

GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

October 2020



INTRODUCTION

ACAPS *Global Risk Analysis* outlines a number of key contexts where a notable deterioration may occur within the next six months, leading to a spike in humanitarian needs

ACAPS analysts conduct daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150 countries, including risk analysis and risks analysis updates. ACAPS continues to monitor closely the risks identified in order to establish how they have evolved and if they have materialised. You can find the updates of the risks identified in Global Risk Report – March 2020 at the end of this analysis.

The objective is to enable humanitarian decision-makers to understand potential changes that could have humanitarian consequences. By exposing the possible developments and understanding their impact, these potential changes can be taken into account in planning and preparedness.

For the next six months, ACAPS has identified the following eight risks:

- High**
 - Lebanon/Syria
 - Haiti
 - Yemen
 - Sudan
- Medium**
 - Cameroon
 - Central African Republic
 - Lesotho
 - Venezuela
- Low**
 - Myanmar

WHAT IS A RISK?

Risk is a function of probability and impact. A risk is the probability of a hazard (or multiple hazards) occurring, combined with the estimated impact of the hazard(s). The risk level (Low, Medium, and High) posed by a hazard increases as either the probability that it will occur increases, the severity of the expected impact increases – or both.

Overall, the occurrence of a risk prompts a change from the status quo, which leads to a notable deterioration in the humanitarian situation and a higher number of people in need (exposure), or a higher severity of need (intensity).

The **ACAPS risk methodology** combines probability with impact for each hazard or combination of hazards. This gives us the risk. Risks will fall into one of three categories: Low, Medium, or High.

OBJECTIVE OF RISK ANALYSIS

The crises identified in this report have been selected because there are certain events or factors (triggers) that may emerge over the coming six months, which point towards a potential shift or change in the current situations of the monitored countries. Some risks are raised as ‘new trends’ while others as ‘rapid and marked deterioration’. A deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at the same rate is considered a trend, rather than a risk. The latter is not included in the report.



INTRODUCTION

KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS

Risk analysis requires a solid understanding of the context and an investigation of the interaction of the variables that could cause or resist change.

Risk analysis is not an exact science. An event identified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as expected, or not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers) that were expected to drive a shift or change in the current situation may not occur or new factors might arise, preventing the expected change or shift in the situation from happening.

The probability of a risk does not need to be high for it to be a concern. A hazardous event estimated to have a 50% probability of occurring should be a cause for concern for humanitarians. In some cases, a probability as low as 30% may be of concern.

LIMITATIONS

- Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises in this report, it has not been possible to cover each one in detail. Instead, we have highlighted the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential deteriorations and inform operational, strategic, and policy decision-makers.
- The focus on risk analysis means that we have not considered multiple possible factors that could lead to an improvement in a given context.
- We do not publish our full risk monitoring, but an edited version that we think is relevant for the humanitarian sector.
- In this report we have not given attention to unforeseen circumstances that may change the course of events, such as natural hazards and sudden onset events.
- Information gaps also limit the analysis.
- While efforts were made to ensure that all information was up to date at the time of publication, the fluidity of situations in some countries means that significant changes are often observed from one week to the next.

[Read more about our risk methodology](#)

OTHER FORWARD-LOOKING ANALYSIS FROM ACAPS

ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios, and anticipatory notes as part of our forward-looking analytical work. Some recent publications that complement this global analysis are:

- [Palestine anticipatory note](#)
- [Yemen scenarios](#)
- [Yemen risk report](#)
- [Venezuela risk report](#)
- [Colombia risk report](#)



GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS

OCTOBER 2020

Risk level

- High
- Medium
- Low

**The risks identified on this map are expected to materialise within the next six months.*

HAITI

An unusually active hurricane season leads to higher levels of food insecurity and humanitarian needs in a country with already limited national response capacity

LEBANON/SYRIA

The deepening socioeconomic crisis in Lebanon leads Syrian refugees to opt for unsafe return to Syria, increasing humanitarian needs

YEMEN

Continued depreciation of the Yemeni riyal drives inflation up, reducing households' purchasing power and access to basic needs

MYANMAR

Fighting between government forces and non-state armed groups continues amid scheduled elections and COVID-19, worsening humanitarian needs and disenfranchising parts of the population

CAMEROON

Rise in violent events targeting civilians, IDPs, and refugees in the Far North region results in increased displacement and protection needs

VENEZUELA

The reactivation of Colombia's economic activity leads to a large influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, who will face increased livelihood and protection needs aggravated by a rise in xenophobia

SUDAN

Severe economic deterioration leads to an inability of the State to cope with immense economic and food insecurity

CAR (Central African Republic)


Loss of state authority following contested elections leads to an increase in armed group activity and in the severity of humanitarian needs

LESOTHO

Reintroduction of COVID-19 mitigation measures results in decreased access to livelihoods and a deterioration in food security



HAITI



Risk level | High

An unusually active hurricane season leads to higher levels of food insecurity and humanitarian needs in a country with already limited national response capacity

RATIONALE

As of 27 October, the 2020 Atlantic hurricane season (1 June–30 November) had already produced 28 named storms – one of which reached Haiti – and three major hurricanes (OCHA 18/10/2020; CDP 26/10/2020). This is well above the yearly average of 12 storms (The Guardian 22/08/2020; NOAA 06/08/2020; NOAA 10/09/2020).


The latest strongest storm to hit Haiti was Hurricane Matthew (a Category 5 tropical hurricane) in October 2016, which left 2.1 million people affected and around 900,000 additional people in urgent need of food assistance (OCHA 02/2017). At least 20% of the country was affected, with extensive flooding and significant damage to infrastructure. In July 2017, 1.4 million of the 2.1 million people affected were still in need of humanitarian assistance (IFRC 10/05/2018). Since then, the recovery capacities of the country have not improved. If a similar event were to happen, there is a high probability that the humanitarian consequences could be severe in terms of food security and damages to core critical infrastructure (ShelterBox 10/09/2020).

