Since their introduction, PRS entry to Lebanon has been almost entirely limited to those transiting to a third country and some cases with confirmed embassy appointments. (UNRWA 03/12/2014, UNRWA 31/10/2014, OCHA 30/11/2014)

## 2.1.8. Humanitarian Needs and Concerns

### 2.1.8.1. Protection

**Armed violence:** The overall security situation in Lebanon remained tense during the reporting period with several incidents in northern and eastern Lebanon, and a peak in violence in Tripoli in late October that killed 11 civilians, injured more than 60, and caused small-scale population movements in the city. (OCHA 30/11/2014)

Several incidents targeting Syrian refugees were recorded. In early December, gunmen reportedly shot at and burned refugee tents in the northern town of Mashha in Akkar. Although circumstances remain unclear, reports suggest the attack was conducted by local armed men and reflects resentment against refugees amid accusations that the displaced are hiding militants in informal settlements. This incident occurred two days after a Lebanese soldier was killed by militants suspected to be affiliated with armed opposition groups (AOGs) fighting in Syria. (Trust 07/12/2014, Reuters 08/12/2014)

**Social tensions:** Social tensions reportedly continue to run high across the country due to the high per capita ratio of refugees, their concentration in marginalised areas, pressure on local resources and jobs, insufficient institutional support, and the adverse consequences of several government measures and restrictions. According to a study by UNHCR in June and July, more than 60% of some 440 surveyed host communities reported tensions and events of violence related to the presence of refugees since the beginning of 2014. (Carnegie 10/12/2014) As of late 2014, more than 85% of refugees are concentrated in impoverished areas where more than 65% of vulnerable Lebanese reside. To better monitor these tensions and provide adequate support, UNDP has been conducting a conflict-sensitive needs assessment through the maps of risks and resources (MRR) methodology. (OCHA 30/11/2014)

**Legal status:** The overall policy towards refugee arrival and residence is characterised by ambiguity. A number of circulars were formally issued and set out a framework, but can be interpreted in different ways. Regarding the issue of legal stay, the latest regularisation rules of September indicated that:

- PRS with visas that expired before 21 August, 2014, who entered Lebanon legally and illegally, and who possess official identification documents will be able to regularise their status and be granted temporary residency for a period of three months, for one time only, free of charge. This should allow freedom of movement for PRS and allow them to complete essential civil registration procedures, such as birth registration. (OCHA 30/11/2014, UNRWA 31/10/2014)
- Syrians refugees who entered legally but failed to renew their legal documentation before 21 August can regularise free of charge for six months, although it is unclear what will happen after these six months. Refugees who entered unofficially may regularize their stay for free for six months one time only, and are likely to then be banned from re-entry. (PI 11/2014, OCHA 30/11/2014)

UNHCR reported that it had removed refugee status from some 73,000 refugees between June and November—28,000 of them in October and November—including refugees who failed to contact the agency after a certain period of time, or refugees who travelled back-and-forth to Syria, and were deemed not in need of protection. (UNHCR 05/12/2014, Daily Star 23/10/2014) Some observers argued that while there are legitimate reasons why UNHCR may de-register a refugee, current procedures are unclear, and a full range of procedural safeguards would be required to ensure the protection of refugees' due process rights. (RSD Watch 23/10/2014)

### 'More than 60% of some 440 surveyed host communities reported tensions and events of violence related to the presence of refugees'

**Evictions and restriction on informal settlements:** According to UNHCR, evictions by municipalities and the Lebanese army have increased from 1,800 people evicted in August to more than 4,800 in September. More than 20 instances of eviction affected collective sites, mainly informal settlements, and most of these events took place in the Beka'a Valley and North Lebanon. (UNHCR 30/09/2014)

There are now almost 1,400 informal settlements across the country, and up to 30% of the refugee population in Beka'a and Akkar live in such settlements. (OCHA 30/11/2014)

**Evictions in urban areas:** A recent assessment conducted in Beirut-Mount Lebanon indicated that key factors in tenure security and evictions include rent burden and rent amount, but also the feeling of insecurity, the lack of host community acceptance, and the lack of trust between refugees and host communities. The assessment found that more than 70% of interviewed households are in dispute with their landlords over rent, which suggests that eviction rates, which have remained relatively low until now, may increase in the near future, especially considering the continued depletion of savings and limited livelihood opportunities for refugees. The report also indicated that only 10% of assessed households have a formal tenancy agreement such as a written contract, which shows that the vast majority of refugees can be exposed to exploitation over rent and eviction. (NRC/SCL 12/2014)


**Early marriage and gender-based violence (GBV):** UNHCR reported that every day in 2014, an average of 130 Syrian refugee women and girls visited the network of centres and spaces to seek support and/or disclose violence. Approximately 40% of them were younger than 18. The report stressed that displacement, especially when protracted, can considerably increase the risk of being exposed to domestic violence, sexual harassment and exploitation, early marriage, and other forms of SGBV. (UNHCR 30/09/2014)

**Freedom of movement:** According to local sources, the Lebanese armed forces have increased discriminatory measures toward Syrian refugees. There have been reports of poor treatment of refugees at the checkpoint separating the area of Wadi Khaled from the rest of North Lebanon, along with movement restrictions in the area. (Syrian Observer 30/11/2014) Overall, tensions also caused an increase in restrictions impacting refugees' freedom of movement, with night curfews being reported in at least 45 municipalities throughout the country. (HRW 03/10/2014) Additionally, the authorities announced in late December that travellers from Aarsal to its eastern outskirts will be required to possess a new permit from the army, which is expected to hamper movement and disrupt the daily work of local residents and refugees in the area. (Daily Star 28/12/2014)

### 2.1.8.2. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

**Economy and livelihoods:** Increased insecurity, disrupted trade routes and the declining confidence of investors and consumers has slowed down Lebanon's economy, evidenced by the sharp decrease in its annual growth rates (from almost 10% pre-crisis to 1-2% in 2011-2014). Recent data showed that exports and foreign direct investments fell by 25% between 2013 and 2014, while tourism has dropped 60% since the start of the refugee crisis. According to projections, the economic conditions are stabilising, but it is expected that continued regional instability will not allow for a significant improvement in the short-term. (WFP 10/2014)

**GDP GROWTH SYRIA AND LEBANON 2006 - 2015**



Lebanon: IMF 2014, Syria: Economist Intelligence Unit 2014

Despite the spillover effects of the Syrian crisis, the latest reports indicate that consumer prices have increased less than expected, with a rapid adjustment of the market for consumer goods (mostly food and hygiene items). The biggest impact of the refugee influx has been felt in the housing and labour markets, and in the quality and availability of public services such as school and health care. (WFP 10/2014)

On the housing market, competition between refugees and host communities mostly appears among middle-income households. Otherwise, low-income refugee households generally cannot access the same type of housing as the Lebanese (WFP 10/2014), and live in unfinished structures or informal settlements. (VASyR 2014) In northern rural areas, poor Lebanese and refugees compete for housing and the rising demand causes a general increase in rents. (WFP 10/2014)

Recent numbers on the labour market impact of the Syria crisis were not available, but in 2013 the World Bank projected that in 2014, Syrian refugees might constitute 27-36% of the Lebanese labour

**'33% of refugees lack access to potable water, 29% need improved sanitation facilities'**

force, substantially more than the 17% share held by Syrian workers pre-conflict. The Bank's projections included significant competition for unskilled and some skilled jobs, and a decrease in real wages for Lebanese workers. (WB 2013)

In a bid to protect the Lebanese labour market, the Labour Ministry issued a decree in December to limit the access to employment in certain sectors for Syrian refugees. Job opportunities would therefore be limited to the agriculture, construction, and cleaning sectors. (Lebanese Labour Ministry 12/2014) Although statistics are not available, some estimated that this measure could deprive up to 80% of currently active Syrians from their job. (News Today 28/12/2014)

**Food security:** Food security is increasingly becoming a source of concern because of the declining economy, the impact of drought-like conditions, and shortfalls in funding. The situation did not significantly deteriorate between 2013 and 2014, despite the growing number of refugees, but shows signs of being unsustainable in the medium term.

More than 80% of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon (more than 900,000 people) currently receive food assistance through WFP and partners, and were affected by the brief assistance cuts in December 2014. Though funding was restored, it remains limited, and voucher values for January 2015 were reduced from USD 30/person/month to USD 19. (PI 16/01/2015, WFP 25/11/2014) The long-term voucher value is uncertain. Long-term cuts to support will have major implications for food security and nutrition, and will likely increase existing socio-economic tensions and competition over jobs. (WFP 10/2014, Reuters 09/12/2014, WFP 09/12/2014)

### 2.1.8.3. Health


**Respiratory Infections:** With the winter season and an increasing number of refugees living in substandard accommodations, health workers have expressed concerns over the expected rise in the cases of pneumonia and respiratory problems among Syrian refugees in the absence of heating in harsh weather conditions. (Daily Star 24/11/2014)

**Hepatitis A in Beka'a:** Although the lack of data limits the ability to assess the outbreak, the incidence of Hepatitis A has been described as significant in some areas in the Bekaa Valley. (IA 10/2014) This is likely a consequence of the substandard sanitation and shelter conditions, along with limited access to healthcare.

## 2.1.8.4. WASH

A recent assessment investigated the environmental impact of the refugee influx on solid waste management (SWM), water, wastewater management, air pollution, land-use, and ecosystems in the country. It projected that the daily quantity of municipal solid waste (MSW) generated by Syrian refugees was equivalent to over 15% of solid waste produced by Lebanese residents prior to the influx. It also indicated that 48% of MSW generated by refugees is currently managed within the existing infrastructure, and added that municipalities' expenditure on SWM rose by 11% in 2012 and an additional 40% in 2013. The remaining 52% of MSW are disposed in open dumps, raising concerns in terms of land and groundwater contamination. (UNDP 09/2014)

### ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF SYRIAN REFUGEES




Source: UNDP 2014/09

The same assessment estimated that water demand increased by about 8-12% owing to the presence of refugees, while the generation of wastewater rose in the same proportion, which results in the depletion of water resources and the deterioration of water quality. (UNDP 09/2014)

According to latest reports, 33% of refugees lack access to potable water, 29% need improved sanitation facilities, and 70% are in need of assistance to adapt to hygienic conditions in displacement. (OCHA 15/07/2014, UNHCR 31/10/2014)

## WASH NEEDS




Sources: VASyR 2014, UNHCR 14/10/13

## 2.1.8.5. Shelter/NFI

**Floods in Akkar:** In the second half of October, heavy rains and floods affected over 14,000 Syrian refugees and Lebanese residents in Akkar. People living in vulnerable structures such as informal settlements were especially affected, as many of them are located on agricultural land, unstable soil, and muddy foundations. (OCHA 30/11/2014)

**Weatherproofing assistance:** The increasing proportion of refugees living in substandard shelters and the lack of funding represent major challenges for the required weatherproofing assistance. As of late November, less than 60% of 92,000 refugee families in need were planned to benefit from assistance, leaving more than 37,000 families without the needed weatherproofing. (IA 11/2014) According to projections based on UNHCR shelter surveys, it was estimated that 55% of Syrian refugees would be living in unfinished houses, construction sites, and informal settlements by the end of 2014. In the Beka'a, assessments showed congestion, low quality drainage systems, and great needs for shelter repair. Also, reports indicated that shelter conditions and winter needs are often more acute in sub-standard buildings than in informal settlements. (UNHCR 30/06/2014)

### INSUFFICIENT WEATHERPROOFING ASSISTANCE



Source: IA 11/2014

### 2.1.8.6. Education

As of June, UNHCR had registered 480,000 school-aged Syrian and PRS children, putting significant pressure on Lebanon's education system. (UNHCR 30/06/2014) The agency estimates that 200,000 children lack access to age-appropriate education because of lack of capacity in the public schools. (UNHCR 11/12/2014) In June, refugees reported the main barriers to accessing education were financial (cost of tuition, transportation and supplies; need to work to support the family), followed by 'lack of opportunities,' which may reflect lack of capacity of the school system or lack of awareness of opportunities by refugee families. Many also reported being turned away by school officials. (REACH/ UNHCR 15/11/2014)

Prior to the refugee influx, an estimated 30% of Lebanese children attended public schools, most of them from lower socio-economic backgrounds. In 2013, the World Bank estimated that Syrian refugees made up 30-35% of all children in Lebanon's public schools, even though the enrolment rate for refugee children was just 34%. (VASyr 2014, WB 09/2013) According to latest data available, government expenditure on education increased from 5.7% to 7.1% between 2011/2012 and 2012/2013. (WB 09/2013, WFP 10/2014)

***'UNHCR estimates that 200,000 children lack access to age-appropriate education because of lack of capacity in the public schools'***


## 2.2 JORDAN

### Displaced

Syrians registered and awaiting registration	622,865
% living in formal camps	~15%
% living in informal settlements/sub-standard accommodation	6%
Palestinian Refugees from Syria	14,690
Estimated returns to Syria	34,000+

Sources: UNRWA 18/11/2014, UNHCR portal, Health Sector Monthly Report 15/11/2014, REACH/UNICEF 02/10/2014

### SYRIAN REFUGEES PER GOVERNORATE



\* Areas where there are one or more informal settlements with more than 200 people

#### Sources:

Refugee numbers: UNHCR, HIU

Informal Settlements: REACH/UNICEF Survey of ITS 09/2014,

UNOSAT 12/2014, UNOSAT 11/2014

*'The average number of new arrivals for the quarter was fewer than 33/day, compared with 163/day in Q3, and more than 1,800/day in early 2013'*

**622,865**

Syrians registered and awaiting registration

**14,690**

Palestinian Refugees from Syria

### 2.2.1. Key Issues

Refugees' access to Jordan has been continuously deteriorating in 2014, and in Q4 it reached new lows, with only an extremely small number of Syrians arriving. The average number of new arrivals for the quarter was fewer than 33/day, compared with 163/day in Q3, and more than 1,800/day in early 2013. (See below, 'Displacement', p. 16)

Recent reports indicate that significant numbers of refugees are being returned to Syria, and that the number of modalities of this have multiplied:

- Evidence is mounting that refugees arriving at the border are being brought into Jordanian territory, screened at the Government of Jordan (GoJ) registration centre, and then immediately deported to Syria without being registered.
- There have been multiple, credible reports of the deportation of refugees residing in Jordan, including medical workers, injured Syrians and children.
- Palestinian refugees from Syria continue to be denied entry and deported. More than 100 are known to have been deported in 2014, a 40% increase from 2013.