Haiti has a total population of 10.9 million. More than

6 million Haitians live below the poverty line (US\$2.41 a day), and 5.1 million are in need of humanitarian assistance (OCHA 09/01/2020; OCHA 03/06/2020). Food insecurity is already a main concern in Haiti; 42% of the population (4 million people) face high acute food insecurity and are in need of urgent action. 3.1 million are classified as facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) levels of food insecurity and 900,000 Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels (IPC 04/09/2020; FEWS NET 16/09/2020).

COVID-19 containment measures implemented between March and June 2020 aggravated the country's long-term economic deterioration, which is characterised by increasing unemployment, currency devaluation, and increased price inflation, which limit people's access to food and essential goods (UN 19/06/2020; FEWS NET 16/09/2020; IOM 04/10/2020).



Food insecurity and humanitarian needs are also likely to be aggravated by an increase in armed gangs, which are operating with impunity and targeting poor neighbourhoods. The current president has been ruling by decree since Haiti's elections were delayed in 2019. This has led to a constitutional and political crisis, social unrest, and a sharp rise in insecurity (Al Jazeera 04/09/2020; The Haitian Times 04/09/2020; France24 15/09/2020).




PROBABILITY



IMPACT





IMPACT

The overall capacity of the country to respond to current humanitarian needs is insufficient. The COVID-19 pandemic and containment measures have intensified these needs (ShelterBox 10/09/2020). Remote locations, poor infrastructure, limited logistics, and increased insecurity also limit aid distribution.

Haiti's healthcare system is experiencing disruptions as a result of COVID-19. There has been a reduction in available services, including reproductive healthcare and routine immunisation (OCHA 31/08/2020). There is a high possibility of a collapse of the health system, which was already weak before COVID-19 and which is unable to cope with the current pandemic. There may also be a possible additional crisis – particularly in the Sud department, which was previously hit by similar events.

The risk of water-borne disease outbreaks during the above-average hurricane season is high, because of the lack of basic healthcare and routine vaccinations during 2020. Shelter, NFIs, livelihoods, and education will also be some of the main needs of the affected population.

Floods, loss of crops, and disruptions in supply chains will likely see the number of people who are food insecure and in need of urgent assistance rising to more than half the population. Because of the country's economic decline, without greater international assistance it is unlikely the government will have the financial resources to properly support the population with safety net programmes and to finance imports (OCHA 31/08/2020; CEPR 27/03/2020).

Recent levels of insecurity could hamper humanitarian access, while COVID-19 and containment measures could make it more challenging for response teams to reach hurricane-hit areas.



LEBANON / SYRIA



Risk level | High

The deepening socioeconomic crisis in Lebanon leads Syrian refugees to opt for unsafe return to Syria, increasing humanitarian needs

RATIONALE

The Lebanese economic crisis – which started in 2017 – has caused many Syrian refugees to lose their jobs. Since October 2019, the Lebanese lira (LBP) has lost over 80% of its value and inflation has exceeded 100%, impacting food prices and other basic goods. The situation has deteriorated further with the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the explosion in Beirut, which destroyed or partially destroyed residential and business areas and Lebanon’s key commercial port (ESCWA 19/08/2020; Business Insider 15/07/2020; WFP 06/2020; Reuters 26/08/2020; SNHR 09/09/2020). In Lebanon it is difficult for Syrians to obtain residence permits, limiting their access to services, jobs, and housing. In July 2020, the Ministry of Social Affairs outlined possible plans to organise the return of Syrian refugees (Al Jazeera 24/08/2020; Arab News 18/07/2020; FDD 04/08/2020).

These developments are forcing some Syrian refugees to view returning to Syria as a viable option. It is expected that at least 5%¹ of Syrian refugees will return in the next six months. Syria still faces protracted conflict and large-scale internal displacement, and has weak or non-existent infrastructure and social services; over 50% of social infrastructure is not operational. A lack of security as a result of the conflict remains widespread across the country (SACD 12/07/2020; USAID 02/07/2020; UNHCR 16/06/2020; SNHR 09/09/2020; IPA 29/09/2020).

Syria has been facing an economic crisis since October 2019 – partly impacted by the Lebanese crisis, which is causing lower remittance flows into Syria. Many Syrians have kept their savings in Lebanese banks, where their value has eroded drastically as a result of the depreciation of the LBP. The economy in Syria also deteriorated with the intensification of sanctions (WFP 07/2020; WFP 08/2020; AP 12/06/2020; Asharq Al-Awsat 10/01/2020; MEI 28/08/2020).


IMPACT

As more Syrians return – both forcibly and voluntarily – the severity of humanitarian needs will significantly increase, including food security, access to essential services, housing, and protection.


Syrians must cross the borders with a valid passport – which costs between US\$300–800 per person – and must exchange US\$100 to Syrian pounds at the official rate in order to enter the country; both are unaffordable to most of the impoverished Syrians in Lebanon. Syrian refugees will likely be refused entry at the border if unable to fulfil these requirements, and will resort to taking dangerous smuggling routes or being stranded at the borders with increased protection, housing, and NFI needs (The New Arab 10/07/2020; SNHR 09/07/2020; The New Arab 18/09/2019; VOA 16/06/2020).

1. This figure is derived from a survey of 3,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon – conducted by Stanford’s Immigration Policy Lab between August and October 2019 – which found that 5% of respondents intended to return to Syria within one year. Given that the survey was conducted at the start of the economic downturn in Lebanon and before the economic repercussions of COVID-19 and the Beirut port explosion, it is expected that at least 5% of the total Syrian refugee population in Lebanon (1,500,000 people) would opt to return. The estimate takes into account the new approved plan by the Ministry of Social Affairs in Lebanon, which would push more Syrians to return.

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



Returnees are at risk of arrest, extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and conscription, kidnappings, and gender-based violence. Since the beginning of 2020, at least 62 Syrians returning from Lebanon have been arrested or forcibly disappeared. The active conflict puts returnees in danger and may force them to flee their homes, becoming new IDPs in Syria (SNHR 09/09/2020; The Washington Post 02/06/2019).

Many Syrians do not have or have lost their civil documentation, limiting their access to essential services, legal rights, and housing, land, and property. With land and property often taken away by the government, many returnees will have no home to return to (EASO 04/2020; InfoMigrants 17/02/2020; HRW 23/09/2020; SNHR 15/08/2019).

Returnees – already the most economically vulnerable – will face another economic crisis in Syria. Scarce economic opportunities will force more households to adopt negative coping mechanisms. Severe fuel and bread shortages will continue to impact the displaced population and host communities (UN 29/06/2020; SAWA 02/2019).




LEBANON / SYRIA



● Risk level | High

Chain of plausability:



SUDAN



Risk level | High

Severe economic deterioration leads to an inability of the State to cope with immense economic and food insecurity

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

Sudan has been in an economic crisis since 2018 (ACAPS 14/02/2019). Continuing violence, disease outbreaks, and fluctuating food security have created a baseline of serious vulnerability. 9.3 million people (23% of the total population) were projected to be food insecure during 2020 (OCHA 01/2020) – even before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and related impacts, and the second wave of the regional desert locust outbreak (FAO 26/10/2020). In July, the IPC increased this number to 9.6 million people facing food insecurity, 65% more than the same period in 2019 and the highest hunger levels ever recorded in Sudan (IPC 07/2020). This estimate did not take into account the impact of severe countrywide flooding between July and September 2020, which affected 875,000 people (OCHA 28/10/2020). The combination of these factors has placed increasing economic pressure on Sudan and put it at high risk of acute food insecurity at unprecedented levels in the coming six months (Radio Dabanga 06/08/2020).

The annual agricultural output in 2020 was 5.1 million metric tons, a 36% decrease from 2019 (FEWS Net 28/02/2020). The overall

inflation rate rose from 114% in May to 212% by September 2020, affecting staples such as bread and sugar and preventing general access to food for poor households (Al Jazeera 14/10/2020). The inflation rate was also driven by the impacts of flooding that destroyed 2.2 million hectares of cultivated land; 108,000 heads of livestock and 1.1 million metric tons of grain were lost. On 5 September, Sudan declared a national state of emergency because of the floods and on 10 September declared an economic state of emergency (Al Jazeera 11/09/2020). These signal that the national government does not have the capacity to manage the crisis without international aid. The US Government is still making its final decision as to whether Sudan remains on its list of 'state sponsors of terrorism'. While on this list, Sudan does not have the right to any loans from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, limiting its access to external structural aid (Al Jazeera 11/09/2020). The Sudanese transitional government is at risk of being unable to provide adequate humanitarian assistance to the increasing numbers of its people who are food insecure.



SUDAN



● Risk level | High


IMPACT

Almost a quarter of the total population is already food insecure. Dire levels of food insecurity could extend to more than a quarter of the population within the next six months, as a result of flood damages, COVID-19 and related measures, violence, and the desert locust outbreak (yet to reach its peak). The impact of these combined factors goes beyond a lack of adequate nutrition and could result in the disruption of all aspects of regular functioning of society.

Rising water levels and consequent landslides have blocked roads and are impeding effective aid delivery to those in need. Sudan imports 50% more than it exports. The currency reserves that are usually used to pay for wheat imports are reaching depletion (*Financial Times 27/09/2020*). Combined with a national shortage of basic foods, the Sudanese state is not able to offset this through revenue from imports.

The countrywide floods have polluted clean water sources, and more than 30,000 collapsed latrines have interrupted sewage and drainage systems (*OCHA 1/10/2020*). This could increase the spread of diseases, ranging from seasonal and waterborne ones such as malaria, dengue, and chikungunya, to vaccine-derived polio which can be spread through infected faeces. Although these diseases are rampant in Sudan, the extent and severity of the flooding hugely increases the potential spread of infection (*OCHA 06/10/2020*). Measures put in place to prevent the rapid onset of COVID-19 have also interrupted vaccination campaigns and continue to limit the reach of humanitarian aid.

Chain of plausability:



YEMEN



Risk level | High

Continued depreciation of the Yemeni riyal drives inflation up, reducing households' purchasing power and access to basic needs

RATIONALE

Foreign currency is of vital importance to the Yemeni economy, as the country imports around 90% of food and fuel requirements (Oxfam 04/12/2017). All main inflows of foreign currency in Yemen have been hit hard by the conflict, and by the global oil prices crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Earnings from Yemen oil exports have halved because of the fall in global oil prices and interrupted exports. A Saudi deposit of US\$2.2 billion in March 2018 to cover letters of credit² for staple food imports is nearly depleted and no additional funding has been confirmed. Humanitarian funding has been severely reduced and major aid programmes scaled down or suspended (UN HC Yemen 23/09/2020; OCHA 07/10/2020); remittances have fallen largely as a result of the effect of COVID-19 on the earnings of Yemenis abroad (World Bank 06/2020). These all combine to reduce the total inflow of foreign currency (IPC 22/07/2020). The internal economic warfare enabled by a divided monetary system has driven a divergence of exchange rates – currently a 15% difference – in areas controlled by the two main parties to the conflict. The exchange rate has remained fairly stable in

Ansar Allah territories at an average of 600 Yemeni Riyal (YER) to the USD since April 2020, while it spiraled from less than 700 YER to over 800 between April and October in areas under the internationally recognised Government of Yemen (IRG) (Sana'a Center 09/09/2020; CCY 11/10/2020). In mid-September the YER reached an all-time low.

Importers are resorting to more expensive formal and informal sources to obtain foreign currency, as usual sources are shrinking. Increased demand for foreign currency will further weaken the YER in both systems. Currency speculation will also destabilise the exchange rate. Reduced foreign currency, increased economic warfare, and increased currency speculation will result in a continued depreciation of the YER, possibly reaching a record of 1,000 YER per 1 USD by the end of 2020 in IRG areas, leading to uncontrolled inflation (Debiefer 04/09/2020).


IMPACT

Food and basic commodity prices continue to increase, in line with the inflation of the YER and at different rates based on the difference in the exchange rate between the north and south.

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



2. Letters of Credit are a document issued by a bank that guarantees a seller or exporter that the trader will pay the cost of imported goods by a specified date; otherwise, the bank will pay the amount due. Letters of Credit, or foreign reserves (FX) credit lines ease cash flow problems and are necessary for the import of basic goods.