There is insufficient evidence to know if forcible returns/deportations are increasing, but the new practices suggest an increase is likely. (See 'Displacement', p. 16, 'Protection', p. 18)

Additionally, there has been a significant erosion of the protection space within Jordan:

- An increasing number of Syrians who left the camps irregularly were forcibly returned to them by the police in Q4; it is not clear if this trend will continue.
- The GoJ has resumed the dismantling of informal tented settlements (ITS) and the transfer of the inhabitants to camps.
- A re-verification exercise, in which Syrians in urban areas will have to update the identity documents issued to them by GoJ, is planned for early 2015, and this may make Syrians with no or false documents more vulnerable to deportation.
- These changes come on top of tightening of restrictions in Q3, when the government asked UNHCR not to give asylum seeker certificates to refugees who had left the camps irregularly.

The changes in protection space are expected to impact a significant number of refugees' ability to access public services and humanitarian assistance. (See 'Protection', p. 18)

The available assistance has also diminished: in late November, the GoJ issued a decision that Syrians can no longer access health care services for free at state hospitals. (See 'Health', p. 19) In October, a funding shortfall caused the WFP to cut food assistance to 37,000 urban refugees (6% of the total population). (See 'Food', p. 19) This is a relatively modest cut when compared to the targeting scheme in Lebanon, where 25% of the registered population no longer receive food assistance based on set vulnerability criteria. Lack of funding also caused the WFP to temporarily suspend food assistance to their entire urban caseload, 400,000-430,000 people. A huge donor commitment is required to maintain the programme at current levels, and further cuts are expected.

In December, the GoJ launched the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), which asks for USD 3 billion in international assistance for refugee aid, development and budgetary support. In the new management system described in the plan, that assistance would be primarily channelled through the GoJ. (See 'Operational Constraints', p. 15)

### 2.2.2. Possible Developments

Given GoJ's concerns about the growth of the Islamic State (IS), security is the most often-invoked explanation for the increasing border restrictions and the decrease in protection space. However, financial issues and community tensions may also play a role. (See 'Operational Constraints', p. 15; 'Social Cohesion', p.20) The GoJ believes it cannot afford to provide services for Syrians without external support. As the Jordanian public become increasingly resentful of the presence of refugees, the GoJ will feel increasing pressure to limit Syrians' access to public services and space. If it fails to secure the budgetary support it has asked for in 2015, it is likely more significant limits will be imposed on refugees' access to protection and assistance. Having reduced refugees' entitlement to state health care, it is possible that the GoJ will also place limits on their access to free education, or impose fees.

It is highly unlikely that donors will redirect significant funding from NGOs and UN agencies to the government of Jordan, as requested in the JRP. This may increase tensions between the GoJ and humanitarian actors in 2015, leading to increasing challenges in obtaining approval for refugee-related projects. Alternatively, improved dialogue and cooperation between humanitarian agencies and GoJ may lead to a better-coordinated response.

Refugees living in host communities are likely to become increasingly fearful of contact with authorities, because of ongoing deportations and forced transfers to the camps. Refugees who do not regularise their status are more vulnerable to exploitation and deportation/forced return, and are less able to access humanitarian aid, which may further increase their vulnerability.

The combination of shrinking protection space and decreasing humanitarian assistance will make life significantly more difficult for refugees, and may drive substantial numbers of the most vulnerable to return to camps, or to Syria. This would likely be a gradual process, though further cuts to assistance could significantly exacerbate the situation.

The security situation appears stable, but even a small deterioration would be cause for major concern. A single successful IS attack on Jordan, for example, could result in a sudden, major deterioration of tolerance for refugees, both by the GoJ and host communities. Forced encampment and/or communal violence are quite unlikely, but possible outcomes.

## 'In Q4, the GoJ instructed humanitarian agencies not to provide assistance to Syrians who do not have service cards.'

### 2.2.3. Operational Constraints

The GoJ's request that UNHCR stop providing asylum certificates to refugees who have left camps without official permission (See 'Protection', p. 18) will potentially limit access to a growing sector of the population. In Q4, the GoJ instructed humanitarian agencies not to provide assistance to Syrians who do not have service cards. There is no sign this decision has been enforced, but it creates a vulnerability for agencies. (PI 03/12/2014, PI 08/01/2014)

The GoJ continues to express frustration over what it considers the lack of adequate financial support from the international community. (Jordan Times 03/12/2014, Guardian 01/12/2014, Jordan Times 20/11/2014, Petra 19/11/2014, Jordan Times 28/10/2014, Jordan Times 14/10/2014) In late 2013, the GoJ asked for USD 1.2 billion to compensate it for what it estimated as the cost of hosting Syrian refugees, including subsidies and impact on public services. (Jordan National Resilience Plan 2014-2015) By Q4, the GoJ reported receiving only 9% of that funding, while the UN's RRP6 appeal for Jordan was 55% funded. (OCHA Comprehensive Regional Strategic Framework Dashboard 16/10/2014, Jordan Times 08/12/2014)

The GoJ informally requires NGOs providing assistance to Syrian refugees to also assist vulnerable Jordanians. Although there appears to be no written record, it is reported that GoJ has in the past asked for at least 30% of beneficiaries to be Jordanian, but recently, some NGOs have been asked to increase that number to 50%. (PI 10/12/2014, PI 08/01/2015)

In December 2014, the United Nations did not release the Jordan chapter of the 2015-2016 Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP), replacing it with the Jordan Response Plan (JRP), a document developed by the GoJ, with participation from the UN and implementing partners. (3RP 2015-2016, JRP 2015-2016) Unlike the 3RP, the JRP does not list implementing agencies for specific objectives, and it proposes a new management system under which international assistance related to the Syria response would be primarily channelled through the GoJ. Numerous sources involved in the process say the UN came under significant pressure from the GoJ to only release the JRP. (PI 09/01/2014, PI 07/12/2014, PI 12/11/2014) The need to participate in two simultaneous coordinated appeals processes, with different structures, has imposed an extra burden on humanitarian agencies. The JRP requests USD 3 billion for 2015: USD 890 million for continued support to refugees, USD 960 million for resilience (development) projects, and USD 1.1 billion in direct budget support for GoJ.

International NGOs working in Jordan are required to get all projects approved by the GoJ's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC), and there continues to be frustration among NGOs about the length of time involved in the approvals process, and lack of clear guidelines. However, there have been some signs of positive progress on

this front: in December, international NGOs sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Jordan, which has received considerable attention from ministries, and it is hoped it will lead to better communication and relations in the future. (PI 10/12/2014, PI 08/01/2015)

#### 2.2.4. Research and Publications Q4

The following assessments became available in Q4:

- The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the International Rescue Committee (IRC) published a secondary data review highlighting border restrictions around the region, and the increasing challenges facing Syrians attempting to enter host countries. The report contains substantial information on Jordan's border policies. (NRC-IRC 13/11/2014)
- The REACH initiative published:
  - A winterisation assessment looking at shelter and NFI needs in the Za'atari refugee camp, with data collected in September 2014. (REACH 31/10/2014)
  - A third iteration of its MSNA for Syrians living in ITS in Jordan, with data collected in June 2014. (REACH 02/10/2014)
  - A Joint Educational Needs Assessment for Za'atari with data collected in late June/early July 2014. (REACH 30/09/2014)
  - Several factsheets on the level of public services available in Jordanian host communities, and their effect on social cohesion. (REACH 02/11/2014, REACH 30/09/2014)
- Mercy Corps released its third report on social tensions between Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities in Mafraq and Ramtha, based on a survey and focus group discussions from May 2014. (Mercy Corps 12/2014)
- The International Medical Corps (IMC) published an assessment of the mental health/psychosocial/child protection situation for Syrian adolescents, focusing particularly on non-camp settings, with data gathered between late May and early July. (IMC-UNICEF 09/12/2014)
- OCHA began to publish regular humanitarian bulletins on the Jordan situation. (OCHA 05/12/2014, OCHA 15/10/2014)
- UNDP released the results of a mapping of Jordanian host communities (Arabic only). (UNDP 2014, UNDP 2014-2)

UNHCR Jordan's assessment registry (UNHCR, accessed 12/2014) lists a number of ongoing assessments:

- REACH is finalising a Joint Education Needs Assessment for Syrians in host communities.
- The Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture are finalising a food security and livelihoods assessment of Jordanians affected by the Syrian refugee influx.
- Première Urgence-Aide Médicale Internationale (PU-AMI) has finished data collection for a Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) needs assessment.
- UNFPA has finished data collection for a reproductive health needs assessment in Za'atari.
- UNHCR has finished data collection for studies of mass communication preferences and gaps among refugees in both camps and urban areas.
- UNHCR and a number of NGOs are conducting a safety audit of Za'atari camp.
- UNHCR and a number of NGOs are conducting a participatory assessment in Za'atari camp, looking at higher education and youth needs, among other subjects.
- ILO, Save the Children International, and UNICEF are finalising an assessment of child labour in Za'ataricamp.
- UNICEF, ACTED, Oxfam and JEN are planning a KAP study on WASH in Za'atari.
- The International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children are planning a rapid household assessment among new arrivals in the camps to identify specific needs of adolescent girls.

### 'Voluntary returns to Syria are not advised by UNCHR, and are not well monitored, despite the fact that they are occurring in significant numbers'

- The Jesuit Refugee Service is planning an assessment of higher education services.
- Caritas has planned a labour market study of Syrian refugees and vulnerable Jordanians.
- The Danish Refugee Council is planning an assessment in southern Jordan, including Karak, Ma'an, and Tafileh governorates. The assessment will identify gaps in available services, coping mechanisms, migration patterns, and social cohesion.

#### 2.2.5. Information Gaps

Large amounts of public information are available on the needs of Syrian refugees in Jordan. The major current information gap concerns the highly sensitive issue of deportations of Syrians by the GoJ: numbers, trends, and reasons remain unknown, limiting humanitarian advocacy on this issue.

There is also limited information about the overall numbers, locations and needs of Syrians in informal tented settlements (ITS), a subject which is also considered highly sensitive by Jordanian authorities, and gathering or publishing such information could expose ITS inhabitants to eviction.

Voluntary returns to Syria are not advised by UNCHR, and are not well monitored, despite the fact that they are occurring in significant numbers. Detailed information on the reasons people are returning, and their destinations in Syria, is a major gap.

Currently, there also appears to be a gap in updated information about the shelter and NFI need of refugees relevant to winterisation; it is not clear how many need assistance in urban areas, or what current winterisation targets are based on.

#### 2.2.6. Displacement

**Entry restrictions:** Syrians continue to face increasing difficulty accessing Jordan. Over the course of the conflict, the average number of Syrians able to enter on a daily basis has dropped from more than 1,800 in early 2013 to fewer than 200 in late 2014. (RRP6 2014-2015, SNAP Analysis of IOM transport data 2013-2014) The number and accessibility of entry points has also been limited: for most of 2014, Syrians hoping to enter have been required to travel to remote informal border crossing points in the eastern desert. A local source reports that Jordan also announced further limits on the categories of Syrians who are allowed to enter through official border points—though these restrictions may already have been in place in practice. (Jordan Times 31/05/2014, Timatic) Since 25 September, 2014, there has been another major decrease in entries, including several periods when the border appeared entirely closed. From 31 October to 19 November, for example, no new arrivals were recorded by UN agencies. (PI 20/11/2014) Since then, fewer than 60 Syrians per day have been allowed to enter. The average number of new arrivals in Q4 was fewer than 33/day; in Q3 it was fewer than 163/day.




On multiple occasions in Q4 there were reports that large numbers of refugees had gathered in the no-man's-land adjacent to the last utilised border crossings, where they were inaccessible to UNHCR, though they did receive assistance from the ICRC. (NYT 20/11/2014, UNOSAT 03/11/2014, UNOSAT/UNITAR 01/10/2014, PI 16/12/2014) In October it was reported that 950 waiting Syrians had been allowed to enter Jordan and taken to the GoJ's Raba'a Sarhan registration centre. However, fewer than 180 appear to have been transported to camps and humanitarian actors assume the rest were returned to Syria. (PI 12/10/2014, PI 09/10/2014, PI 18/12/2014, IOM data 01/10-15/10/2014) On 12 December, there were again reports that some 1,300 Syrians waiting in no-man's-land had been allowed into Jordan. (NYT 12/12/2014, PI 16/12/2014) Over the next week, nearly 650 Syrians were transported to the camps (compared to just over 470 the previous week). (IOM data 5/12-19/12/2014) Again, it is assumed that the bulk of the Syrians from no-man's-land were returned to Syria, although the uncertainty in the reports is high, and it is possible they were allowed entry over a longer period, or that the estimates of the number allowed entry were too high. However, other reports, considered reliable, indicate that large numbers of refugees have been returned from Raba'a Sarhan on other occasions, and that this may be a regular practice in Jordan. (PI 16/11/2014, PI 15/10/2014)

Jordanian officials continue to maintain that the border is open to refugees, and that Jordan is simply instituting security measures to exclude people connected to 'terrorist organisations'. (Al Ghad 14/12/2014, Jordan Times 11/12/2014)

**New Arrivals:** In Q4, IOM transported just over 2,900 refugees to camps, averaging fewer than 33/day—a massive decrease from the roughly 15,000 transported in Q3, averaging 163/day.

#### NEW ARRIVALS JORDAN



Source: IOM daily transport data. This is considered a very good proxy for new arrivals, but it is not perfect, as there is a very small (perhaps 2/day) number of people transported to camps who arrived from urban areas or regular border crossings.

**Registered refugees:** As of 30 December 2014, UNHCR had registered nearly 623,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan, an increase of 3,700 in Q4. (UNHCR dashboard) As of 18 November, the GoJ said it has distributed service cards to almost 647,000 Syrians. (JRP 2015-2016) Little change in these numbers is expected in 2015.

**'On multiple occasions in Q4 there were reports that large numbers of refugees had gathered in the no-man's-land adjacent to the last utilised border crossings, where they were inaccessible to UNHCR'**

**Palestinian Refugees from Syria:** UNRWA currently records almost 15,000 Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) and their families, who have approached the agency for support. (UNRWA 03/12/2014) The number has continued to increase over the reporting period, by 30-110 cases/month. (UNRWA 18/11/2014, UNRWA 28/10/2014, UNRWA 03/10/2014) It is unclear if these cases represent new arrivals, or simply people approaching UNRWA for the first time. 183 PRS, along with a similar number of Syrians, are held in the Cyber City facility near Ramtha; this number has dropped from 201 at the start of the reporting period. UNRWA reports 106 cases of PRS deported in 2014, a 40% increase on 2013, but warns the actual number of deportations is likely much higher.

**Unregistered refugees:** Studies by multiple humanitarian and UN agencies suggest that between 15-30% of the refugees in Jordan may not be fully registered. (UN Women 06/2014, CARE 24/04/2013, WFP-REACH 06/2014, PI 12/11/2014) Such estimates suggest 100,000-200,000 as a likely number of unregistered refugees. The GoJ frequently refers to 1.4 million Syrians in Jordan; however, this number combines the GoJ estimate of 650,000 refugees with another 750,000 Syrians who the GoJ says resided in Jordan before the crisis. (JRP 2015-2016)

**Returns:** In 2014, more than 33,000 Syrians returned to Syria through unofficial border crossings, with the assistance of the GoJ—a serious decline from 2013, when there were more than 90,000 returns by this pathway. (UNHCR 01/2015, UNHCR 12/2014)

The assisted returns are primarily spontaneous, though they also very likely include some Syrians who were deported using the same transport method. It is likely that un-counted returns, including those through official border crossings, are much more numerous.

**Non-Syrian Refugees:** The end of Q3 saw a surge in the number of Iraqis registering with UNHCR, up to 120 a day, almost two-thirds of whom hailed from areas now under the control of IS. (UNHCR 23/09/2014) The rate of new registrations has fluctuated from some 80/day through October up to 176/day from 16-20 November. By the end of December, the number of Iraqis registered with UNHCR had surpassed 43,000. (PI 07/10/2015)

## 2.2.7. Humanitarian Needs and Concerns

### 2.2.7.1. Protection

The topic of formal and informal GoJ policies and their impact on the protection space enjoyed by Syrians is considered highly sensitive by most actors. As a result, there is only limited structured data collection, and public condemnation of harmful policies is rare. Despite these limitations, after personal interviews with numerous actors in Jordan, SNAP considers reports of shrinking protection space to be highly reliable.

In Jordan, Syrians who have been able to enter and register as refugees (technically: asylum seekers) with UNHCR have previously enjoyed significant protection space, including de facto acceptance of their choice to live in either urban settings or camps, and access to public health and education services. Recently, however, there have been credible reports of significant erosions of this protection, including the forced return of refugees to camps, and deportation/forced return.

**Legal status and documentation:** To access the full range of services available in Jordan, Syrians must register with both UNHCR and the Jordanian Ministry of Interior (MoI). Procedures are different for those in camps and those in urban areas. For urban refugees, a UNHCR asylum seeker certificate has traditionally given access to many humanitarian services, while an MoI 'service card' is required for access to state health care and education services. Refugees in camps are given different documents, allowing them to access only services in the camps. Refugees registered in camps who wish to move to urban areas must obtain 'bail' from the government. While the process has remained somewhat opaque, humanitarian agencies say most of the Syrians they encounter who have obtained bail have had to prove they have a relative who is a Jordanian citizen without a criminal record. (UNHCR information pamphlet on bail procedure 13/08/2014, PI 04/11/2014, PI 03/12/2014) However, large numbers of refugees have left the camps without obtaining bail, and for years their presence in urban areas has been tolerated. Most have been able to get documentation and access assistance.

Recently, however, there have been reliable reports that Jordanian authorities have begun enforcing bail regulations. Some refugees who have obtained bail have also had it declared invalid by the authorities, for apparently arbitrary reasons. Refugees without bail may be unable to obtain MoI service cards, or may be forcibly returned to camps if they approach the authorities. (NRC-IRC 13/11/2014, PI 03/12/2014, PI 12/11/2014) The number of forced returns to camps increased considerably in the first part of Q4, many of them for reasons related only to lack of bail, though it is not clear if this is a trend, or was a temporary increase. (PI 20/11/2014, PI 12/11/2014) The GoJ has also asked UNHCR not to issue asylum seeker certificates to Syrians in urban areas who left the camp after 14 July, and who did not obtain bail. (PI 16/07/2014, PI 07/2014)

These changes have left some refugees unable to obtain complete documentation, and, for others, are contributing to a climate of fear around approaching authorities. This has a significant impact on refugees' access to services. Those without the MoI service card, in particular, are unable to access public education and health services, and are also technically ineligible for assistance from international humanitarian organisations, as the GoJ has instructed these not to provide aid to Syrians who do not have service cards. (PI 03/12/2014, PI 08/10/2014)

Should the current enforcement trend continue, a huge number of Syrians will be at risk of losing access to services, being forced into a camp, or possibly being deported. The number of Syrians who have left the camp without bail is unknown, but it is definitely in the hundreds of thousands, perhaps

## 'A huge number of Syrians will be at risk of losing access to services, being forced into a camp, or possibly being deported'

as high as 300,000. (NRC-IRC 13/11/2014) The declaration of bail as invalid by the authorities potentially puts more than half a million refugees at risk.

The government of Jordan and UNHCR are preparing for a 'verification exercise', in urban areas, likely to begin at the end of January, 2015, which will involve re-issuing the MoI service cards, as well as biometric registration, and the return of previously confiscated identity documents. This will apply to all Syrians in Jordan, not only registered refugees. The government has assured humanitarian agencies that all refugees possessing a valid asylum seeker certificate will be able to receive service cards, and that there will be no retroactive investigation of bail status issues. (PI 12/11/2014) However, given the tightening of controls on other fronts, concerns remain that this exercise will be used as an attempt to transfer significant numbers of refugees from urban areas into camps.

**Forced returns:** Credible reports suggest recent deportations have included children and injured adults. (HRW 08/12/2014, PI 03/12/2014, HRW 23/11/2014) The GoJ denies this. (Jordan Times 11/12/2014) Current information makes it impossible to estimate how many Syrians have been deported from Jordan, or whether this number has changed over time. The reasons for deportation are also unclear, though humanitarian sources suggested that the most vulnerable refugees included those without identity documents, or with forged documents; and those who had previously returned to Syria, then re-entered Jordan. (PI 29/09/2014) These refugees may also face some increased risk of deportation in Q1 owing to the upcoming verification exercise.

**Evictions and restrictions on informal settlements:** The GoJ has resumed dismantling informal tented settlements (ITS), and forcibly relocating the inhabitants to camps. (See also 'Shelter', p. 19) Beginning in December, several ITS were dismantled, affecting more than 100 families; Some of the inhabitants were returned to camps, despite having gone through bail procedures; their bail was now deemed invalid by the authorities. (PI 10/12/2014, Jordan Times 09/10/2014)

After the previous round of evictions, in June, when some 2,000 people were returned to camps, Jordanian authorities offered assurances they would notify ITS residents 48 hours in advance of evictions. (REACH 02/10/2014, PI 28/08/2014) This has not been followed in all cases, and the early December evictions took place without warning. 'Sweeps' of the northern border area by Jordanian authorities continued in the subsequent week, and Syrians discovered living in ITS were warned to leave within 48 hours or face eviction. (PI 18/12/2014)

**Child protection:** In November a decision by the GoJ exempted refugees from the USD 1,400 fine for failing to register a marriage, lasting until the end of 2014. (Inter-Sector Working Group 15/12/2014, PI 12/11/2014) The children of marriages that are not officially registered cannot obtain identity documents and are at risk of statelessness. (Economist 26/10/2014)

There are a number of reasons why some Syrians have not registered marriages, including lack of identity documents and concerns about approaching authorities. Also the marriage of girls aged 14-17 was a common practice in parts of Syria, but is illegal in Jordan in most cases. (*Economist* 26/10/2014, *Save the Children* 16/07/2014)

### 2.2.7.2. Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

In Jordan, between 490,000-530,000 Syrians are receiving regular WFP food assistance. (*Jordan Inter-Sector Working Group Update* 15/12/2014, *WFP* 25/11/2014, *Jordan Inter-Sector Working Group Update* 21/11/2014) Maintaining assistance to the 90,000 refugees in Jordan's camps has been prioritised by WFP, however the assistance to 400,000-440,000 urban refugees has come under threat repeatedly during the reporting period. In October, WFP replaced blanket food distribution with a targeted approach, based on vulnerability criteria derived from a Comprehensive Food Security Monitoring Exercise (CFSME) in June. As a result, 37,000 urban refugees (6% of the total population in Jordan) no longer receive food aid. (*WFP* 11/11/2014, *CFSME* 07/08/2014) The exercise generated a substantial number of appeals (more than 4,000, to date) and it is likely a significant proportion will have their assistance restored. (*Jordan Inter-Sector Working Group Update* 13/01/2014, *PI* 20/01/2014) In October and November, reductions in the level of assistance to urban refugees were considered because of funding shortfalls, but were not implemented thanks to last-minute donations. (*Jordan Inter-Sector Working Group Update* 21/11/2014, *Jordan Inter-Sector Working Group Update* 30/09/2014)

In December, the brief, region-wide cuts to WFP assistance affected only the urban refugee beneficiaries in Jordan. After emergency fundraising in early December, WFP announced that it would reinstate assistance for December at its full previous value. (*WFP* 09/12/2014) In 2015 the programme plans to standardise the value of its food vouchers across host countries, which will result in a small permanent reduction in the value to Jordanian beneficiaries—from USD 33.60 to USD 28.00/person/month. (*WFP* 18/12/2014) For January, available funding only allows WFP to distribute full-value vouchers to the roughly 90,000 refugees in camps, while the more than 400,000 in urban areas are receiving USD 18.20/person/month. Further funding shortfalls are expected in Q1 2015, though the amount is not yet known. WFP will confirm funding for each month on the 20th of the previous month. (*PI* 11/01/2015, *Jordan Times* 12/01/2014)

The programme continues to be widely seen as unsustainable, and further cuts to voucher value, increased targeting, or both, are expected in the near term. The consequences of this for refugees in Jordan are potentially serious: in the WFP CFSME, 85% of refugees said they would be unable to meet the cost of basic needs without the WFP food aid, and 74% said it was their only source of income. (*CFSME* 07/08/2014) In surveys asking what would happen if food assistance were cut, large numbers of respondents said they would have no choice but to return to Syria. (*IRC* 05/12/2014, *PI* 10/12/2014) Notwithstanding the likely bias of these results due to assistance-seeking by some respondents, it is reasonable to believe that without food aid a considerable proportion of refugees would resort to negative coping strategies.

### 2.2.7.3. Health

In late November, the GoJ issued a decision that Syrians can no longer access health care services for free at state hospitals; from now on they will have to pay the same rates as uninsured Jordanians. The rates are still highly subsidised, but the decision will increase hardship for vulnerable refugees.

**'85% of refugees said they would be unable to meet the cost of basic needs without the WFP food aid, and 74% said it was their only source of income'**

(*Jordan Inter-Sector Working Group Update* 15/12/2014) Treatment for communicable diseases, the government has said, will remain free. The GoJ has cited lack of funding as the reason for the cuts, saying that providing care had cost the government nearly USD 50 million—although this figure seems low: the JRP estimates that the cost of providing health services to refugees in 2015 will be USD 220 million. (*Jordan Times* 01/12/2014) Prior to the cuts, Jordan's foreign minister told donors the number of operations in Jordanian hospitals had increased by 600% since the start of the crisis in Syria. (*Jordan Times* 28/10/2014-2)

### 2.2.7.4. WASH

While Jordan has an effective public water system, supplying households at highly subsidised rates, reports suggest these facilities are under significant strain in areas with high concentrations of Syrians. In a REACH assessment of 16 municipalities in northern Jordan from Aug-Sept 2014, water shortages were almost universally rated as one of the two most serious observed changes since Syrians entered the community. (*REACH* 12/11/2014) In 11 of the 16 municipalities, 85-99% of residents had access to municipal water networks, while in the other five, rates were between 55-79%.

There is also widespread dissatisfaction with municipal garbage collection and sewerage services in the north, including both refugees and host communities. Local officials complain sanitation services have been severely taxed by the refugee influx. (*Jordan Times* 04/12/2014) A recently released UNDP study of host communities, conducted in late 2013, also listed garbage collection as a high priority. (*UNDP* 2014, *UNDP* 2014-2) The REACH assessment also highlighted 11 municipalities in Ramtha and Irbid where between 0-5% of residents had sewer connections. (*REACH* 16/12/2014, *REACH* 12/11/2014)

Some groups continue to be particularly vulnerable: for example, a REACH assessment of ITS suggested that nearly 60% of households in informal settlements had no access to latrines. (*REACH* 19/06/2014)

### 2.2.7.5. Shelter/NFI

The arrival of winter remains a concern for displaced people in Jordan, but there has been no recent, publicly available assessment of winterisation needs across the board. In September 2014, REACH conducted an assessment in Za'atari camp, which suggested significant winterisation needs. Of 392 randomly sampled households, 20-25% were still living in tents,

and of those living in caravans, nearly 50% said these were not adequate for winter because of holes, cracks, or poor waterproofing. Also, fewer than 50% reported having a functioning heater; more than 40% reported heating as a need, and 20% reported needing blankets. (REACH 31/10/2014) No similar information is available for urban areas, but there are indications that the needs are high: CARE assessments of urban refugees in Jan/Feb 2013 and Jan/Feb 2014 both found significant reported needs, including substandard shelter and lack of blankets and NFIs. In the more recent assessment, covering 263 households in four urban centres (almost all registered with UNHCR) 18% reported having no heating at all, and 16% specifically reported winterisation needs. Notably, those numbers appear worse than in 2013, when only 12% had no access to heating. (CARE 07/04/2013, CARE 15/04/2014) The most comprehensive data on urban refugees, based on 92,000 home visits conducted by International Relief and Development (IRD) and UNHCR in 2012 and 2013, found that while the majority of urban refugees were renting apartments, 7% were living in insecure shelter types including basements, tents, and collective shelters, and fully 48% were in what enumerators considered sub-standard housing. (UNHCR-IRD 18/03/2014)

In addition, In June 2014, REACH assessed 10,500 Syrians (1.5% of total population) residing in 125 ITS across six governorates, nearly half of those in Mafraq. This is the third such assessment, and over time the number of ITS has increased considerably; some of this is the result of greater geographic coverage of the assessment, but in Mafraq, the number of ITS increased fourfold from Dec 2013 to June 2014, and the number of inhabitants more than doubled. This assessment is not comprehensive, and it suggests at least 10,000 Syrians living in ITS in northern Jordan should be considered in high need of winterisation assistance. (REACH/UNICEF 02/10/2014)

The winterisation task force reports targeting 64,000 people for winterisation assistance (slightly over 10% of the refugee population) and reaching 47% of this target by 3 December. (Winterization Task Force 19/12/2014, Winterization Task Force 21/11/2014) Without further information on needs, it is impossible to say whether these targets are sufficient.

### 2.2.7.6. Education

There are roughly 220,000 Syrian school-aged children in Jordan registered with UNHCR. Preliminary records released by the Ministry of Education (MoE) indicate that nearly 110,000 Syrian children are enrolled in public schools for the 2014/2015 school year, including 19,000 in Jordan's three major camps. (Inter-Agency Regional Update 05/12/2014) The GoJ decision to end the provision of free healthcare for Syrians has sparked worries that Jordan will also limit access to education, but so far there are no signs of this.