YEMEN




In August, the average price of the monthly food basket stood at 39,375 YER – 30% higher than in August 2019 and surpassing the 2018 crisis level by 15% (REACH 05/10/2020).

State and business salaries in the north mostly go unpaid, mainly because of economic warfare, and the severe liquidity shortage is worsened by the continued ban on new YER banknotes. In IRG-controlled areas, erratic payment of civil servant salaries could continue, financed by the issuance of additional YER banknotes that would drive further currency depreciation and inflation (Sana'a Center 21/01/2020).

Reduced income and increased prices will reduce households' purchasing power, pushing more people under the poverty line and unable to afford basic goods. The additional financial stress could increase the adoption of negative coping mechanisms including food rationing, child labour, child marriage, crime, illegal migration, and families sending their children to fighting fronts. Any significant deterioration of living conditions would lead to mass demonstrations that weaken the IRG's credibility which, in turn, may lead to renewed conflict in the south, as either the Southern Transitional Council or Houthis seek to exploit this weakness.

High inflation compounded by the funding shortfall will reduce humanitarian operations even more in a time of rising needs and high dependency on food aid.

Exchange rate YER/USD in Aden and Sana'a: Aug 2019-Aug 2020



CAMEROON



Risk level | Medium

Rise in violent events targeting civilians, IDPs, and refugees in the Far North region results in increased displacement and protection needs

PROBABILITY



IMPACT




RATIONALE

Boko Haram’s activity in the Lake Chad Basin was at its peak in 2014–2015 and declined afterwards (ICG 06/04/2016). Since 2019, an increase in violent events by Boko Haram and other armed groups, such as attacks, killings, and kidnappings, has been observed in the area, including in the Far North region of Cameroon (Africa Center for Strategic Studies 18/01/2020; Africa News 05/08/2020; UNHCR 04/08/2020; OCHA 07/2020). A total of 28 violent events against civilians were reported in the Far North region in the second quarter of 2019, and have gradually increased – reaching a peak of 67 events in the first quarter of 2020 (ACLED accessed on 07/10/2020). The increased frequency of violent attacks targeting civilians and IDP populations is expected to continue. Between 1 August and 14 September 2020, three deadly attacks were carried out in different IDP camps or villages hosting IDPs. At least 32 people were killed and over 40 wounded (INGOs call 24/09/2020; UNHCR 02/09/2020; Crisis24 02/09/2020). In the first half of 2020, violent events triggered around 21,000 new displacements, especially in the Mayo-Sava department, which borders Nigeria (IDMC 09/2020).

Over 4.7 million people live in the Far North region – 1.2 million of whom are in urgent need of humanitarian aid, especially

Numbers of violent events against the civilian population in the Far North region



CAMEROON



● Risk level | Medium

healthcare and mental health assistance (OCHA 27/03/2020; OCHA 06/2020). As of 30 September 2020, over 114,000 refugees, almost 322,000 IDPs, and more than 123,000 returnees were hosted in the region (UNHCR 07/10/2020). This population is particularly in need of protection, and lacks access to health and nutrition assistance (OCHA 27/03/2020). 60% of the refugees and 64% of the IDPs and IDP returnees are minors (UNHCR 17/09/2020). Child protection and access to education are key priorities. Insecurity impacts livelihoods and increases the need for food assistance, especially for IDPs, refugees, and returnees. 690,000 people are estimated to be food insecure from April–December 2020, taking into consideration the impact of COVID-19 (OCHA 06/2020).

Combined factors contributing to the rise in violent attacks against civilians in the Far North region are the porous border between Nigeria and Cameroon, a lower presence of security forces in both the Far North region and the Nigerian northeast states where Boko Haram is based, and the decreased effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force operations as a result of disjointed planning and funding issues (ICG 07/07/2020).


IMPACT

The increase of violent events targeting civilian and displaced populations will lead to a surge in population movements, including secondary displacements, and an increase in the number of refugees and IDPs needing shelter, food, water, and non-food items (NFIs). Population movements will put additional pressure on already scarce natural and financial resources. As the majority of the displaced population are minors, child protection needs will intensify, with a particular focus on gender-based violence for girls and protection from forced recruitment for boys (OCHA 06/2020). Violent attacks will also increase food insecurity and worsen malnutrition – because of the consequences of displacement on people's livelihoods, access to land, and job opportunities.

Humanitarian access in the Far North region is already very limited. Insecurity and violence impact people's freedom of movement, including humanitarian actors' (OCHA 06/2020). The increase in violence by Boko Haram militants will worsen the situation, both in terms of humanitarian workers accessing the affected population and people in need accessing humanitarian aid. The population will likely be further isolated from services and assistance. Cameroon is experiencing an additional security crisis in the Southwest and Northwest anglophone regions, which limits the humanitarian and national response to the Boko Haram crisis.



CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)




Risk level | Medium

Loss of state authority following contested elections leads to an increase in armed group activity and in the severity of humanitarian needs

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE


CAR is currently experiencing a complex crisis, largely as a result of protracted conflict between government forces and a variety of armed groups since 2013. The state does not have full authority over the nation's territory and maintains ambiguous relationships with armed groups (IFRI 04/2020). Legislative and presidential elections are scheduled for 27 December 2020, with a potential second round (if a majority is not reached in the first round) on 14 February 2021 (Jeune Afrique 20/06/2019). Voter registration has been slower than expected because of insecurity and the COVID-19 pandemic, which has forced parliament to quickly vote on a new election law extending the deadline for voter enrolment until 16 October (RFI 24/09/2020). President Touadéra recently failed to secure an amendment to the Constitution authorising presidents to remain in power in case of force majeure; the Constitution forbids the president from staying in power beyond the end of their term (currently 29 March 2021). As a result, postponed elections constitute a reason for a potential constitutional crisis, which would further destabilise the country.

The various armed groups are rumoured to have split their support between presidential candidates, although there has been no public confirmation of this (Corbeau News 02/09/2020). Voter registration has been temporarily halted in some localities because of armed group activity – for example in Ngaoundaye town, where armed group Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R) clashed with peacekeepers from UN peacekeeping mission MINUSCA when enrolment officials arrived in the town (Crisis24 01/10/2020).