The Joint Educational Needs Assessment (JENA) conducted in Za'atari at the end of the 2013/2014 school year found that although attendance had more than doubled since 2013, 48% of school aged children in the camp were not attending school, 38% were not attending any form of education, and 28% had never attended any form of education in the camp. (REACH 04/11/2014) Boys 12-17 years old were the least likely to attend, with only 33% in school, and 50% not attending any form of education. Their main reasons for non-attendance included distance to school, concerns about the quality of education, and, among those who attended then dropped out, a lack of interest in education.

Distance to school is perceived as the main reason for non-attendance across age groups. However, while distance to a school did generally correlate to attendance, the camp overall is not huge, and some families reported distance was a problem while living quite close to schools. (REACH 04/11/2014, PI 04/11/2014) Worries about distance to school may reflect a perception that the camp is still unsafe:

**'While the majority of urban refugees were renting apartments, 7% were living in insecure shelter types including basements, tents, and collective shelters, and fully 48% were in what enumerators considered sub-standard housing'**

harassment on the way to and from school was also cited as a problem, particularly among girls and younger boys. While only 6% of 12-17 year old boys reported skipping school for work, 20% of families said the main thing that would improve children's attendance was financial support, which could mean the role of working children is being under-represented.

A JENA for Syrians living in host communities is currently underway, but other sources indicate that concerns about violence in schools, and on the way to school, is also a serious issue in host communities, as well as in Za'atari. (IMC-UNICEF 09/12/2014) Of particular concern are Syrians living in ITS: a recent report indicates that only 3.5% of children residing in ITS were attending school, and more than 20% were working. (REACH 02/10/2014)

### 2.2.7.7. Social Cohesion

Assessing the level of tension between Syrian refugees and Jordanian host communities remains a challenge. The latest update of Mercy Corps' mapping of tensions in Mafraq and Ramtha suggests that tensions are driven by two primary issues: a sense of competition over scarce jobs and scarce housing stock. The severity of the problem may be growing: while overt violence between the communities has not been an issue, the study indicates that in some areas people are increasingly seeing violence as an appropriate coping mechanism. The report also suggests that in addition to tensions with the host community, perceived inequalities in the distribution of aid may be fuelling tensions between refugees as well. (Mercy Corps, 'Seeking Stability', 12/2014)

Recent UNDP mapping suggested that many Jordanian host communities feel Syrians are responsible for their economic woes: in Irbid and Mafraq, 55% and 59% of respondents said Syrians had caused their income to decrease, and 98% of people said they had caused major increases in rents. (UNDP 2014) Other drivers of community tensions were explored in a series of REACH reports in August. (REACH 28/08/2014) Press reports continue to reinforce negative perceptions of Syrians—for example, a recent study that claimed Syrians took 91% of the new private sector jobs in Jordan, something that appears highly unlikely. (Jordan Times 28/10/2014)

For some refugees, a pervasive sense of being unwelcome may be having negative mental health consequences. An IMC/UNICEF study of Syrian adolescents recently found that those living outside camps felt more stressed and less safe than those in camps, reported a pervasive sense of harassment and discrimination, particularly in in school settings, and listed 'poor treatment by Jordanians' as their primary concern. (IMC-UNICEF 09/12/2014)

## 2.3. TURKEY

### Displaced

Syrians registered and awaiting registration	1,622,839
% living in formal camps	~14%
% living in informal settlements/sub-standard accommodation	25%
Unregistered refugees	Unknown
Estimated returns to Syria	181,200+

Sources: UNHCR dashboard including data from AFAD/GoT, UNHCR 12/12/2014, UNHCR 20/11/2014, Inter-Agency Regional Update 14/12/2014

### SYRIAN REFUGEES PER GOVERNORATE



Sources: HUI, Data from AFAD, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; reported in UNHCR 15/09/2014 and UNHCR 14/12/2014

#### 2.3.1. Key Issues

Though Turkey has not adopted the kind of highly exclusionary border policies seen in Jordan, Egypt or Lebanon, Syrians still face significant challenges accessing Turkish territory. New restrictions put on the movement of Syrians with valid travel documents in Q1 2015 are increasing these challenges. (See 'Displacement,' p.23)

Winterisation, shelter and NFI needs remain a key humanitarian priority for newly arrived refugees, vulnerable refugees in host communities, and some refugees in camps. (See 'Shelter,' p. 24) Information on refugees in urban areas remains extremely limited, (See 'Information Gaps,' p. 22) and they are harder to identify and reach with much needed assistance, particularly winterisation. Despite the significant efforts of the humanitarian community to respond to needs inside Turkey, it is presumed that a large proportion of refugees remains unserved.

*'Despite the significant efforts of the humanitarian community to respond to needs inside Turkey, it is presumed that a large proportion of refugees remains unserved'*

**1,622,839**

Syrians registered and awaiting registration

**181,200+**

Estimated returns to Syria

Recently, the Government of Turkey (GoT) has expressed the importance of increasing assistance to refugees in urban areas—for example, by changing regulations to allow more Syrians access to livelihoods, and asking for WFP food assistance to be extended to refugees in urban areas. (See 'Livelihoods and Food Security,' p. 24) The Turkish General Directorate for Migration Management (DGMM) is also working with UNHCR to create a registration database, which will include information about needs and vulnerabilities. (3RP 2015-2016) This may signify a shift in GoT aid policies, which have left urban refugees underserved and under-assessed.

Education actors estimate that only 30% of refugee children are attending school, meaning there are some 450,000 school aged refugee children who are not accessing education. (See 'Education,' p. 25)

#### 2.3.2. Possible Developments

The upcoming Ministry of Labour decision concerning which refugees will be allowed to work in Turkey, how many, and in what sectors, is expected to have a major effect on both refugee livelihoods and the humanitarian response in Q1 2015, as it could significantly reduce the vulnerability of some parts of the population.

However, the imposition of the new border regulations may reduce the flow of Syrian refugees back and forth between Turkey and Syria, and put a burden on refugees seeking to maintain property in Syria or generate an income there. If this happens, the likely result is a further erosion of livelihoods.

It is not clear whether further increases should be expected in the refugee population in Turkey. Tightening border controls suggest increases will be small, however the 3RP estimates that the refugee population in Turkey in 2015 will increase with 1 million to 2.5 million, with 300,000 residing in camps. (3RP 2015-2016) Such a major increase seems most likely in the case of a major change in the dynamic, for example, an offensive in Aleppo that sent a large number of people fleeing immediate peril.

The creation of a UNHCR/DGMM registration database is expected to significantly improve the information available to humanitarian actors in urban areas. It remains to be seen whether humanitarian actors will have the space to increase their level of response to this population, which would also require a loosening of GoT regulations to allow more assistance to the most vulnerable urban refugees and host communities. Such an opening is perhaps possible, if GoT is indeed shifting its policies, but is not considered very likely.

### 2.3.3. Security and Political Developments

In December, the UN launched the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for Turkey, asking for USD 624 million to support refugees and affected host communities. (3RP 2015-2016) The USD 461 million requested for assistance to refugees is actually a small decrease from the USD 497 million requested in the 2014 RRP6—which was only 29% funded by the end of the year. (RRP6 Funding Snapshot 12/12/2014) However the 3RP also asks for USD 163 million to support the resilience of local institutions and host communities. Some analysts have suggested that the end of 2014 has signalled a shift in GoT policy, from a ‘go-it-alone’ stance on assisting Syrian refugees to a broader embrace of an international role in the response. (German Institute for International and Security Affairs 01/11/2014)

The beginning of Q4 saw violent clashes across the country between protesters (primarily Turkish Kurds, angered by what they saw as the government’s inaction in the face of the IS attack on Ain Al Arab/Kobani), police and a Kurdish pro-government Islamist party. (BBC 08/10/2014, Al Arabiya 10/10/2014, Al Jazeera 08/10/2014, also reported in RAS Q3) Though the protests died down, in late December there were again clashes between Islamists and Kurdish youths in Cizre, causing two deaths and several injuries, and indicating that Kurdish-Turkish and intra-Kurdish tensions have ongoing potential as a driver of civil unrest. (Reuters 27/12/2014, Al Arabiya 27/12/2014, Associated Press 27/12/2014)

Turkey’s continued advocacy for a US-created buffer zone, safe zone or no-fly zone in northern Syria garnered considerable media attention in Q4. (Foreign Policy 15/10/2014, NYT 09/10/2014, Brookings 24/11/103, Syria Deeply 02/12/2014) Though the idea has been firmly rejected in the past, media reports quoted anonymous US officials saying it might now actually be under consideration, and linking it to negotiations over US use of Incirlik air base, and the joint effort to train Syrian anti-government fighters in Turkey. (Bloomberg 30/11/2014, Washington Post 01/12/2014) In public, US officials walked back those reports, though messages remained mixed. (Telegraph 18/11/2014, Reuters 01/12/2014, NYT 01/12/2014, Al Arabiya 11/12/2014) The latest reports suggest the plan is stalled. (Washington Post 18/01/2014) Turkey and the US have reportedly agreed to train Syrian opposition fighters, though details are yet to be worked out. (Reuters 05/01/2014)

In October, Turkish police twice reported seizing large amounts of explosives, weapons and suicide vests that were cached in Gaziantep, presumably by individuals linked to IS. (Hurriyet Daily News 23/10/2014, Hurriyet Daily News 13/10/2014, Today’s Zaman 13/10/2014)

### 2.3.4. Operational Constraints

The GoT has firmly taken the lead on providing humanitarian assistance in Turkey, and while the response is considered well-organised in many ways, it has also led to a challenging operating environment for humanitarian organisations. A recent Amnesty International report describes NGOs facing serious restrictions on their activities and the constraints resulting from a slow, complicated and un-transparent registration process in order to work legally. (Amnesty 20/11/2014)

New visa regulations for Syrians implemented in Q1 2015 (see ‘Protection’, p. xx) are likely to add significant challenges for NGOs based in Turkey and operating within Syria, as Syrian staff may be unable to move back-and-forth across the border regularly. (IRIN 13/01/2015, OCHA 24/12/2014, PI 18/01/2015)

Nearly 1.6 million registered Syrian refugees are living in urban areas, where they are difficult to identify and reach. Despite the significant efforts of the humanitarian community to respond to needs inside Turkey, it is presumed that a large proportion of refugees remains unserved.

### 2.3.5. Research and Publications Q4

UNHCR and Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) provides regular updates on the number of refugees residing in Turkey, including progress with registration, yet information on humanitarian needs remains scarce.

In Q4, UNOCHA Turkey began providing weekly media updates on both international and domestic political developments, and their impact on humanitarian assistance and humanitarian access; as well as specific thematic reports on issues such as legal status. OCHA Turkey has further been providing weekly updates on the status of the border crossings between Turkey and Syria.

CARE published a Rapid Gender and Protection Assessment of Syrian refugees from Ain Al Arab/Kobani. (CARE 15/10/2014)

Amnesty International published the results of a major research project, which documents push-backs and violence against Syrians at the Turkish border, and the challenges Syrians in Turkey face in meeting their basic needs and accessing assistance. (Amnesty 20/11/2014)

### 2.3.6. Information Gaps

While humanitarian actors, who are implementing partners of the local authorities as well as UNHCR, are generally able to assess the number of beneficiaries and conduct monitoring of distribution of assistance, few comprehensive, coordinated needs assessments have been conducted by humanitarian organisations. As a result, the major source of information on refugees in urban areas remains an AFAD field study conducted in late 2013. This is the source of many published numbers, but given the change in the scale of the crisis, it should be considered completely out of date. (AFAD 12/11/2013) Information on the food security, livelihoods and WASH needs of urban refugees is urgently needed.

While there are sector-specific rapid needs assessments conducted, there are still constraints to information sharing. Actors responding in Turkey have highlighted the need for a comprehensive secondary data review on the needs of Ain Al Arab/Kobani refugees and urban refugees in general.

As of December, more than half of the new arrivals from Ain Al Arab/Kobani were unaccounted for, having moved on from the Suruc area, presumably to larger cities in Turkey. (See RAS Brief: 1 November-7 December) It is likely that those refugees are among the large number of urban refugees registered by AFAD in December, but information on this issue is not currently available.

Very limited information is available on the livelihoods of Syrian refugees, or the effect their presence has had on livelihoods of host communities.

### 2.3.7. Displacement

**Entry Restrictions:** Syrians face significant difficulties accessing Turkish territory. The limited space available in camps has led Turkish border authorities to adopt a system of 'staggered arrivals.' Syrians with passports have so far been able to enter unhindered, but most of those without passports are only allowed entry when space becomes available in the camps. Exceptions are reportedly made for individual medical emergencies and some vulnerable groups, and borders have been opened at times when large numbers of people are believed to be in immediate fear for their lives, such as occurred in Q3 at Ain Al Arab/Kobani. (3RP 2015-2016, UNCHR 2014/07/01)

As only two border crossings remain open to refugees, many Syrians seeking asylum must either make a long journey across contested areas of Syria, or attempt to enter Turkey irregularly. Amnesty documents 17 cases of Syrians the organisation says were shot and killed while attempting informal border crossings, and numerous others who were detained by Turkish border guards, beaten, and/or returned to Syria. (Amnesty 2011/12/014)

Since 2012, Syrian refugees have been exempt from the general rule that foreigners can only remain in Turkey for 19 out of every 180 days. On 31 December 2014, that exemption expired, leaving Syrians who stay in Turkey on tourist visas vulnerable to fines and entry bans. (OCHA 09/01/2015, IRIN 13/01/2015) The removal of the exemption seems designed to push Syrians to obtain residency or to register under Turkey's new Temporary Protection Regulation (TP). Syrians with no documents or expired passports could not previously get residency, but should be able to register for TP.

According to OCHA, border officials are applying the rules retroactively, meaning that non-compliance with the 90/180 rule anytime in 2014 will result in a fine, even though that rule was not in force in 2014. In addition, foreigners arriving at Turkish ports-of-entry with passports or travel documents that are not valid for at least 60 days after the expiry date of their visas, visa exemptions, or residence permits, will not be granted entry into Turkey. (OCHA 02/01/2015)

**Registered refugees:** The number of registered refugees in Turkey increased dramatically in Q4: from 870,000 on 30 September to more than 1.5 million on 31 December. (UNHCR dashboard, data from AFAD/GoT) The increase is primarily explained by changes to the GoT's registration procedure, as well as the influx of more than 192,000 refugees from Ain Al Arab/Kobani. As of January, 2015, there remained 70,000 persons awaiting registration in Turkey. Unlike in other host countries, The GoT has taken primary responsibility for registering refugees, with the UNHCR playing only an advisory role, so it is unclear to what degree these registration figures are comparable to those from Lebanon, Jordan, etc. (3RP 2015-2016, Boston University 11/2014)

Registration is required for Syrian refugees to access assistance and services, including health care and core relief items. According to AFAD, the vast majority of the population has been biometrically registered, in spite of their initial reservations, in order to have access to health services. (UNHCR 11/12/2014)


## 'The number of registered refugees in Turkey increased dramatically in Q4: from 870,000 on 30 September to more than 1.5 million on 31 December'

**New Arrivals:** Since 13 November, there have been no further admissions of Syrians from Ain Al Arab/Kobani. According to the GoT, the total number admitted was more than 192,000, of whom more than 52,000 have been biometrically registered. (UNHCR 12/12/2014) An estimated 58,000 Ain Al Arab/Kobani refugees remain in Suruç town, the surrounding villages and nearby camps run by AFAD or the local municipality. A further 26,000 refugees continued on to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I). (See Iraq chapter, p. 27) Local sources reported that others crossed back into Syria through the Bab As-Salam crossing, but no accurate figures were available.