While the politics and tactics of the various armed groups are complex and hard to predict, the overall political situation in CAR is unstable and highly vulnerable to the influence of senior politicians. It is very possible that incomplete voter registration will provide grounds for either postponing or contesting the elections and lead to a constitutional crisis or political impasse, with senior politicians – and possibly foreign interests – encouraging armed groups to intervene. Such actions risk significantly increasing the level of conflict and derailing the peace process.



CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)




● Risk level | Medium

IMPACT

In the event of a spike in armed group activity and increased insecurity, more people will be displaced. A large portion of the population – who mainly rely on agricultural and mining activities – will lose access to land and their source of income. As their livelihoods are affected, they will likely face more severe needs, further relying on humanitarian assistance or resorting to negative coping mechanisms. Food markets will also be disrupted, generating increased food security needs (IPC 10/2020). A rise in violence by armed groups also risks fuelling other forms of violence, such as land conflicts between farmers and herders – further disrupting food production and increasing needs in other sectors.

An attack on MINUSCA forces by 3R on 13 July was the first recorded use of anti-tank mines or landmines in CAR (Journal de Bangui 21/07/2020). A potential increased use of landmines by armed groups will fully cut off certain areas, particularly 3R-controlled regions in the north-west. Coupled with general insecurity, physical constraints, and COVID-19 restrictions, this will further hamper humanitarian access. Insecurity has already led OCHA to recommending the temporary suspension of humanitarian activities in certain localities, most recently in the north-west (OCHA 02/10/2020). Since armed groups earn part of their income from controlling roads and demanding payments from its users, expanded armed group activity would lead to more restrictions on the free movement of humanitarians in areas beyond the government's reach (IFRI 04/2020).



LESOTHO



Risk level | Medium

Reintroduction of COVID-19 mitigation measures results in decreased access to livelihoods and a deterioration in food security

RATIONALE

Over 90% of consumer goods and services in Lesotho come from South Africa, which is also an important labour market for Lesotho citizens – 420,000 migrants from Lesotho work in South Africa. Almost 10,000 more people are employed annually in South African farms as seasonal workers (IPC 08/2020).

Both Lesotho and South Africa implemented a lockdown from the end of March to May 2020 and closed the border to mitigate the COVID-19 impact (Crisis24 31/03/2020; Crisis24 23/03/2020). Household income for both workers in Lesotho and migrant workers in South Africa has decreased because of movement restrictions and businesses closures. Although border closures have not blocked the flow of goods between the two countries, only formal traders have been allowed to operate (IPC 08/2020). Hygiene control measures for traders, lower working capacity, and having to obtain special permits have resulted in disruptions in supply chains and an increase in staple food prices (FEWS NET 08/2020; FEWS NET 06/2020). COVID-19 has also impacted remittances: annual contributions have reduced from 35% to 15%, leading to additional household income losses. 17% of households in Lesotho depend on remittances as their main source of income (IPC 08/2020).

The number of COVID-19 cases in Lesotho is low (around 1,900), but South Africa is the worst-affected country in the continent with 715,868 cases and 18,968 deaths as of 26 October (WHO 26/10/2020). A significant increase in COVID-19 cases in Lesotho and South Africa will likely result in the reintroduction of mitigation measures, including movement restrictions. The South African Government is implementing a COVID-19 response strategy consisting of five levels of emergency (Republic of South Africa 2020). Since 20 September, the country has been in the lowest level of emergency. International movements are partially allowed with a negative COVID-19 test certificate (Crisis24 01/10/2020; Government of Lesotho 29/09/2020). Since October 2020, South Africa seems to have experienced a rise in cases (BBC 15/10/2020; Reuters 21/10/2020). The five-step strategy allows the reintroduction of border closures.

40% (582,000 people) of the population assessed in all regions of Lesotho is expected to face Crisis (IPC 3) and Emergency (IPC 4) levels of food insecurity between October 2020 and March 2021 (IPC 08/2020; FAO 10/07/2020).

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



LESOTHO



● Risk level | Medium


IMPACT

Closing the border between Lesotho and South Africa would cause additional price rises for food and other basic goods, if supply chains are disrupted. Given that the annual agricultural production in Lesotho has declined since 2017 – resulting in a dependency on imported staple foods from South Africa – households' access to food is expected to further deteriorate (IPC 08/2020).

A second lockdown risks affecting access to livelihoods, causing further income losses. The lockdown imposed in South Africa in April led to the return of an estimated 93,000 migrant workers to Lesotho after losing their jobs (IPC 08/2020). Over 300,000 more workers from Lesotho in South Africa will be at risk of losing their jobs as a rise in COVID-19 cases impacts the country. Remittances will decrease further. Additional loss of income for households, both in urban and rural areas, will aggravate food insecurity, resulting in more than half of the population experiencing acute food insecurity.

The Government of Lesotho launched an economic mitigation plan of US\$8 million to respond to the first wave of COVID-19 (FAO 10/07/2020; FEWS NET 08/2020). The Lesotho economy was already decelerating prior to the pandemic; because of the impact of COVID-19, the GDP growth rate was projected at -5.1% in 2020/21 (IPC 08/2020). Lack of financial resources means the government will likely not be able to address the economic impacts of an additional rise in COVID-19 cases.

COVID-19 cases for Lesotho and South Africa and containment measures (log scale)



VENEZUELA



Risk level | Medium

The reactivation of Colombia's economic activity leads to a large influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, who will face increased livelihood and protection needs aggravated by a rise in xenophobia

RATIONALE

Colombia hosts around 1.8 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants. Many of these are part of the informal economy and lost their livelihoods because of COVID-19 containment measures. Colombia's economy has been particularly affected by COVID-19, experiencing a 7.1% GDP loss since March and an increase in the unemployment rate of 6% from August 2019 to August 2020 (El Espectador 21/09/2020; DANE 01/09/2020). This pushed many vulnerable Venezuelans into poverty, food insecurity, and increased evictions (because of being unable to pay rent).

Because of the situation in Colombia and other countries in the region, over 120,000 Venezuelans have returned to Venezuela since March 2020 (OCHA 12/10/2020; Government of Colombia 06/08/2020).