### KOBANE REFUGEE INFLUX OVERVIEW

#### Movement of Persons of Concern:

The situation remains fluid, with high mobility of the displaced population with onward movement of half of the refugees within Turkey and northern Iraq. Lack of adequate shelter coupled with decreasing temperatures highlight the urgency of a quick implementation of a winterization plan. Refugees are facing extreme hardship residing in abandoned or unfinished buildings, warehouses and small tents.



The sub-governor of Suruç estimates that there could be up to 40,000 vehicles and 1,000 people waiting on the Syrian side along the border with Turkey. So far, over 3,000 vehicles have been admitted, but they are parked and not allowed to circulate. In mid-December, it was estimated that around 500-600 people were waiting across the Yumurtalik border crossing, the one closest to Suruç, for their vehicles to be admitted. (UNHCR 11/12/2014)

**Non-Syrian refugees:** The number of Yazidi refugees from Iraq who fled into Turkey amidst ongoing attacks by IS is now estimated at 30,000 by the EU. (ECHO 03/12/2014, EU 03/12/2014) UNHCR only reports 25,000 Iraqi refugees in Turkey, but it is not clear to what extent the recent Yazidi displacement is captured within this figure. (UNHCR 01/2015)

### 2.3.8. Humanitarian Needs and Concerns

Priority needs highlighted in the 3RP include improved sanitary facilities in both camps and urban areas, greater access to education for Syrian children, improved access to livelihoods for refugees in high-influx areas, and improved access to health and mental health services. (3RP 2015-2016)

#### 2.3.8.1. Livelihoods and Food Security

Turkish officials are currently making a decision about expanding formal access to livelihoods for Syrians under the new Temporary Protection Regulation. When completed this will have a significant effect on the humanitarian landscape, as up until now Syrian refugees have in general had only limited and informal access to livelihoods. (AFP 13/11/2014, 3RP 2015-2016)

The brief cuts to WFP assistance in December did not affect refugees in Turkey, where WFP food assistance is provided only in camps, and regionally WFP made cuts almost exclusively in non-camp settings. However there have been suggestions that even this aid is threatened. As of late September, WFP distributed USD 27.50/person/month via e-voucher to refugees in camps in Turkey, who also received USD 11.45 from AFAD. According to the 3RP, WFP budget shortfalls were expected to leave 77% of its existing camp-based caseload without access to food vouchers in October.

As of September, only 150,000 refugees in host communities (just under 10%) were reported to receive assistance, though targets were being raised to 320,000 in 2015. (3RP 2015-2016) UNHCR has highlighted a need for life-saving food assistance outside camps, and to expand food assistance in the camps from 220,000 to the full current population of 300,000. (UNHCR 31/12/2014) Turkish authorities have also requested WFP to expand its e-voucher assistance to urban refugees, and to develop a vulnerability framework for targeting beneficiaries. (WFP 03/12/2014, 3RP 2015-2016)

#### 2.3.8.2. Shelter and NFI

**Refugees in host communities:** Information about the shelter needs of the nearly 1.6 million urban refugees in Turkey is extremely limited. According to the AFAD survey in 2013, the majority were living in houses and apartments, although 25% inhabited ruined structures, make-shift housing or tents. This result is likely to be completely outdated and the number of refugees in insecure shelter may be significantly higher. (AFAD 12/11/2013)

**Refugees in camps:** There is inconsistency in UNHCR reporting on the number of refugees in camps: the 3RP and some UNHCR sources say the camp population has already reached 300,000, while the most recent UNHCR monthly update, from December, still puts the camp population at 224,000. (3RP 2015-2016, UNHCR 31/12/2014, UNHCR 12/12/2014) The shelter situation in the camps

has generally been considered up to standards, with solid shelters, winterised tents, and fuel generally available. However the 3RP notes that after two years of occupation by refugees, many camp facilities are in critical need of maintenance and improvements. It should be noted that the AFAD survey reported nearly as many households in sub-standard accommodation types in camps as in urban areas. (AFAD 12/11/2013)

AFAD has reportedly opened two camps, Nusaybin and the newly built Islahiye 2, to accommodate refugees from urban areas who did not have adequate shelter. As of early December, AFAD reported 73 individuals had come to Islahiye, and expected that it would soon reach its capacity of 4,000 individuals. (UNHCR 05/12/2014, UNHCR 15/11/2014, Daily Sabah 10/11/2014, Today's Zaman 22/06/2014) This appears not to have occurred, as in January media reported that AFAD was demolishing informal settlements, and had forcibly relocated nearly 3,000 people to the camp. (See 'Protection', p. 24)

**New Arrivals in Suruç:** Local officials in Suruç say the majority of the new arrivals are staying with relatives or host families, and there are also a large number in private accommodations. (UNHCR 11/12/2014) However, other reports say that as of November, significant numbers were also living in abandoned or unfinished buildings, warehouses and small tents, often with minimal or no household goods. (AAR Japan 19/11/2014, ECHO 09/12/2014) There are reports of high fire risks in the municipality camps caused by poor infrastructure and the increased use of open fires for heating. (PI 18/11/2014) An INGO stressed the assumption that most people currently present in Suruç will stay there over the winter months, leading to a need for ongoing NFI and food assistance. In December, UNHCR reported a crucial need for blankets, shoes and winter clothes. (UNHCR 05/12/2014)

Both AFAD-run shelters in the Suruç area are at capacity, and Turkish authorities in December began building a new camp, expected to house 32,500 people, but SNAP currently has no information on whether it has been completed. (Reuters 21/12/2014, UNHCR 20/11/2014)

There is also concern for thousands of newly arrived Yazidi refugees from Iraq, who have settled in the Silopi area, and are staying in temporary shelters not fit for severe winter conditions. (UNHCR 15/11/2014)



#### 2.3.8.3. Protection

Turkey's new Temporary Protection (TP) Regulation took effect on 22 October and, through an interim provision, is immediately applicable to Syrian refugees. Coupled with issuing TP identification cards, the regulation guarantees no forced returns, the right to stay as long as the temporary protection is in effect, access to health and education services and to social aid, as well as access to services and the labour market, although the limitations of this access have yet to be defined. (See chart, p. 25) While the TP directive provides allowances similar to those afforded to foreigners obtaining residency permits (a status many Syrians have applied for), there are distinctions on movements abroad between the two statuses. (OCHA 18/11/2014, UNHCR-Turkey, Unofficial Translation Temporary Protection Regulation)

The main issues requiring further clarification relate to the labour market, geographical restrictions, and the extent to which provincial governments can decide how TP will be implemented. Some Syrians have been reluctant to go through with this process, as it's unclear how their ability to move in and outside the country may be affected. However, there is a legal obligation to register, and this will be enforced by local authorities.



## TURKEY'S TEMPORARY PROTECTION REGULATION

	<b>RP</b> <b>RESIDENCE PERMITS</b> applicable to <b>ALL FOREIGNERS;</b> language adapted here to reflect impact on Syrians	<b>TP</b> <b>TEMPORARY PROTECTION</b> <b>REGULATION</b>
<b>Granted To</b>	 Syrian passport holders who have legally entered Turkey and have a valid passport and a valid visa.   Married to Turkish citizens.	Every Syrian, regardless of possession of legal papers, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stateless persons</li> <li>Palestinians from Syria</li> </ul> <b>Exceptions</b> Anyone who may have committed acts of terrorism or human rights violations.




### Access to services



### Access to labour market

- Work permits must be obtained through the employer
- Work permits can be obtained by those with RPs over 6 months, by employers applying on behalf of refugee
- Work permits cannot exceed duration of RP and cannot exceed 12 months, but can be renewed upon extension of RPs

Access to labour market, albeit with restrictions, as to be determined by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection limited to:



### Duration

- Issued for 6 months - 12 months.
- Cannot be issued for more than 12 months, but can be extended (up to 4 times) within 15 days prior to expiration.
- Longer term residence cards may be obtained after 8 years of stay in the country.

- The duration of the TP policy is subject to decision of the Council of Ministers



### Expiration

- If leaving Turkey with expired RP, must apply for new visa and may be banned for 90 days.
- If do not wish to renew, Syrians can obtain Temporary Protection ID.
- Syrians:
  - Whose passports or visas expired in the last 12 months
  - Who entered Turkey illegally
  - Whose visas expired more than 12 months ago – cannot get a Residence Permit but can receive a TP ID.

- If leaving Turkey of own will.
- If availing protection of another country.
- If admitted to another country under humanitarian reasons or resettlement.

**Sources:**  
 OCHA 18/11/2014, UNHCR-Turkey, Unofficial Translation Temporary Protection Regulation

**Child Protection:** Issues of early marriage and child labour are difficult to track, but humanitarian actors report they remain significant concerns. (3RP 2015-2016)

**Evictions:** AFAD has begun demolishing informal tented settlements and shantytowns where Syrians reside, and relocating the inhabitants to a camp in Gaziantep, according to a recent news article. Officials said the evictions come in response to the threat to extreme cold, that 3,000 people had been relocated nationwide, and that the evictions would continue as long as necessary. (Reuters 09/01/2015)

In Q3 it was reported that GoT was relocating Syrian refugees from some urban areas, particularly Gaziantep, in response to violent clashes and heightened social tensions. (See RAS Q3) No information was available on whether this practice continues.

**Explosive Remnants of War (ERW):** In early December, there were reports that landmines killed two Syrians, out of a population of more than 2,000 inhabiting a mine-contaminated border area. (HRW 02/12/2014)

### 2.3.8.4. Health

Lack of registration has been reported as a problem for refugees attempting to access health care in the past; however, increasing registration numbers make it less likely this will continue to be a major issue. (RRP6 2014-2015 Mid-Year Update) Unregistered refugees currently have access to emergency care. However, local health care facilities report an additional patient load of 30-40%, and overcrowding and language barriers are pushing Syrian refugees to turn to alternative, ad hoc clinics. Syrian refugees are increasingly exposed to vaccine-preventable diseases, and mental health and long-term support for the large population of seriously injured are critical issues. (3RP 2015-2016)

### 2.3.8.5. WASH

After two years, WASH facilities in some camps are moving below standard, and require critical maintenance to return them to an acceptable level. (3RP 2015-2016) There are still reports of inadequate water supply and sanitation issues in some camps—one recent report suggests only six toilets for 110 tents with an average size of seven people, and open defecation has been observed. (PI 18/11/2014) As in Iraq, there are concerns about the outbreak of infectious disease, including measles and polio, among newly arrived refugees from northern Syria, where vaccination rates are low. (UNICEF 13/10/2014)

### 2.3.8.6. Education

There are at least 576,000 school-aged children who require access to schooling. Refugees have access to both the public education system (though language barriers make this a challenge) and, where available, to 'temporary education centres', with instruction in Arabic, using a modified version of the Syrian curriculum. At the end of the 2013/2014 school year, 65,000 children were attending school in camps, 45,000 attending temporary education centers in communities, and 7,500 in the national education system. However, 70% of school-aged children are still out of school, with a sharp drop in enrollment in grade 10-12.

The major challenges include insufficient school places to meet demand; families prioritising basic needs over schooling (child labour may be a significant factor); lack of subsidised transportation to schools, and language barriers. The quality of education in the temporary education centers is affected by high turnover and use of volunteer teachers. (3RP 2015-2016, UNICEF 13/10/2014)

Previously it was reported that formal state education was only available to Syrians with a national number, i.e., those entering through official border points, with valid travel documents. It is not clear if the TP regime will change this requirement. (See RAS Q3)

### 2.3.8.7. Community Tensions and Social Cohesion

Community tensions in Turkey remain difficult to monitor conclusively, however media reports continue to highlight growing rifts between Turks and Syrian refugees, based primarily on competition over jobs and housing, and perceptions that the presence of Syrians has increased crime in Turkish cities. (Reuters 03/12/2014, Al Monitor 07/11/2014, Displacement Research and Action Network 03/11/2014, McClatchy 18/12/2014) The 3RP also highlights these issues, saying that, while evidence is limited, it appears Syrians have had a major effect on the overall economy of southeastern Anatolia, where the greatest number of urban refugees is concentrated. The area was already economically disadvantaged, and according to some reports, salaries have dropped to 1/5 of pre-crisis levels, while the cost of some goods has risen by 50%. (3RP 2015-2016)

According to one report, recent surveys within Turkey show that 70% of the local population disapproves of providing aid to Syrians, almost two-thirds believe the Syrians to be responsible for disruptions of law and order, and a majority supports a more restrictive refugee policy. The reliability of these surveys could not be verified. (The Turkey Analyst 17/12/2014)


## 2.4. IRAQ

### Displaced

Syrians registered and awaiting registration (as of Dec 31)	233,625
% living in formal camps	39%
% living in informal settlements/sub-standard accommodation	Unknown
PRS	Unknown
Iraqi returnees	Unknown
Estimated returns to Syria	5,500

Sources: UNHCR dashboard 31/12/2014, 3RP 2015

### SYRIAN REFUGEES PER GOVERNORATE



#### Sources:

IDP Numbers: IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix 09/12/2014

Total population: Iraq HNO 25/09/2014

Refugees: UNCHR Dashboard

**'More than 2 million Iraqis have been internally displaced as direct and indirect consequences of IS offensives'**

**233,625**  
Syrians registered and awaiting registration

**5,500**  
Estimated returns to Syria

#### 2.4.1. Context

At the start of 2014, the humanitarian situation in Iraq severely deteriorated as a result of offensives by the Islamic State (IS) in Anbar governorate. In June, the humanitarian situation further degraded, with IS taking control of additional areas in five governorates. Between January and the start of December 2014, more than 2 million Iraqis had been internally displaced as direct and indirect consequences of IS offensives and counter-offensives led by the Iraqi Armed Forces, Kurdish Peshmerga, and irregular armed groups. As the scope of the RAS includes only the Syria crisis, this chapter will focus on the situation of the Syrian refugees who have been displaced into Iraq, while noting issues connected to the larger Iraq-wide crisis to the extent that it affects Syrians or the communities hosting them.