In Venezuela, challenges in accessing basic services and goods, food insecurity, and the risk of political persecution remain. The situation has been further aggravated by the pandemic. As a result, it is estimated that in the next five months 200,000 to 250,000 Venezuelans will try to reach Colombia, as Colombia's economy has re-opened following the easing of COVID-19-related restrictions (El Tiempo 18/09/2020; RCN 15/10/2020). In July 2020, Colombia migration authorities estimated that 80% of those who

returned to Venezuela would possibly come back to Colombia and that every re-migrating person would be accompanied by a new migrant (RCN 06/07/2020). According to Colombian authorities, 300 Venezuelans are entering Colombia daily (Proyecto Migración Venezuela 20/10/2020). Since the Colombia-Venezuela border remains officially closed, Venezuelan refugees and migrants predominantly cross via irregular land and river border crossings. Those who enter irregularly and who lack a regular status in Colombia will highly likely face challenges in accessing protection and basic services, making them particularly vulnerable to the armed conflict in Colombia.

Since the beginning of the pandemic, xenophobia against Venezuelans has increased, as a result of rising economic and social tensions. The percentage of Colombians who hold negative opinions towards Venezuelan refugees and migrants jumped from 67% in February 2020 to 81% in April, but dropped again to 65% in June (El País 18/08/2020; Proyecto Migración Venezuela 29/05/2020).

IMPACT

Most of the Venezuelan refugees and migrants who will cross the border to Colombia in the coming months will use irregular

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



border crossings. This highly increases their exposure to conflict, armed groups, sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation, forced recruitment, forced labour, and human rights abuses. In Colombia, they will lack a regular status, preventing them from accessing basic services and exposing them to protection risks, including fear (real or imagined) of deportation, risk of labour exploitation, and inability to report crimes and abuses to the authorities. In particular, Venezuelan migrants and refugees who move through Colombia on foot (so-called *caminantes*) risk greater exposure to COVID-19, limited access to proper sanitation and hygiene, and lack of access to adequate shelter.

Once back in Colombia, it is likely that returning Venezuelan refugees and migrants will face higher levels of xenophobia and increased labour competition, which will make it more challenging for them to reintegrate into the labour market, diminishing their livelihoods. This is likely to result in higher poverty levels, lack of shelter, food insecurity, and lack of access to a diversified diet. Real or perceived competition over limited resources between Colombians and Venezuelans will probably lead to a rise in resentment among the Colombian population (TNH 13/02/2020).



MYANMAR



Risk level | Low

Fighting between government forces and non-state armed groups continues amid scheduled elections and COVID-19, worsening humanitarian needs and disenfranchising parts of the population

PROBABILITY



IMPACT



RATIONALE

A general election is set to take place in Myanmar on 8 November, amid the COVID-19 pandemic and despite continued fighting between several ethnic armed groups (EAOs), Tatmadaw government forces, and armed militias in Rakhine, Kachin, Chin, and Shan States (Al Jazeera 02/07/2020; ICG 28/08/2020; The Asia Foundation 07/2016). This has resulted in continued internal displacement, difficulty in accessing certain areas – particularly Rakhine State – and increased humanitarian needs across the four states (Frontier Myanmar 24/08/2020). The peace process, which began in 2016, and subsequent ceasefire agreements have lost momentum as state and non-state actors continue to use violence instead of a viable political solution (ICG 06/08/2019; USIP 04/2019).

Violence between Tatmadaw government forces, the Arakan Army (AA), and other armed groups has intensified since early 2019, and in March 2020 the government declared the AA a terrorist organisation, reducing the likelihood of a compromise in the near future (ICG 09/06/2020). Armed conflict has disrupted the electoral cycle, and certain areas are considered highly

insecure and inaccessible by the Union Electoral Commission (UEC). On 17 and 27 October, the UEC deemed 56 townships insecure and partially or totally cancelled elections in Kachin, Karen, Mon, Rakhine, Chin and Shan States and in Bago Division (Shan News 19/10/2020; Reuters 30/07/2020). Paletwa township in Chin State is not included, despite active conflict. In 2015, general elections were also cancelled in at least 500 villages across Rakhine, Shan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, and Mon States and the Bago Region, so the scale of the 2020 cancellations is particularly significant (Radio Free Asia 27/10/2015; Frontier Myanmar 24/08/2020).

Trust in the central government is already low, because of their handling of the COVID-19 pandemic and the setup of the 2008 Constitution – which guarantees the military 25% of parliamentary seats (Frontier Myanmar 27/07/2020). Cancelled elections and a lack of transparency by the UEC – considered an independent body – has fuelled anger, particularly among ethnic groups (Myanmar Times 23/10/2020). Fighting is likely to escalate as ethnic armed groups, particularly in Rakhine, Shan, and Kachin, attempt to represent these grievances and consolidate their control of their respective state.



MYANMAR




Risk level | Low

IMPACT

Rakhine State – particularly the centre and north – will continue to face the brunt of the fighting. The state has a population of over three million, and more than 200,000 people are displaced –126,000 of whom have been living in camp settings since 2012. The needs of people will become more severe as access will probably worsen (OCHA 12/2019). Rathedaung Township in Rakhine is likely to continue being on the front line of the conflict, which has repercussions on humanitarian access to IDP camps, including Zaydi Pyin camp, where there are existing food and shelter shortages (The Irrawaddy 31/08/2020). Food shortages are also an issue in other townships including Sittwe and Mrauk U Townships and Paletwa (Chin State), and are likely to worsen if the Tatmadaw uses a “four-cut” strategy to starve insurgents of food, funds, intelligence, and recruits. This will probably also increase the severity of people in need as they are indirectly affected by these cuts (Lowy Institute 04/09/2017; Myanmar Times 16/10/2020).

In northern Shan, clashes between the Tatmadaw and EAOs will likely cause more displacement (BNI 20/09/2020). While this may be temporary, there are already over 9,000 people currently displaced across the state who will probably be affected, increasing the need for fast response mechanisms (OCHA 12/2019). There are also major protection concerns as ethnic armed groups forcibly recruit children and young men in vulnerable situations. Major longer-term impacts on livelihood activities are also expected (BNI 04/09/2020).