#### 2.4.2. Key Issues

During Q4, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), which hosts 96% of the Syrian refugees, has seen an influx of more than 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). This adds to previous flows: as of 9 December, an estimated 830,000 Iraq IDPs resided in the KR-I. (IOM 03/10/2014, IOM 09/12/2014) Most are living with host families or renting apartments, and although information is limited, it can be assumed that because of the increased demand for public services, refugees in urban areas and host-communities face more difficulties accessing services such as education and health care, and greater competition for jobs and housing. (KRG 22/12/2014)

Between 25 September and 15 December, almost 24,000 Syrian refugees from Ain Al Arab/Kobani crossed into the KR-I—equivalent to the number of new arrivals in the preceding six months. The new arrivals are particularly vulnerable, with multiple displacements in and outside of Syria having drained their already limited financial resources. Apart from the most recent influx, border closures have prevented major refugee influxes since August 2014. (See below, 'Displacement', p. 30)


Al Obaidi camp in Anbar remains inaccessible to international humanitarian organisations since its takeover by IS in June. Although some support is provided through local organisations, there are large concerns over the humanitarian and protection status of those residing in the camp. (WFP 30/10/2014, WFP 01/09/2014)

Routine immunisation programmes in conflict-affected areas of Iraq and Syria have been severely disrupted. The large-scale population displacements increase the risk of outbreaks of infectious diseases, and incidence of measles, diarrhoea and Hepatitis A has increased since the onset of the crisis. (See 'Health', p. 32)

Both the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and Government of Iraq (GoI) face severe budget constraints, which have limited resilience and service delivery. On 15 November, the two reached agreement on a long-standing dispute over oil revenues, which has allowed the payment of state salaries in KR-I after a long hiatus, somewhat easing the economic crisis in KR-I. (See 'Security and Political Developments', p. 28)

Also, on 18 December, the Strategic Response Plan for 2015 was launched, requesting almost USD 500 million to support 250,000 refugees in 2015. (See 'Security and Political Developments', 28)

#### IDP AND REFUGEE POPULATION KRI Q4



Source: UNHCR dashboard, IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix

The overall Syrian refugee crisis in Iraq is of small scale compared to the ongoing conflict and resulting displacement flows within Iraq itself. More than 2 million IDPs and millions of residents in conflict-affected areas face life-threatening shortages in water, shelter and health care.

#### 2.4.3. Possible Developments

Without a change in KRG policies or the security situation, the total number of Syrians in the country is unlikely to increase significantly in Q1. However, further displacement from central Iraq into the KR-I is likely, particularly from Ninewa, where an offensive led by Kurdish forces with the objective to isolate the IS-held city of Mosul has started. (Al Jazeera 2014/12/21, NYT 09/12/2014) Winter weather patterns that disrupt coalition air strikes may benefit IS and its affiliates, and allow further offensives in Anbar, Diyala and Ninewa, also leading to displacement. (OCHA 24/10/2014)

### 'The overall Syrian refugee crisis in Iraq is of small scale compared to the ongoing conflict and resulting displacement flows within Iraq itself'

Syrian refugees in Iraq are expected to feel some increased hardship as a result of serious winter conditions, decreased livelihoods, and public services heavily impacted by the IDP crisis. However, much more severe impacts are possible, given the volatile conflict situation in the rest of the country. Fighting in Mosul, in particular, would be expected to lead to massive displacement; a change in control of the city, though unlikely, would lead to large scale return, and a major refocus of humanitarian operations toward the city.

In the scenario of a further large influx of either IDPs or, much less likely, Syrian refugees, the humanitarian community will face significant difficulties responding, as the current crisis has overwhelmed national and international response resources.

A measles outbreak is of immediate concern, with recent large-scale outbreaks in 2008, 2010 and 2014. Outbreaks of other infectious diseases are possible, but appear less likely.

The recent rapprochement between KRG and the GoI has been the first step to resolving a decade-long budget dispute, mainly around oil revenues. However, in the upcoming months the details of the agreement need to be formalised. Any breakdown in the talks will have immediate implications on KRG's financial resources and, by extension, on its capacity to respond to the refugee and IDP crisis and its ability to finance public services.

#### 2.4.4. Security and political developments





On 19 November, a rare suicide bombing struck a government office in the KR-I capital of Erbil, killing between 4-10 people, and injuring dozens. IS claimed responsibility for the attack, which led to increased scrutiny of IDPs, especially Sunni Arabs, at KR-I borders, but appeared to have little effect on the overall security situation. (AFP 19/11/2014, Rudaw 20/11/2014, HRW 21/11/2014, AFP 20/11/2014, 27/11/2014 Niqash, OCHA 28/11/2014)

The security situation in Iraq as a whole is beyond the scope of this report, but it has implications for more than 2,000 registered Syrian refugees residing in Kirkuk, Baghdad and Ninewa, where they are subject to widespread insecurity, with heavy fighting in Kirkuk and Ninewa during Q4, and regular bomb attacks in and around Baghdad. Increasing prices for basic goods are also an issue in these areas. (UNHCR 30/11/2014)

Global declining oil prices, the costs of military operations, and IS control of strategic resources such as wheat and oil have led to a corrosion of the Gol's financial resources. Although Iraq is a middle-income country, the recent request by the government to defer USD 4.6 billion in reparations to Kuwait illustrates the volatile financial situation. A further contraction of resources will impact service delivery, the Public Distribution System and the Gol's capacity to provide support. (Reuters 18/12/2014)

On 15 November, the KRG and Gol reached agreement on a long-standing dispute over oil revenues. Under this agreement, covering oil sale and Federal Budget payments to the KRG, public sector employees in KR-I will start receiving salaries again. The delayed approval of Federal Budget payments severely impacted the refugee crisis, as important investments in socio-economic infrastructure were put on hold and public sector salaries remained unpaid. (NYT 13/11/2014, 3RP 2015-2016)

#### FUNDING REQUESTED FOR REFUGEES AND RESILIENCE 2014/2015

	RRP6 (December 2013)	3RP (December 2014)	
		Refugees	Resilience
 <b>Refugees</b> projected by the end of the year	400,000	250,000	—
 <b>Host communities</b> direct beneficiaries	—	—	48,000
 <b>Funding requirements</b>	USD <b>552</b> million	USD <b>318</b> million	USD <b>108</b> million
 <b>USD per capita</b>	1,380	1,272	2,250

Sources: 3RP 2015-2016, RRP6

On 18 December, the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) for Iraq was launched, requesting USD 318 million for humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in 2015, and an additional USD 108 million to develop resilience among host communities affected by the influx. The new plan significantly reduces the estimates of how many new refugees will arrive in Iraq: the 2014 plan predicted there would be 400,000 by the end of the year, while the 2015 plan predicts an increase of only 15,000 individuals in the next 12 months because of border restrictions. However, a contingency plan for an influx of additional 35,000 refugees is currently under preparation. The appeal also includes an increased focus on social cohesion and resilience, acknowledging the protracted nature of the crisis and its impact on Iraqi communities. (RRP6 2014-2015, 3RP 2015-2016)

#### 2.4.5. Operational Constraints

The main access constraint affecting the Syrian refugee crisis in Iraq is the security situation in Anbar, where the border town of Al Qaim was taken over by IS in June 2014, severely curtailing access to the estimated 3,000 Syrian refugees who live there, and almost 1,000 in the nearby Al Obaidi camp. It is not clear how many refugees still reside in the area because of a lack of information on the ground. Although humanitarian actors are able to provide support to the camp through local partners, and report distributing to about 1,300 people, monitoring of the needs and expansion of the response is limited. (WFP 30/10/2014, WFP 01/09/2014, 3RP 2015, UNHCR 15/01/2015)

**'There is still a lack of comprehensive information on the current needs of refugees in urban settings, where at least 60% of the refugees are hosted'**

Since the declaration of an L3 emergency on 12 August 2014, the coordination structure facilitating the response to IDPs has been based on the structures used earlier for the refugee response. However, in practice, the coordination structure facilitating the response to IDPs and refugees has been largely disjointed, with differences in funding mechanisms and separate projects. Several organisations are currently advocating to programme based on needs instead of status, particularly in non-camp areas where the refugee and IDP needs are similar. (IRIN 14/11/2014) The current review of the coordination system is expected to provide more clarity on possible overlap and ambiguity within the existing structure.

According to information needs surveys, not all refugees are aware of how to receive assistances and services when needed, which impacts beneficiaries' access to aid. (REACH 15/10/2014)

WFP's Iraq operating was not affected by the region-wide interruption of food assistance in early December, but blockades in the food supply chain led to delays in food provision to Gawilan, Darashakran, Arbat, Kawergosk, Al Obaidi, Basirma and Qushtapa camps. (Food Security Cluster 29/10/2014, Food Security Cluster 10/12/2014, WFP 25/11/2014)

Regulations on relief provision to non-camp refugee populations vary between governorates in the KR-I. Although there is currently more space to provide aid to non-camp refugees than at the start of the year, when existing policies almost completely blocked support to urban refugees in Erbil, the unpredictability of regulations frustrates longer-term planning. (3RP 2015-2016)

#### 2.4.6. Research and Publications Q4

The following assessment results have become available during Q4:

- UNICEF, Joint WASH Assessment among 1,300 Syrian refugee households living in nine camps in Dahuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. The data for this assessment was collected in February 2014. Owing to the large-scale response, deterioration of the general situation in Iraq, and influx of Ain Al Arab/Kobani refugees in the last ten months, most of the data is likely outdated. (UNICEF 09/10/2014)
- REACH, Mass Communication Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Camps. Data collection took place from 1-18 June and covered eight refugee camps and transit sites. This assessment supports earlier assessments on information needs, with the main requests

for information relating to access to services and refugee rights and status. (MS 01/08/2014, REACH 15/10/2014)

- At least two assessments were undertaken to gauge the winterisation needs of those displaced, including refugees. NRC undertook a small-scale assessment in Erbil from 15-29 September, comprising 71 household surveys of refugees and IDPs in urban, non-camp settings. Tearfund undertook an analysis of markets in Semel District, Dahuk Governorate, and their capacity to meet the demand for winterised non-food items. (TearFund 01/09/2014, NRC 23/10/2014)
- Two assessments on the situation of Syrian refugees with disabilities have been produced during the reporting period:
  - REACH, Syrian Refugees with Disabilities Living in Camps in Northern Iraq. Assessed more than 500 Syrian refugee households in camps, and conducted KI interviews. Data collected in December 2013. (REACH 10/11/2014)
  - DRC/Handicap International Rapid Needs Assessment, Situation of people with disabilities in 4 camps in Erbil– Kawergosk, Darashakran, Qushtapa and Basirma, data collected in July 2014. (DRC/HI 04/12/2014)

Although the information collected related to service accessibility is likely to be outdated by now, the demography and type of disabilities remains relevant. However, the findings differ significantly between assessments. For instance REACH found 10% of disabilities of a visual nature, while Handicap International results indicate a visual disability in 50% of the cases. As assessment methodology and concepts used differ across assessments, it is difficult to compare results and explain discrepancies.

In addition, several rapid assessments among refugees arrived from Ain Al Arab/Kobani have become available. REACH for instance undertook an assessment of newly arrived Syrian refugees to Gawilan camp, highlighting urgent medical and food needs. (REACH 13/10/2014)

#### 2.4.7. Information Gaps

There is still a lack of comprehensive information on the current needs of refugees in urban settings, where at least 60% of the refugees are hosted. Although a multi-sector needs assessment (MSNA) of refugees was done at the start of the year by REACH, it can be assumed that these results are largely outdated since the marked change in context since April and May. (REACH 15/09/2014, REACH 17/09/2014) To address this issue, a follow-up MSNA is currently planned for camp and non-camp residents, to provide insights on the impact of the IDP influx on the humanitarian needs of refugees.

There is no or limited information available on the impact of the IDP and refugee crisis on host communities. A planned UNDP/REACH assessment among the Kurdistan host communities is expected to provide more information on the impact of the refugee and IDP influx.


#### 2.4.8. Displacement

**Entry restrictions:** Although the flow of Syrian refugees from Ain Al Arab/Kobani into Turkey stopped on 13 November, the influx of Syrians from Turkey into Iraq continues. Between 25 September and 31 December, over 26,000 Syrian refugees have crossed into the KR-I—equivalent to the number of new registrations in the preceding six months. The surge in arrivals followed the official opening of the Ibrahim Khalil crossing between KR-I and Turkey on 10 October. The new arrivals are particularly vulnerable, with multiple displacements in and outside of Syria having drained their already limited financial resources. The Simalka-Pesh Khabur informal crossing with Syria remained closed for new

### 'Practice suggests that the admission decisions are based on security considerations rather than respect for the principle of non-refoulement'

arrivals, however, some 200 individuals from Ain Al Arab/Kobani were admitted. New arrivals from Ain Al Arab/Kobani have been transferred to seven of the eight camps for Syrian refugees in KR-I: Akre, Gawilan, Darashakran, Basirma, Kawergosk, Qushtapa and Arbat. UNHCR reports that the majority of families have left the camps, preferring instead to reside in host communities. (UNHCR 31/12/2014, UNHCR 16/12/2014, UNHCR 15/12/2014, UNHCR 15/10/2014, WFP 25/11/2014, USAID 12/12/2014, UNHCR 15/10/2014, REACH 13/10/2014)

#### KOBANI INFLUX (15 SEP - 31 DEC)



Sources: UNHCR 31/12/2014, UNHCR 15/12/2014, UNHCR 30/11/2014, UNHCR 15/11/2014, UNHCR 31/10/2014, UNHCR 15/10/2014

Apart from the opening of the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing and, to a limited extent, Simalka-Pesh Khabur, Syrians have been unable to enter Iraq during the reporting period. Border crossings have remained closed. There are no consistent admission criteria and the practice suggests that the admission decisions are based on security considerations rather than respect for the principle of non-refoulement as part of international customary law. (3RP 2015-2016, Guardian 17/12/2014) It can be assumed that irregular crossings continue, for instance in Anbar, where IS has publicly renounced the existence of a border between Iraq and Syria. However, there is no information available on the scope and nature of the crossings. There is no evidence of people waiting on the Syrian side for an opportunity to cross, likely because borders have been mostly closed for more than a year, and no change is expected.

**Registered Refugees:** As of 30 November, there were some 80,000 Syrian refugee households registered in Iraq, comprising just under 234,000 individuals. This is an increase of 18,000 from the end of Q3, primarily due to the Ain Al Arab/Kobani influx. Al Hasakeh governorate in Syria, which borders the KR-I, remains the main area of origin for those registered (60%), followed by Aleppo (25%). (UNHCR 15/12/2014)

**Unregistered refugees:** The latest estimate of the size of the unregistered Syrian population stems from early 2014, when MSNA results indicated that 94% of urban refugee households are registered with UNHCR, and essentially 100% of camp refugees. The lowest rate found was in Erbil, where only 87% of urban refugees were registered. This assessment was undertaken before the most recent influx from Ain Al Arab/Kobani. (REACH 14/09/2014, UNHCR 15/12/2014)

**Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS):** Very little information is available about Palestinian refugees from Syria, but it is not likely they make up a population of notable size in Iraq. UNRWA's mandate does not cover Iraq and the UN Agency therefore does not have a presence in the country. (UNRWA, accessed on 29/12/2014)

**Syrian Refugee Returns:** In 2014, UNHCR recorded more than 33,000 Syrians who returned to Syria through the Simalka-Pesh Khabur crossing, almost 5,500 of them during Q4. (PI 07/01/2014)

## 2.4.9. Humanitarian Needs and Concerns

### 2.4.9.1. Protection

**Armed violence:** Several refugees from Al Obaidi camp were arrested by armed groups in Q4. After release, the refugees returned to Syria as instructed by the armed groups. UNHCR remains unable to access and monitor the protection needs of refugees in the camp. However, it can be assumed that all Syrians residing in the area are at risk of grave protection concerns, including kidnapping, extortion and restrictions in freedom of movement. (UNHCR 15/10/2014, OCHA 17/10/2014)

**Legal status, documentation and forced returns:** The lack of access to Kurdish and Iraqi territory remains a major concern, and individuals crossing irregularly continue to be arrested. UNHCR reports there has been a regular pattern of asylum seekers or refugees summoned and interrogated by officials, and eventually deported. With the deteriorating security situation, and increased suspicion of those crossing irregularly, this trend has become more apparent. (UNHCR 15/12/2014, 3RP 2015-2016)

While authorities in the KR-I governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah continue to issue residency cards, which grant access to work and freedom of movement, a number of refugees remain without residency papers. During an assessment in April/May, 89% of households assessed in Dahuk reported having at least one member with a residency card, versus 34% in Erbil and only 5% in Sulaymaniyah. Some residencies have expired, although this issue has been partly resolved in Dahuk, where the validity of residency cards was officially increased from six months to one year. Documentation is a prerequisite for obtaining residency permits. Refugee children, particularly those born shortly before their arrival to KR-I, do not always have the required papers. (UNHCR 15/12/2014)

New arrivals from Ain Al Arab/Kobani have to go through the same process to obtain residency cards as the other refugees. However, as most of the new arrivals choose to stay in urban areas, delays in processing the residency permit are likely, owing to limited capacity within the residency department.

Although in practice, access to public services does not appear to be dependent on the possession of a residency card, the fear of interaction with the authorities may affect access to justice for those without proper paperwork. (UNHCR 15/12/2014, REACH 01/09/2014, UNHCR 15/10/2014, UNHCR 20/11/2014)

**'89% of households assessed in Dahuk reported having at least one member with a residency card, versus 34% in Erbil and only 5% in Sulaymaniyah'**

A survey on information needs found that refugees are not always aware of their rights and status, which was highlighted by respondents as one of the main information needs. (REACH 15/10/2014)

**Early marriage and gender-based violence (GBV):** Although a difficult-to-assess issue, the protection sector reports that incidents of SGBV including early marriage, domestic violence, emotional abuse and other forms of sexual violence remain widespread. (3RP 2015-2016)

**Disability:** Two disability surveys highlight the specific vulnerabilities of households with a member with a disability. Handicap International found that families with a member having a disability are amongst the poorest, because of disability-related expenses. (Handicap International 01/08/2014) A REACH survey found that the households concerned face specific difficulties accessing healthcare. (REACH 10/11/2014)

### 2.4.9.2 Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL)

The April/May MSNA results suggest that prior to the IDP influx, most refugees were in stable situations, though some were still in need, and long-term vulnerabilities resulted from the spending of savings and incurring debt. Findings suggested that refugees in host communities are more vulnerable than those in camps. It can be assumed that the non-camp refugees have become more vulnerable since the assessment, with the IDP influx impacting access to livelihoods, basic commodities and aid. (REACH 15/09/2014, REACH 17/09/2014)

The brief WFP cuts in December did not affect Iraq, as urban refugees there are not eligible for WFP assistance, and camp refugees have generally been prioritised by WFP. However, food assistance budgets are also strained, and earlier in 2014 WFP Iraq had raised the possibility a change from vouchers to less-expensive, in-kind assistance, or introducing targeting. (PI 23/09/2014)

### 2.4.9.3. Health

**Access to health services:** The influx of IDPs and refugees continued to stretch health service delivery, and shortages of essential medicines occur frequently in public health facilities. Syrians in urban settings increasingly have to purchase medications in public or private pharmacies. (UNHCR 15/10/2014, WHO 10/11/2014)

In mid-November, WHO reported an increase of consultation rates/person/year in health facilities monitored through the Early Warning and Response Network (EWARN). The consultation rate increased to an average of 4.2, slightly above the expected range of 1 – 4 consultations/person/year. The increase is largely related to the influx of refugees from Ain Al Arab/Kobani who sought initial treatment in the camp health facilities, as well as an increase in upper respiratory infections with the onset of winter. (WHO 10/11/2014)

The shortage of various vaccines in Iraq is an ongoing issue for health actors. In addition, high turnover of trained health staff from health centres and services across the KR-I continues to affect the continuation and consistency of services available to Syrians. (UNICEF 12/12/2014)

**Disease incidence:** Acute respiratory infection (ARI) and acute diarrhoea (AD) remained the leading causes of morbidity. With the upcoming winter, the numbers of ARI and AD cases are likely to increase. (WHO 20/12/2014, WHO 30/11/2014)

Diseases incidence is tracked through the EWARN. However, this disease surveillance system covers only seven of nine refugee camps in KR-I and does not cover Syrian refugees in urban areas or those residing outside KR-I. As a result, this information tracks only about 40% of the Syrian refugee population. (WHO 30/11/2014, WHO 18/11/2014, WHO 09/11/2014) It can be assumed that, during the winter months, cases of ARI are also the main cause of morbidity among refugees not monitored under the EWARN. The MSNA indicated that access to water is not of concern for most refugees in urban areas. It is therefore likely that the incidence AD is lower outside of camps. However, without an expansion of disease monitoring to urban areas this cannot be confirmed.

An outbreak of Acute Jaundice Syndrome (AJS) was recorded by the EWARN on 23 October in IDP camp Baharka and later confirmed as a viral Hepatitis A outbreak. Hepatitis A can be transmitted through contaminated water or food. During Q4, cases of AJS have been reported from Basirma, Domiz, Gawilan and Darashakran refugee camps. (Health Cluster 09/11/2014, WHO 23/11/2014, WHO 09/11/2014, WHO 16/11/2014)

**Host communities:** Apart from the added burden to an already-stretched health care infrastructure, there is also the threat of the import of disease, particularly wild polio. The nearly four-year-long civil war in neighbouring Syria has prevented routine and effective vaccination coverage for many Syrians, particularly in the north of the country, from which the latest wave of refugees originates. (OCHA 24/10/2014)

### 2.4.9.4. WASH

Recent camp profiles indicated that access to water for those residing in the nine camps is above Sphere standards. (UNHCR Camp Profiles 15/12/2014) However, 40% of refugees in camps access water through boreholes, while the remainder receive water through trucking, a highly expensive method to deliver water. Expansion of the water infrastructure in camps is currently hampered by the rainy season. Heavy rains caused damage to WASH facilities at several camps at the start of November. (UNICEF 08/11/2014, UNHCR 12/11/2014) Flooding damaging tents and infrastructure is of concern


## 'Urban refugees receive lower levels of support, partly due to previous and existing restrictions on providing aid to Syrians outside of camps'

during the winter months. The KR-I is particularly prone to flooding because of the high clay content of its soil. (OCHA 24/10/2014)

There is no updated information on the WASH situation in urban areas. However, in April water and sanitation were not reported as primary needs by refugees and it can be assumed that the situation has not significantly changed. (REACH 14/09/2014)

### 2.4.9.5. Shelter/NFI

#### CAMP OCCUPANCY AND CAPACITY



Source: UNHCR 15/12/2014, Shelter Cluster 10/2014

**Shelter issues affecting Syrian refugees:** More than 90,000 refugees reside in nine refugee camps. Congestion of camps remains of concern. In Domiz camp, the number of residents exceeds official capacity by 30%, and the available space per person remains less than UNHCR standard. The recent influx from Ain Al Arab/ Kobani has pushed Basirma and Kawergosk camps to capacity. (UNHCR 15/12/2014, Shelter Cluster 10/2014) The majority of registered refugees (143,000) have settled among host communities. The MSNA found that the majority of non-camp refugees were renting accommodation. Shelter was the main need identified at the start of the year during this assessment, particularly rental support. It can be assumed that this remains a priority concern. (UNHCR 30/11/2014, REACH 01/09/2014, REACH 01/09/2014)



**Winterisation:** With night-time temperatures currently below zero in northern parts of Iraq, where almost all Syrian refugees are located, there is a continuing need for winterisation activities. Activities to support camp refugees are ongoing, in the form of distribution of winter kits and kerosene. (UNHCR 15/12/2014) However, urban refugees receive lower levels of support, partly due to previous and existing restrictions on providing aid to Syrians outside of camps. (MSNA 14/09/2014) A small-scale assessment among urban refugees and IDPs in Erbil found that Syrian respondents were, in general, in possession of many essential winter clothing and housing items such as blankets, curtains, carpets and stoves. However, the majority of interviewees expressed a desire for additional heaters, fuel, winter clothes and carpets. (NRC 23/10/2014) Despite advocacy by UN and humanitarian agencies, the government has not resumed its 2013 policy of providing subsidised kerosene. While the Gol has committed 12 million litres of kerosene to the IDPs in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk, refugees remain reliant on fuel provided through the market and relief distributions. (OCHA 20/11/2014, OCHA 03/11/2014, UNAMI 10/12/2014)

As colder weather continues across the KR-I, the risk of fires, especially in tented areas of refugee camps, is a concern. (UNICEF 12/12/2014)

The situation for IDPs is of greater concern, with an estimated 40% of IDPs residing in sub-standard shelter offering limited protection against the elements. In December, the KRG, in cooperation with the UN, launched Phase II of an immediate response plan to address the significant winterisation needs. This plan, which builds on Phase I launched in September, aims to provide almost 600,000 vulnerable IDPs with winter support. However, funding shortages hamper the required response. (UNHCR 30/11/2014, KRG/UN 23/12/2014)

#### 2.4.9.6. Education

The academic year in most governorates started on 22 October, after postponement from 15 September because of school use for IDP shelters. In Dahuk Governorate the beginning of the school year was postponed to 1 December, because of delays in relocating the over 100,000 IDPs residing in the 494 schools. (UNICEF 20/10/2014, OCHA 24/10/2014, UNAM/ICODHA 19/10/2014)

Although schools have now opened, refugee children continue to face difficulties accessing education. There is a shortage of Syrian teachers in both camp and non-camp schools and the lack of Arabic textbooks remains a challenge in the majority of the camps. The existing issues with teachers' contracts were resolved during the reporting period. On 18 December the KRG stated that it will be able to pay the salaries of over 600 refugee teachers, thereby retracting an earlier announcement that it will be unable to pay refugee teachers' salaries as of December without support from the Gol. (Education Cluster 10/2014, Education Cluster 12/2014, UNICEF 12/11/2014)


Access to education is of concern in all refugee camps, with recent camp profiles indicating that the proportion of school-aged children enrolled in schools ranges from 32% (in Gawilan camp) to 75% (Qushtapa camp). The main constraints are the lack of appropriate school level available for children and the requirement for older children to work. (UNHCR 14/12/2014, UNHCR 14/12/2014)

**'Access to education is of concern in all refugee camps, with recent camp profiles indicating that the proportion of school-aged children enrolled in schools ranges from 32% to 75%'**

**Host community:** The IDP and refugee influx has led to a marked increase in students – in Dahuk for instance, the studentaged population has increased by 50% (from 400,000 to 600,000). (OCHA 24/10/2014) An estimated 950,000 school children across the country have been affected by the increase in pressure on the education infrastructure. (UNICEF 12/11/2014, HNO 24/10/2014)

**Social cohesion:** Widespread social tensions are not expected between refugees and their host communities because of the strong kinship between Iraqi and Syrian Kurds. However, the continuing IDP influx and resulting pressure on economic resources and livelihood opportunities could result in smallscale localised tensions. Of greater concern is the relationship between host communities and IDPs, particularly as the high level of explicitly sectarian violence in the current conflict exacerbates Iraq's existing sectarian divisions.

#### % OF SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN ENROLLED IN SCHOOLS PER CAMP



Sources: UNHCR camp profiles 14/12/2014


## 2.5. EGYPT

### Displaced

Syrians registered and awaiting registration	138,212
% living in formal camps	None
% living in informal settlements/sub-standard accommodation	Unknown
Palestinian Refugees from Syria	4,000
Estimated returns to Syria	Unknown

Sources: 3RP 2015-2016, UNRWA 12/2014, UNHCR Dashboard

### Syrian Refugees per governorate




#### 2.5.1. Key Issues

Syrians' access to refuge in Egypt was extremely limited throughout 2014, and by Q4 it appeared new arrivals had almost completely ceased. Syrians continue to face limited protection space, and are subject to detention and deportation. Particularly vulnerable are Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS), Syrians without documentation or with forged documents, and Syrians attempting irregular migration to Europe. (See 'Displacement', p. 35, 'Protection', p. 35)

Faced with harsh living conditions in Egypt, large numbers of Syrians continue to attempt to make the costly and hazardous trip to Europe, which puts them at risk in Egypt, in addition to the risk of exploitation and misadventure on the voyage and the challenges faced on the other end. No reliable data is available on numbers, or whether they are increasing.

**'The major concern in 2015 will be a significant deterioration in refugees' livelihoods'**



#### 2.5.2. Possible Developments

The major concern in 2015 will be a significant deterioration in refugees' livelihoods, which would have consequences in multiple sectors. A lack of humanitarian funding in 2014 has caused significant cuts to assistance, including cuts to food assistance, cash assistance and medical services. In addition, inflation has been high, primarily due to state removal of subsidies. Both these trends are expected to continue in 2015. Very likely outcomes would include decreased food security, decreased shelter security, and greater risk of eviction for many refugees. This might also lead to greater competition with Egyptians for livelihoods, and increased community tensions. It is highly likely this will push more Syrians toward negative coping strategies, including irregular migration. The detention of refugees, particularly those who attempt to migrate to Europe, and deportation of vulnerable groups, will also remain major concerns.