Number of violent events since march 2020 for Rakhine, Chin, Shan and Kachin States



UPDATE FROM THE MARCH 2020 RISK ANALYSIS

The countries listed below refer to risks identified in ACAPS' March 2020 Global Risk Analysis. This section is a review of previous risks to show how these have evolved

BURKINA FASO ● High risk level

Increasing insecurity and displacement cause a deterioration of food security in the Central North, East, North, and Sahel regions.

Food insecurity in Burkina Faso has dramatically increased, from 1.2 million people facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) food insecurity levels or above in September–December 2019 to 1.6 million in January–May 2020 and reaching 3.28 million in June–August 2020. Soum and Oudalan provinces were classified as Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of food insecurity in June–August (Cadre Harmonise 08/10/2020). The increase was primarily driven by the secondary effects of COVID-19 restrictions as well as continued insecurity and displacement. COVID-19 mitigating measures resulted in a loss in purchasing power, a decrease in agropastoral production, and disruption to food markets for the population of Burkina Faso (FAO 23/07/2020). As of 8 September 2020, over one million people had been displaced as a result of violence in the country, up from 838,500 in March 2020 when our March risk analysis was published (UNHCR accessed 10/06/2020). Attacks on cattle markets have led to numerous closures and decreased sales, especially in the Est region (RFI 08/08/2020; Droit Libre TV 14/09/2020). Above-average rainfall between April and October is predicted to favour the upcoming September 2020 to January 2021 harvest; flooding has, however, affected over 71,000 people since April and destroyed over 250 metric tons of food stocks (FEWS NET 09/2020; CONASUR and OCHA 13/09/2020).

ETHIOPIA ● High risk level

The lead-up to elections intensifies preexisting ethnic and political divisions, triggering conflict and displacement

Federal elections (initially scheduled for 29 August) were identified as a potential point of eruption of conflict and resultant humanitarian issues. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic pushed Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to postpone the elections indefinitely (CGTN 11/06/2020). Violence that might have erupted because of elections instead arose because they did not occur. The Tigray region defied a national electoral ban and held its own elections on 9 September 2020, generating political tension with the central government. Subsequently, the national parliament voted to cut ties with the region (Al Jazeera 07/10/2020). Ethiopia's national parliament has now voted to hold the federal elections within 2020 after Health Minister Liya Kebede ruled that necessary precautions could be taken to make the process safe from COVID-19 (Anadolu Agency 18/09/2020), despite a rapid rise in the number of COVID-19 cases in early September (OCHA 18/09/2020). An election schedule has not yet been announced (CGTN 22/09/2020).



UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

COLOMBIA ● Medium risk level

Increased violence between armed groups leads to confinement, displacement and humanitarian needs in rural areas in Norte de Santander, Chocó and Nariño.

During 2020, Colombia has experienced increased insecurity and high levels of violence across the country because of an escalation of conflict between armed groups. This has resulted in deaths, forced displacement, confinement, and protection concerns related to the presence of anti-personnel mines. As of September 2020, 20,000 people had been displaced in mass displacements in Colombia – slightly below the 24,000 people displaced in mass displacement in the same time period in 2019 – 67% of whom were concentrated in the Pacific Corridor (Nariño, Chocó, and Cauca). Confinement has affected over 64,600 people in the first nine months of 2020, an increase from 16,900 affected people in the same time period in 2019. Catatumbo in Norte de Santander and Chocó are most affected. Confinements due to activity of armed groups worsen the exist-ing needs of communities as access to services and livelihoods activities is restricted. COVID-19 containment measures have further impacted humanitarian access. As of September 2020, 263 people had been killed in 66 massacres since the beginning of 2020; the highest number since 2014. As of July 2020, there was a 5% increase in the number of victims of anti-personnel mines. Humanitarian needs of the affected population currently exceed the institutional response capacities (OCHA 07/2020; ELC 25/09/2020; Indepaz 18/10/2020; OCHA 26/10/2020).

HONDURAS ● Medium risk level

Deteriorating drought conditions in the Dry Corridor lead to 24% of population in severe food insecurity and increased outward migration.

Below-average rainfall in Honduras since March has led to severe drought in seven departments, wildfires, scarcity of potable water in some cities, and below-average crop production (Infobae 01/10/2020; EFE 03/03/2020; Forbes 05/05/2020). The number of people who are food insecure has surpassed estimations and, as of August 2020, there were 1.65 million people experiencing high acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 and above) in Honduras. The number of people at the Crisis (IPC Phase 3) level rose to 1.3 million people, and to 350,000 at the Emergency (IPC Phase 4) level. Households throughout Honduras are not able to meet their needs without depleting essential livelihood assets and resorting to coping strategies. The main reason for this increase – besides the drought – are the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 contingency measures in Honduras have limited access to markets and cross-border trade. As a result, the country has experienced a loss of employment, low household income in both the formal and informal sectors, and an increase in the cost of the basic food basket. Families dependent on remittances have seen their family support decline. The reserves of locally produced basic grains were depleted before August 2020 (IPC 07/2020; FEWS NET 09/2020). Lockdown measures have also halted outward migration from Honduras.

INDIA ● Medium risk level

Additional government citizenship initiatives fuel intercommunal violence, embolden militancy in Kashmir, and lead to government oppression of Muslim communities, increasing protection concerns, access restrictions, and displacement.

Muslim communities across India continued facing protection issues during the period for which the risk was raised. There were a number of attacks and boycotts by the general population against the Muslim community in Delhi, Karnataka, Telangana, and Madhya Pradesh (The Guardian 13/04/2020). A domicile law, adopted in March in Kashmir, granted non-Kashmiris greater access to residency, jobs, and land. This caused anger among Muslim citizens who face lengthy administrative procedures to achieve domicile status (The Conversation 29/07/2020). Human rights violations by Indian forces persisted throughout the risk period (Al Jazeera 29/08/2020). Several organisations have since drawn attention to human rights abuses that took place during the Delhi riots in February (Amnesty International 29/09/2020). Since March, there has been a substantial increase in violence between Indian forces and armed militias in Kashmir (ACLEDD 05/10/2020). Because of major information gaps, partly as a result of an internet ban which is still in place, it is unclear whether there was displacement (Scroll 30/09/2020). With fighting now concentrated in the north of the region and along the Line of Actual Control, Kashmir remains unstable and it is unclear how this has affected access to healthcare, schooling, and livelihood activities.



LYBIA ● Medium risk level

The opening of a new frontline along the Abu Qurayn-Tawergha-Misrata main road leads to displacement and protection violations, while threatening the livelihoods of the population of the three centres.

Although Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) took the strategic coastal city of Sirte – 500km east of Tripoli – in January, the military victory did not translate into further territorial gains towards Tripoli city. As of October 2020, Misrata remained under the control of the Government of National Accord with no major offensive taking place. Since March, however, there has been increased mobilisation of forces, air strikes, and exchange of indirect fire along the front lines near Abu Qurayn and Washkah, south of Misrata and west of Sirte. The use of drones by both sides has increased, with the LAAF targeting areas east of Tripoli and Misrata. Drones were used in heavy fighting which took place throughout March around Abu Qurayn (400km to the east of Tripoli), though both sides claimed victory (MEMO 02/04/2020). Serious casualties were reported by both sides. During March and April, there were new displacements because of an increase in armed conflicts in western Libya. Abu Qurayn was one area that witnessed new displacements as a result of the substantial deterioration of the security situation. Sirte district recorded 12,925 IDPs in March–April 2020. Sporadic attacks on Abu Qurayn village are taking place to this day. No major displacement movement was reported in Tawergha or Misrata. Overall civilian casualties have risen, increasing protection needs, as a result of the escalation in hostilities throughout the country since March, especially in western Libya (Health Sector 06/2020; IOM 10/06/2020; UNSMIL 29/07/2020).

MYANMAR ● Medium risk level

Escalating conflict and government restrictions in Rakhine lead to deterioration of humanitarian conditions for Rohingya, especially in northern and central townships.

Since March 2020, conflict in the north of Myanmar has moved further south and directly impacted townships that were previously less affected by active conflict (Myebon, Ponnagyun, Minbya, and Sittwe townships). The number of security incidents in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine State, has increased, and routes via land and water have been blocked (The Irrawaddy 07/10/2020). Landmines and improvised explosive devices continued to affect civilians’ access to paddy fields, which has hindered the growing season and is likely to affect the harvesting season as well (CASS 22/07/2020). Throughout the risk period, several roads – including the Yangon-Sittwe highway – were affected by fighting which impacted access to people in need of humanitarian assistance (The Irrawaddy 20/04/2020). Flooding in Minbya, Myebon, Rathedaung, Buthidaung, and Mrauk-U townships damaged shelters, but it is unclear whether there was a rise in water-borne diseases (BNI 24/06/2020). Humanitarian access and provision of services decreased dramatically because of COVID-19 containment measures, which limited services to “essential assistance”, including food, health, water, and latrines (OCHA 05/2020; OCHA 05/10/2020). Several humanitarian organisations reported being “on hold” despite being ready for aid delivery (DRC 08/10/2020). Based on these events, the severity of people in need is likely to have worsened, but it is not clear to what extent. Persecution in Rakhine continues as evidenced by extrajudicial killings, including on 2 August. The Rohingya community continues to face limited access to healthcare, education, livelihoods, internet, and other basic rights (CASS 09/2020).



NIGERIA ● Medium risk level

Escalation of banditry in the northwest leading to increased protection, food security and displacement concerns.

As raised in ACAPS March 2020 Risk Report, there has been an escalation in banditry activity (village raids, kidnapping, and cattle rustling) in the northwest of Nigeria, impacting the humanitarian needs of people living in Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, and Niger States. Violent attacks and abductions committed by identity militias – which in most cases are groups that are locally identified as bandits – increased between the third quarter of 2019 and the third quarter of 2020 (ACLED 23/10/2020). At least 1,100 villagers were killed by bandits from January to June 2020 (Amnesty International 24/08/2020). During the first half of 2020, 7,900 more people were internally displaced in Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara States because of the conflict. Tens of thousands of people have crossed the border and sought shelter in the Maradi region of Niger (IDMC 09/2020). Food insecurity deteriorated in the northwest of Nigeria in the first half of 2020 and people in the worst-affected areas are in Stressed (IPC 2) and Crisis (IPC 3) levels of food insecurity (FEWS NET 02/2020; FEWS NET 06/2020; FEWS NET 08/2020). An additional threat to the security situation in the region is the expansion of Boko Haram activity to northwestern states. Boko Haram has already claimed responsibility for attacks in the northwest region in 2020, as a result of a lack of security capacity and the opportunity to build alliances with local banditry groups (ICG 18/05/2020; Institute for Security Studies 03/08/2020).

YEMEN ● Medium risk level

Renewed Houthi offensive in Marib intensifies, causing re-displacement southwards and severely reduced access to essential services.

Conflict around Marib between Ansar Allah and local tribes supported by the Internationally Recognised Government of Yemen and the Saudi-led coalition has been increasing since early 2020. This conflict intensified in August and September with the Houthis advancing in southern Marib through Al Mahliyah and Al Rahbah districts, confronting the local Murad tribe – one of the most cohesive and powerful in the governorate. The Houthis also advanced in the northwest, where they have managed to put military pressure on Meghdal and Raghwan districts. Any success in surrounding Marib city or its capture would likely give the Houthis full control of the north of Yemen, including access to strategic gas reserves and oil fields. The front could become stagnant, however, because of the strong defence from local tribes, resulting in very restricted freedom of movement and access to essential services (Sana'a Center 05/10/2020).

Over 29,000 people were displaced towards Marib city between 15 August and 24 September. Further escalation of fighting in districts bordering Marib city will drive additional displacement to Marib city, which is already home to 800,000 IDPs. The inflow will put further pressure on public services and infrastructure. People's vulnerability in Marib has increased following the impact of severe flooding in July, which destroyed hundreds of shelters and reduced access to livelihoods for thousands of people. Disrupted access to WASH services because of displacement and access concerns would increase the risk of diseases spreading, including cholera and COVID-19 (IOM 05/10/2020).



SEE THE CRISIS CHANGE THE OUTCOME

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