#### 2.5.3. Operational Constraints

In November, a major assessment of Syrian refugee households by WFP, UNHCR and their partners was halted by the Government of Egypt (GoE), which requested that the agencies no longer conduct home visits, but carry out the assessment only on UNHCR premises. Syrian families are now being interviewed at UNHCR, but the results will be considerably delayed, and the methodology is being revised. A major obstacle will be that enumerators can no longer do visual assessments of the shelter/WASH/NFI conditions in refugee households. (WFP 25/11/2014, PI 11/10/2015)

Local and international NGOs operating in Egypt continue to face an uncertain situation. The existing NGO law, passed in 2002, is highly restrictive, giving the GoE wide latitude to shut down NGOs or block their funding, and the government has recently made gestures in the direction of greater enforcement. (OpenDemocracy 21/10/2014, Al Arabiya 10/11/2014) According to some NGOs, recent changes to the penal code also allow for the criminalisation of the work of foreign-funded organisations for vague reasons. (Al Ahram 23/09/2014, International Center for Non-Profit Law 25/11/2014, Al Arabiya 14/11/2014, The Nation 12/11/2013) Although there appear to have been no consequences to these changes so far, they have caused widespread worry among both local and international humanitarian actors. (Al Arabiya 14/11/2014, Daily News Egypt 24/11/2014, Daily News Egypt 22/12/2014) A new NGO law is currently under formulation by the government, and the latest drafts have not been made public, but a previous draft was also heavily criticized for allowing the government to dissolve organisations, control all aspects of their activities, restrict foreign funding, and impose prison sentences for infractions. (3RP 2015-2016, Middle East Eye 03/10/2014, HRW 27/07/2014, Reuters 22/10/2014)

The Syrian population is scattered widely across urban and suburban areas of Cairo, other Egyptian cities, and rural areas, which may pose a challenge for registration, outreach, and provision of services and assistance. (UNHCR 15/02/2014-1, UNHCR 15/02/2014-2, UNHCR 15/02/2014-3)

At the end of 2014, Egypt operations under RRP6 were roughly 45% funded, in line with individual funding available to other countries in the region: only Jordan received a significantly higher proportion, and Turkey and Iraq received significantly less. (RRP6 Funding Snapshot 12/12/2014) However, humanitarian agencies report significant operational impact from funding constraints, including the targeting of cash distributions from roughly 45% of the refugee population to only 23% over 2013, the reduction of WFP food voucher value from \$28/person/month to \$17/person/month, and the mainstreaming of health services into Egyptian public hospitals. (3RP 2015-2016, PI 11/01/2015)

#### 2.5.4. Research and Publications Q4

UNHCR and WFP began conducting a joint socio-economic assessment, in an attempt to better assess vulnerability and target aid by vulnerability rather than geography or social grouping. (3RP 2015-2016) The assessment was originally to be conducted at the household level, aiming at 100% coverage of Syrian households registered with UNHCR. (Inter-Agency Update 15/10/2014) The initial stage of the assessment, conducted by Save the Children International in September and early October, involved some 2,100 household interviews, surveying more than 10,000 people. (WFP 30/10/2014) However the assessment was delayed in response to GoE concerns. (See 'Operational Constraints', p. 34)

WFP also analysed market assessments to better understand spending patterns; however, full results do not appear to have been published. (WFP 30/09/2014)

#### 2.5.5. Information Gaps

There are notable information gaps on almost all topics related to the situation of Syrian refugees in Egypt. It is perhaps the most neglected country in the regional response, in part because it does not border Syria, although it also has the smallest caseload. Limited humanitarian funding, the difficulty of identifying and assessing vulnerable refugees in a challenging urban context, and GoE sensitivities regarding assessments all contribute to information gaps. In particular, there is a lack of regularly updated information on:

- The locations where Syrian refugees reside, particularly in remote areas,
- Refugees' access to basic services, including health, education, and protection,
- The number of those whose legal status has lapsed and the underlying reasons,
- The number denied entry, detained and/or deported,
- The number of unregistered refugees, and reasons for non- or de-registration, including the recent decline in the number of registered refugees,
- The numbers and intentions of refugees leaving Egypt, either in an irregular manner to attempt to gain asylum in Europe, to travel to other host countries, or to return to Syria.

#### 2.5.6. Displacement

**Entry restrictions:** The number of new arrivals dropped drastically after the GoE instituted visa requirements for Syrians in mid-2013, and continued to fall during 2014. Based on registration numbers, it appears new arrivals have now essentially stopped. UNHCR reports that GoE issues

## 'There are notable information gaps on almost all topics related to the situation of Syrian refugees in Egypt'

occasional visas for family reunification, but Syrians who arrive in Egypt without visas or with forged documents continue to face either prolonged detention or risk of deportation to third countries. (3RP 2015-2016)

**Registered refugees:** As of 31 December, UNHCR had registered just over 138,000 Syrians in Egypt. In Q4 2014, the number of registered refugees increased by fewer than 1,000, then, since the last week of November, fell by more than 2,100, the first noticeable decline since the start of the crisis. (UNHCR dashboard) UNHCR attributes the decline to an ongoing verification process of registered Syrians, to verify their continued physical presence in the country. The updated data and more accurate profiling will also improve the identification of vulnerable groups and ensure appropriate referrals. (PI 11/01/2015, UNHCR 30/10/2014, Inter-Agency Update 15/10/2014) By the end of December, 2014, almost 98,000 Syrian refugees had been iris-scanned and given biometric IDs. (PI 11/01/2015)

**Unregistered Refugees:** The GoE claims there are some 300,000 Syrian refugees in Egypt. (3RP 2015-2016)

**Palestinian Refugees from Syria:** UNRWA does not have a formal presence in Egypt, but maintains a small office which liaises on behalf of some 4,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) who have found their way there. (UNRWA 12/2014) The Palestinian Embassy also monitors PRS, and reports more than 6,800 in the country. (HRW 13/11/2013, Boston University 11/2014)

**Non-Syrian Refugees:** Syrians make up more than 60% of UNHCR's caseload of people of concern in Egypt; the remainder are coming from Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Iraq. (UNHCR, accessed 26/12/2014)

#### 2.5.7. Humanitarian Needs and Concerns

##### 2.5.7.1. Protection

**Legal status and documentation:** Since the fall of the government of former President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013, Syrians in Egypt have faced increasing problems with their legal status: Syrians require a visa to enter, those without one, or with forged documents, face prolonged detention or deportation. (3RP 2015-2016, Al Ahram 24/10/2014) PRS may be particularly vulnerable. (Amnesty 14/11/2014-1) Syrian refugees have been granted access to health and education services, but are not entitled to work without work permits, which are difficult to obtain, although they can open businesses with Egyptian partners. Regulations related to work permits are seldom enforced. (Boston University 11/2014, PI 11/01/2015)

**Curfews, detention:** In 2014, more than 1,400 Syrians in Egypt were arrested for attempting irregular migration to Europe by sea, including women and children. (*Inter-Agency Update 14/12/2014, UNICEF 12/12/2014*) UNHCR says most of those detained are released after 5-20 days, and have the opportunity to remain and obtain six-month residency permits; it may only be those with relatives in Egypt who have this option. (*Inter-Agency Update 14/12/2014, Inter-Agency Update 15/10/2014, 3RP 2015-2016*)

**Forced returns:** Amnesty International said in December it was aware of at least 150 Syrians who were deported to Lebanon or Turkey since the beginning of 2014, and at least two Syrian men deported to Syria. (*Amnesty 05/12/2014*) In November, Egyptian authorities were holding more than 70 refugees, including PRS, Syrians and Gazans, at imminent risk of deportation, after arriving in Egypt while trying to migrate from Turkey to Europe. (*Amnesty 14/11/2014-2, Amnesty 11/12/2014*)

### 2.5.7.2. Food Security and Livelihoods

Results from the initial stage of the UNHCR/WFP household survey indicated that Syrian families' main expenditure was rent, followed by food, education and health. Nearly 90% of those interviewed had received at least one type of assistance, the most common being food assistance, received by 65% of households. However, 16% also reported the use of negative coping strategies, most commonly, reducing essential non-food expenditures like education and health, followed by buying food on credit or borrowing money to purchase food, and spending savings. The most common long-term negative coping strategy, was for a family member to attempt irregular migration outside Egypt. (*3RP 2015-2016, Inter-Agency Update 15/10/2014, WFP 30/10/2014*)

A lack of funding also resulted in the threat of cuts to, or cancellation of, the WFP food assistance programme in Q4. (*Inter-Agency Update 20/10/2014*) WFP has decreased the number it plans to assist from 126,000 in mid-2014 to just under 90,000 in 2015, and has made small cuts in voucher values. (*3RP 2015-2016*) Despite this, in December, the brief, region-wide cuts to WFP assistance affected all beneficiaries in Egypt. Food aid was restored in December and January, but only to USD 17/person/month, 61% of its early 2014 value. It is unclear what will happen to this programme in 2015. (PI 11/01/2015) UNHCR also had to reduce the number of beneficiaries of cash assistance by nearly 50% between January-September 2014—from about 45% of the refugee population to only 23%. (*3RP 2015-2016*)

Inflation in Egypt has been high, particularly because government subsidies were removed in Q3, and is likely to continue to exert pressure on refugee livelihoods. (*UNCHR 30/10/2014-2, WFP 02/09/2014*) There are also reports that influxes of refugees have contributed to rising residential and commercial rents in certain areas, possibly causing major spikes in the areas of highest concentration. (*3RP 2015-2016*)

### 2.5.7.3. Health

The Ministry of Health currently grants free access to primary care for Syrians at state medical facilities; however, the large number of Syrians concentrated in certain areas has strained an already overstretched health care system. Syrians may face long waits, and secondary and tertiary care is expensive, and only available after prioritisation. (*3RP 2015-2016*) Additionally, Syrians are also scattered across 230 districts, meaning many face difficulties reaching available health services because of distance and associated cost. (*UNHCR 30/10/2014-4*) UN partners have been providing various health care services to supplement state efforts; however, in the end of Q3 and Q4, it began to phase

**'The Ministry of Health currently grants free access to primary care for Syrians at state medical facilities; however, the large number of Syrians concentrated in certain areas has strained an already overstretched health care system'**

out parallel services and mainstream care through existing state institutions, primarily because of a lack of UN funding. (*3RP 2015-2016, PI 11/01/2015*)

### 2.5.7.4. WASH

No information was available on the WASH situation in Q4. As Syrian refugees in Egypt are mostly living in rented apartments, it is unlikely to be an issue of primary concern. Overcrowding and substandard accommodation may pose health risks, but given the exclusion of WASH from the Egypt 3RP, the primary interventions are expected to be livelihoods-based. (*3RP 2015-2016*)

### 2.5.7.5. Shelter/NFI

Assessment results indicate cash for rent is the main priority of Syrian refugees in Egypt. (*3RP 2015-2016*)

### 2.5.7.6. Education

Since 2012, the Egyptian Ministry of Education (MoE) has offered Syrians the same access to public education as Egyptians. MoE figures from August 2014 say that approximately 35,000 Syrian students were registered in all grades for the academic year 2013-2014, and 10,912 are registered in universities. (*3RP 2015-2016*) This is roughly 83% of the more than 42,000 school-age refugee children UNHCR has registered in Egypt. (*UNICEF 12/12/2014*)

In practice, however, some problems remain, including overcrowded schools, distance and cost of transportation for refugees, harassment and discrimination. (Refugees particularly highlighted these problems for girls.) UNHCR reports refugees attempting to register their children have faced significant barriers, including lack of documentation, lack of space in schools, and waitlists. (*UNHCR 30/09/2014-5, 3RP 2015-2016*)

## BACKGROUND TO THE RAS

## Definitions humanitarian profile

## Affected

The number of affected refers to people affected by the violence in Syria. The number of affected can be divided in two groups: those non-displaced and those displaced.

## Non-Displaced

The non-displaced include all those within Syria that have been, directly or indirectly, affected by the conflict, including those who have been injured, have lost access to essential services, and those whose vulnerability has increased due to the impact of the unrest on livelihoods and access to essential services. (OCHA 05/06/2012)

In addition, this group includes the host community, the people who are part of a community or family receiving displaced people. Host families and communities are considered part of the humanitarian caseload because of the extra stress placed on their resources. As there is currently no information available on the needs of the host communities, these groups are currently excluded from this humanitarian profile.

## Displaced

**Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)** are those persons or groups of persons who are residing in Syria but who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict. (OCHA 2004)

**Refugees and Asylum Seekers** are those who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, are outside Syria, and are unable to, or owing to such fear, are unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country. (UN 1951)

For the purpose of this document, the category 'refugees' includes those registered, awaiting registration as well as those unregistered – despite the fact that unregistered Syrians are technically not refugees, as their refugee status has not been established. Within this group, the Iraqi and Palestinian refugees are in a particularly vulnerable position, both within Syria as outside.

**Others of Concern** - Persons who have been displaced by the emergency and form part of the humanitarian caseload, but do not fall into either of the above categories (e.g. migrants, returnees).

## Other definitions

In this report the term 'armed opposition groups' is used to refer to all armed groups and individuals engaged in armed conflict against the Government of Syria.

## Previous SNAP reports

Regional Analysis for Syria  
Thematic reports

January 2013 – October 2014

Aleppo Governorate Profile	April 2013
Legal Status of Individuals Fleeing Syria	June 2013
Impact of the Conflict on Syrian Economy and Livelihoods	July 2013
Syrian Border Crossings	September 2013
Assessment Lessons Learned	September 2013
Lebanon Baseline Data	October 2013
Cross-Border Movements of Goods	December 2013
Relief Actors in Syria	December 2013
Jordan Baseline Data	December 2013
Palestinians from Syria	February 2014
Idleb Governorate Profile	June 2014
Explosive Remnants of War	August 2014
The Onset of Winter	October 2014
Latest Scenarios	November 2014

All reports can be found on: <http://www.acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project>

## Map data sources

Administration: OCHA Common Operational Datasets. Syria IDP camps: U.S. Department of State HIU, SNAP. Syria IDP movements: WFP. Iraq IDP camps: UNHCR, REACH. Refugee camps: U.S. Department of State HIU. Informal tent settlements: inter-agency Lebanon, REACH/UNICEF. Refugees: UNHCR. Infrastructure: Global Energy Observatory, OCHA, WFP. Border crossings: SNAP.

## How to use the RAS

This report is divided into three sections:

- Part A-I focuses on the situation in Syria, first by outlining the issues on a country level and afterwards, in more depth, on a sectoral level.
- Part A-II outlines the humanitarian situation per governorate
- Part II covers the host countries Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Iraq, and discusses the main humanitarian issues related to the crisis.

The RAS is intended as a reference document and the different parts and components can be read separately, according to information needs. While those working in a host country or a specific governorate might only be interested in small parts of the report, individuals working on a regional level can benefit from reading all sections.

Disclaimer: Information provided is provisional as it has not been possible to independently verify field reports. As this report covers highly dynamic subject, utility of the information may decrease with time.

## How to quote this document

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